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**HISTORY**  
**OF THE**  
**CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE**  
**OF**  
**FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.**

**FORMING A SEQUEL TO**  
**"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."**

**BY**  
**M. A. THIERS,**  
**MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY AND OF THE INSTITUTE,**  
**&c., &c., &c.**

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## C O N T E N T S .

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### BOOK LIV.

	PAGE
RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS . . .	1

### BOOK LV.

GOVERNMENT OF LOUIS XVIII. . . .	121
----------------------------------	-----

### BOOK LVI.

CONGRESS OF VIENNA . . . .	247
----------------------------	-----



## BOOK LIV.

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### RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS.

LAST operations of the French, who remained scattered in different parts of Europe—Campaign of General Maison in Flanders, and defence of Antwerp by General Carnot—Surrender of Antwerp, and conditions of this surrender—The French troops begin to desert—Firmness of General Maison under a misfortune that threatens to leave France without an army—Long and memorable resistance of Marshal Davout at Hambourg—Conditions on which he surrenders, after having saved a numerous army and abundant war materials—Noble conduct of Prince Eugene in Italy—The French army led back from Italy by General Grenier—Events in the Pyrenees—The news from Paris having arrived too late to stop hostilities, the English and French fight for the last time—Sanguinary battle of Toulouse—Armistice on all the frontiers—Position of the Count d'Artois after his entrance into Paris—Debate as to the title under which he should provisionally govern the kingdom—The senate objects to recognise his rank of lieutenant-general, excepting on condition of a solemn pledge with respect to the constitution—Irritation of the Count d'Artois and his friends—The Duke d'Otranto devises a mode of proceeding which is adopted—The Senate repairs to the Tuileries, and invests the Count d'Artois with the lieutenant-generalship, at the conclusion of a declaration in which the Prince, becoming responsible for Louis XVIII., promises the adoption of the principal bases of the Senatorial Constitution—First acts of the Count d'Artois' administration—The provisional government becomes the prince's council—Constitution of the ministry—Despatch of envoys extraordinary into different parts of France—Sufferings of the occupied provinces, and contemplated alleviations—New quarters assigned to the French armies—The conscription of 1815 suspended—Financial measures of M. Louis—His firm resolution to pay all the debts of the state, to keep up the taxes, and especially the *droits réunis*—Rapidity with which public credit begins to be re-established under the combined influence of this minister and peace—Transient changes effected in our commercial tariffs—Sufferings of the occupied provinces continue to increase—A negotiation is hastily commenced to obtain the evacuation of the territory by the combined armies—The evacuation of the French provinces cannot be spoken of, without exciting a similar demand with regard to the foreign provinces occupied by our troops—It being impossible to refuse this reciprocity, it is agreed by the convention of the 23rd April, to evacuate Hambourg, Antwerp, Flushing, Berg-op-Zoom, Mons, Luxembourg, Mayence, and, in a word, the most important fortresses in Europe—The imprudence of this convention is not at first perceived, which



becomes soon a subject of bitter reproach—Rapid change which has taken place in the public mind since the entry of the Count d'Artois—The mass of the population, familiarised with the idea of the return of the Bourbons, soon submit to them unreservedly, but the transports of the royalist party irritate the revolutionists and the Bonapartists, and provoke sharp recriminations from both parties. The Count d'Artois commits certain acts of imprudence, which make his most enlightened friends anxious for the return of the king—Various messages despatched to Louis XVIII., and description he receives of the state of France—In consequence of being told that his adhesion to the constitution of the senate is not indispensable, he defers his decision, and advances slowly towards France—His sojourn at London—Enthusiasm that his presence excites among the English—Imprudent address, in which he declares that, next to God, he is most indebted to England—Disembarkation of Louis XVIII. at Calais—His journey through the northern departments, and his arrival at Compiègne—Warm attentions, of which he is the object, especially on the part of the marshals, to whom he gives the most flattering reception—Impatience testified to know his character—Character of Louis XVIII., and of the Count d'Artois, and remarkable difference between the two brothers—Interview of M. de Talleyrand with the king—Solicitude of the latter to avoid all pledges—Visit of the Emperor Alexander to Compiègne, and uselessness of his efforts to win attention for his advice—Louis XVIII. is not adverse to the idea of a constitution, even of a liberal one, but he wishes to give it himself, in order to maintain the principle of his authority—It is arranged that before entering Paris he shall pause at St. Ouen, and make a general declaration, confirmatory of that of the Count d'Artois, and framed in conformity with the bases of the senatorial constitution—Sojourn at St. Ouen, and declaration of St. Ouen, dated 2nd May, 1814—Entrance of Louis XVIII. into Paris, 3rd May—The Parisians give him the most cordial reception—Louis XVIII. seizes on the supreme power, and frames the royal council—First meeting of this council, in which all the public questions are slightly touched—General views concerning the army, the navy, the finances—M. Louis persists in his two principles, respect for the public debts, and support of the necessary taxes—Royal proclamation relative to the *droits réunis*—Adjournment of the question of conscription—Louis XVIII. shows a determination to re-establish the ancient military household, and even to increase it considerably—No member of the council dares resist this imprudent resolution—Fresh efforts to terminate the sufferings in the occupied provinces—It is now evident that the convention of the 23rd April, whilst depriving us of valuable pledges, has not advanced the departure of the allied armies by a single day—The allied sovereigns promise to give fresh orders to their armies, and Louis XVIII. issues a proclamation, commanding the local authorities to disobey the requisitions of the foreign generals—Anxiety to conclude peace—M. de Talleyrand receives a mission to negotiate—Fresh error resulting from precipitation, similar to that committed in signing the convention of the 23rd April—It would be better that the fate of France should be regulated at Vienna at the same time as that of the other powers, because there would be a diversity of opinions, and the French interests might find support—M. de Metternich believes on the contrary, that it is for the interest of the allied powers to treat immediately with France, and defer the solution of the European questions until the assembly of the general congress at Vienna—The royal government does not comprehend the profundity of these views, and impatient to claim the merit of making peace, is anxious to conclude it immediately—Adoption of the frontiers of 1790 laid down as an irrevocable principle—This frontier adopted with some additions—The Isle of France made an exception in the restitution of our colonies—Noble opposition of the king to every species of compensation for the expenses of the war—He succeeds, thanks to the firmness displayed by him and the government on this occasion—Preservation of the museums—Treaty of Paris of the 30th May, 1814—Whilst peace is being negotiated, the constitution is also discussed—The king does not wish to confide this task to the royal council, and undertakes it himself with MM. Montesquieu, Dambray, Ferrand, and Beugnot. His liberal views, attributable to his residence in England, but all subordinate to one condition, which is that the new constitu-

sion shall emanate exclusively from the royal authority—Various questions debated—Pliancy of the king on every point, when his favourite principle is conceded—The sketch of the constitution laid before two commissions, one chosen by the senate, the other by the legislative corps—The new constitution is called the “constitutional charter”—The foreign sovereigns, not wishing to leave Paris before the promises made at St. Ouen are fulfilled, the 4th June is fixed for the royal audience, when the charter is to be proclaimed—Royal audience of the 4th of June—Favourable results of this audience—Proclamation of the charter—Departure of the foreign sovereigns—Definite establishment of the Bourbon government.



HISTORY  
OF  
THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE  
OF  
FRANCE  
UNDER  
NAPOLEON.

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BOOK LIV.

RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS.

THE departure of Napoleon for the isle of Elba had delivered the Bourbons from the presence of a formidable enemy, who, though conquered, still alarmed the victorious powers. But although the monster—as the imperial government was called—was decapitated, the trunk remained, and its scattered fragments still agitated Europe by their convulsive throes. Various detachments of troops that had not yet received intelligence of what had occurred at Paris, or who refused to believe these accounts, were dispersed through Flanders, Holland, Westphalia, Italy, Dauphine, Languedoc, and Spain. The first care of the provisional government had been to despatch agents to inform these troops of the entrance of the allies into Paris, the abdication of Napoleon, and the re-establishment of the Bourbons on the throne of France. The replies were expected with a certain amount of anxiety, for the provisional

government would not have wished to command the siege of such places as Strasbourg, Mayence, Lille, Antwerp, Flushing, the Texel, Hambourg, Magdebourg, Wurzbourg, Palma-Nova, Venice, Mantua, Alessandria, Genoa, Lerida, Tortosa, &c., &c., nor would the allies like to be obliged to undertake such enterprises. Nor was it without considerable difficulty that the voice of reason could find its way to the hearts of the old soldiers that guarded these remote posts, and at whose head Napoleon had placed energetic commanders, devoted to his interest and that of France. Their last acts are worthy of a place in history, and clearly illustrate the position in which Napoleon left affairs, and in which the Bourbons found them. We shall give a rapid glance over these events.

The illustrious Carnot defended Antwerp, whilst the brave and talented General Maison occupied by his activity and courage the whole extent of country lying between Antwerp, Lille, and Valenciennes. It must not be forgotten how Carnot, who of his own will had stood aloof from the Empire and the Emperor, had, as soon as he saw our frontiers invaded, discerned, more by the impulses of his heart than the reasonings of his head, the danger that threatened the cause of the revolution and France, and wrote to Napoleon to offer him, as he said, his *sexagenary arm*, not as an aid, but as an example. Napoleon received, as it deserved, this patriotic offer, and confided to Carnot the task most suited to him, that of defending Antwerp—Antwerp the most magnificent creation of the empire, the depôt of our maritime riches, the bulwark of our Scheldt frontier. Carnot had established order in the fortress, inspired the garrison with a sentiment of the most absolute devotedness, and shown the enemy the impossibility of obtaining, otherwise than by a regular and protracted siege, this object of England's intense hatred. The besiegers might indeed avail themselves of the barbarous alternative of bombardment. Carnot, in concert with Admiral Missiessy, had made preparations for such an event. The *escadre* was covered with earth and dung, the magazines and the most exposed works were protected with blinds, and then, with heroic impassability, the besieged supported during several days a continuous shower of bombs and howitzers, taking care to extinguish instantly the flames that from time to time sprung up in different places. The besiegers, after having exhausted their ammunition, saw themselves reduced to a simple blockade, and Carnot having well victualled the garrison, proved unquestionably that his patience was as indomitable as his courage.

The active troops shut up in Antwerp in consequence of the movement of the invading armies, were a great loss to General Maison, who had only 6,000 men for the occupation



of Flanders. Amongst the troops shut up in Antwerp, there was a division of the Young Guard, consisting of 4,000 foot and some hundred horse, which would have been a great assistance in defending the frontier. Consequently, Carnot and Maison exerted themselves, the one to find the means of sending off these guards and the other to secure their safe passage through a host of enemies.

General Maison after having hastily thrown some dépôt battalions and some provisions into the fortresses of Berg-op-Zoom, Ostend, Dunkirk, Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Condé and Lille, hastened with from five to six thousand men from one of these fortresses to the other, relieving sometimes this, sometimes that, destroying from time to time vast detachments of the enemy, and by a series of ambushes giving occupation to the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, who with between forty and fifty thousand men had not succeeded in expelling us from the labyrinth of our fortresses.\* Whilst General Maison thus executed actual prodigies of daring and activity, several of our commanders won for themselves unfading laurels by resisting formidable attacks with a handful of men. General Bizanet, obliged to defend with 2,700 men the fortress of Berg-op-Zoom, which would have required a garrison of 12,000, was not able to prevent Graham's soldiers, who were favoured by a popular movement, from ascending the *escalade* and entering the city as victors. But undisturbed by this disaster, General Bizanet rushed upon the English columns, overthrew them one after the other, killed 1,500 and captured 2,500 men. The Prince of Saxe-Weimar, having made a similar attempt on Maubeuge, which was defended by Colonel Schouller, of the artillery, at the head of 1,000 national guards and custom house-officers, had seen his artillery dismounted, his soldiers repulsed, and his enterprize defeated in the most humiliating manner.

General Maison, who was seeking a means by which the Roguet division might safely join him, profited of the opportunity afforded by the failure of the attempt against Maubeuge, and advanced towards Antwerp amidst hosts of the enemy. Uniting the two infantry divisions, Barrois and Solignac, that were 6,000 strong, and the cavalry division of Castex consisting of 1,100 horse, he left Lille under pretext of going to aid Maubeuge, overthrew the detachments that occupied Courtray, feigned to pursue them in the direction of Oudenarde and

\* Napoleon, who had only learned the commencement of the campaign in Belgium, and who had only heard of the retreat from Brussels upon Lille, had often in his correspondence complained of General Maison. He would have spoken in a different tone, had he had time to appreciate fully this campaign, which at that period excited the admiration of the military world.

Brussels, when suddenly turning towards Ghent, which he captured, he took up a position before this city, awaiting the arrival of General Roguet, to whom he had sent intelligence of his approach. Carnot having received timely information, sent out of Antwerp the Roguet division, which joined General Maison at Ghent, increasing his numbers by nearly 5,000 men.

General Maison, now at the head of 12,000 men, saw numerous columns of the enemy abandon the blockade of the fortresses, to march against him; he especially noted the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, who was preparing to cut off his retreat with an army of 30,000 men. General Maison did not lose an instant, he marched straight through Thielmann's corps, of whom he killed or captured 1,200, and after an expedition of six continuous days, entered victoriously into Lille, at the head of a little army, all imbued with the spirit of their commander, and ready again to achieve such deeds as they had lately performed. It was whilst affairs were in this position that General Maison received intelligence of what had occurred at Paris, despatched officially by the provisional government. This general, an ancient aide-de-camp of Bernadotte, and an old soldier of the Rhenish army, was not strongly attached to Napoleon; but untainted by the spirit of intrigue, though endowed with great activity of mind and character, he was incapable of becoming the associate of plotters. Thus, though surrounded by Bernadotte's agents, he repulsed them, threatening to have them shot, if they renewed their propositions. But destiny having pronounced its decrees, he submitted, and informed his soldiers of the events that had occurred in France, whose consequences would be henceforth irresistible, and proposed to them to give in their adhesion. His generals unanimously adopted his opinion, but in the lower ranks of the army a general cry arose against the traitors, who, they said, had betrayed the capital. The soldiers could not be persuaded that Paris had succumbed to natural causes, or the mere events of war, and the report of a great treason, which was vaguely spread, tended to increase their unwise distrust. They were persuaded that France and Napoleon had been victims to the blackest treason. The old soldiers, through indignation, and the new, through want of discipline, mutinied, saying, it was better to abandon standards dishonoured by treason. The imprudent expression—"no more conscriptions," no more *droits réunis*, uttered by the Count d'Artois, had echoed to the remotest provinces, "Let us come away, let us return home," was the language heard from the lips of all the soldiers. In fact, hundreds quitted their standards within a few hours. General Maison understood perfectly well, that whatever

might be the government, an army would be always needed. He assembled his soldiers, who at first appeared to feel his energetic representations, but who soon began again to desert in numbers. He then assembled his officers and appealed to their patriotism. These yielded to his remonstrances, and in their turn appealing to the sub-officers and the veteran soldiers, succeeded in making an impression. In this way, a nucleus of faithful men was formed, and with their aid General Maison pointing his artillery at the principal gates of Lille, declared that he would pour a shower of grape on the first who attempted to desert. This vigorous demonstration awed the mutineers, and they returned to their duty. The Flemish army had lost about two thousand out of twelve thousand men, but the remainder were staunch and could be relied on.

General Maison's conduct on this occasion was called for by circumstances, for desertion was becoming contagious. Profiting of the anger of the veteran soldiers against those whom they called traitors, and endeavouring to increase in order to take advantage of it, the conscripts deserted in masses, saying they were no longer bound to the service, and in the end they enticed their veteran comrades, who began to feel longings after their native villages. In the great army that Napoleon had left at Fontainebleau, desertion had spread to a disastrous extent, and there was even danger that none but foreign soldiers might remain, which would be a deplorable condition in which to treat for peace. Many of the immediate partizans of the Count d'Artois looked upon the dispersion of the Imperial troops as a fortunate event, but the marshals pointed out the threatened danger of the extinction of a public force. Marmont, the principal author of this dispersion, wishing to make his zeal for the interests of the army serve as an excuse for his conduct, was one of the most active in representing the state of things to the government, and finally the Count d'Artois was induced to make a significant manifestation. He accordingly wrote a letter to General Maison, which was instantly published, thanking him for his noble conduct, and informing him that his services should be made known to Louis XVIII., and would be a claim on the esteem and confidence of his sovereign.

Whilst the Flemish army thus rallied round the new government, Carnot, whatever his dislike to the Bourbons, could not act otherwise than as a good citizen. He felt that he must submit to the law of necessity and accept the Bourbons, as their government was the sole remaining alternative. But the Bourbons being accepted and recognised, there still remained duties towards France, and though the gates of Antwerp had been opened to the envoys of the ancient



dynasty, that was no reason that the place should be delivered to the enemy. Bernadotte had informed Carnot of the events that had taken place at Paris, and endeavoured to induce him to give up Antwerp to the allies, but Carnot replied that these circumstances had not yet been sufficiently proved to induce the faithful commander of a besieged city to regard them as certain, and that, moreover, supposing them true, he would surrender the keys of the fortress confided to him only to the envoys of the King of France. Some days having elapsed, and all doubt having disappeared, Carnot informed the garrison of what had passed, made them assume the white cockade, and kept his gates still closed, waiting the orders of Louis XVIII.

Whilst the French generals established on the Scheld and Rhine pursued a line of conduct alike prudent and patriotic, an illustrious warrior distinguished himself in Westphalia, by persevering firmness in his endeavours to preserve intact the trust confided to him. We have not forgotten how Marshal Davout was besieged in Hambourg at the head of the *corps d'armée* that he commanded. Commissioned to subdue the rebellious provinces in the north of Germany, and to defend the line of the Elbe, he had not put into execution against any body the severities prescribed by Napoleon, but had contented himself with converting these penalties into *contributions de guerre*, and had sent to the main army lying before Dresden supplies in provisions and money, which had sufficed for its maintenance, and after the disastrous battle of Leipsic, not finding himself joined, either by the garrison of Dresden or by any other, he had taken up his position in Hambourg, determined to defend himself there against all the armies of Europe, and to save this important position, which would be a valuable object of compensation in the future negotiations of peace, an important bond with Denmark, and the dépôt of an immense war material, collected by France.

Shut up in Hambourg from the month of September, 1813, and, from the month of November cut off from all communication with France, Marshal Davout had remained immovable, determined to hold out as long as he should have soldiers, ammunition, and provisions. Towards the end of November, a communication, scarcely official, being couched partly in ordinary letters, and partly in cipher, commanded him to go to the assistance of Holland if he could, if not, to remain at Hambourg, to protect that place and engage the enemy as much as possible. All the roads leading to Holland and France being intercepted, he adopted the latter alternative.

The marshal had under his command nearly 40,000 men, who had become under his instructions excellent soldiers, but of

this number, seven or eight thousand were incapacitated by sickness. He had laid in large supplies of provisions and ammunition, and had by Napoleon's command, drawn round Hambourg, Harbourg, and the islands of the Elbe, a vast line of defence, consisting of earthworks, palisades, and hastily repaired bastions ; thus defended, less than a hundred thousand men, aided by skilful engineers, could not have dislodged him. Never shrinking from danger when it appeared, but never going to seek it, he had deferred until the place should be invested, the destruction of any buildings that might interfere with the defence ; he warned the inhabitants of the terrible struggle that was approaching, advised them to lay in provisions, and declared to them that every person unprovided with the means of subsistence, should be remorselessly expelled from Hambourg. The enemy having at length appeared, he got the houses that were condemned to be pulled down valued, and out of eighty thousand inhabitants, expelled twenty thousand, who had not laid in provisions. It is true that the poor people thus expelled need only pass the gates, when they would find themselves in Altona, a neutral city belonging to the Danes, but half hamburgian, where they would be sure of abundant assistance. The Marshal then commenced defensive operations, and in various combats killed between seven and eight thousand of Benningesen's soldiers ; a circumstance that put a period to these attacks. He passed the entire winter of 1813-14 in this manner, receiving no direct intelligence from the French Government, but many reports through the enemy, some false, others true and depressing, but Marshal Davout, regardless alike of both, determined to persevere in his resistance until all the armies of Europe should advance to overwhelm him.

Always severe, but upright and honest, he was determined to pay for the provisions he took, for the works he commanded, and the property he was compelled to destroy : the expenses thus incurred he defrayed from the *contributions de guerre*, to which Hambourg had been condemned for the rebellion of 1813. Being at the head of an active force, he might, like so many other commanders of besieged places, have refused to make compensation for the injury he caused in seizing provisions, pulling down houses, or raising levies of men. A few individuals would, under such circumstances, be obliged to support all the evils attendant on war. But it was repugnant to Marshal Davout's principles to lay upon some the burden that ought to be borne by all, and a fine having been levied the preceding year, he thought it more just to employ this money in indemnifying those whose property and services he employed for the public benefit. The Hamburgers had

refused, since the French reverses, to pay the imposed fine, and Marshal Davout now assembled the merchants, and informed them that he wanted funds to pay the services he required from the inhabitants, and if they did not furnish what he required, he would seize the specie in the Bank, upon which the bills for the payment of the *contribution de guerre* had been drawn. This declaration not having produced the desired effect, he kept his word, took the specie out of the Bank, and employed in the public service the thirteen millions of which he thus obtained possession, without converting a single centime to an obscure or equivocal use. He continued to hold his position with indomitable tenacity amidst the bullets of the enemy and the calumnies of the Hamburgers, who were loud in their vociferations against what they called the crimes of the French, forgetting the acts of the English in Portugal, where they burned the harvests, the trees, the houses, and forced the Portuguese under pain of death to burn them themselves.

In this formidable position of affairs, Marshal Davout attacked by the Russian and German armies, held out eight entire months, without receiving either commands from his sovereign or intelligence of his country. About the commencement of April, General Benningsen communicated to him through the instrumentality of the Danes, what had occurred at Paris, and summoned him to open the gates. The Marshal replied by quoting the decree relative to besieged places which forbids belief in reports circulated by the enemy, and added, that his sovereign might have experienced reverses, but that reverses did not absolve a man of honor from his duty. General Benningsen then commanded a fresh attack, which was executed in the name of the Bourbons, and under the white flag. The Marshal fired on the white as on the Russian standard, and repulsed the assailants after having experienced considerable loss. General Benningsen thus defeated, had again recourse to negotiations, still through the instrumentality of the Danes, our ancient allies. The Marshal did not refuse to listen, and offered to send General Delcambre to France, to learn authentic intelligence, promising to look on these accounts as true and act accordingly, if they proceeded from a French source. General Benningsen consented to this arrangement, on condition that one of the principal fortifications of Hambourg should be delivered to him. This the Marshal refused. At length an envoy, a member of his own family, having arrived, bearing official communications from the provisional government, he, on the 28th April, assembled his army, which still amounted to 30,000 men, well armed, well dressed, and loyally disposed, and announced to them the restoration of the Bourbons. He made them assume the white cockade,

and declared amidst universal applause, that he would never yield the fortress until he should receive an order from Louis XVIII. Marshal Davout by this memorable defence preserved for our negotiators, a valuable object of compensation, saved for France 30,000 men, an immense war *matériel* and the honour of the national standard. Calumnies circulated by interested persons through Europe, and especially through France, cannot dim the lustre of such services. Under any circumstances, it is the duty of the historian to record such events with impartial justice.

In Italy, Prince Eugene had valiantly opposed Marshal Bellegarde, and perseveringly refused propositions made by the allies through the King of Bavaria, his father-in-law. Napoleon, as we have seen, after having ordered him to bring back the army to France—an order which, had it been executed in time, might have changed the fate of the war—had unfortunately, after the successes of Montmirail, Champaubert, and Montereau, commanded him to remain in Italy, where the prince successfully maintained his position, until Murat attacked him in the rear. He then despatched the Maucune division to oppose the Neapolitans at the passage of the Po. The brave Maucune had, in fact, routed them whenever they appeared, either alone or supported by the Austrians, and still continued to keep them in check, when positive intelligence of the occurrences at Paris reached Milan. Prince Eugene immediately consented to negotiate with Marshal Bellegarde, and on the 16th of April signed an armistice on the following bases:—The French troops scattered through Italy were to return to France with the honours of war, bringing away their *matériel*. The Italian army under Prince Eugene was to remain on the Po, and continue to guard the fortresses until the allied powers should have decided the fate of Italy.

The armistice being signed, the noble-minded prince, who, owing to the extraordinary events of the times, had become a foreign prince without ceasing to be a French soldier, took a touching leave of the army from which he was about to be separated for ever, and received in return the most expressive testimonies of affection and regret. The French army then advanced towards the Alps under the orders of General Grenier, and were joined on the way by the garrisons that were evacuating the Italian fortresses; they experienced a patriotic sadness in leaving this country, where they had shed so much blood, acquired so much glory, and made so short-lived an impression.

At Genoa some thousand conscripts, under the orders of General Frezia, had disputed the possession of the place with



the English, and the Genoese themselves had foolishly hoped to recover their independence by rising against us. Obligated to yield, they too abandoned Italy, retreating along the foot of the Maritime Alps. In Dauphiné, Marshal Augereau, who had not been able to defend either Franche-Comté, or Lyons, nor his own dignity, had fallen back on the Isere, whilst General Marchand, after having made a much better defence at Geneva and Chambery, had retired to Grenoble. Intelligence of the capitulation of Paris, which had quickly reached this part of France, had caused a cessation of hostilities in virtue of a local armistice. But it was very different at the foot of the Pyrenees on account of the distance, and the forces engaged, and even after the roar of cannon had ceased elsewhere, a sanguinary battle marked in this region the last days of the war.

Marshal Suchet, as we have seen, had deprived himself of the best part of his army for the benefit of Augereau, who had not profitted of the advantage. With an army reduced to a few thousand men, he took up a position before Figuières, endeavouring to recover his Catalonian garrisons in exchange for Ferdinand VII., whom he offered to give up. Not having been able to induce the Spaniards to listen to his propositions, he had in the end set Ferdinand at liberty, by the express order of Napoleon, and had been obliged to trust for the faithful execution of the treaty of Valençay to the rather unreliable word of the new King of Spain, and the generosity of the Spaniards, whose feelings towards us were those of intense hatred. The Marshal afterwards returned to France, determined to join Marshal Soult, if circumstances afforded him time and means.

Marshal Soult, after the battle of Orthez—which, had he displayed a little more tenacity, might have been a victory—had retired to Toulouse, flattering himself that he could draw Lord Wellington thither, and so cover Bordeaux by a simple manœuvre. But Lord Wellington had no intention of pursuing an adversary, whom he was certain to overtake when he pleased; he therefore seized Bordeaux, opened that city to the Bourbons, and then set out in pursuit of Marshal Soult, returning for that purpose along the left bank of the Garonne.

The English general had 60,000 men, amongst whom were many Spaniards and Portuguese, animated by victory, and who, under the influence of example and success, were nearly as good as the English troops, though not resembling them in any particular. Marshal Soult's soldiers did not amount to more than 36,000, but all were tried men, and at this moment filled with truly patriotic ardour. Unfortunately, the

Marshal, depressed by recent events, had no longer confidence either in himself or his fortunes; he had fallen back on Toulouse, where he had scientifically fortified the position.

It was important in every sense, both military and political, to keep this city, which, like Bordeaux and Marseilles, exercised great moral influence in the south. It is situate, with the exception of the Saint Cyprien suburb, on the right bank of the Garonne, and in order to attack the city, the English General would have been obliged to cross before our eyes a deep and rapid river. Cautious in all his movements, with soldiers incompetent to make long marches, and burdened with an immense convoy of provisions, Lord Wellington would not have been able by the quickest manœuvres, to elude the vigilance of an adversary determined to prevent his crossing the Garonne. But Marshal Soult, placing his entire confidence in the position he had chosen round Toulouse, did not think of disputing the passage of the river that separated him from the English General, and left him free to traverse the banks above and below Toulouse to seek a position for throwing a bridge across. Lord Wellington carried his researches beyond the confluence of the Ariège and the Garonne, he even entered Cinte-Gabelle, whether that he hoped to find at this height an easier passage, or that he hoped by threatening the communications of Marshal Soult with Marshal Suchet, to induce the French to abandon their position. However this may be, Lord Wellington, thinking the risk too great at this distance, redescended the course of the Garonne, and resolved to cross below Toulouse, that is to say, at Granada.

On the 4th April, the day of Napoleon's first abdication, the English General succeeded, notwithstanding the rapidity of the current, in throwing a bridge of boats across near Granada, and transported to the right bank Marshal Beresford's corps. Scarcely had this corps crossed the Garonne, when a sudden and violent swelling of the river, common to the season of the year, endangered and nearly carried away the bridge. Fifteen thousand English, constituting the best part of the enemy's army, were thus thrown into our power, and these once destroyed, the entire English army would have been exposed to ruin. The cavalry of General Soult—brother to the Marshal—witnessed this happy accident; General Count d'Erlon was also aware of it, and both communicated to the General-in-Chief this unexpected favour from fortune that had been so adverse during the past two years. The Marshal, depressed by his reverses, and seeing safety only in the strongly defended position of Toulouse, dared not go in quest of the English, whom he could have overtaken in twenty-four hours, and precipitated into the Garonne. The English remained

four days in this perilous position, but the waters having abated, Lord Wellington repaired the bridge, and transported all his forces to the right bank. On the 9th he appeared before Toulouse and resolved to attack the French on the following day, taking care that his bridge of boats kept pace with his progress along the Garonne, so that he might be assured of a means of retreat in case of need.

The position taken up by Marshal Soult possessed great advantages. The Garonne, which in the beginning of its course, descends perpendicularly from the Pyrenees, turns suddenly to the right on reaching Toulouse, and there making a bend flows afterwards nearly parallel with the mountains, to the sea. Though the enemy having passed the Garonne, threatened the right much more than the left bank, Marshal Soult had naturally thought of defending Toulouse on both banks. On the left bank, that is to say in the inner angle formed by the Garonne, and occupied by the suburb of Saint-Cyprien, he had thrown up earth-works and planted a strong range of palisades, both extremities of which reached the banks of the river. Behind this line of works, the embattled wall of the suburb flanked with towers and bristling with artillery, formed a second and almost impregnable obstacle. And supposing that the St. Cyprien suburb were forced, the French need only cross the stone bridge which connected the suburb with the city, and then blowing up the bridge, the enemy would find themselves confined to the left bank, after having lost numbers of men in a fruitless attack. One efficient division would have been sufficient to defend us on this side and frustrate all the efforts of the British army.

It was not therefore probable that the principal attack would be made on the left bank, where there was only a suburb to conquer; it was much more likely that the attack would be made on the right bank, where the prey offered was the city itself. But the approach on this side was not easier than on the other. The great southern canal which surrounded Toulouse, joining the Garonne below the city, offered the first line of defence, which might be warmly disputed, an additional means of prolonging the resistance being afforded by the wall of circumvallation. The banks of the canal had been carefully fortified; the bridges had been protected by works, and mined. In this manner, the entire north of Toulouse was defended by the canal. On the east and south the position was still stronger, because beyond the canal there was a line of heights, reaching from Pujade to Calvignet, and everywhere bristling with redoubts and artillery. It was here that Marshal Soult placed the main body of his forces, and it was impossible that the

enemy could think of attacking any part of the city until they should have driven the French army from the heights. The enemy would have been obliged to make a descent towards the south, leaving themselves exposed during this movement to an attack from the French, and crossing the canal that lay on the right and rear, attack the city by the Saint-Michel suburb. But the marshal had taken precautions in this direction, and protected this suburb with works and artillery.

Marshal Soult had established the Maransin division—a detachment of General Reille's corps—on the left bank, in the St. Cyprien suburb. It was sufficient, as we have seen, for the defence of this quarter. The main body of his army was drawn up on the right bank. The Darricau division—belonging to Drouet d'Erlon's corps, stationed behind the canal, at the Matabiau bridge, defended the north of the city. The Darmagnac division of the same corps occupied the interval between the canal and the heights. The Harispe and Villatte divisions of the Clausel corps occupied the heights also. Lastly, behind the heights and as a reserve, the Taupin division, forming the remainder of General Reille's corps, was placed.

Lord Wellington resolved to commence operations on the morning of the 10th of April. He ordered General Hill, with the Murray, Stewart, and Morillo divisions, to attack the French on the left bank of the Garonne, in front of the St. Cyprien suburb; this was more than a sufficient force for an operation which could only be secondary to the main action. The remainder of the English army was transported to the right bank. General Picton, at the head of the Scotch division, was ordered to force the canal on the north of the city, whilst Alton's light division was to second this attack by one the Spaniards were to attempt against the heights of Pujade. Lastly, Marshal Beresford, with the Clinton and Cole divisions, was to skirt the foot of the heights, advancing from the north towards the south, and endeavour to carry the Calvinet position, and then advance in a southerly direction in front of the St. Michel suburb. He had under his command a considerable portion of the British cavalry.

On the morning of the 10th, General Hill on the left bank attacked the Maransin division, in front of the St. Cyprien suburb, but cautiously, as the decisive effort was not to be made on that side. He met a determined resistance, and perceived that it would be a serious matter to persevere in his attempt. On the right bank, the real theatre of the warfare, General Picton attacked the canal courageously.



The brave Darricau, the veteran colonel of the 32nd, who had distinguished himself at Diernstein, at Hall, and lately in Spain, defended the banks of the canal with his division. Skilfully disposing his soldiers behind this line of defence, and animating them by his example, he repulsed all the efforts of the English during several hours, and covered the line of the canal with dead or wounded Scots. During this time, General Freyre tried to carry, by the aid of his Spaniards, the heights of Pujade, which are connected with that portion of the canal defended by General Darricau. The Spaniards, received with a brisk fire of artillery and musketry, advanced boldly to the foot of the entrenchments. But, arrived at this point, they were attacked on their left flank by General Harispe, and on their right flank by General Darmagnac; they were unable to hold their ground against this combined assault, and numbers were killed. They would have been completely destroyed but for Alton's light division that hastened to their relief.

On the south, the English had lost nearly 3,000 men, and the fruit of their efforts was everywhere the same. They were repulsed both on the left and the right bank, along the canal, as well as before the heights of Pujade.

At this moment, Marshal Beresford afforded the French general a happy opportunity of terminating the conflict by a decisive success. The Marshal, advancing from the north to the south along the heights that covered the east of our position, operated in front of us, a dangerous but necessary flank movement, for it was indispensably necessary that he should come down to the south side in order to approach Toulouse. The danger of this movement was so much the greater, for if at this moment the enemy had advanced upon him *en masse*, he would have been precipitated into the muddy bed of a little river called the Ers, which flows parallel to the heights. Fortune smiled upon us a second time within eight days, but this was her last favour. Generals Clausel, Harispe, and Taupin, assembling round the Commander-in-Chief, urged him to profit of the opportunity, and to pour the mass of his forces on the flank of the rash Beresford, who, feeling the danger of his position, was hurrying the accomplishment of his movement. Marshal Soult, remembering the faults already committed with regard to the English, when the French quitted strong positions for the purpose of attacking them, and fearing to commit a like error on this occasion, hesitated more than two hours, and only made up his mind to arrest Beresford's march when the troops of the latter no longer exposed their flank to his fire, but were marching abreast towards the Calvinet point, the extreme right of our

position. The Taupin division, despatched too late, abandoned uselessly a village where they might have long defended themselves, and attacking the enemy with impetuosity, were received by the English with their accustomed vigour: they unfortunately lost their General at the most critical moment. The division was left some moments without a leader, and without orders, and the English profited of their embarrassment to seize the redoubts of Calvinet. The French endeavoured in vain to recover them. General Harispe was wounded severely, and Marshal Berestford then crossing the line of the heights, on our extreme right, appeared before the south side of the city. The retreat was effected with some little disorder, which put Toulouse for a moment in danger. Fortunately a grenadier captain of the 118th, named Larouzière, assembling his company behind the *remblai* of the canal surprised the English by a close fire, arrested their progress, and gave the Darmagnac division time to rally. The enemy could carry their attempt no further. Although along the rest of the line, we had repulsed the enemy as valiantly as in the morning, the position being turned on the south was no longer tenable.

The entire French army ought now to have fallen back on the walls of Toulouse, determined to fight there to the last. It would have been difficult in this position to force the 32,000 men that Marshal Soult still commanded. But the situation was completely isolated, and such a movement would besides leave the city of Toulouse exposed to the most imminent danger. On the other hand, by falling back on Carcassonne, Marshal Soult was certain of being joined by Marshal Suchet, and both united would present to the prudent Wellington, a mass of forces against which he would scarcely attempt anything. Marshal Soult therefore took the wise resolution of traversing Toulouse, and falling back on Villefranche. He had killed or wounded about 5,000 English, and had himself lost 3,500 men. As usual, the Spanish army had been unfortunate but heroic.

At length, intelligence of the late events at Paris was received. The provisional government by a little more activity might have spared the lives of 8,000 brave men, uselessly sacrificed for the solution of a question that had been solved elsewhere. It was only on the 8th April that the provisional government thought of sending an emissary to the two armies that were battling at the foot of the Pyrenees, and yet they ought to have been the first objects of attention, as they were most likely to renew the sanguinary conflict. M. de Talleyrand had chosen for this mission M. de St. Simon, who had set out accompanied by an English officer in order to secure a passage through the enemy's army. The escort of this officer,

though it facilitated M. de St. Simon's passage through the English army, rendered him suspected in the eyes of the French, who fancied they saw traitors on every side. Delayed first at Orleans, next at Montauban by the French, and lastly at Toulouse by the English, M. de St. Simon did not reach the camp of Marshal Soult until the 14th. The Marshal had chosen an impregnable position at Villefranche; he there waited the arrival of troops from the Catalonian army, and flattered himself that he should be soon revenged of the English. The arrival of M. de St. Simon was therefore a cause of extreme vexation, for besides the disastrous intelligence of which he was bearer, he checked the Marshal at the very moment when victory was not impossible. The presence of M. de St. Simon produced moreover an intense emotion among the troops, who were still more exasperated than the veterans of the other armies. Influenced by all these motives, Marshal Soult endeavoured to persuade himself that the accounts from Paris were not true. He even fancied that these communications might be a snare of the enemy and was about to put M. de St. Simon under arrest. But the latter effected his escape and repaired to Marshal Suchet's camp. This Marshal immediately gave credence to M. de St. Simon, and showed himself disposed to obey the orders of the provisional government, but on condition of awaiting a definite confirmation of the received accounts. The confirmation soon arrived, and an armistice exclusively local, such as had been concluded in other places, suspended hostilities between the French marshals and the adverse forces that had invaded the Pyrenean frontier.

Whilst that in the most remote regions our armies still defended the Empire, of whose fall they were ignorant, on our frontiers, and even at the gates of Paris, brave men fought for their country to the last gasp. Count Marmier, though he had never been a soldier, had enrolled and equipped, at his own expense, a legion of *mobile* national guards, and took up a position in Huningue, where he had heroically defended the place during five months. On his side, the brave Daumesnil, so celebrated as "the wooden leg," had shut himself up in Vincennes, determined that the enemy should not get possession of the immense *matériel* lodged there. Threatened with the rigours of war, he replied by declaring he would blow the place up, if his adversaries persisted in their threat; they consequently desisted. Like all the other commanders he had only yielded on receiving evidence of the revolution that had taken place at Paris and the regular government established there. So terminated the opposition that our soldiers, dispersed in so many different places, had not ceased to offer to combined Europe from Antwerp to Hamburgh, from Ham-

burgh to Milan, from Milan to Toulouse, and from Toulouse to Vincennes. Henceforth, the new government delivered from the presence of Napoleon, was also freed from the resistance of his lieutenants, all of whom were now ready to acknowledge the Bourbons.

But if the resistance of the armies had ceased, that of the passions was about to commence, and to this, prudence was the only efficacious force that could be opposed. Could this prudence be expected from the princes of the house of Bourbon and their friends, all returning to their country after twenty-five years of proscription and misfortune? Such was the important question that arose on the fall of the Empire.

The Count d'Artois, established during two or three days in Paris—he had entered on the 12th April—was, so to speak, carried away by a whirl that would have disturbed a stronger head than his. Having taken up his abode in the Tuileries, he could scarcely contain his joy at finding himself in such a residence; he wished that the world at large should share in the satisfaction he felt, and endeavoured to persuade the partisans of the Empire that nothing should be changed, whilst, on the contrary, he told the emigrants who returned with him after twenty-five years of suffering, that they should have full satisfaction, provided they waited with patience. But he soon perceived that soft words were not sufficient to remove the difficulties of his position. He wanted aides-de-camp, and the choice required deliberation. The friends who had accompanied the prince from foreign lands, or those who having remained in France, had been the first to greet him, expected that if high political posts had been given to those who served under the Empire, they at least ought to fill the places immediately near the persons of the restored princes. But where could aides-de-camp be chosen but from amongst the military, and where were military men to be found but in the imperial armies? The question was a difficult one; and M. de Vitrolles, who understood the true state of things, advised the Count d'Artois to choose some of his aides-de-camp from among the distinguished officers of the Empire. The prince followed this advice, and appointed MM. de Nansouty and de Lauriston, than whom none better could be selected, for they were respected in the army and were connected with the ancient nobility. These appointments excited loud murmurs amongst the personal friends of the prince, brought many reproaches on M. de Vitrolles, and were a complete revelation of the sentiments that animated the partisans of the ancient and modern régime towards each other in flocking round the Bourbons. The Count d'Artois, entirely engrossed by congratulations, visits, and interviews with the sovereigns, paid but little attention to this

incident, and continued to testify his delight by lavishing pressures of the hand and promises. However, it was necessary to take into consideration an important affair, which mere pliancy of temper could not decide, and that was the title with which the prince should be invested, in order to direct the government. The title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, exercising the royal authority in absence of the king, seemed the most natural to adopt. But how could he dare to assume this title in presence of the senate? at this moment the sole recognised authority, but who held themselves apart, since they had deposed Napoleon, not wishing to take part in any of the late proceedings, showing by their attitude as well as by the language of several individual members, that they would neither invest the Count d'Artois nor the king himself with regal power without a solemn pledge to maintain the constitution. Scarcely could M. d'Artois or his friends be made to understand this difficulty, so natural did it appear to them that, at the bare presence of the legitimate sovereign, or his representative, every other authority ought to disappear, and so ignorant were they that, beside the royal power, any authority could exist emanating from the people or responsible to them. M. de Vitrolles, who acted as the royalist intermediary with the provisional government, being informed of the difficulty, knowing that it ought not to be treated lightly, laid the case before the prince, who confided to him the care of solving the question as best he could, by coming to terms with those to whom the more serious state affairs were entrusted.

Although the people at large still continued to ridicule the senate, they nevertheless looked upon that body as the only existing authority, and had they supposed that the Bourbons, in order to return to France as absolute princes, refused to receive the investiture of their authority from the senators, the nation would have risen in favor of the latter; the army would have followed the example, and the allied sovereigns, would have joined the public and the army, bound as they were by their plighted word, by the dictates of good sense, and by conscientious conviction; the Emperor Alexander, in particular, warmly approved the determination of recalling the ancient dynasty only on condition of supporting a liberal constitution. It would therefore have been folly to dispute the authority of the senate; but the senators, on the other hand, were considerably embarrassed; public opinion once convinced of the propriety and necessity of recalling the Bourbons, had turned in their favor with a kind of enthusiasm. This excitement, the offspring of reason and natural sensibility amongst the masses, and the result of ambition and sometimes of meanness of character in individuals, continued to



increase. The personal qualities of the Count d'Artois contributed very much to this feeling, and the senate ran the risk of being deserted in a few days. It was, therefore, prudent in both parties to effect a compromise. But, as usual, before attempting to negotiate, each asserted extreme opinions; and it was not M. de Talleyrand who was likely to effect a reconciliation so necessary to both parties, for he habitually, partly through indolence, and partly because he was tired of discussion, shunned disputation. He allowed them to go on disputing, quietly waiting the moment when both parties being worn out, the difficulty should be solved in some way.

There was a personage whose arrival at Paris we have already mentioned—the Duke d'Otranto—who sought rather than shunned trouble; who was fond of commotion and intrigue; who wished to put himself forward, and bitterly regretted having by his absence lost the opportunity of being the principal actor in the late changes. Since his return he had given evidence of his presence by exclaiming against the treaty of the 11th April; and he beheld with intense joy, in the question now agitated, a stage ready prepared, where his turbulent and daring activity might be exhibited. It was his opinion that the senate ought to endeavour to bind the Bourbons, and being a regicide, this was a precaution more needful to him than to others, but he perceived the embarrassment of the senate and wished to extricate them, and at the same time do the Bourbons a service which would give him a claim to their favor in future. He was, besides, better suited than M. de Talleyrand, to surmount the present difficulty, because he was more fertile in expedients, because he feared less to take a prominent part, and besides he was better suited to carry on intrigues with the senators. Intruding himself everywhere, he had become as conversant in the affairs of the provisional government as one of the members, and M. de Talleyrand wishing to humour that he might afterwards make use of him, had offered no opposition.

The provisional government had transferred its sittings from the rue Saint-Florentin to the Tuileries, after the Count d'Artois had taken up his abode there, but their doors were not more firmly closed than before; they were still open to busy-bodies, who came to intermeddle or to obtrude their advice, nor were they closed against mere loungers. The provisional government was at this moment busy discussing, with a select number of senators, the important question of the day—the title to be conferred on the Count d'Artois, and M. de Vitrolles, on the prince's part, asserted the rights of legitimate royalty, when M. de Fouché, with a mixture of vulgarity, effrontery and good sense, rising suddenly, gave M. de Vitrolles clearly to un-

derstand, that he did not comprehend the question under discussion; that it was necessary that the Count d'Artois should receive the title of Lieutenant-General, but that he should receive it from the senate, who would confer the title on the prince when he would be willing to pledge himself to support the senatorial constitution. M. de Vitrolles objected the want of powers on the part of the prince, who had not time to receive authority sanctioning his acceptance of the Constitution. M. Fouché treated this objection lightly. He said that the difficulty that embarrassed M. de Vitrolles was not of a serious character, that of course the Count d'Artois knew the feelings and opinions of his brother Louis XVIII, that he might therefore become surety for him, and declare that aware of his intentions, he was certain that the king would accept the Constitution, if not in all its details, at least in its principal bases. M. de Fouché did not stop there, he instantly sketched a document, leaving it optional to modify the terms more or less, but which embodied a positive moral pledge with regard to the Constitution, without removing the difficulty of the want of the royal sanction. According to this plan, the senate should repair to the Tuileries, where the Count d'Artois would read the prepared declaration, and this being done, the senate should invest the prince with the lieutenant-generalship. "But," said M. de Vitrolles, "who can assure us that the senate will accept this arrangement?" "I can," replied M. Fouché, with his usual effrontery. M. de Vitrolles, who had never seen M. Fouché before, seemed to ask all present by his looks, who the person was with whom he was discussing, and who answered so confidently for himself and others. Having learned the name he ceased to be surprised at the presumption of his interlocutor, and felt no doubt of the promised result, without appearing alarmed at the idea of his prince being laid under obligations by a regicide. The proposed expedient was agreed on, and each departed to prepare the minds of the parties interested. M. de Talleyrand allowed M. Fouché to do as he pleased, like all indolent persons who allow themselves to be deprived of their privileges by the active-minded.

M. de Vitrolles having returned to the Count d'Artois, communicated to him and his friends the arrangement devised by M. Fouché. The prince was not then the person most annoyed. Intoxicated by success and the applause with which he was everywhere greeted, he was inclined to look upon the proposed difficulties, as unimportant subtilities that time would dissipate, and he was ready to consent to everything, provided that the title of Lieutenant-General was immediately conferred on him. But his friends, whose prejudices were less dissipated

by personal flattery, were disgusted at not seeing the legitimate authority acknowledged, and, as it were, adored, the moment it became visible, but on the contrary they saw it cheapened, by a power that arrogated a superior authority, under pretext of representing the nation. These pretensions of the senate irritated the royalists, and they were determined to put them down at any price. As they had triumphed in the case of the tricolour cockades, they flattered themselves that they should triumph as easily over what they called *revolutionary principles*. M. de Vitrolles after having poured his grievances into the sympathising hearts of his friends, did not however wish to urge them to acts of imprudence of whose folly he was conscious, and he saw clearly that it would be necessary to come to some conclusion. But what was to be done under the circumstances? It was impossible to remain at Paris without legal authority; to assume it in presence of the senate and in spite of that body, was equally impossible, unless that the senate could be annihilated, by its dissolution being pronounced, and the chamber where the senators held their sittings closed. But how could such a resolve be put into execution? There were not more than eight or ten of these ultra royalists in Paris, they did not know any person, not an official of the administration to whom they could give an order. They had no organized force at their command, for Marmont's soldiers, who alone had abandoned Napoleon, belonged to the provisional government, the national guard had assumed the white cockade with visible repugnance, and the soldiers of the allies were at the disposal of the too liberal-minded Alexander. To attempt, in this destitute state, to upset the senate and the provisional government would have been an act of madness, the projectors would expose themselves to a prodigious amount of ridicule, and probably to a disavowal of their acts by Louis XVIII.; perhaps even that public opinion might suddenly change in favour of the regency of Maria Louisa, if this counter revolutionary attempt assumed a serious aspect.

The Count d'Artois, disposed to take everything in good part, said that he could not without orders from his brother, indeed without his formal approval, expose to perilous chances the cause of royalty, that had just so miraculously triumphed. He thought it better to accept the investiture from the hands of the senate on the best terms that could be obtained, take possession of the royal authority as soon as possible, and exercise it to the best of his judgment until the arrival of Louis XVIII., who, once seated on his throne, could do as he thought fit. The Count d'Artois' self-created advisers, seeing him inclined to submit, dared not offer further resistance, they therefore adopted the part of submission, modifying at the same time



the declaration suggested by M. Fouché, making the pledges taken by the prince as light as possible, and mentioning only the principal bases of the future constitution. This task being finished, M. de Vitrolles returned to M. Fouché, who showed little concern about the changes of form provided the principles remained. He went immediately to prepare the senate for the proposed arrangement.

Whilst the ultra royalists were thus employed, the Emperor Alexander having learned the difficulties, opposed by the Count d'Artois' advisers to the conditions of the senate, commissioned M. de Nesselrode to visit M. de Vitrolles, and communicate to him the intentions of the allied sovereigns. On the morning of the 14th, while the senate was preparing to assemble, M. de Nesselrode had a clear and conclusive conversation with M. de Vitrolles. The Russian minister, whose language in general was simple and moderate, but decisive, declared to M. de Vitrolles, in the name of his master and the allied sovereigns, that it was the senate who had done everything; that it was the senate who had deposed Napoleon, and recalled the Bourbons; that but for the existence of this body, the allies would not have found a legitimate authority with whom to treat, and that reviled though the senate may be, it contained the most enlightened and experienced men the country possessed; that it was not by the aid of emigrants, who did not understand either the state of France or Europe, nor the spirit of the times, that so formidable a nation as France could be ruled; that it was therefore necessary to submit to the conditions offered by the senate, which, after all, were not unreasonable. M. de Nesselrode added that there existed at this moment only two military forces—the army of Napoleon, and the two hundred thousand bayonets of the allied sovereigns; that Napoleon's army was in the interest of the King of Rome, and that the two hundred thousand bayonets of the allies should never serve to enact an 18th Brumaire against the senate, but would rather be employed to prevent it: that this was a fixed resolution which he was not commissioned to discuss, but to announce.

M. de Vitrolles again retired indignant against the foreign influence which, however, he had himself gone to seek at Troyes, and laid before the prince the communications with which he was charged. There was a unanimous outcry against *that fool Alexander*, as the ultra royalists called the Emperor of Russia, and they waited with a forced resignation the determination of the senate.

This body assembled on the same day, and heard the propositions of M. Fouché, supported by all M. de Talleyrand's influence. It was not by sound reasons,

adduced in public sittings, that the senate was influenced, but by words whispered in the ear of individual members by active and crafty agents. And amongst these none was more conspicuous than M. Fouché. He told the senators that it was absolutely necessary to get out of this difficulty, and invest the Count d'Artois with the lieutenant-generalship, still maintaining the conditions already stipulated, that is to say, the senatorial constitution and the oath of the king to maintain this constitution.

Influenced by the opinions of MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand, the senate passed in full sitting the following resolution, which did honor to the firmness of the senate, and gave no opportunity for ridicule :—

“In conformity with the proposition of the provisional government, and the report of a special commission of seven members,—

“The senate resigns the provisional government of France to S. A. R. Mgr, the Count d'Artois, with the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, until Louis Stanislaus Xavier, called to the throne of the French, shall have accepted the constitutional charter.

“The senate further declares that the resolution passed this day shall be presented in the evening to S. A. R. Mgr, the Count d'Artois, by the entire body of the senate.

“Resolved at Paris 14th April.”

On his return to the Tuileries, M. de Talleyrand met M. de Vitrolles, and said, throwing carelessly on a table a copy of the resolutions adopted by the senate, that the royalists must be satisfied with that, for the senate would come in the evening to receive the declaration of the prince, and to read him their decree. M. de Vitrolles returning to the prince, found him now less accommodating than on the previous evening. The haughty precision of the terms in which the provisional and conditional power was conferred on him, filled him with anger. He flung away the document offered to him, exclaiming that the gentlemen senators might do as they pleased; that he did not know them; that he would not receive them; and that he would be lieutenant-general of the kingdom in virtue of his own right, and not in virtue of their decree.

Thus the prince, who on the previous day had been more rational than his friends, was much less so now; each in turn had become intractable. But necessity, before which the friends of the Count d'Artois had bent, was equally powerful with him. The prince and his friends were not stronger on the 14th than they had been on the 13th April; they had no power over the army, for that obeyed Napoleon, nor over the national guard, which obeyed the senate, nor over the foreign

soldiers who were under the command of the Emperor Alexander. They had thought of making use of the legislative corps, a body more popular than the senate, but possessed of less authority, and for this purpose had endeavoured to learn the sentiments of the most influential members of the legislative corps, but the replies were timid and disheartening. Besides, there were so few of the members then in Paris, that it would be impossible to assemble that body. In short, the day was advancing, the senate would soon arrive, so that there was not time to get up an outcry. The declaration required of the prince was read over, the pledges demanded of him were made as light as possible, but allowing the fundamental principles to remain, and these principles were, the recall of the king on condition of giving guarantees, which have since received the title of the *Constitutional Charter*, that is to say, on condition of recognizing the French Revolution in all its most legitimate and respectable phases.

The senate arrived at eight in the evening at the Tuileries, and at their head the president, M. de Talleyrand.

This personage, so well calculated to figure in scenes where it was needed to temper firmness with the most refined politeness, approached the prince, and leaning as usual on a cane, with his head inclined to one side, read a discourse, at once haughty and adroit, in which he explained without excusing the conduct of the senate, for it did not need excuse.

"The senate," he said, "has promoted the return of your august house to the throne of France. Taught by the present and the past, the senate desires, with the nation, to fix the royal authority for ever, on the enduring basis of a just division of power and the security of public liberty; the only guarantees for the happiness and interest of all.

"The senate persuaded that the principles of the new constitution have penetrated your heart, confer on you by the decree that I have the honour of presenting, the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, until the arrival of the King, your august brother. Our respectful confidence cannot offer a higher testimony of regard to the spirit of chivalrous honour transmitted to you by your ancestors.

"My lord, the senate, in these moments of public joy, being obliged, in the discharge of its duties, to preserve a greater calmness of manner, is not the less penetrated with the popular sentiments. Your Royal Highness can read the sentiments of our hearts, even through the reserve of our language."

M. de Talleyrand added to these firm and respectful words protestations of devotedness, then common in every mouth, but which in his case were the least commonplace and mean that could be selected.

The prince replied in the words already agreed on. "Gentlemen," he said, "I have read the constitutional act that recalls to the throne of France the king, my august brother. I have not received from him authority to accept the constitution, but I know his sentiments and his principles, and I do not apprehend a disavowal when I declare, in his name, that he will admit the bases of this act."

After this explicit engagement, the declaration enumerated the bases, that is to say, the division of power, the participation of the executive between the king and the chambers, the responsibility of ministers, the right of the nation to levy taxes, the liberty of the press, individual liberty, freedom of religious worship, permanency of judges, inviolability of the public debt, and of the sales, called "national;" maintenance of the legion of honour, of ranks and pensions in the army, and an oblivion for the votes and acts anterior to, &c., &c.

"I hope," added the prince, "that the enumeration of these conditions will satisfy you, and that it comprises all the guarantees that can secure the liberty and tranquillity of France."

These remarks having produced an effect, the prince, emboldened by success, spoke in the most happily-chosen phrases, first to the senate collectively, then to different senators with whom he conversed familiarly. One of them could not help exclaiming; "Yes, it is indeed the blood of Henry IV. that flows in your veins." "His blood flows indeed in my veins," rejoined the prince; "I would wish to possess his talents, but in default of his talents, I possess his heart and his love for France."

These expressions excited warm approbation, and the senate and the prince appeared to be two powers, thoroughly reconciled. After the senate came the members of the legislative corps, anxious to give in their adhesion to the act that was consummated before their eyes. The prince addressed them in words that indicated a certain preference, for he complimented them on having resisted tyranny, a compliment which he could not address to the senate. This little piece of flattery, highly gratifying to the legislative corps, but scarcely perceived by the senate, disappeared amid the general content.

The prince had achieved a complete success, and he was perfectly happy. The idea of appearing before a great body composed of the most important personages in France, had inspired him with a certain amount of timidity. He was enchanted at having got so well out of the business, and with his usual volatility, appeared to have forgotten his recent anger. "Upon my word," he said, to his intimate friends, "the pledge is taken: we must abide by it honestly, and, if

after some years, things do not go on well, we shall see what can be done towards a new arrangement.\*

From this moment, the prince might consider himself as legally invested with the royal authority, and he had passed triumphantly through one of the most trying phases of his position. But he now suddenly remembered that during the last fortnight, carried away by the whirl of events, he had always acted according to his own opinions, or the advice of his friends, without thinking of Louis XVIII. He certainly was not guilty of negligence or usurpation, for he had not had one hour free to devote to obedience to the king, and in every circumstance he had only yielded to necessity. But he feared his brother, who was witty, jealous, and sarcastic. Perceiving, that in all which he had done since the affair of Nancy, he had not once thought of consulting his brother, who, in his eyes was a king by divine right, he was terrified. "But my brother," he said, "we have not thought of him, we have not communicated to him anything we have done. What will he say?" M. de Vitrolles, rather surprised at this innocent and unfounded remorse, replied, that in the first place he had seized the crown, which was a signal service, for which Louis XVIII. must hold himself indebted; that besides, there had not been time to send intelligence to London, that the sincerity of his conduct was evident in all his acts, that at the utmost the time had only now arrived to send an envoy to London, and that Louis XVIII. would see clearly that this was the first moment the prince had had at his disposal. Somewhat recovered from his alarm, the Count d'Artois selected the Count de Bruges as his envoy to England, to explain to Louis XVIII. what had been done, to show him the reasons for this mode of acting, and to receive his royal orders concerning what was yet to be done, and commands for the preparations of his journey into France.

The Count d'Artois, being invested with royal authority, it was necessary to put a term to the existence of the provisional government, without however estranging the men who composed it, or losing the benefit of their influence. Setting aside all claims of gratitude, it would have been a great imprudence to break with them so soon and so abruptly. The means of satisfying every requirement was clearly pointed out: which was to resolve the provisional government into a council for the Count d'Artois, because this prince, even had he been better acquainted with men and things than he was, could not dispense with a council. The provisional government was therefore changed into a privy council, deliberating with

\* This is the account given by M. de Vitrolles, the devoted friend of the prince.

the prince on all state affairs. The ministers, unexceptional in every respect, and some worthy of governing France, during the brightest epochs of her history, became privy councillors, *en attendant* the return of Louis XVIII., who would confirm them in office.

Meanwhile, the council of the prince, composed exclusively of the provisional government, was defective in more than one respect. There was no representative of the army, for the hoary Beurnonville could not be looked upon as such; formerly indeed a good officer, he had since fallen into such complete oblivion, that the glorious phalanxes that had traversed Europe during twenty years could not think themselves represented by him. Two persons were at first thought of, Marshal Suchet, because of his talents as a warrior and statesman, and Marshal Marmont, because of the signal service he had rendered to the royal cause. But M. de Talleyrand did not wish to be associated with a person so influential as Marshal Suchet, and nobody had either the courage or inclination to enter into close relationship with Marshal Marmont. This unfortunate man, who had hoped to secure to himself the first rank, by transferring his services to the provisional government, had become odious to his ancient comrades and insupportable to his new friends. Military men ascribing more influence to the defection of the 6th corps than it really had had on the result of the war, took pleasure in thinking, and still more in saying, that treason alone had conquered them, and at the moment when they abandoned Napoleon for the Bourbons, they took especial care to establish a decided distinction between *betraying* and *giving in adhesion*. Thus the more they yielded, the more severe were they on Marmont, who was become the traitor *par excellence*.

This unhappy man perceiving the abyss into which he had fallen without anticipating it, exclaimed against the injustice of fate. The more he suffered internally, the more he exerted himself externally, going hither and thither sometimes for the purpose of acquiring additional importance, sometimes to render to the army services for which he was thanked by the military; and it was this that had inspired him with so much ardour in defending the tricolour cockade and instituting measures against desertion. But without succeeding in clearing himself in the eyes of his ancient comrades, he had rendered himself singularly disagreeable to those he had served, by the commotion he excited, by the excessive pretensions he put forth, and by the reproach of ingratitude, always ready on his lips, when what he wished was not done. His vanity, his fickleness, his very courage added to the disagreeables of his presence, and he was become a heavy burden to those whose

triumph he had secured ; a terrible example to those who during political revolutions are tempted to deviate from the line of plain and obvious duty, arising naturally from their position. To elect him member of the supreme council was really impossible, and it was only suggested in order that it might be said that it was impracticable. Marshals Moncey and Oudinot were selected ; honest men, who had been amongst the first to give in their adhesion, but who were incompetent to exercise a political influence. These new colleagues suited M. de Talleyrand, for they could not excite his suspicions. Another of different stamp was elected—General Dessoles,—who did not put forth any great pretensions. It was long known that the head of Moreau's staff was a distinguished man. This opinion was changed into conviction on the part of those who passed a few days in his society. He gave evidence of a refined, cultivated, and enlarged mind, an upright character, and an adherence to the honest convictions of the times, that is to say, a sincere belief that henceforth, peace and legitimate liberty could be found only under the Bourbons. Moreover, General Dessoles had been able in a few days to win the good opinion of the national guards, who, drawn from the middle classes of Paris, holding rational and temperate opinions, would become for the new government a powerful support between the imperial army, already a prey to regret, and the allied army that was under foreign control. General Dessoles was, therefore, as representative of the national guard, and on his own account, appointed a member of the royal council.

There was a personage who, after having served as intermediary between the ruling powers of the day, and even incurred actual dangers for the royal cause, had no idea of being set aside as a henceforth useless instrument—this personage was M. de Vitrolles. Having become the special agent, and almost the personal friend of the Count d'Artois, he hoped to play under the Bourbons the same part that M. de Bassano had played under the Empire. This was a strange mistake, for the part of M. de Bassano, which was only to receive the wishes of an absolute master, and transmit them to clerk ministers, ceased with Napoleon's reign. Nevertheless, M. de Vitrolles assumed spontaneously the functions of Secretary to the royal council, took notes of the proceedings, which displeased M. de Talleyrand very much, for he wisely believed that it is the definite resolutions of a privy council that ought to be recorded, and not the thousand fugitive and often contradictory opinions, which even men of the strongest intellect put forth before arriving at definite resolutions. M. de Vitrolles undertook the office of recording the delibera-

tions of the royal council, though he was often recommended not certainly to withdraw, but to abstain from writing.

Still all the claimants for office that hovered round the new government were not satisfied. There was the Abbé de Pradt, who imagined that he was as useful as he was petulant, and of whom nobody would have thought of making a minister, nor wished to make a colleague, and who on this account was placed in dignified isolation, by being appointed Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honour. And there was another person, who had long been intimate with Napoleon, who had been his schoolfellow, and who having lost his confidence some years before, repaid by a rabid hatred the disgrace he had incurred: this was M. de Bourrienne, who had on the first change of government been appointed to the office of Postmaster-General. He was allowed to keep the appointment, because he had it, and there would have been a difficulty in finding him another. Amongst all these appointments, very few were bestowed on the emigrants, who having returned to France either at a late or more remote period, regarded the reign of the Bourbons, not only as a triumph achieved by them, but as their patrimony. Some had already returned from England or the provinces, and thronged round the Count d'Artois, who not being able to give them places in the government of the country, formed them into a private government, and made of them, so to speak, his personal *clientèle*. We have mentioned MM. de Montceil and de la Maisonfort, who had returned, the one from Franche-Comté, the other from England, men of talent and learning, who must not be confounded with the herd that seek to turn every revolution to their personal advantage. The Count d'Artois installed them at the Tuileries, for the purpose of having near him a kind of secret council, that should possess his entire confidence. Had the Count d'Artois admitted only such men to his confidence—though antagonistic influences are always dangerous in government—the quality of the choice might have partly corrected the evil. But whilst his brother Louis XVIII, through prudence, idleness, or contempt had uniformly kept at a distance those royalists who came from Vendée or Paris to England, bringing groundless information, and raising false hopes, the Count d'Artois, who was of a restless disposition and compliant temper, was always surrounded by these men, and he was now beset by them as constantly as circumstances permitted. In fact the Tuileries were now filled with men, who reminded the prince that they had done this or that, that they had been charged with such or such mission, which according to their account had been most difficult of execution, and they now offered to perform services of any kind whatsoever. Some proposed to go



into the departments, and depose the refractory prefects or sub-prefects of the Empire, or to pursue the members of the Bonaparte family, and tear from them the riches, which, it was said, they had carried off. Others went so far as to volunteer to rid France of the tyrant, who, though dethroned, would never allow France to enjoy peace, if he were allowed to live. The Count d'Artois, not listening attentively, above all, not examining minutely these propositions, gave a gracious reception to all these busy-bodies, shook hands with all, did not question any of their pretended services, did not say to any one that he did not remember to have seen him before; he received the offers of all, and in return, lavished on them promises with a warmth of manner and words, the result alike of his amiability and frivolity. His only care was to send every body away content, and he treated exactly in the same manner, those high-minded royalists, who, faithful to their principles, had never stained their honour by a single misdeed, and men who, during the civil war, had covered themselves with crime. To all, without exception, he said that they must have patience, that each should receive the recompense due to his services, provided he would only wait; that for the present, the government had been obliged to give places to *Bonaparte's people*, who had certainly rendered services that deserved to be rewarded, but that the turn of the pure royalists would come, and that they should not have in vain suffered, loved, and waited during five and twenty years.

Incapable of knowingly doing what was wrong, but very capable of allowing it to be done, the Count d'Artois had become almost immediately on his arrival in Paris the centre of two governments, the one regularly appointed, composed of the ancient functionaries of the Empire, who had invested him with the authority he held; the other irregular, and what might be called clandestine, had not its existence been generally known, composed of royalists, that had been oppressed during the revolution, and their existence ignored under the Empire, some of whom had passed with unblemished reputation through the ordeal of the civil war, and others stained with all the vices engendered by that period. The Count d'Artois passed from one party to the other, presenting a fair face to each, thinking to conciliate both, and thus strengthen his cause; a double part, in the effort to sustain which, the strongest-minded and wisest man might have failed.

Meanwhile, the state of France was deplorable, and called loudly for a remedy. Desolation and terror reigned in Franche-Comté, Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, Burgundy, and Flanders. The allied troops, particularly the Prussians, committed atrocities of which the French armies, though they had often

committed deplorable excesses in conquered countries, had never rendered themselves guilty, at least in the same degree. The allied sovereigns resident in Paris, commanded in all sincerity the observance of discipline and humanity, but the officers believing that they might disobey these orders, or that, at least, their disobedience would remain unknown or unpunished, neither abstained from any excess themselves, nor imposed any restraint on their soldiers. They seized every thing of which they had need, and allowed still more to be destroyed. In Champagne especially, where the fury of war had been greatest, the villages were reduced to ashes, the inhabitants had taken flight, traffic had ceased, the bridges were cut down, the roads broken up, and the air rendered infectious by exhalations arising from the unburied dead. The enraged peasantry murdered without pity the foreign soldiers that fell into their power. The imperial functionaries had been replaced by persons who had volunteered their services, or who had been found in the locality, and who were employed to levy on the country whatever the enemy needed, a species of extortion preferable however to pillage. To this disheartening spectacle was added another of a nature to excite intense uneasiness. The French armies, especially those that had seen most service, were in close proximity to the allied armies. Their first emotion was one of satisfaction at seeing a horribly destructive war terminated, but this feeling soon gave place to regret, and this regret was quickly converted into anger against the *traitors*, to whom they imputed the disasters that had befallen our arms. In the excitement of their feelings they were ready to fall again upon the enemy, an event that might have occurred but for desertion, which had become, as we have said, a general contagion. Consequently, the highways were covered with soldiers, deserting in troops with arms, baggage, and horses, so that France was threatened with one of two misfortunes, either to be deprived of soldiers, or to retain those who were too faithful, and ready, spontaneously, to recommence the war.

In the provinces, to which the invaders had not penetrated, the authorities, anxious, restless, and uneasy, fearing alike to abandon Napoleon too soon, or to join the Bourbons too late, held an equivocal line of conduct, and were not competent to restrain the excited inhabitants. In the midland departments, generally so peaceable, these inconveniences were not strongly felt, the worst disposition manifested being the public ridicule with which the vacillating conduct of the magistracy was assailed. But in Vendée, in the South, and in every place where the royalists and revolutionists found themselves in juxtaposition, the weakness of the authorities became a posi-

tive danger. At length, taxation became as obnoxious as conscription. Following the example of the Count d'Artois, the Dukes of Angoulême and Berry had appeared, the one in Gascony, the other in Normandy, amid cries of "Down with the conscription, down with the *droits réunis*."

The people were desirous that the second of these promises should be instantly realized, and from Marseilles to Bordeaux all refused to pay the indirect taxes. To complete this sad picture, it must be added that the English, faithful to their habit of introducing their merchandize in the rear of their armies, had crowded the seaports on the coast of the English channel, of the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean, with sugars, coffees, cotton goods and iron, offered at extremely low prices, which threatened to ruin our merchants and manufacturers, for the former had in their warehouses, only colonial goods that had paid a duty of 50 per cent., and the others could only offer for sale goods manufactured from a high-priced raw material. It was therefore possible that a commercial catastrophe might be added to all the calamities of a frightful war.

Lastly, there was only one disposable million of francs in the Treasury. In the invaded provinces, the public money had been carried off by the enemy, and in the provinces where the foreign troops had not penetrated, the taxes had ceased to be collected.

When we regard attentively the difficulties with which a government just emerged from a revolution is beset, we are impressed with a feeling of alarm, for it seems impossible that such a government can be firmly established without the aid of prodigious genius. But genius is never necessary in the commencement of such a work, because a kind of general goodwill seconds governments in their beginnings, and it is only according to the wisdom they display later, when the moments of greatest difficulty seem to be passed, that we should judge them.

Commissioners extraordinary were sent into the provinces for the purpose of making known what were, at that time, called the *acts of the senate*; they were to procure the public acceptance of these acts, and get them put into execution; they were to set at liberty the priests or royalists who were detained in prison, to put an end to the vexations caused by conscription, to examine carefully the local authorities, the prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors, to demand their adhesion to the Bourbon cause, and in case of refusal to deprive them of their official rank. The motive in selecting these commissioners was most conciliatory, and they received the most prudent instructions. They were chosen from amongst *Bonaparte's people*—it is so these men were called, who had

studied in Napoleon's school, and who had had the worldly wisdom to abandon him before committing themselves—and the grand seigneurs of the ancient nobility, men who were moderate-minded and benevolent, as people generally are in the first flush of triumph.

In a selection so diversified, we find Marshal Kellerman, who was sent to the 3rd military division (Metz); the Count Dejean to the 11th (Bordeaux); the Duke de Plaisance, nephew to the treasurer Lebrun, to the 14th (Caen); M. Otto, an ancient diplomatist, to the 21st (Bourges); General Marescot, companion of the unfortunate General Dupont, to the 20th (Perigueux); Count Jules de Polignac, to the 10th (Toulouse); Count Roger de Damas to the 4th (Nancy); Count Auguste de Juigné, nephew of the former archbishop of Paris to the 7th (Grenoble); Count Bruno de Boisgelin to the 8th (Toulon); Chevalier de la Salle, son of the former governor of Alsace to the 5th (Strasbourg); the Count Alexis de Noailles, to the 19th (Lyon), &c.

These persons, whose antecedents were so opposite, set off immediately to announce in the departments, the good news of the return of the Bourbons, the approaching peace, and the recognition of constitutional liberty; they were to use every effort to enlist the sympathies of the people in these changes.

One of the first acts of the government was to disperse in different localities the army that Napoleon had concentrated round Fontainebleau, and to change the commanders of whom doubts were entertained. The Imperial Guards, that by being concentrated had become so formidable, were dispersed through those departments least likely to be influenced by their spirit. The Old Guard was allowed to remain at Fontainebleau, but the Young Guard was sent to Orleans. The cavalry of the guard was quartered at Bourges, Saumur and Angers; the artillery at Vendôme. The 6th corps, which, under the influence of Marmont and his generals of division, had separated from the imperial cause, was stationed at Rouen and in the environs. The 7th corps, that of Oudinot, chiefly composed of the troops brought from Spain, was sent off to Evreux, with the Count de Valmy's cavalry. The 11th, or Macdonald's corps, was sent with Milhaud's cavalry to Chartres. The 2nd corps, commanded by General Gérard, was sent to Nevers with the St. Germain cavalry. Those that remained of the Poles were assembled at St. Denis, to be placed at the disposal of the Emperor of Russia. In like manner the Croats were assembled at Dijon, to be delivered to the Prince de Schwarzenberg, and the Belgians were brought to St. Germain to be given up to the Prince of Orange. Quartered in this manner, there was no further cause to fear collisions between the French and foreign

troops. General Maison, who had distinguished himself in the Belgian campaign, where he had maintained the strictest discipline, was left at the head of the troops in Flanders. Marshal Davout was reputed an obstinate partizan of the Empire. His resistance at Hambourg had exasperated the allied sovereigns; his name made all the enemies of France in Germany tremble; he had not hesitated to fire upon the white flag, when it appeared beside the Russian, and these were acts which, without involving the imputation of intolerance, rendered him unacceptable to the government. General Gérard was sent to Hambourg to take his command. General Grenier was allowed to bring back the army from Italy without having received any particular orders as to its disposition, and Augereau was to command during the peace the troops in Dauphiné, that he had commanded so badly during the war, but which, judging at least by his late proclamation, he did not seem inclined to give up to Napoleon. Lastly, with regard to the Marshals Soult and Suchet, the decision of the government was influenced by the report they had lately received. According to these reports, Marshal Suchet had shown himself calm and temperate; Marshal Soult, refractory, hostile and inordinately attached to the Empire. The latter was ordered to give up his command to Marshal Suchet, who thus became chief of the veteran armies of Arragon and of Castille.

These pressing matters having been arranged, it was equally urgent to come to some resolution touching the army. The question to be debated was the conscription, a necessary but at that time universally detested institution. The government, notwithstanding the imprudent promises of the Princes, came to the wiser resolution of passing no law on the subject at that time, but adjourned the debate, under pretext of respectfully reserving for the consideration of the absent monarch, every deeply important question. But as it was necessary to take some notice of the prevailing desertion, it was decided that the conscripts of 1815, enlisted in 1814, according to the Emperor's custom of anticipating the conscriptions by a year—might remain in their homes, if they had not yet joined, or return home if they had already quitted their parishes. This was only in some sort legalizing a proceeding already generally adopted. The government wisely considered that the soldiers, who were returning in vast numbers from Italy, Spain, Germany, Russia and England, where they had been either prisoners of war, or had garrisoned the fortresses that had been surrendered, would supply the army with excellent soldiers and in greater numbers, in fact, than they could afford to pay.

Money payments had become one of the principal difficulties of the new government. Napoleon during the latter part

of his reign had supported the Treasury by loans, furnished from the savings he had made out of the civil list after the *domaine extraordinaire* was exhausted. Out of about 150 millions which he had saved from his different civil lists, he possessed, as we have seen, about eighteen millions in January 1814, of which ten millions with the Emperor's private plate, had been forcibly taken from Maria Louisa at Orleans. The perpetrators of this act of rapine, regarding this booty as a recovered portion of the public property, wished to bring the waggons containing the ten millions to the Tuileries, and dutiously present them to the Count d'Artois; and, in fact, the prize had been conducted intact to the Prince's portal.

When Baron Louis, the Minister of Finance, learned this, he was irritated beyond expression. He was, as we have said, a man of impetuous temper, but great intellect, imbued with the soundest principles of finance, understanding perfectly well the resources afforded by an unblemished public credit, and he alone was capable under existing circumstances of attempting the proof, and succeeding in the attempt. To the depth and vastness of his views he united a love of order that amounted to passion. He had warmly espoused the cause of the Bourbons, not because he approved the principles of the emigration, but through a sincere desire of establishing constitutional liberty, which he believed could only be obtained under the Bourbons. Notwithstanding his devotedness to the new government, when he learned that the ten millions which he needed so much had been transported to the Tuileries, he was highly exasperated, both on account of the loss and the irregularity of the proceeding. He immediately assembled the principal members of the ministry and of the Prince's council, informed them of what had occurred, and declared that if the ten millions were not instantly sent to the Treasury, he would send in his resignation. The members endeavoured to calm him; they advised him to go to the Prince, and explain with moderation and politeness, the rules established since 1789, concerning the disposal of the public money, and they promised him that he should receive full satisfaction.

Baron Louis, somewhat tranquillized, sought the Count d'Artois, whom he surprised but did not displease, by the vigour of his language. He found no difficulty in persuading him to restore money that he had never intended to appropriate to his own use, and which at worst he only would have applied to the benefit of his distressed friends, had he not been told it was the property of the state, and absolutely needed for the discharge of the public debts. The ten millions were restored with the exception of about 500,000 francs, which were employed to defray the expenses of the Prince's household.

This supply was a most timely relief, and being in specie, was of still greater utility. No person has perhaps ever understood more thoroughly than M. Louis that the secret of maintaining an unblemished credit, is by punctually fulfilling our engagements. It is a common error amongst political parties of all times, to care little about the engagements contracted by their predecessors, and royalists were not wanted at the period of which we speak, who were disposed to treat lightly the debts incurred during the time of the empire and the revolution. But M. Louis declared firmly that though resolved to economise every penny of the public money, he would never defraud the state creditors of their due, and that consequently former debts, on whatever account incurred, should be faithfully paid. He added, what gave his declaration greater weight, that he was determined to maintain the existing taxes, spite of the clamours of parties or the cries of the populace. A few thoughtless words uttered by the princes, immediately on their return to France, were not, in his opinion, a reason for deviating from the principles of sound finance. The indirect taxes and the conscription were necessary, for every government stands in need of men and money, and government ought therefore to have the courage to maintain these two institutions.

The presence of the Count d'Artois, who of all the princes had been the most lavish in promises, put no restraint on the courageous minister, and he asserted that if the government did not immediately declare in favour of the maintenance of all the ordinary and extraordinary taxes already voted for 1814, it would be impossible to carry on the public business, and that for his part he would not undertake it. He was satisfied on this point by being told that when the king arrived, a strict and minute enquiry should be made into existing taxes. M. Louis therefore continued provisionally the *droits réunis*, with the exception of some changes of form, made in compliance with popular feeling. Thus the tax, known as "*détail*" had always been odious to the lower classes, because it was collected at the public house. M. Louis still maintaining the tax, permitted that in towns where there was an *octroi*, the *détail* should be converted into an increase on the entrance duties. He also permitted some simplification in the tax *de mouvement*, which was collected when spirituous liquors were removed from one place to another. Excepting these slight concessions, M. Louis remained immovable on the subject of taxation, and brought over the entire council to his opinion. M. de Talleyrand and his colleagues smiled at the earnestness of the Minister of Finance, but even in smiling they gave the Count d'Artois an example of re-

specting and yielding to that passion so rare, a passion for the public good. The Count d'Artois, at once ignorant and compliant, and moreover unmindful of his promises, allowed the minister and his council to do as they pleased, being well inclined to listen to men who were reputed to know what he and his companions in misfortune were absolutely ignorant of.

Self-interest inspires a quick and delicate tact that early discovers those that are deserving of confidence. The French public soon perceived that they had to do with a Minister of Finance, who was willing to pay, without exception, all the legitimate public debts, and that in order to do so he did not fear to maintain the necessary taxes, caring little about being unpopular, provided he could establish the credit of the state. This credit was created as if by magic, thanks to the prospects of an assured peace, and thanks to a minister, whose principles were so lofty and so firmly expressed. Commercial men, the chief organs of public confidence, manifested an extreme eagerness to aid M. Louis, and the latter was immediately able to carry into effect, a measure which before would have been impossible; he intended to issue bills at short date, that is to say, *exchequer bills*.

Custom has consecrated in modern states two kinds of public debt—the funded debt, where the stock is not terminable, or terminable at a very remote period, and the floating debt, where bills are of short date, and the interest varies according to the state of the public credit. Thus in England and France there are interminable annuities, and *exchequer* or treasury bonds. The discredit resulting from bankruptcy had been so great after the time of the Directory, that, during the Empire, Napoleon had never been able to issue a treasury bond, and was even obliged to cloak the principal involved, by never mentioning the treasury. On this account he had recourse to bills of the receivers general; M. Mollien having afterwards wisely created the *caisse de service*, the receivers generals' bills were converted into *caisse de service* bills. These were in reality *exchequer bills*, only the government dared not to call them so. In 1814, the *caisse de service* was so involved in debt, that the managers dared not issue another bill in addition to those in circulation. M. Louis did not hesitate to create a new floating debt, by issuing *exchequer bills* for ten millions at short date, and at an interest proportioned to existing circumstances. These bills, thanks to the confidence inspired by the minister, were readily accepted. The government had received from Orleans ten millions in specie; the taxes were levied, and though not paid in some provinces, they still furnished sup-



plies, and the government was able during the first month to distribute amongst the heads of the different departments, fifty million francs in ready money, which put all the public departments into full operation. Business received a favourable impulse, which contributed to revive the credit on which the state was henceforth to subsist. Whilst M. Louis began in this way to establish the public credit, he showed equal firmness in maintaining order, which had been the chief merit of the imperial system of finance, and he continued the custom of presenting to the council every month a synopsis of the expenses of the coming month, that proper measures might be taken to find the supplies.

The finances, which were the great difficulty of the new government, began to assume a favourable aspect, thanks to the skilful and active-minded minister, who had taken the burden upon himself. It was necessary in this department of the administration to provide against the serious difficulty resulting from the extraordinary position of the national commerce, to which we have already alluded. Though Napoleon had, through want of patience, failed in conquering England by the system of continental blockade, he had, at least, laid the foundation of our manufactures. The spinning and weaving of cotton and wool, the mode of preparing iron, and its application to different uses, had made extraordinary progress. The extraction of sugar from vegetables of European growth, and the dyeing of stuffs by chemical agency, had made a not less astonishing advance. Our manufactures were presentable in every market, at a disadvantage, certainly, as to price, but equal, and often superior in quality, to British produce. But Napoleon wishing to destroy the commerce as well as the industry of Great Britain, was not satisfied with forbidding the importation of English manufactured goods, he also prohibited the raw material carried under the British flag, such as raw cotton, indigo, dyeing wood, sugar, coffee, &c. In 1810, instead of the prohibition, he substituted the famous tariff of fifty per cent., which all these articles were obliged to pay. Nevertheless, our manufactures had been able to support this tax, being protected from English competition by these high prohibitory duties. It is easy to conceive, without comment, how great must have been, under such circumstances, the perturbation caused by the sudden influx of British manufactures. And sugars, coffees, cotton goods, &c., so ardently longed for by the inhabitants of the continent, and scattered abundantly throughout Germany since 1813, were poured into France, in 1814, in the train of the allied armies. These goods had passed the Rhine, the Scheldt, the Meuse, and followed the allied soldiers step by step, or

else they had been landed on the coast, for our ports had, even before receiving orders from Paris, admitted the British flag. The consequence was, that our cotton goods had to contend with the English, which, to their economical mode of fabrication, united the advantage of not having had to pay fifty per cent. on the raw material; and the English coffee, which cost 28 sous at London, and in our ports stood at 38, had to compete with the French coffee, which, having had to pay a duty of 44 sous, was absolutely unsaleable, as the purchaser would have had to pay more than four francs. It was the same with sugar, and all colonial produce. Had peace been established without a foreign invasion, the most natural mode would have been to suppress these duties gradually, leaving time to sell off the goods that had been taxed so highly. But a military and commercial invasion having taken place at the same moment, we were obliged to submit to the consequences of both, but not to prolong the evil, by keeping up a tariff that became unsuitable to the commercial condition of the country. For example, raw cotton ought to be admitted duty free, in order that our manufacturers might be less burdened in competing with British productions. It would also be necessary to make a considerable reduction in the duty on sugar, coffee, and colonial produce in general, to enable the French vendor to sell at the same rate as the English. Thus, coffee, which in London cost 28 sous per pound, might very well bear a duty of six sous, which would raise the cost to 34 sous, and permit the retailer to sell at 38 sous, the current price at Paris since the arrival of the allies. Without these precautions our markets would be exclusively supplied by smugglers, who sold at the lowest price the goods that had found an entrance into France in the train of the enemy.

These considerations clearly set forth, served as a preamble to regulations which provisionally modified the duties. By these regulations the minister suppressed the duty on cotton and several raw materials, reduced about seven-eighths the duties on sugar and coffee, and promised to re-establish the custom houses as soon as the allied armies should have evacuated the territory, and promised to put in force at the same time a new scale of duties, which would sufficiently protect our manufacturers against the foreign, without making them pay too high a price for the raw material, or putting on colonial produce, such as cotton, sugar, coffee, &c., heavier taxes than were indispensably needed by the exchequer.

These measures, though undoubtedly very prudent, did not entirely tranquillize the manufacturing towns, where an apprehension prevailed that, under the reign of princes just returned from England, British trade would be favoured. The

new regulations, however, lessened the existing pressure, ~~without~~ public uneasiness, and gave reason to hope that a better system would be established as soon as circumstances would permit the application of a definite system of legislation to commerce and industry.

To these measures of general interest were added others, exclusively applicable to the provinces ravaged by the war. Commissioners were sent to rebuild the bridges that had been destroyed, to repair the roads that had been broken up, to bury the dead, to reorganise the postal service, and, in a word, to establish order as far as possible. On every side the people, who had been afflicted by the misfortunes of the country, but who now began to be consoled by the prospect of peace, and to have confidence in the Bourbons, complied with the demands made on them, and even afforded manual aid in execution of the orders that came from Paris. However, if the government succeeded in triumphing over the principal difficulties in the unoccupied provinces, it was quite different in those where the enemy still remained. In the latter the foreign troops presented a serious obstacle. They arrogated to themselves the rights of absolute authority, and committed excesses of all kinds. They did not limit their crimes to despoiling chateaux, to pillaging cottages, and outraging women; they seized the property of the state, and endeavoured to sell for their private advantage the woods, as well as the stores of salt, and the metals contained in our arsenals. It was a scene of universal spoliation, both private and public, which, besides ruining the country, exasperated the inhabitants, and rendered them ill-disposed towards the new government, unjustly reputed allies and accomplices of the foreigners.

A universal cry was raised, demanding the departure of the allied armies. Their generals had declared, on passing the Rhine, that they had come, not to humiliate France, but to set her free. Napoleon being conquered, disarmed, and deported, and the Bourbons universally recognised, why should the allied armies remain longer in France?

This reasoning, which was perfectly just, was rendered more impressive by the sufferings of the people, and had become the dominant feeling; consequently, an unanimous appeal was made to the ministers, and by the ministers presented to the Prince to whom the royal authority had been delegated, demanding the immediate evacuation of the French territory by the Russians. This appeal, so natural, so general, so becoming, was, however, imprudent. In fact, how could we speak to the allied sovereigns of evacuating our territory, without presenting a similar demand on their part with regard to the Russian places we still occupied? These places were

fortresses, such as Hambourg, Magdebourg, the Texel, Flushing, Berg-op-Zoom, Antwerp, Mons, Luxembourg, Mayence, Lerida, Tarragona, Figuières, and Girona, filled with a large war *matériel*, and some of the harbours containing magnificent fleets. Was it possible to ask the Austrians, the Russians, the Prussians, the English, to quit Champagne, Lorraine, Alsace, Languedoc, without expecting them in return to ask us to give up these first-class fortresses, which it was intended we should ultimately lose? The consequence of such a step would be the serious inconvenience of giving up pledges which, in the negotiation of a future peace, would be of the highest importance. Undoubtedly, the conditions of this peace could not vary much, for the principles of the frontiers of 1790 were so generally admitted, that it was only the victorious sword of Napoleon which could effect a change. But in consenting to abandon the Rhenish provinces and Belgium, that is to say, the Rhine and the Scheldt, there remained between these rivers and the limits of 1790 an extensive and solid frontier which might have been claimed by France, as we shall see presently; a frontier that might have been obtained by negotiating with firmness and patience, in the name of the Bourbons, in virtue of the good will they inspired, and the desire the allies felt to render them popular. One means of securing success would certainly have been the possession of such pledges as we were about to surrender, for it is easy to imagine how great would have been the embarrassment of the allied sovereigns, had they been obliged to recover by force Hambourg, Magdebourg, Antwerp, Mayence, &c., &c. But was it possible, we repeat, to demand the evacuation of France without instantly provoking a similar demand with regard to the territories we occupied beyond the limits of our ancient frontiers? Evidently not, and no negotiator could have obtained a hearing, who would have advanced the one demand, without admitting the other.

We certainly might have consented to the evacuation of the more remote fortresses, such as Hambourg, Magdebourg, the Texel, and Flushing, in the north, Lerida, Tarragona, and Figuières, in the south, and endeavoured to retain Antwerp, Mayence, Luxembourg, and Mons, as lying nearer. But the allied powers would have seen in this proposition an intention to contest the frontiers of 1790, and the offer of a partial evacuation would have been as unacceptable as an absolute refusal to give up any of the fortresses.

A wiser mode of acting would have been to wait patiently for two months longer, asking the Emperor Alexander and his allies to give positive orders to their soldiers to treat our unhappy provinces less cruelly. If the French, amid their

sufferings had been capable of reflection they would not have failed to perceive that even had the foreign armies signed an act of evacuation on the spot, they could not have left before two months on account of their claims on some of the magazines, and that before the expiration of two months, as the event proved, peace might be signed. The King, it is true, was absent, but his absence, which was no impediment to yielding the principal European fortresses, could have been no obstacle to commence at least discussing the bases of peace. But grief does not reason, and the unanimous and ardent desire of the nation forced the government to commence negotiations for an evacuation which should necessarily be reciprocal. Let us in justice add that the places which there was a question of giving up, Hambourg, Magdebourg, the Texel, Lerida, Tarragona, and others, were evidences of a madly ambitious policy, which had fallen into general disrepute, and traces of which no one cared to preserve.

M. de Talleyrand, who naturally enough had been commissioned to conduct the negotiations, was listened to by the representatives of the allied powers with profound attention and a feigned benevolence for France, which they said they had hastened to deliver from foreign occupation. In reality, the allies were extremely anxious to obtain possession of the fortresses that we held. Prussia was undoubtedly certain of sooner or later getting possession of Magdebourg and Hambourg; England of having Antwerp; and Austria, Mayence; but ardent desires are accompanied by an impatience that can only be satisfied by immediate possession. The allies promised to evacuate France without delay, on condition that our garrisons would evacuate the places we have named. It was therefore no longer possible to retain Antwerp, Mayence, Luxembourg, by restoring Hambourg, Magdebourg, &c., yet the allied monarchs had promised to treat France under the Bourbons better than under the Bonapartes. Their ministers did not deny this, and still holding firmly by the principle of the frontier of 1790, they spoke of a territorial extension beyond these frontiers, which might be represented by a million souls. Finding it impossible to do better M. de Talleyrand was obliged to be content with this promise. There now remained the serious consideration, of what was to be done with the *matériel* contained in the fortresses we were about to give up. There was in these fortresses, besides the field artillery, a vast war *matériel* of every kind, which might have been, if not saved, at least disputed. But no attention was paid to this, both parties were so anxious to come to a conclusion. It was stipulated that our troops should leave with arms and baggage, and three field pieces to every thousand men. It was

certainly only a loss in money of thirty or perhaps forty million francs, by no means comparable to the loss of territory, but still it was a loss. But our magnificent fleets lying in certain harbours were not forgotten, and this part of the *matériel* was reserved as an object of future consideration, when negotiations for a definite peace should be commenced.

It was consequently agreed that the foreign troops should evacuate the French territory (that of 1790) in proportion as we withdrew our troops from the remote fortresses we occupied, leaving those of the Rhine within ten days, those of Piedmont and Italy in fifteen, and the Spanish fortresses within twenty days. The most distant should be evacuated by the 1st June. It was arranged besides, that prisoners of every nation, no matter in what place they might be found, should be immediately set at liberty.

This convention being signed by M. de Talleyrand, was the same day submitted to the Count d'Artois and his council. It is a singular fact, and one that proves the strength of an absorbing idea, that no observation was made on this convention, because it fulfilled a universal wish, that of removing foreigners from the soil of France.\* The unfortunate Prince, upon whom this act afterwards induced an unmerited unpopularity, was incapable of foreseeing the consequences of what he did, and sincerely believed that he was delivering France from the presence of foreign soldiers; he therefore joyfully signed the deed. It was instantly published, and on the first day excited no more remark than it had done at the royal council. But the voice of criticism was soon heard, and thanks to a sudden change in public opinion, became as bitter as universal.

In fact, a very great change had taken place in the public mind since the deposition of Napoleon, that is to say within a month. The absolute submission and the almost perfect silence that prevailed during the Empire, had been suddenly replaced by an extraordinary frankness of sentiment and language. Whilst the idea of the return of the Bourbons, which at first appeared strange and rather surprising, began to be received by the mass of the public and regarded as a prudent measure, and that the Bourbons themselves were gaining a certain amount of popularity on account of their misfortunes and their virtues, a sharp and bitter quarrel suddenly sprung up between parties newly called into existence. The press had recovered a certain liberty enjoyed by sufferance but not by right, for the imperial regulations concerning publications

\* M. de Vitrolles, an eye-witness, and who noted down events as they occurred, says that not a single remark was made in the royal council.

were still in force. The new government had contented themselves with restoring to the proprietors of public journals the property of which they had been deprived by Napoleon, and required of them in return, the appointment of a principal editor who should be accountable for the acts of each journal. The liberty of the press had sprung up under the equivocal form which made it dependant on a censorship. As usual, the press had become the expression of the passion of the day, and this passion was detestation of the empire, of its incessant wars and arbitrary government. There consequently prevailed a fearful excitement against Napoleon, against his family, against his ministers, and against everything that belonged to him. And public opinion, soon running farther back, passed from the empire to the revolution, which became an object of no less anger than Napoleon himself. Though the Count d'Artois, on entering Paris, had spoken of an act of oblivion, though the senate had made such an express condition of the recall of the Bourbons, this act of oblivion, so much easier to promise than put into execution, had not been put into practice by any one. The cruel death of the Duke d'Enghien was commented on, and still more violently was the iniquitous death of the unfortunate Louis XVI. condemned. In this regard, so strong was popular feeling, that Napoleon for awhile gave place to the regicides, upon whom a torrent of abuse was poured. Undoubtedly, the existing generation should have lost all memory, and every sense of justice and humanity, not to be penetrated with the profoundest pity, in recalling to memory the punishment inflicted by fanatics on one of our best kings; and yet, with regard to the tranquillity of France and the development of its destinies, this cry of the public conscience was a very great imprudence. The clergy, more thoughtless, if possible, than the royalists, and less justifiable in such demonstrations, entertained strong antipathies, of which Cardinal Maury was the principal object. Priests, of whom very few had dared to defend the cause of the church during the revolution, and of whom not one had refused ecclesiastical favours under the empire, could not pardon Cardinal Maury, the most eloquent and courageous defender of his order, for having accepted the diocese of Paris. They had commenced by overwhelming him with insults, then declared the diocese vacant, nominated vicars capitulary, and used every possible means to induce the cardinal archbishop to abandon his diocese. Thus violently persecuted, he quitted Paris, and ceded the place to his embittered enemies.

When parties are sought for in this manner they are easily found. In fact, a few days had sufficed to revive and gather

together all the men whom the royalists attacked in this manner. At the first return of the Bourbons, these men, divided and confounded, had held their peace. The revolutionists, avenged by the fall of the empire, had experienced a moment of joy. The civil and military functionaries, eager to secure their own safety, had at first thought only of giving in their adhesion to the Bourbons, and had given it, execrating at the same time the senate that had dethroned Napoleon, and applauding the raileries uttered by the royalists against that body. But after a few days' reflection, the revolutionists and the civil and military functionaries felt their fate was cast in common, and that if the senate had struck them in striking Napoleon, it had also defended them in stipulating constitutional guarantees. They consequently began to take part with the senate. In reading in the journals of the triumphant party—the only ones that enjoyed the freedom of the press—furious declamations against all that had taken place since 1790, in seeing gather round the princes, and round the special commissioners, the men of former times, they felt that under the new order of things they could not fail to be in peril, or at least in disfavour. The military men, especially (we mean the officers), quitting the ranks, like the soldiers, had come in numbers to Paris. They crowded the streets and public places, where they participated in the general agitation, and sought to know what was to be their fate. The War Minister, General Dupont, had issued an order, commanding them to return to their regiments—the only place, said this order, where they would learn the fate reserved for them. Amid the general confusion, scarcely one of these officers had obeyed. They still crowded the capital, where the presence of foreign soldiers irritated them deeply, and provoked on their part the most dangerous expressions of feeling. They took especial pleasure in declaiming against the *traitors* who, they said, had betrayed Napoleon and France.

The convention of the 23rd April, whose conditions, as we have already explained, were inevitable, was at first received as a natural, and even as a very desirable event, because it stipulated the evacuation of France by the foreign troops; but ill-disposed people soon began to put forth different opinions. Though the surrender of Hambourg, Magdebourg, Lerida, did not really touch the solid greatness of France, yet these names recalled undying memories, and besides, when to these remote fortresses were added Mayence, Luxembourg, Wesel, Flushing, and Antwerp, which we were accustomed to look on as French possessions, in seeing all these fortresses given up with the single stroke of the pen, without



any guarantee for indemnification, military men were touched with sincere grief. The public even, the rational, disinterested public, spite of the joy infused by peace, spite of their well-founded dislike to distant conquests, could not help feeling a profound sadness, in seeing so many important fortresses abandoned, and though they did not cry out treason, as did the military men, yet they felt that they were under the iron hand of foreigners, who, whilst flattering France in order to render her more manageable, left her only so much of her greatness as they could not deprive her of.

Still the dominant sentiment was a lively and universal satisfaction at the prospect of peace, and, if a bitter censure were heard, it was from the lips of men whose existence was imperilled by the change of government, or who were disturbed in their retreat by outbursts of royalist feeling. As to the Count d'Artois, he did all in his power to satisfy everybody, and especially to win the good graces of the army. He invited the marshals, generals, and colonels, who were staying at Paris, to dinner; he used every exertion to please them, but they felt sensibly that at the Tuileries they were only passing acquaintances, not intimate friends. The abiding guests in this palace, which had been occupied, and was still destined to be occupied by so many generations, of various origins, of different modes of thinking and of different sentiments—the abiding guests, we say, at the Tuileries were the royalists, who began to flock to Paris in great numbers from the provinces, or from those lands whither they had emigrated. Less caressed, less flattered than the heads of the army, but evidently more loved, they alone enjoyed a real intimacy. They came at all hours, and when the Count d'Artois could not receive them himself, he deputed his most confidential friends to do so. These received, as we have already said, their protestations of affection, and offers of service; and, moreover, the reports made by these royalists were received with attention; they were formed into a kind of police, who, merely officious in the commencement, would one day pretend to play a higher part.

We have already spoken of these daring men, whom the Count d'Artois had had the weakness to admit to his confidence, and to whom he had the imprudence to confide important missions, or allow them to assume such. Some of these men had taken upon themselves to pursue the Princess Catherine, wife of Prince Jerome Napoleon. This princess, daughter to the King of Wurtemberg, and universally respected on account of her personal qualities, was arrested near Fossard, when on her way to Germany. She was robbed of every thing. The men who arrested her said they were com-

missioned by government to restore to the treasury property belonging to the state, and, under this pretext, the baggage taken from the princess was brought to the Tuileries apparently intact. Scarcely was this act consummated, when the Emperor of Russia having learned what had occurred, became indignant, and sent his minister to complain, and demand reparation for the insult offered to a respectable princess, protected by the treaty of the 11th April, and, moreover, his own near relative. The first act of reparation was to restore the princess's trunks, which were all found empty. The diamonds belonging to the princess, which were valued at 1,500,000 francs, had disappeared. The men who had arrested the princess denied the robbery, and threatened, if anything further were said about it, to compromise the provisional government, by declaring what their real mission was. Of this mission they made no secret; it was to assassinate Napoleon.

The affair was certainly of a doubtful character, but amid the existing chaos it was evident that many imprudent expressions had been allowed to find utterance; and if things went on in this manner, disagreeable incidents might become more frequent. The Count d'Artois had been now twenty days at Paris, and the arrival of Louis XVIII. was already anxiously desired, in order that he might assume the reins of government. This was the wish of the prince's most enlightened friends; it was the wish of the prince himself, who, though anxious to meddle in everything, was alarmed at seeing his responsibility every day increasing. It was one day the question of taxation on which he was called on to decide; another day, the commercial interests of the country formed the subject of debate, or perhaps the extent of the French territory; and all this in the absence of a brother, of whom the Count d'Artois stood much in fear, who was king, and very jealous of his authority. The Count d'Artois had been joined by his two sons. The Duke d'Angoulême, a modest and courageous prince, not very intellectual, but steady and prudent, had landed a month before at Bordeaux. The Duke de Berry, who had entered France by Brittany and Normandy, possessed considerable talent; his sentiments were generous, but he was hot-headed. These two young princes were received at the gates of Paris with great pomp, and many demonstrations of joy. They brought in their train a fresh contingent of devoted royalists, and these arrivals were not a pledge of greater unity and prudence in the government.

The presence of the king was therefore justly wished for, because much was hoped from his prudence, and because many

were anxious for the speedy solution of questions that were left in suspense until the king's arrival. How would this monarch receive the conditions that the senate wished to impose on him. What value would he attach to the engagements, contracted in his name by the Count d'Artois? These were doubts which it was important to solve, and waiting the solution, each had endeavoured to induce Louis XVIII. to regard his particular views and interests with favour. The Count d'Artois had sent to inform his brother that the engagement into which he had entered was of a very general character, that consequently the king was absolutely free with regard to the substance of the senatorial constitution, and still freer with respect to the required oath; that no positive engagement was contracted, and that with regard to the general bases of the constitution, there was a reservation in favour of the royal pleasure, which left a great latitude. It was evident that the Count d'Artois, to excuse his having assumed too much authority, sought to make the pledges he had given the senate appear as light as possible. M. de Talleyrand had at first sent M. de Liancourt to Louis XVIII, and he had neither been well received nor his reports listened to, as we shall soon see; others of less note were afterwards sent, whilst M. de Talleyrand, instead of speaking of things as they really were, adopted a tone of complaisance, and wishing to impress the new king with the idea that his authority had not been infringed, he sent him word that with some flattery to the marshals, and a general declaration in conformity with the prevailing opinions of the day, which should be published immediately on his entrance into France, all existing necessities would be satisfied. M. de Montesquieu, though still adhering to his peculiar view of matters, had been more truthful and more firm. He had in writing to Louis XVIII. displayed much irritation against the senate, and against the pretensions put forth by this body, to impose conditions on the king, but he had not sought to depreciate either the gravity of the engagements contracted, nor the power the senate still possessed. He said that France was not so deeply imbued with a royalist spirit, as some persons took pleasure in believing; that many regretted the days of the Empire; that others, strongly attached to revolutionary principles, had not made up their minds to abandon them; that the army especially was in general hostile to the legitimate dynasty; that these different classes of malcontents, having physical force on their side, were ready to take part with the senate, and so render that body formidable; it would therefore be better to make a compromise with the senate, however disagreeable such a proceeding might be, that the jealousy of the legislative corps might be turned to some advantage, but that this body was weak and incompe-

tent; that the senate still possessed the chief power; that it would be better to select from the senatorial constitution whatever was least objectionable, and from these materials, frame an act purporting to emanate from the royal authority alone; that besides, the finances were in a perilous state, and would probably necessitate a considerable loan, and that without the intervention of the great bodies of the state, lenders could not be found. Though these opinions were not in every respect correct, they represented more exactly the real state of things than the accounts forwarded by the Count d'Artois and M. de Talleyrand. On the whole, the intelligence sent by all caused considerable surprise at Hartwell.

Louis XVIII., who, after the death of Louis XVII., the unfortunate son of Louis XVI., had become legitimate king, according to the principles of hereditary monarchy, had resided for several years at Hartwell, in England, where his love of study and natural tranquillity of disposition had induced him to fix his abode. He had, so to speak, lulled himself to sleep in the peaceful uniformity of his exile, when the terrible events of 1812 suddenly awakened in his heart hopes that were almost extinguished. He then thought proper to make certain declarations, less vague than the preceding, promising to reform ancient abuses, to forget the past, and respect the alienation of the *biens nationaux*, conditions which at that time comprised the entire programme of the most liberal-minded emigrants. These declarations, scattered through Europe, had never been heard of in France. When Louis XVIII. learned the acts of the senate, he experienced a delight quite as strong as what the Count d'Artois had felt, though less demonstrative; and, in the first moments of his joy, he thought no more than his brother had done at Nancy, of disputing the conditions on which he was to be recalled to the throne. Consequently, M. de Blacas, who had become his confidant and the executor of all his wishes, received orders to prepare his act of adhesion to the senatorial constitution. Nor did Louis XVIII. think he purchased too dearly his return to France, by accepting a form of government which, since his abode at Hartwell, he had himself seen in operation to the great advantage of England, and without any other inconvenience than disagreements, which sometimes became serious for the ministers.

It was in these dispositions that Louis XVIII. was found by the emissaries of the Count d'Artois, of M. de Talleyrand, and M. de Montesquiou. Very yielding, as we have seen, with regard to things, he was much less accommodating when persons were in question, for old prejudices yield more easily to the former than the latter. Things have no living features, but persons, on the contrary, have, which revive painful

impressions, and implacable rancours. The worthy M. de Liancourt, hateful to the ancient noblesse because of the good sense he had displayed in the earlier period of the revolution, was so coldly received at Hartwell, when sent there by M. de Talleyrand, that he took his immediate departure, not being of a humour to bow his high birth, his cultivated mind, and honourable life, before emigrants of any rank. The reception given to the other messengers of M. de Talleyrand was very different, and still more so to those of the Count d'Artois and M. de Montesquiou. As soon as Louis XVIII. learned that these gentlemen had preserved intact the essential principle of legitimate royalty, such as the ultra-royalists understood it, and that he could still retain, not only the colours of the house of Bourbon, but was not even obliged to submit to any condition, nor take an oath, and that it would be sufficient to make a general declaration of principles to satisfy the exigencies of his position, he laid aside his act of adhesion, and prepared to assume an absolutely royal attitude. He had been advised, on leaving England, to make his progress slowly, in order to receive *en route* the homages of the inhabitants, and to make a stay in one of the ancient royal castles, that of Compeigne, for example, which had been splendidly fitted up by Napoleon. There, he could hear and see everybody, and become acquainted with men and things before entering Paris, and assuming engagements which would be now personal and obligatory. This advice he promised to follow, and decided that, after visiting at London the Prince Regent of England, the host to whom he was indebted for such noble hospitality, he would repair by Calais to Compeigne, to receive there the first homage of his subjects.

It was on the 20th of April that Louis XVIII. made his entrance into London. We may easily divine, without need of expatiating on the subject, what were the sentiments of the English people on seeing the house of Bourbon again in possession of the throne of France. Whilst that every power in Europe had in succession recognised him who was called the usurper, and refused shelter to the Bourbons, England alone had never acknowledged Napoleon as emperor; she had received the proscribed princes, and had thrown over them the protection of her inviolable hospitality. In truth, though her ministers denied it in parliament, she had always sought the restoration of the Bourbons, as the most certain means of avenging herself of Napoleon and the French revolution.

Though England had more than once been desirous of peace, though she had been more than once ready to conclude it, and had only been prevented by the obstinacy of Napoleon

with regard to Spain, she now forgot these moments of weakness, and thought only of the last triumph of the coalition, of which she attributed all the merit to herself. According to English reports, it was not Prussian, Austrian, or Russian generals with whom Napoleon had to do in the terrible campaigns of 1813 and 1814; it was to Lord Wellington the definite success was due; and yet it must be avowed that it was Marshal Soult, and not Napoleon, whom Wellington encountered. But nothing could efface these notions from the minds of the English; who were absolutely intoxicated with joy and pride. It is undeniable that the English had had a considerable share in bringing about the general result, but it is also true that they had received the largest share of profit. They also believed, and to a greater extent than they were warranted, that the Bourbon princes, now accustomed to the English habits, and imbued with the English spirit, would be the firmest supporters of British policy. Influenced by these feelings, the English resolved to give Louis XVIII. a magnificent reception. During the three days this prince passed at London, all the English wore the white cockade, and he was received with acclamations as joyous as could have been expected in his own capital. Louis XVIII. entered the palace of the Prince Regent, leaning on the arm of this prince, and having on his left hand the Duke of York; he was thus conducted to the chair of state, in quality of king and guest. No sooner was he seated than he listened with proud self-possession to the speech of the Prince Regent, who congratulated him on his restoration to the throne of France; and he congratulated him on it as an event, not alone fortunate for France, but for England, for Europe, for the entire world; an event which every man in England felt as a personal advantage. Louis XVIII. replied to this discourse by thanking the prince for the proofs he received of his friendship, and for his generous hospitality, and added those sadly memorable words—*that it was to his prudent advice, to his noble efforts, to the indefatigable perseverance of his nation, that he should always attribute, under Providence, the restoration of his family to the throne of France.*

These words, so completely in unison with the pretensions put forth by the English, and even with their hopes, were listened to with transport. Instantly circulated with the promptitude of British publicity, they produced an extraordinary effect. In uttering these words had Louis XVIII. thought only of his hosts, to whom he wished to testify his well-founded gratitude in terms the most calculated to gratify them? Or, had he thought of the senate who pretended to

recall him to the throne conditionally, or of the continental sovereigns who supported the senate, and who, basing their pretensions on the services they had rendered to the house of Bourbon, thought themselves justified in giving the king advice and expecting him to follow it? Did he mean to say to both parties that he had reason to be grateful only to God and to England? It is difficult to say; but it is possible that he was at the time influenced solely by a feeling of courtesy towards the nation to whom he believed himself more indebted than to any other. Whatever may have been the motive that dictated these words, the effect, as often happens, was destined to be greater than the cause.

Féted at London during three days, and greeted wherever he appeared with enthusiastic applause, Louis XVIII., before leaving, invested the Prince Regent with the *ordon bleu*, the highest distinction in the power of a French monarch to bestow, and which implied the restoration of the order of the Saint-Esprit. He left London on the 23rd April, and arrived the same day at Dover, accompanied by the Prince Regent, the greater number of the English princes, and the most distinguished members of the aristocracy. The next day,—the 24th,—he embarked and set sail for Calais, escorted by a fleet of eight ships of the line, several frigates, and a number of smaller vessels. The inhabitants of Dover and the environs headed by the Prince Regent, all wearing the white cockade and waving white handkerchiefs, saluted the French monarch with loud cheers, and did not leave the shore whilst his ship remained in sight. The Duke of Clarence accompanied Louis XVIII. to the coast of France, and took leave of him, amid the roar of the cannon of both nations, a sound that had not wakened the echoes of that locality since the time of the camp at Boulogne. What a contrast! what changes! Alas! in our fitful century, two or three years have often sufficed to bring about changes the most contradictory and the most surprising.

On arriving at Calais, the king was received by a considerable number of persons, who, so to speak, prostrated themselves before him. The people, once habituated to the idea of the restoration of the Bourbons, vied with each other in testifying their delight by the noisiest demonstrations. Besides, the inhabitants of a provincial town when visited by their sovereign, are always delighted with the honour, and profoundly touched at a spectacle, novel to them, they experience transports of affection, sincere certainly, but not so durable as they believe, and as may be desirable. But it was not with joy, but with tears, that Louis XVIII. was received, for the recollection of the past was dominant on this occasion, and in

thinking of the long and bloody tragedy that commenced in 1789, and terminated in 1814, the French might well shed unfeigned tears. Flattery, as usual, adding something to emotion—we may divine the demonstrations of which Louis XVIII. was the object. After having devoted a day to the people of Calais and the environs, he passed the night of the 26th at Boulogne, the 27th at Abbeville, the 28th at Amiens, imbibing slowly the incense burned before his legitimate authority, and finally, on the 29th, made his entrance into Compiegne, where he was awaited by the most illustrious persons of France and of Europe.

The impatience to see the king and become acquainted with his disposition were extreme, for in this case, curiosity was heightened by the stimulant of self-interest. With what kind of master would these new subjects have to do, some of whom were the originators of the Revolution and the Empire, others of the emigration? With what kind of ally would these continental monarchs have to do, who had just reinstated the house of Bourbon on the throne, and already heard their services disputed? Such were the questions which each asked himself. To judge by the attitude Louis XVIII. assumed, and the sentiments he first expressed in public, one would be tempted to believe him the haughtiest, the vainest, and least prudent of the emigrants. In fact, his words to the Prince Regent had already deeply disturbed those who had taken a part in the last revolution, and had produced a feeling of discomfort amongst the military men, who detested England more than any of the other powers, and lastly, disobliged the allied sovereigns themselves, who were not inclined to admit that England had done everything, and had been nearly equal to Providence in the late events. Yet it would have been acting with injustice towards Louis XVIII. to have judged him by these first manifestations.

The first impression that Louis XVIII. made on those already acquainted with the Count d'Artois, was that there was a great difference between the two brothers. The Count d'Artois was graceful and elegant in his deportment, whilst the Count de Provence, now become Louis XVIII, was embarrassed in his manner and awkward in his gait. Corpulent to a degree, which was burdensome at sixty (he was about this age in 1814), he was moreover gouty and walked with difficulty, leaning on a cane. He wore a blue coat with a general's epaulettes, a small English hat, and gaiters of red velvet, completely enveloping his infirm legs. But above this cumbrous and awkward body, there rose a handsome and intelligent head, somewhat too large, differing in one particular from the general cast of the Bourbons, that the nose was not



very aquiline, with a bright and commanding eye that might have become a man of genius and of lofty character. The manners of the Count d'Artois were characterized by affability and a complaisance that suited itself to everybody's humour, whilst Louis XVIII. was calm and haughty. The two princes were as different in disposition as in person. The Count d'Artois, profitting of his personal advantages, had formerly sought and enjoyed the pleasures of the world, and led a frivolous life at the court of Marie Antoinette, but when the day of adversity came, he repented, became a pious Christian, and of his former life retained only his amiability of manner.

Louis XVIII., on the contrary, destitute of the physical advantages of his brother, sought an indemnification in study, to which he applied assiduously, endeavouring to become solidly instructed, but he only succeeded in acquiring superficial information. He associated with the literary men of his time, that is to say, with those of the second class, for a prince of the blood would have compromised himself too deeply, had he sought the society of literary men of the highest class, such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau. Louis XVIII. favoured the philosophy of the French school, and even its revolutionary principles, but when the hour of adversity came, without repenting, like the Count d'Artois, he still preserved in his philosophy opinions that could not be deemed religious, and retained in politics sound principles. When his brother involved himself in the exaggerations and intrigues of the emigration, he avoided the former through a natural moderation of character, and the latter through aversion to excitement, and he shunned both to mark a distinction between him and his younger brother, whose conduct he did not approve, and for whom he entertained little affection. Not devoid of kindness of heart, though possessing a somewhat malicious wit, often sarcastic, and a little egotistical, seeking above all things that repose which his infirmities rendered necessary, attaching much less importance to the exercise, than to the recognition of the principle of his authority, of which he was prouder than any monarch in the world; ever ready to delegate his power to whomsoever submissively acknowledged its existence; detesting business, and avoiding it to enjoy his favourite authors—the Latin—whom he quoted often and appropriately; in fact, a crowned wit, admirably well calculated, both by the qualities he possessed, and those in which he was deficient, to play the part of a constitutional king, a part which the English monarchs have, happily for themselves and their country, acquired the habit of performing. Louis XVIII. was ensured by his defects, as much as by his good qualities, from committing those faults into

which his brother was likely to fall. Such was this prince, such the portrait of him which the impartial historian ought, in our opinion, to present to future generations.

We should not, however, present a correct portrait of Louis XVIII., if we did not speak of a personage who at that time was reputed to exercise great influence over his mind. This personage was M. de Blacas. Men afflicted with physical infirmities, whether princes or private individuals, stand more in need of confidants than do other persons. This necessity is increased, if, like Louis XVIII., such men are widowers without children, and if, in addition, they are occupants of a throne, they possess facilities for forming this circle of assiduous, obsequious, submissive friends who are sometimes called favourites, and to whom, either justly or unjustly, all the errors of the reign are attributed. Louis XVIII. had long reposed his confidence in M. d'Avaray, and he having died, his place was filled by M. de Blacas. Member of a noble family of Provence, he had been one of the first emigrants, and sympathised in all the sentiments of the French emigration with frigid obstinacy rather than fervent enthusiasm. He was a proud and virtuous man, tall of stature, unbending in person and disposition, and possessing as much good sense as was compatible with strong party spirit. As to the rest, he was more anxious to rule in the prince's household than in the state, and possessed, like his master, a refined taste for the arts, in which he found refuge from the pressure of business. M. de Blacas might have become in the hands of a skilful premier, who knew how to bend the court to the designs of the government, a valuable instrument, for he might have been made the means of enunciating, at the foot of the throne, the truth, which he loved when he was able to discern it. However this may be, the courtiers of the various *régimes*, after having saluted and flattered Louis XVIII., flocked round M. de Blacas, to present him their stupid and vulgar adoration.

When Louis XVIII., accompanied by his niece the Duchess d'Angoulême, whom he called his daughter, and the two Condés, the father and grandfather of the Duke d'Enghien—he affected in this way to surround himself with the great victims of the revolution—approached Compiègne, the crowd of courtiers, those who were not capable of being anything else, and those who might have been something much better, the marshals for example—hastened to meet him with unexampled eagerness, and had they dared, had the prince permitted it, they would have thrown themselves at his feet. The marshals had confided to Berthier, on account of his age, his position, and his talents, the task of speaking for them, and he, broken

down by recent events, his mind filled with anxiety for the future career of his children, had undertaken this part, though he was fully conscious how little it became him. Without uttering a word derogatory to the great man whose glory he had shared, he gave utterance to the same commonplaces which at that time fell from every mouth.

"The marshals, as representatives of the army, hastened," he said, "to greet a father whom France during so long a time had the misfortune to disown, but to whom, taught by experience and misfortune, she now returned with transports of joy, certain of finding under his rule, the repose, prosperity, and even the glory she had enjoyed under the sceptre of Henry IV. and Louis XIV. The heads of the army were anxious to offer to this father their hearts and their swords, which having never belonged to any other than to France, were especially due to the legitimate sovereign of restored and regenerated France."

If these are not the exact words, they are at least the sentiments contained in the harangue pronounced by Berthier, and deserve a place here, as a sample of all the public speeches of the time.

The king being fully aware that of all the persons concerned in the late revolution, the marshals were those whom it was most necessary and easiest to flatter, mollified by the most perfect gracefulness, the haughtiness for which he was indebted to his natural disposition and his social rank, he shook hands with them, and said that in his exile he had admired their exploits, that these exploits had afforded much consolation to his paternal heart amid the woes of France, that it was a pleasure that the marshals should be the first he met on returning to the patrimony of his ancestors, that he confided in them, that he brought them peace, a precious blessing, due to his family, but that should this peace ever be disturbed, old and infirm as he was, he would march at their head, under the ancient banner of French honour. Then suiting the action to the word, Louis XVIII. took two marshals by the arm and moved through the spacious apartments of Compiègne, saluting affectionately the crowds that pressed eagerly round him, but showing a marked preference for the marshals, and making to each some appropriate remark. To the old republican Lefebvre, he spoke of the gout, and conversed with the unfortunate Marmont about the wound he had received at Salamanca; he introduced the marshals in succession to his niece and to his cousins, and made them stay to dinner; during the repast, toasted the army in English liquor, and did not leave until he had charmed them by the mingled gracefulness and dignity of his manners, totally unlike either

the amiability of the Count d'Artois or the abruptness of Napoleon, whose manners, though irresistibly attractive, were harsh.

Close observers remarked with concern the foreign habits of the royal family, of which they seemed unconscious themselves: they remarked the wholly English costume of the Duchess d'Angoulême, as well as the coldness of manner, which the respect inspired by her misfortunes easily rendered excusable: but close observers are rare, especially under such circumstances. But the majority were delighted, and it must be confessed that existing circumstances were calculated to excite the imagination strongly, for here were presented two conditions rarely united, antiquity the most venerable, joined to novelty the most imposing. Under the rule of this ancient family, the men of the old *régime* recovered their position, and the modern men believed themselves secured in that which they had acquired. If, on the arrival of the Count d'Artois, comparisons were made, disadvantageous to the empire, it was still worse at Compiègne! The crowds assembled at the château declared that now they saw what kingly majesty was, of which they had not before had the slightest idea. And yet the greater number of these men had had the honour of approaching genius in its grandest and most striking phases. We must confess that these men would have been in the right had they said, that between a prince, born to the throne and uniting to the lustre of his origin, talent, knowledge, and a noble cast of feature; between this tranquil authority undisturbed by self-mistrust, and the haughty, fitful, abstracted, often harsh and abrupt rule of genius, there was a very great difference. But very few amongst them possessed so refined a taste, as to discern these distinctions, and it was strange to hear Marmont, Ney, Kellerman, Oudinot, Moncey, and Berthier speaking of the *majesty* of King Louis XVIII., and assuring each new-comer, that they had never seen anything similar. Such is the unceasing comedy of human life, which men never weary of playing, even though they have already played it a hundred times, and over which we shall pass rapidly, for it would be useless to hold the mirror again before their eyes, as we should never succeed in correcting that spirit of idolatry, which bows before the powers that be. But Compiègne was to be the scene of something more serious than official receptions; Louis XVIII. was to receive there those high personages that held in their hands the springs that moved the machinery of the state.

The king had, during his protracted journey from Calais to Compiègne, sent M. de Blacas to Paris, to learn from the Count d'Artois, and the most reliable royalists, all that was

most important for him to know. The Count d'Artois had hastened to fling himself into his brother's arms, and had received a welcome more affectionate than usual from Louis XVIII., whose heart was softened by joy. Besides, the news he brought was satisfactory. The Bourbons were momentarily becoming stronger, and the senate weaker, for from the day that this body had, by the Duke d'Otranto's advice, made a compromise by accepting a vague and general promise, legitimate royalty had not ceased to gain ground. However, it was impossible to contest fundamental principles; and though the ultra-royalists had a horror of everything bearing the name of constitution, still a constitution could not be refused. France, at every change of government, had acquired such a habit of drawing up in writing the conditions of her new position, that now, too, recourse must be had to the pen; and there was no choice but to grant a government like that of England, with two chambers debating and voting on public affairs, a free press, the impartial administration of justice, the confirmation of the sale of national property, the maintenance of the legion of honour, and of the new nobility. The Count d'Artois, M. de Montesquieu, and, indeed, all who had assisted in the work for the last month, were obliged to admit this. But those points to which Louis XVIII. attached most importance had been gained. He was not even obliged to accept the senatorial constitution, he was dispensed with taking the oath, and, in fact, with doing anything that had the appearance of accepting a constitution. He could give this constitution himself—give it as emanating spontaneously from his own royal authority—a proceeding which consecrated the principle of legitimate royalty, such as the ultra-royalists understood it. Besides, he need only choose some members of the senate, those that displeased him least, and complete the number from the ancient nobility. He could retain the legislative corps, which had given more satisfaction than the senate, and thus compose a government more to his taste. In short, in order to make more evident the difference between this truly royal mode of proceeding and that which the senate had at first required, the king was to enter Paris without giving a constitution, merely making a simple declaration in general terms, almost the same as that made by the Count d'Artois, an arrangement that would leave time to consider maturely the conditions of the new constitution.

These points coincided exactly with the views of Louis XVIII. He had no objection to this kind of government, which consists of two chambers, that torment the ministers, and leave the king in peace, for he had seen this system work

very well in England. But his authority, which, with the blood that flowed in his veins, had descended to him from Louis XIV., Henry IV., Saint Louis, and Hugh Capet—this authority had been recognised, and this was for him the principal point. To grant, what were called written guarantees, couched in whatever style might be desired, provided that he was supposed to have written them himself; to receive oaths, but not to take any, was a mode of proceeding that soothed his regal pride, and gratified his feelings. He would afterwards allow the country to be governed one way or another, provided that certain limits were not overstepped, and that he should be allowed to have such men as he pleased about his person. His brother, having provided for all these conditions, was welcome, and for the first time, in the king's opinion, his conduct was faultless.

Firmly fixed in these points by the information he had received from the Count d'Artois, M. de Blacas, and M. de Montesquiou, he knew how to treat everybody, and he spoke with some, listened to others, was gracious with all, without promising anything, but allowing everything to be expected from his unfettered wisdom, whilst he was firmly resolved not to accept from any one an advice which had the appearance of a condition.

The most important person, and he whose first interview with the King would be of great consequence, was M. de Talleyrand, who had been for some time, the principal actor on the political stage. Both Louis XVIII. and M. de Talleyrand had studied their parts well, for they were fond of acting, an art in which both excelled. M. de Talleyrand's part was the more difficult, not because he was the less talented of the two performers, but because of his position. For men who act exclusively upon principle, success is not an absolute necessity, but for men who trust solely to their talents it is an indispensable condition. Up to this time, between those who had refused all connection with the revolution, and those who had made a compromise with it, the advantage had appeared to be entirely on the side of the latter, for they seemed to understand in what the strength of the time lay, and joined the revolution, in order to guide it, whilst the others, blind and obstinate, had only hurried their king and friends to the scaffold. Suddenly the aspect of things changed, and those who had obstinately refused to listen to any accommodation, seemed to have judged correctly, and if the long revolution had now assumed its last phase—and the existing phase always seemed destined to be the last—it was they who would be pronounced to have acted wisely and correctly. Between Louis XVIII. returning from exile, and M. de Talleyrand,

who having alternately served the Republic and the Empire, had now, at the end of twenty years, returned to the feet of legitimacy, the advantage of position was entirely with the former. M. de Talleyrand could, indeed, boast of having contributed to the late change of affairs, but such services are soon forgotten. Besides, these services, in the opinion of the ultra royalists, were only an acknowledgment of his fault, a tardy return to true principles, and for the moment, Louis XVIII. was the conqueror, M. de Talleyrand the conquered, although he had himself contributed to his defeat. However, M. de Talleyrand assumed an attitude quite as haughty as that of his royal interlocutor. He also possessed exquisite tact, and a perfect knowledge of affairs, and the art of disposing of them with a word, and, above all, the art of flattering without demeaning himself, and of never playing a subordinate part, even in the presence of kings and princes. Louis XVIII. and M. de Talleyrand could, therefore, meet without disadvantage on either side, and each had prepared himself thoroughly for an interview, of which both felt the importance.

Louis XVIII. received M. de Talleyrand with extreme courtesy, thanked him for his services, like a prince who felt he owed everything to his own claims, showed him that those who returned from exile were not, after all, those who had displayed least judgment or penetration, but he passed quickly from this subject to that of the existing state of affairs. In point of fact, the King and his future prime minister coincided, for both agreed in essentials. On one side, the question was a written constitution; on the other, the giving it spontaneously. There was no further need of discussion; each eagerly assented to the points proposed by the other. To concede these two Chambers, which could not be refused, and gratify military men, whom it would be sufficient to flatter, for they neither desired to govern, nor knew how. Such was M. de Talleyrand's project, and the only one to which the King offered no objection. Louis XVIII., on his side, gave M. de Talleyrand to understand, that a man such as he, well skilled in the art of diplomacy, and still reflecting the *éclat* of the great empire, a *prestige* which Louis felt without acknowledging, should always be his representative before Europe. This was sufficient for M. de Talleyrand. The King and the minister then separated, after an interview which royal politeness had made sufficiently long—the King really satisfied, M. de Talleyrand affecting to be so. It may be supposed the latter was not fully content, for he did not tell any one what reasons he had to be so, and he preserved, which was unusual with him, a profound silence on the incidents of the

interview, which proved, at least, the unimportant nature of the conversation. He contented himself with saying, to those who questioned him, that the king was a man of intelligence, of very great intelligence, of a cast of mind, indeed, of which no specimens had appeared since the end of the eighteenth century.

Meanwhile, a more important visit was announced, that of the Emperor of Russia. The Emperor Alexander played, with sincerity and success, the part of the generous conqueror at Paris, and interested himself in our future destiny with a warmth and goodwill that well deserved the gratitude of the French, if it were not painful to be indebted even for one's happiness to a stranger. The King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria thought little of such things. The King of Prussia troubled himself little with what might happen to France, provided he could return to Berlin with solid assurances of peace, and large sums towards the expenses of the war; and the Emperor of Austria thought as little of the fate of France, provided he returned to Vienna with the certainty of getting Italy and the Tyrol. Let the Bourbons get out of the affair as well as they could; that was their business, and that of the French. Nothing more was asked of them, than that they would not again cross the Alps or the Rhine. As for Napoleon, it would be more agreeable had he been at the Azores or Saint Helena, than at Elba; but there he was, and no more interest was taken in him, at least for the present. Alexander thought otherwise. Liberal, and in little danger of being taken at his word on the subject of liberty by his subjects, yet sincere in his sentiments, he thought it more consistent with his own greatness to leave the French free, and also more prudent to leave them content. In the habit of frequenting the society of men who advocated liberal institutions, and very intimate with M. de Lafayette, who, at the first hope of a free government, had left his retreat at Lagrange, he became confirmed in his generous inclinations, bound himself by his words, and had, in some sort, taken upon himself the task of defending the ideas and interests of the senate, to whom he took a pleasure in acknowledging his obligations, for it was to this body the allied monarchs owed the deposition of Napoleon. Discontented, not with the Count d'Artois, but with the emigrants who had hurried from England and the provinces to Paris, Alexander had sent Count Pozzo di Borgo to Compeigne, to talk reason to Louis XVIII. But, though very adroit, Count Pozzo could not succeed in entering into any satisfactory explanation with this king, so heavy in body and so agile in mind, and who warded off all serious re-



monstrance with a half natural, half affected thoughtlessness. Alexander, therefore, determined to go himself to Compeigne, a bold step, for neither the King of Prussia nor the Emperor of Austria had gone there; but it was a step that the age and vivacity of the young Emperor might explain, and which could not fail to flatter Louis XVIII. extremely. Alexander wished to make him understand, that he must not only grant a constitution, but have about his person the men of the empire and revolution, give up the idea of dating his reign from the death of Louis XVII., comply in many points with the prevailing ideas of the times, and, above all, consider the army. Louis XVIII., having been apprised of this visit, determined to receive the Emperor, and to act towards him, as he did towards all who pretended to give him advice, with dignity and general professions of goodwill.

No sooner was Alexander announced, than crowds of courtiers fell back, leaving face to face the head of the European coalition, and the head of the old French dynasty. Flattered by this visit, and wishing to appear penetrated with gratitude, Louis XVIII. opened his arms to the young Emperor and received him as a father, but as a father, whose age and rank placed him above all the sovereigns of his time. Whilst he thanked him for the assistance he had given his family, he affected to refer the great events that had taken place, to superior and Providential causes, and especially to the influence of the great principle of which he was the representative. He seemed to have nothing to learn; when the Czar spoke to him of the new position of France, he listened with politeness, but as a man to whom a young prince could not teach anything, he disputed nothing, admitted nothing, expressed decided resolutions on every subject, conformable to his authority, which was not derived from any one, and to his wisdom, which needed no counsel; he allowed his resolutions to be understood without entering into particulars, and, in a word, was almost as incomprehensible to the sovereign as he had been to the ambassador. The embarrassment of the Emperor Alexander was completed by the arrival of a deputation of the legislative corps at Compeigne, to compliment the King, whilst the senate resuming its reserve and silence towards Louis XVIII. had neglected to appear. A body that pretended to represent the nation, and that had acquired popularity by its recent resistance to Napoleon, thus hastening to meet the monarch, and prostrate itself before his legitimate authority before he had made any promise, necessarily deprived the senate's silence of its influence, and gave Alexander the appearance of an importunate adviser. This prince gave up the idea of remonstrating warmly and returned unsuccessful

though overwhelmed with politeness ; he had spoken but few words, and had obtained still fewer from his august interlocutor ; he was not more contented than M. de Talleyrand, though he acknowledged it more frankly. Having two hundred thousand soldiers at his command, and being, unfortunately, master of France, it was more to his credit than discredit to acknowledge that he had been politely dismissed. After spending three or four days at Compeigne, in reposing himself and acquiring some notion of men and things, Louis XVIII. determined to repair to Saint Ouen, at the gates of Paris, where he would make a last and short stay before entering Paris itself. He decided with his brother and the members of the Provisional Government, that by publishing a general declaration, announcing the guaranteed constitutional principles they would satisfy the senate, who would visit the King, and thus the affair would be finished, three weeks before those men, who wished to procure France solid liberty under the ancient dynasty, would have been able, by the assistance of Alexander, to deny admittance to Louis XVIII., until he promised all that was demanded. But the excitement had become so great within a few days that it could not be allayed, and had the attempt been made, it would seem as if the assistance of foreigners had been sought in order to stop a national movement. France, indeed, having first hesitated whether she would recal the Bourbons, then saw that they were her only resource, and the necessity once admitted, the sensibility of some, and the sordidness of others, had given an impulse to the public mind, unexampled since the taking of the Bastille and the return of General Bonaparte from Egypt. The senate, which had grown weak by continual concessions, was losing ground every day ; but if the senate was conquered in what regarded its own interests, it was not vanquished in the principles which it had undertaken to support. The senate had demanded a constitution, and a constitution was about to be granted with the essential clauses. But the senate did not succeed in making the constitution the result of a combined act of the nation and the King, which would have given the constitution a strength and inviolability that might have secured its duration ; and in this respect the Bourbons lost their cause when they believed they had secured its triumph, for they established the ascendancy of this principle of *octroi royal*, of which the results at a future day were a *coup d'état* and their own downfall.

It was decided that they should confine themselves to a simple, general declaration, and all the Count d'Artois' assistants were set to work—M. de Vitrolles, his chief instrument, as well as M.M. de la Maisonfort and Terrier de

Montciel—who formed a second council in the *entresol* of the Tuileries. The King, who disdained such literature, did not interfere, but depended on M. de Blacas to superintend and revise their work. The question for these many editors was to know what part should be accorded to the senate, what amount of gratitude should be shown to that body, and how far, whilst carrying out their own wishes, they might seem to comply with the desires of the senate. It was agreed that these questions should be definitely arranged at Saint Ouen. The King was overjoyed at the idea of returning to his capital, and abandoned himself to the pleasure of inhaling once more that royal incense, which had not been burned before him for so many years, and of which he now received an inordinate measure. He set out for Saint Ouen, where he arrived on the first of May. At this, the last station of his route, the influx of visitors overflowed again, and filled the royal dwelling. The senate had not yet appeared in the presence of Louis XVIII. But it was necessary to put an end to the separation between the King and that constituent body which had recalled the Bourbons, from whose hands the Count d'Artois had received the Lieutenant Generalship, and which, though detested and even despised, nobody dared dissolve or annul, for the senate was supported by the high officers of the state, by the army, and the allied sovereigns. But as it had been decided that there should be a constitution, that this constitution should emanate from the royal authority, and that the senate should compose in great part, the upper chamber, there was no reason why the senate should hold back any longer. The senators therefore consented to visit the King, and M. de Talleyrand presented them to Louis XVIII. at St. Ouen, as he had presented them to the Count d'Artois at the Tuileries. M. de Talleyrand's discourse, carefully drawn up, expressed the current ideas of the day. It was no longer the senate, he said, but the entire nation, enlightened by experience, that came to meet the King and recal him to the throne of his ancestors. The senate sharing the sentiments of the nation, came at the same time to salute the monarch. He, on his side, guided by his wisdom, was about to grant institutions conformable to the wants of modern reason. A constitutional charter would unite the interests of all parties with those of the throne, and strengthen the royal will by the adhesion of the nation's will. The King knew better than any one, that such institutions, long and happily tried in a neighbouring nation, offered a support and not an obstacle to those monarchs who based their authority on the law of the land, and were fathers to their people.

To this discourse the King made a gracious reply, which

contained a full assent to the sentiments expressed by the president of the senate. Strange to say, the members of the legislative corps, whose conduct in these circumstances dictated by a puerile jealousy, was far from honourable, and very injurious to the public cause, wished to present themselves a second time before the King, though they had already paid him their respects at Compeigne. They repeated the commonplaces of the day, and after them, the principal bodies of the state would needs recommence defiling and haranguing. The 2nd May was appointed for receptions, and but little time remained for serious business. The declaration that was to precede the King's entry into Paris, and which was, in reality, the condition of this entry, was not even drawn up on the evening of the second, or to speak more correctly, it was overdone, for there were five or six drafts, one drawn up by M. de Vitrolles, another by M. de la Maisonfort, besides several others. The King weary, and caring little about the terms in which he should be made say what had been agreed on several days before, ordered M. de Blacas to see to the definite arrangement of this declaration that was to be published the following day. M. de Blacas assembled the different compilers, passed a part of the night of the 2-3rd May with them, gave audience to some advisers, each of whom brought a phrase or an idea, took care to dismiss the greater number of them, and then, having softened down those sentences which seemed to express too much gratitude to the senate, or too much dependance on that body, he decided on the form of the declaration. M. de Vitrolles, who was the principal compiler, having asked if it should not be submitted to the King, M. de Blacas replied that it was not necessary to disturb the monarch, who had much need of repose on the eve of such a day as the approaching, and the original of the celebrated declaration of St. Ouen was dated 2nd May, sent to the King's printer, and in the morning a large number of copies was issued.

The following is the preamble to this declaration :—

“Recalled by the love of our people to the throne of our fathers, enlightened by the misfortunes of the nation that we are destined to govern, our first thought is to invoke that mutual confidence so necessary to our repose, and to the happiness of our people.

“Having read attentively the plan of the constitution proposed by the senate at its meeting of the sixth of last April, we find the fundamental principles of this constitution excellent, but many of the articles bear the impress of the haste with which they were drawn up, and

cannot, in their present form, become fundamental laws of the state.

“Being resolved to adopt a liberal constitution, desirous that it should be the result of mature deliberation, wishing that it should be wisely compiled, and not wishing to accept one that would require revision, we summon for the tenth of the month of June of the present year, the senate and legislative corps, before whom we pledge ourselves to lay the result of our labours, assisted by a commission selected from these two bodies, and to lay down as bases of this constitution the following guarantees.”

After this preamble, the guarantees which had never varied, were enumerated. Two chambers voting on all affairs of state; responsible ministers bound to appear before these chambers; personal liberty; liberty of the press; liberty of conscience; taxation by vote; the eligibility of Frenchmen of every rank to civil and military employments; the permanency of judges, the confirmation of the national sales; the support of the Legion of Honour, &c. With the exception of the fundamental question of its origin, which made the constitutional charter a concession and not a contract, the promise to give it such as was desired was formal; and besides, it was made to the senate, which heightened the importance and authority of this body, and assured the adoption of the most desired resolutions, with one exception, which, we repeat, the Bourbons ought to have been less inclined to reject than any other, for well would it have been for them had they been bound beyond the possibility of retracting.

Under the auspices of this declaration, Louis XVIII. prepared to make his entry into Paris the 3rd May. He left St. Ouen at eleven in the morning, escorted by an immense crowd that came to meet him. He was in a caleche drawn by eight horses, the Duchess d'Angoulême at his side, and the two Princes de Condé on the opposite seat; the Count d'Artois on the right of his carriage; the Duke of Berry on the left, both on horseback. Behind the King's carriage came the Marshals, next followed the cavalry of the National Guard, commanded by Count Charles de Damas. Whilst this great cortege was passing, every eye was turned on the infantry of the Imperial Guard, of which some companies had guarded the King at Compeigne, had followed him to St. Ouen, and now escorted him to Paris. The public contemplated with extreme curiosity those manly faces, tanned by twenty-five years warfare, assisting respectfully at a ceremony opposed to their inclinations, neither joyous nor excited like their marshals, but haughty though submissive to the desires of France, whose

destinies were now being changed. Amidst the ardent and unanimous cries of "Vive le Roi," there was frequently heard "Vive la Garde," an expressive cry that proved the sympathy of all present for these noble relics of our heroic wars. Even the more rational of the royalists admired their attitude, at once proud and resigned.\*

Louis XVIII. was received with enthusiasm. Those deep-seated emotions, the offspring of memory, which the Bourbons possessed the gift of awakening, were perhaps stronger, when the Count d'Artois made his entrance into Paris, because the people then felt those emotions for the first time. But reflection told all minds, that nothing better could be done than to recal the Bourbons, and that with them alone could peace and a moderate government be expected. This was also become the opinion of the middle classes, dispassionate and disinterested judges of the questions of Government. They had a particularly good opinion of the King who had gained an undisputed reputation for wisdom, by his prudent conduct during the emigration; the middle-classes were very well disposed, and possessing great influence with the populace, who are naturally imitative, they caused Louis XVIII. to be loudly applauded, by applauding him themselves. The King's figure was concealed by the carriage, and his noble countenance rendered more gracious by content, was alone visible, and gave pleasure to all beholders. The desire of peace being universal, no one regretted that the King now called to the throne, was unable to manage a horse, and the public imagination dwelt with pleasure on the oft-sketched image of an aged father returning to the bosom of his family. The Duchess d' Angoulême, whose usually severe countenance was several times this day bathed with tears, and the Princes of Condé, whose misfortunes were present to every mind, excited general interest. This carriage, which contained the entire Bourbon family, was accompanied by the most respectful acclamations, until it arrived at Nôtre Dame. After the religious ceremony the carriage turned towards the Tuileries by the Pont Neuf, where a statue in plaster of Henry IV. had been raised, and at this spot all present hastened to the assistance of the Duchess d' Angoulême, who fainted at the sight of this palace which her parents had left to go to the Temple and from the Temple to the scaffold. At this affecting scene every heart was moved. Brought back in this fashion to the palace of their fathers, this august family might with good reason believe

\*Many writers and M. de Chateaubriand in particular, who in general troubles himself very little about the truth, have spoken of the deportment of the guards in exaggerated terms. According to the most creditable witnesses they behaved exactly as we have endeavoured to describe, coldly but submissively.

themselves definitely established within its walls. And that it should be so, only one thing was necessary—that in entering the Tuileries the Bourbons had participated in the advanced intelligence of the age and the enlightenment of the country over which they were come to reign! It was to be desired both for them and for France. But at this very moment, these unfortunate emigrants gave a new proof of the difficulty of reconciling them with this France, of which they had seen little during twenty years, and studied still less. The grenadiers of the Imperial Guard, who had attended the King both at Compeigne and St. Ouen, and who had no other thought than to fulfil their duty to him, were placed as sentinels round the Tuileries. When the courtiers, both men and women, learned to whom their safety, and above all, that of the royal family was confided, they were seized with terror. They had recourse to M. Dupont, the Minister of War, and asked him if he had lost his reason, when he dared to trust the precious existence of the King to such hands? The General, accustomed to the fidelity of the French soldiers under arms, scarcely understood what they meant. He was at first tempted to laugh at such fears, but they recalled him to what they called the importance of the affair, and that very evening, without any consideration for these brave soldiers, who though their hearts were full of Napoleon would still have defended Louis XVIII. against all comers, he was forced to dismiss them, and insultingly send them to their barracks. And these were the hearts that were to be united, that were to be fused in love for the same dynasty.\*

Next day, the different bodies of the state recommenced their visits to the Royal Family, always repeating the same speeches; then the allied troops defiled before Louis XVIII. seated on the balcony of his palace, and surrounded by the principal sovereigns of Europe, who courteously yielded the first place to him, wishing thereby to prove to France how much they esteemed both her King and herself.

Some time having been devoted to ceremonies and congratulations, the moment was now come to commence the laborious work of reconciling the past and present, of giving some compensation to the classes injured by a long proscription, without, however, offending the nation, that would not consent to be sacrificed to any private interest; seeking truth and justice through a space of twenty-five years filled with bloody quarrels, and from these to construct a system of government; a very difficult task, and almost impossible, unless a clear and firm

\* I only repeat in this place, in other words, the very sentiments which General Dupont expresses in his manuscript memoirs.

May, 1814.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE.

intellect should be found in the King, or one of the princes of his family, or in some minister capable of obtaining a decisive ascendancy over the court and government! Could this phenomenon be found? This was the question, and a very obscure one.

Under the short rule of the Count d'Artois, the government had only had a provisional character, and the ministers had merely borne the title of commissioners of the different ministerial departments. It was now necessary to form a definite ministry. Louis XVIII. taking things as he found them, continued the separation, which had existed under the Count d'Artois, between the Royal Council aiding the Prince with its advice, and the ministers executing his wishes, some ministers being permanent members of this council, and others only summoned to it for the special affairs of their departments. It was a strange combination, and very little suited to the government that was about to be given to France.

In order that a free state, formed upon the principle of deliberative assemblies should possess that unity of will, without which promptitude and vigour of action would be impossible, and that clearness of perception which can only result from the co-operation of many minds, it is necessary that the ministers trusted with the governing power under the crown and the chambers, should be the sole councillors of the crown, that they should concoct the resolutions of government, get them sanctioned by the king and the chambers, and then have them executed on their own responsibility, both collective and individual. It would also be necessary, before bringing the great powers of the state to this desirable state of unity, that the ministers themselves should be united by the influence of one amongst them, superior to the others in intelligence, temper, and position. It is under such conditions alone, that all the intelligence of a country can be united for the common good, which is the privilege of free states, and, at the same time, preserve that unity of action which seems to be the privilege of absolute governments, but which enjoy this advantage only in appearance, for such governments are frequently the most unstable. Between the crown and the deliberative bodies, there must, therefore, be no other intermediaries than the ministers alone, who are at once the authors, demonstrators, and executors, on their own responsibility, of the different acts that constitute the administrative authority. All additional machinery is useless and consequently hurtful. But, in 1814, experience had not yet taught us anything on these important subjects, and even in England people acted more from instinct than reflection.



Free government was a science existing in England practically, but theoretically nowhere.

The King simply accepted the legacy of circumstances—that is, the superior royal council, which was only, as we have seen, the old provisional government transformed into the council of the Lieutenant General, and under it the ministers, some being members of the council and some not. He confined himself to making definite appointments to each department by continuing in office the actual possessors of portfolios, or by changing them as circumstances arose. The following were his selection.

No one would wish to remove M. Louis from the finance department, where, in a few days, he had gained universal confidence. He was named minister of this department. General Dupont, who was well acquainted with the army, and did all in his power to satisfy the feelings of the military, but unfortunately possessed of less firmness than intelligence, and who had with difficulty preserved his presence of mind, in the midst of conflicting pretensions, but who had not yet lost the prestige of his long disgrace, was confirmed in the post of Minister of War. M. de Malouet, an honest, laborious man, retained his office as Marine Minister. M.M. de Talleyrand, and de Montesquiou were summoned to the ministry, however, without losing their places in the council. Although M. de Laforest was Minister of Foreign Affairs, it was M. de Talleyrand alone who had directed the negotiation of the armistice, and he was the only person that could arrange the conditions of a definite peace. He became titular minister of foreign affairs, whilst next to the princes of the blood, he was the most important member of the superior royal council, which from custom was now called the "upper council."

Although M. de Montesquiou was a clergyman, he did not wish to be either cardinal or ambassador to the Holy See; he wished to be minister in France, and chief minister. He willingly resigned the foreign policy, which, on account of the peace, he believed would be, for a long time, very unimportant, and which also belonged of right to M. de Talleyrand, and reserved himself for the home policy which was about to become very active, very difficult, and very stormy. He possessed more than one advantage for this department. He exercised a certain authority over his own party, and could be as arrogant to his colleagues as to others; he was accustomed to public life, and spoke with ease. But he was irritable, and did not possess sufficient vigour either of mind or character, and was quite unequal to the burden he was about to assume—a burden which would have been, indeed, too

heavy for anybody. But the royalist party had not, at this time, a better candidate to offer to the king, so that the choice of the minister for the home department, was, under the circumstances, the best that could be made. M. Beugnot, who had temporarily administered the home department, was compensated with the command of the police under the title of "director general," an office almost equivalent to a place in the ministry.

M. Henrion de Pansey, notwithstanding the excellence of his character, lost his appointment of chancellor. It was desirable, that a man who had belonged to the ancient parliaments, should be at the head of the magistracy, and a magistrate was chosen who possessed the learning, and somewhat of the studied eloquence of d'Aguesseau, and who, endowed at the same time with a mild temper and honourable principles, entertained all the opinions of the old royalists. This magistrate was M. Dambray. Lastly, it would be impolitic to exclude from the official members of the government, a person who possessed so much influence at court as M. de Blacas, and the ministers, desirous of associating him with themselves, offered him the control of the royal household. M. de Blacas had just been appointed Grand Master of the Bedchamber, the only important office that was vacant at court, for all the others had been given to their old possessors. Vain of this distinguished favour, he thought it would be a degradation to enter the ministry. It was only by great efforts that he could be induced to yield. Great efforts were made, and he was prevailed on to accept a portfolio, which leaving him near the King's person, without imposing on him any portion of the burden of public affairs, yet united him in the collective responsibility of the ministry.

The Count d'Artois had admitted M. de Vitrolles into the council with the title of secretary of state. A secretary of state, placed between the sovereign and his ministers, in order to transmit to them the orders of a master who never took council but of himself, ought to have passed away with Napoleon. In the new order of things this post should have fallen to the lot of M. de Blacas, and would have been an impossibility even for him. In fact, the ministers had determined to communicate directly with the King, and had already refused to accept the intervention of M. de Vitrolles with the Count d'Artois, which, indeed, was only natural, since they were the responsible authors of their own acts. But one function, therefore, remained to the new secretary of state, that of keeping a registry of the meetings of the council. The members of the council would not on

any account sanction this registry. M. de Montesquiou and M. de Talleyrand said, with justice, that a registry would restrain the freedom of debate, for the certainty of having all they said noted down, whether correctly or not, would prevent the most sincere and the most courageous members of the government from speaking with perfect frankness. Therefore, there being no longer any intermediary between the ministers and the King, and, not being allowed to keep a register, the secretary of state had no duties to perform. His colleagues did what they could to exclude M. de Vitrolles from the royal council, and to compensate him by a post at court. But he was obstinate, and, being supported by the princes, remained in the council, where his only employment was to take notes of the adopted resolutions, and to correspond with the *Moniteur* or the *Telegraph*. So he remained, little liked by his colleagues, liking them still less, at open enmity with M. de Montesquiou, who was not sparing of arrogance towards a person whose rank he despised, whose merit he did not recognise, and whose services he denied.\*

To these personages was added, with the title of minister of state in charge of the post-office, M. Ferrand, a well-informed old man, and a not very skilful writer, endowed with all the obstinacy and the vehemence of the ultra-royalists. He was in the administration of the post-office what M. Beugnot was in the police—a director-general, with almost ministerial rank.

Such was the cabinet of Louis XVIII., if an assemblage of ministers can be called a cabinet, in which M. de Talleyrand, the most important by his position, was allowed to occupy himself only with foreign affairs, where M. de Montesquiou, the next in importance, was obliged to give his entire attention to affairs connected with the Chambers; and M. de Blacas, the third in rank, was allowed to interfere solely in business brought immediately under the King's notice—a cabinet, in which each minister acted almost isolated, not being united by a prime minister, for no such person existed; nor by the superior royal council, which had no leader; for a literary king, indolent and solely occupied with classic reading, could not be considered as a head. There was reason to fear that this ministerial chaos, unguided by any governing power, would be led by the passions of the times, which were very irrational, very exacting, and very unsettled.

On the second day after his entry into Paris the King assembled the royal council, to which, on this occasion, all

\* M. de Vitrolles kept, nevertheless, some sort of register of the meetings of the council, very short, but very interesting, and which is still preserved in the archives of the state, and is perhaps one of the most curious documents we possess concerning the government of the first Restoration.

the ministers were summoned, besides the princes, who were amongst its habitual members. The King addressed the council in an opening speech, which was studied, polite, and affectionate. He spoke in a clear voice, with effect, though haughtily, touching rather superficially on every subject, wishing that, on the first day, a word at least should be said about everything. He enumerated the different objects that were to be provided for; the army, which should be re-organised, and attached to the present dynasty; the navy, which should be remodelled, and proportioned to our financial resources; the old military establishment of the King, which was to be again set on foot; the finances, which should be the measure of what could be done for the army and navy; the taxes, which must be maintained and collected in spite of imprudent promises; the sufferings of the occupied provinces, to which a speedy end must be put; the negotiations, which it was important should end in a definite but not humiliating peace; and, lastly, the constitution, which was promised for the 10th of June at the latest.

The task with regard to the army was most difficult. It was in the first place necessary to decide on the principle of recruiting, and come to a rational resolution, considering the pledge the princes had made to abolish conscription. Besides, notwithstanding the number of desertions, the difficulty was not in the want of men, but, on the contrary, in their too great number, and in the sentiments they expressed. A hundred and fifty thousand men were about to return from England, Russia, Germany, and Spain, and about as many prisoners, all old soldiers. There would be, consequently, four hundred thousand men, at least, and more than forty thousand officers, for all of whom provision should be made. The minister of finance declared, that when the state debts should be paid, he would not have more than two hundred millions of francs to devote to the army—that is to say, that he had scarcely sufficient to pay half the claims that would be made on him. As to the navy, Napoleon's hundred vessels must be given up, for if this number was too great when the empire extended from Lubeck to Trieste, and when France had double the number of sailors, it would be ridiculous when France would be reduced to the frontiers of 1790.

Some words were exchanged on these serious subjects. The minister of war was requested to produce a plan of organisation, which would, as far as possible, satisfy all interests, by conforming to the temporary financial distress. The minister of marine was authorised to prepare large reductions, for a long peace with England was reckoned on, and it was not

desirable to offend this power by an expensive and useless display of naval force. The King, who was very sensitive to externals, desired that the names of several vessels, which recalled revolutionary memories, should be changed, whilst those of Austerlitz and Friedland, for example, which only spoke of victory, should be retained. Lastly, he questioned the minister of finance, who did not hesitate to explain again his irrevocable intentions. At first he wished to lay it down as a principle, that all the state debts should be paid, even those that were called "Buonaparte's debts," and which, unfortunately, had been contracted to support unwise wars. Whether the money were well or ill employed, these debts had been contracted on the credit of France, and it would have been as scandalous as impossible to deny them. Without this scrupulous exactness in fulfilling the engagements of the treasury there would be no public credit, and without credit, whatever system may be adopted, the taxes being insufficient for several years, it would not be possible to satisfy the most pressing wants of the state. But with credit it would be possible, provided that the proper means were adopted to obtain it. But as credit would not suffice for everything, it would be necessary also to require the exact payment of the taxes. The city of Bordeaux, in calling itself the "*City of the Twelfth of March*," signified an intention not to pay the *droits réunis*; and the other cities of the south, encouraged by this example, adopted the like resolution. If the King, now that he was at the head of the government, did not address the southern populations with great firmness, all help from the taxes, and consequently all public credit, would disappear. So spoke the minister.

The Count d'Artois reminded him that a promise had been given to abolish the *droits réunis*. "You made another promise," replied M. Louis, "that the public debts should be paid, and this promise is much more important than the other."

The King, always glad of an opportunity to make his nephews, and still more his brother, appear to be in the wrong, fully agreed with M. Louis; he declared, that without depriving the people, who had been led away by thoughtless promises, of all hope of amelioration, he intended to address a proclamation to them, recalling them to their duty, and reminding them that taxation, like law, was to be the same for all, and that good intentions, however excellent they may be, would not suffice to pay the expenses of the state. It was decided that this proclamation should be immediately drawn up, signed by the King, and published.

The ministers of finance, of war, and of the navy, having

spoken together for a few moments, it was evident that economy should be the inflexible law of the new government, for without economy it would be impossible to meet the various demands of the different government departments, and above all, to satisfy the army, whose good will it was all-important to gain. This was no time to think of expense or luxury, or of any project not demanded by absolute necessity. And still Louis XVIII. spoke in the simplest and most decided manner of the ancient military household of the King, as of an institution definitely re-established. "Already," he said, "the ancient officers of the body guards have resumed their titles." These were MM. d'Havr , de Grammont, de Poix, and de Luxembourg. But this was not enough; he also wished to increase the number of companies, in order to appoint two new officers chosen from the Imperial Army. And he was desirous of re-establishing the red companies. His determination was fixed, for it was, in his opinion, for want of a sufficient military household that royalty, and France with her, had suffered so many misfortunes in 1789.

To understand how imprudent it was to re-establish this ancient military household, it must be explained that under the name of *red companies*, it was meant to assemble two or three thousand gentlemen, some very old, and others mere boys, not deficient in courage, if an occasion called for it, but wholly unfit for effective military service; they were all to have magnificent uniforms, and a rank not lower than that of captain. Besides these, there were to be assembled, under the name of body-guards, three thousand young men who should have the rank of cornets, and to whom were to be added artillery and infantry, to the number of four thousand, which would make altogether about ten thousand men, costing as much as forty or fifty thousand, at a moment when it would be, perhaps, necessary to disband two hundred thousand soldiers, and thirty thousand veteran officers, covered with wounds, and doomed to sink into misery. The King's household, thus constituted, could not cost less than twenty million francs; and should the civil list pay a part, it would be a great imprudence to divert such a sum from the war budget, and give the army, little disposed as it was to interpret favorably the diminution it was about to undergo, an opportunity of comparing its misery with the opulence of the King's household troops. Louis XVIII. distinctly declared that the Imperial Guard should meet the highest consideration, but how were all these things to be conciliated? how were all these expenses to be met?

We may see from this, that the Bourbon princes returned with resolutions ready-formed on the most important sub-

jects. They wished in the present instance to furnish employment to poor gentlemen (the only specious excuse for the proceeding), and they actually believed that six thousand gentlemen, well armed, could have checked the French Revolution, an opinion, indeed, which they were not singular in professing. This august family was destined soon to experience what resistance could be made against a revolution with even the bravest gentlemen! No member of the council dared to raise an objection to a resolution apparently irrevocable. Even the Minister of Finance was silent. He gave what money he could, employing all his energy to avoid giving more; and as to how it should be employed, he left that to the consideration of the Minister of War, who was more interested in the question than he. The latter would take good care not to quarrel with the French nobility, who were willing in this fashion to resume the profession of arms. M. de Talleyrand and M. de Montesquiou possessed sufficient power to render them fearless of the nobility, but the former wished to win their good opinion, and the latter agreed with him on this occasion, so that no opposition was offered to a measure destined to be fatal to the Bourbon dynasty. As a proof of his solicitude for the army, and of the attention with which its interests would be guarded, the King announced that he would form a superior Council of War, composed of the princes, of several marshals, and of some of the most distinguished lieutenants-general of each service. He added that he would himself preside.

The sufferings of the occupied provinces were then spoken of. It was already evident that the Convention of the 23rd April was a deception. The foreign troops that were to have retired in proportion as we evacuated the fortresses, had not even moved. The heads of the armies intended to sell for their own advantage the *materiel* deposited in the magazines and arsenals of which they had taken possession. They even carried their pretensions so far as to lay claim to the salt magazines, and attempted to cut down the woods for their private benefit, and, in the disputes resulting from these pretensions, sought a fresh motive for delaying their departure. The sacrifices that had been made in evacuating so many distant posts of the highest importance, met with no compensation, and the immediate relief that had been hoped from the Convention of the 23rd of April, was found to be an illusion.

The King expressed himself very warmly on this subject, and the Duke de Berry, who was always excitable, said that France should not be devastated in this manner on unfounded pretexts, Napoleon having already gone to Elba, and all the



commanders of the French army having submitted to the new order of things. M. de Talleyrand was ordered to speak on this subject with the sovereigns and their ministers, and to express himself in the most decided manner. He was also desired to introduce the important subject of peace; and as to the constitution, the King, as we have already remarked, said nothing, or almost nothing. But it was of the first importance to fulfil the pledges made to the senate and the legislative corps, that were summoned to meet on the 10th of June. The allied sovereigns, on their part, showed a desire to leave France, recalled to their dominions by their own affairs, and also desirous to obtain their share of the spoils of the great empire. They were consequently anxious for the speedy conclusion of the peace; and they often insinuated—Alexander more than the others—that they should not consider their obligations towards France fulfilled, and particularly towards those who had rid them of Napoleon, until the question of the constitution should be decided. Influenced by these different reasons, Louis XVIII. declared his intention of anticipating the day appointed for the convocation of the senate and the legislative corps; consequently the 31st May was substituted for the 10th June—a change which necessitated greater expedition in drawing up a sketch of the new constitution.

During this preliminary examination of the great affairs of state, Louis XVIII. appeared to his councillors to be dignified, affable, and, perhaps, a little superficial to those who, like M. de Talleyrand, M. Louis, and General Dessoles, were capable of seeing beyond the surface. However, the members of the council were satisfied, and, according to custom, affected to be still more so than they really were.

Every subject entered upon was of importance. M. de Talleyrand, having learned from the Minister of the Interior the horrible exactions practised in our provinces, introduced the subject to the allied monarchs and their ministers. To produce the treaty of the 23rd April was sufficient to prove them in the wrong; for it had been decided that from the date of this convention all exactions should cease, that the allied troops should commence their retreat, and that the territories through which they marched should alone be obliged to furnish them provisions during their passage. Although the articles of the convention might in the execution give rise to abuses, still the exactions that had been made were exorbitant, and so odious, that no excuse could be offered for them. Alexander appeared to be sincerely indignant at what he heard, and declared that he had given orders, and that he would now renew them. The King of Prussia, being niggardly and desirous of small profits for his army, was



really embarrassed, but promised to issue fresh instructions. Prince Schwarzenberg's language was satisfactory, but his sincerity doubtful. M. de Talleyrand said to the allied ministers that since all admitted the injustice of what was going on, no one could take it amiss if the King, in a proclamation addressed to his subjects, should advise them to resist the exactions daily committed, both by levies in kind and by the sale of property belonging to the state. The ministers did not dare to object, for that would be to acknowledge themselves the accomplices of their subordinates, and a proclamation was drawn up upon the spot, conformable to the truths that had been admitted, and sent to the Royal Council. There was at the same time laid before the council the proclamation concerning the collection of the *droits réunis*—an affair always of great difficulty, as we have said, in the Southern provinces.

The proclamation intended for the occupied provinces, cited the convention of the 23rd April, of which the intention had been to allow France to enjoy an anticipated peace. In the proclamation the inhabitants of these provinces were called upon to fulfil faithfully the conditions of this convention, and consequently to treat the allied armies well, and supply them during their retreat with whatever they might need.

But the proclamation reminded the people of the promises made to France, not to make any further war levies, to respect public and private property, and enjoined them to refuse compliance with every illegal demand, and forbade them to purchase articles offered for sale by the foreign armies, such as wood, salt, or furniture, declaring beforehand that all such sales were illegal and void. The precaution was a good one, for, taking wood as an example, as its cutting down and removal would require several months, the declaration of the nullity of the sale would prevent purchasers from presenting themselves, seeing that they would be certain not to obtain what they should have paid for. It is sad to think that such measures were necessary to prevent the French from assisting in the spoliation of the land; but since the mournful necessity existed, we repeat, that the precaution was well devised. Besides, it was couched in firm and dignified language, which was not at all calculated to offend the allied sovereigns, however severe upon their generals.

The proclamation was adopted and published immediately. The motion concerning the *droits réunis* was less unanimously supported, and met with much opposition from the princes. In treating this subject, the promises made by the Count d'Artois and his sons always presented a difficulty. This prince returned to the charge, reminded the ministers of the promises made

to the people, and alleged the excellent dispositions of the refractory provinces. But these remarks had no effect on M. Louis, who said that, in financial matters, the best disposed were those who paid the taxes punctually, and that it was an indispensable necessity that all should submit to the laws, otherwise he should be obliged to retire, and leave his place to those who would undertake to govern in the midst of such anarchy. The King, annoyed at constantly hearing of the promises made by his brother and nephews, and weary of a royalism that manifested itself by refusing to pay the taxes, said that the Vendéans were as much royalists as the Bordelais, and that notwithstanding they paid the public dues. Had the King been better informed, he would have known that the Vendéans behaved no better, with regard to the duty on salt, than the Bordelais with regard to that on wines. However, the argument was good with respect to others, if not to the Vendéans, and the Minister of Finance, supported by the King and his colleagues, carried the proclamation in dispute; it was published with that intended for the invaded provinces.

In this proclamation, the King, addressing himself to the wine-growing provinces, said that, like Henry IV. and Louis XII., he wished to be called the father of his people, and to be able to suppress all burdensome imposts; but that the present taxes, which had been much ameliorated, were indispensable, until some means should be devised to replace or suppress them; that a sacred duty was to be fulfilled towards the creditors of the State, and towards the army, which could not be done if the finances became disorganised; besides, it was necessary to give an example of respect for the laws, if they did not wish to fall into a frightful state of anarchy; he hoped that his subjects in the southern province, who every day bestowed on him lavish expressions of their affection, would now give an effective proof of it, by submitting to a necessity, whose duration he would endeavour to abridge; that he would rather warn than correct, but that if, having admonished, his voice were not attended to, he should be obliged to punish, and he would do so, to prevent the disorganisation of the finances, the destruction of the laws, and the ruin of the State.

These two proclamations were, indeed, only words, but it was useful that they should be heard, especially from the lips of the head of the house of Bourbon. The foreign generals would be less audacious in their exactions, and compelled to greater precaution now that their acts were disclaimed by their sovereigns, and by the Bourbons their allies, besides being exposed to meet with greater opposition from the people. As to the refractory provinces, the affectionate language of the monarch was certainly not capable of converting them, but

the resolution, so decidedly expressed concerning the execution of the laws, would give the authorities a moral force which, up to this moment they had not possessed, and would also hasten the time when the taxes might be again collected.

The next objects to be considered were the peace and the constitution, in order to place France in a proper and definite position, externally with regard to Europe and internally with respect to herself.

M. de Talleyrand was naturally the principal agent of the Government in the important negotiation concerning the peace, and the task was not an easy one, even for him. A great deal had been said on this subject, in the conversation of each day, but no positive decision had been come to. But there were two description of questions to be decided, those which concerned France in particular, and those which concerned all Europe. Thus, although the principal belligerent powers were decided as to what they wished for, and tacitly determined to let each satisfy itself; although England, as was well known, had resolved to claim Belgium, in order to join it to Holland and thus create an important monarchy, which would remove us from the mouths of large rivers; although Austria, independently of Italy, also desired a portion of the banks of the Rhine to give Bavaria in exchange for the Tyrol; although Russia and Prussia desired to have Poland and Saxony to share amongst themselves; and that these motives decided all four to deprive us of the Rhine frontier, in order that these different arrangements might be practicable, still, even in permitting each other to effect these different spoliations, there still remained so many subordinate questions to be determined, both as to the extent of the partitions, and the combinations to be adopted, in order to establish in some sort a European equilibrium, so that the lesser states should not be sacrificed to the greater, that the decision was not easy, and there was no certainty of obtaining it but after long and painful efforts. It was seen at a glance, that without supposing sittings so protracted as those of the congress of Westphalia (which had continued several years) it would require some months to conciliate all these interests, and the allied sovereigns did not wish to pass these months in Paris. There was another reason why these numerous questions should not be debated in Paris, and this was that France should not be afforded an opportunity of taking part in the discussion. However desirous the allies might be of agreeing, they were almost certain of not doing so, and consequently of quarrelling more than once before arriving at a definite resolution, and they did not wish to give France the immense advantage of being present at the disputes. Besides being a moral triumph, it would offer her an

opportunity of recovering with ease a strong position, by uniting herself to one party against the other, and so making powerful alliances. Although the other powers pretended that France should be better treated than she was at Châtillon, in point of fact, they cared little about how she was treated, and under the Bourbons as well as under Napoleon it was determined to reduce her to her ancient limits, and, as far as possible, exclude her from the great European arrangements. There was less to irritate under the Bourbons, but there was also less of the fear that Napoleon inspired, and the one almost compensated for the other. M. de Metternich had since his arrival again taken the chief part in the negotiations, and thanks to his profound and redoubtable sagacity, he said that it was necessary, first to arrange relations with us, and that there would be afterwards less difficulty in arranging the relations of the European states amongst themselves.

This subtle thought soon penetrated the minds of the allied sovereigns, and they decided to conclude their arrangements with France at Paris, and reserve for a congress, which should be held in one of the great capitals of the continent, the general arrangements which should constitute the new balance of power in Europe. Austria was treated at this period with great deference because she had secured the general safety by joining the coalition spite of her natural repugnance and the ties of blood, and it was decided that the future congress should be held at Vienna.

The foregoing arrangements being communicated to the French negotiators met with no opposition from them. At first view they appeared simple and free from guile, for it was of the first importance to put an end to the war, and consequently to treat first with France, against whom arms had been taken up. No opposition could be offered to the project of submitting the numerous questions to which the new order of things would give rise in Europe, to a future assembly to be held in a central capital after the different monarchs should have had time to return to their dominions, and arrange their most pressing affairs, and thus be more at liberty to give the necessary attention to those definite arrangements which interested the entire world. It would have been difficult to make any objection to so specious a plan, and one so apparently well founded. In fact nothing was objected, for on our part we were anxious to enjoy the honour of having concluded a peace, which would furnish so happy a contrast between the government of the Bourbons and that of Napoleon.

These resolutions were consequently adopted, and it was arranged that all things concerning France should be first and immediately decided. The frontier question was the first, and

beyond all comparison the most important. We had often been told that France would be treated very differently under the Bourbons to what she was under the Bonapartes. More was done than saying this—it had been written, and a number of proclamations had been filled with this promise. Afterwards, in the conversations to which the conventions of the 23rd April had given occasion, there had been mention, but in a very vague manner, and without any definite engagement, of adding a million subjects in addition to our territorial possessions of 1790. As to the principle of the frontiers of 1790 it had never been altered either directly or indirectly, and no negotiator in the world, except it had been Napoleon himself flushed with victory, could have obtained a concession on this point. In fact, on this depended the creation of the kingdom of the Low Countries, so anxiously desired by England, the restitution of the Tyrol and Italy for Austria, the acquisition of Poland for Russia, and of Saxony for Prussia, since it would have been impossible to accomplish these projects without depriving us of the left bank of the Rhine. It would therefore have been unreasonable to try to change this resolution. It would be uselessly exerting a tenacity of disposition which could be better employed elsewhere. Consequently good care was taken not to dispute a point so decided, and every effort was directed to the manner of defining the frontier of 1790, of which we had been solemnly promised an improvement.

M. de Talleyrand had received certain instructions in full royal council. He had been recommended most particularly to try and obtain the million subjects on the north side of France, and not on the south-east—that is in Savoy. The house of Savoy, which was about being restored at the same time as the house of Bourbon, was united to Louis XVIII. by the bonds of blood and friendship, and it would be repugnant to his feelings to share in its spoils. Let us add that our ancient frontier needed much more to be strengthened to the north than to the south. M. de Talleyrand was also desired to require the entire restoration of our colonies, and not to consent to any contribution for the expenses of the war.

The idea of obtaining the promised augmentation to the north instead of the south, although inspired by family reason, was very wise. It would be possible, indeed, without exceeding the limit marked by a million souls, to improve our frontier considerably, and render it almost as strong as that of the Rhine, though neither so extensive in territory or so formidable to our neighbours. And by extending it a little further, and letting it pass through the following points—Nieuport, Ypres, Courtray, Tournay, Ath, Mons, Namur, Dinant, Givet, Neuchâteau, Arlon, Luxembourg, Sarrelouis, Kaisers-Lautern, and Spire—

we should have gained a frontier not only more extensive, but more solid, since to the noble enclosure of fortresses that we already possessed, we should have joined that of the Belgian fortifications. To the celebrated fortress of Luxembourg we should have added the important position of Kaiserslautern in the Vosges, and the fortress of Landau on the Rhine. This would have been a certain compensation for the Rhine frontier, and an immense amelioration with regard to our territorial position in 1790. To obtain such a frontier, it would have been worth while to fight more than one battle.

The two negotiators who assisted M. de Talleyrand in these details—M. de Laforest and M. d'Osmond—had with much intelligence traced this new line upon the map. They proposed it in the first meeting of the negotiators, at which M. de Talleyrand was not present, as he reserved himself for an interview in which he would bring his personal influence to bear upon the monarchs and the allied ministers. MM. Laforest and d'Osmond supported their case by means of an ably written document. In this document they recounted how it had been publicly and repeatedly promised that France should be left great and strong; that it had been formally said that she should be granted an increase of a million inhabitants; and, they asserted, that unless the allied monarchs desired to destroy all equilibrium, they ought not—considering the manner in which all the other European powers had aggrandized themselves since the division of Poland—condemn France to remain as she had been at the end of the last century.

Hardly had the foreign commissioners heard this memoir read, and cast their eyes upon the map, than they exclaimed against our pretensions, and appeared as much surprised as if the thing had been quite unexpected, and what they could not have foreseen. They had only heard, they said, of the frontiers of 1790; they did not know whether there had ever been mention *de vive voix* of any augmentation whatever; as for them, they now heard of it for the first time, and could find no trace of it in their instructions. The English commissioner alone, entering a little deeper into the subject, showed that the execution of this project would dismember Belgium, which would be contrary to the promises made to the Belgians, that their territories should not be parcelled out, and given to different masters. Our negotiators replied that if under the rule of Napoleon the Belgians did not feel much desire to belong to France, on account of the conscription and the *droits réunis*, it would be quite different under the Bourbons; that the feeling of the Belgians was totally changed; and that those who should be left to France would never think of objecting,—and

that the only objection would be from those who should be given up to Holland—an assertion whose truth was strictly proved, since the Belgians had had the English and German troops amongst them, and had reflected on what would be their fate under a Protestant power. Our adversaries did not reply, and did not advance the only reason which could have had any value, namely, that France would by this means gain the Belgian fortresses in addition to her own, and that the future kingdom of the Low Countries would be without a frontier. Their only defence was an exhibition of profound astonishment, and a declaration that our pretensions were so novel, so unforeseen, that it was impossible to discuss them, nobody being prepared for the subject. It was evidently necessary that the meeting should separate, and each member consult his respective chief.

The French Commissioners told M. de Talleyrand of the effect produced by their first proposition, and he immediately determined to confer with those persons, monarchs or ministers, who decided sovereignty on European affairs. Promises had indeed been made him at the time of the convention of the 23rd April when there was a question of evacuating the most important fortresses, but vague promises which, if contested, would give no ground for exclaiming against a breach of faith, the mere mention of which would seem an offence. Besides deriving all his strength against emigration from the favour of the foreign monarchs, M. de Talleyrand was not sufficiently at his ease, to speak to them with that decided energy which would have commanded attention.

M. de Talleyrand had several interviews with Lord Castlereagh, M. de Nesselrode, and M. de Metternich, the three persons who could alone exert any influence in this dispute. Lord Castlereagh represented the power to which Louis XVIII. had expressed the most gratitude and from which some return might be expected. But there was none. M. de Talleyrand found the English minister plain-spoken and friendly, but obstinate as the English ever are when their interests are at stake. England wished to found the monarchy of the Low Countries on a firm basis, and this object she hoped to attain by incorporating the entire of Belgium with Holland, and who certainly would not contribute to weaken the former by depriving her of her fortresses. England never forgot the continental blockade, and was most solicitous to cut us off from the sea board. Besides, without avowing her motive, she wished by this means to compensate Holland for the colonies of which she was preparing to deprive her, especially for the Cape of Good Hope. Lord Castlereagh was consequently innumerable through politics, and spoke in such a manner as not

to leave the least hope. An appeal to M. de Nesselrode and M. de Metternich was equally unsuccessful, though neither the one nor the other had the least interest in the affair, for neither Russia nor Austria desired to curtail our possessions in the Low Countries. But M. de Talleyrand saw that M. de Nesselrode took but little interest in the subject, and was an exact reflection of his master's sentiments. The haughtiness of Louis XVIII., and the little desire he showed on different occasions to gratify Russia, above all, the spirit that seemed to animate the Bourbons, were extremely disagreeable to Alexander; for example, whilst Louis XVIII. had been so very eager to offer the *Cordon bleu* to the Prince Regent of England, he had not even thought of offering it to the Emperor of Russia, who was, however, the principal cause of Napoleon's downfall and of the restoration of the Bourbons. Alexander entertained a warm affection for M. de Caulaincourt, but when he sought, certainly without this noble-minded gentleman's solicitation, to obtain him some share of the royal favour, Louis scarcely listened to the request. There had been some question of uniting the Duke de Berry to the Archduchess Anne, who was to have been married to Napoleon, but the restored family did not appear very anxious for the union, though it was spoken of from time to time. Alexander had consequently become cool, and said frankly to his allies, that he was not certain, whether the restoration of the Bourbons was the best service they could have rendered to France and to Europe.

It was evident that no support could be expected from the Russians, and none was obtained. We might have had more hope from the Austrians. If, at the new French court, it was commonly said, that with all his talent Alexander had not common sense, and that he was too lavish of his advice; on the other hand, great praise was bestowed on the wisdom and reserve of the Emperor of Austria, who was neither a liberal, nor eager to offer advice to those who did not ask it, and moreover he warmly approved of giving as little liberty as possible to the French. It thus happened, that for some time Louis XVIII. had been on better terms with Napoleon's father-in-law, than with any other of the allied monarchs. M. de Metternich was mild, friendly, and well-disposed towards the Bourbons, whom, he said, ought not to be rendered unpopular. Still, he appeared very much embarrassed. Austria had renewed her union with England, her old and constant friend, and this union had become closer since Russia had acquired such a preponderance. She agreed with her on every point, and expected an unreserved assistance from her in the affairs of Italy. Now, England having formally announced her intention of restricting us to the frontiers of



1790, Austria could not hold a different opinion. M. de Metternich did not deny that his master had no personal reason for refusing us an extension of territory in the direction of Belgium or the Rhenish provinces, but neither did he deny that England's wishes would guide Austria on this point. He did not absolutely deny the promised increase of a million souls, but he said it was only a form of speech, that the million might not have meant more than five hundred thousand, and that in those must be counted Avignon and Montbéliard, which had been added to the territory of 1790; that certainly something might be added towards the North, but, above all, that the augmentation should extend in the direction of Savoy, and that when five hundred thousand souls should have been gained here and there, there was no reason why they should not be reckoned a million; the *amour-propre* of the allies was concerned in the affair, and they would never contradict the French government, if, in order to make the Bourbons popular, it should be publicly announced that a million inhabitants had been added to the frontiers of 1790.

It was evident that none would support us, for Prussia would either remain neuter or take part against us. She was preparing to introduce the question of money, a point on which she was particularly sensitive, and she did not wish to lose the goodwill of any of her allies by disobliging them. It was evident that nothing was to be hoped from our conquerors, at least for the present.

Nothing now remained but to refer the subject to the King's council, explain the position of affairs, and await further orders. For some time past, a universal, and it must be admitted an unjust outcry had been raised against the convention of the 23rd April, by which we had abandoned the greater number of the great European fortresses. In truth, we had made a mistake, and in desiring to put an end to the evils of war, we had not shortened the sufferings of the occupied provinces by a single day. But the intention was good, and moreover universally approved; but that was forgotten now as well by the impartial, as by the prejudiced and discontented portion of the public. But what is still stranger, these sentiments had penetrated even into the Royal Council itself, and when M. de Talleyrand had explained the species of insincerity of which he had to complain, almost everybody blamed the convention of the 23rd of April, which had deprived us of our pledges, as if all had not at that time unanimously concurred in the wisdom of the measure. The Duke de Berry, with his accustomed impetuosity, exclaimed—forgetting that he was blaming his own father—that it was the consequence of the fault committed, in so hastily signing the unfortunate

armistice. The King looked maliciously at his brother and nephew, and seemed to approve what had been said by the latter. The Duke d'Artois, deeply affected, said that it was easy to talk of the convention then, but that at the time it was signed, the government had done as well as it could, and that those who blamed would not probably have done better in the same circumstances. This prince might have added, that, at that time, the idea of hastening the evacuation of the country was the dominant thought of every mind, that a single objection had not been made, either in the council or elsewhere on the day the convention was signed. He contented himself with exhibiting a profound grief, the grief of a good man, who receives, without returning an injury, and it became an established opinion that the cause of France had been sacrificed by signing the convention too precipitately and without compensation. M. de Talleyrand, who was the author of the deed, replied to the attack by cold and disdainful silence.

However, those who blamed the convention of the 23rd of April were about to commit a like fault, that is, a fault of precipitation. Since nothing of what had been promised could be obtained, there remained but one possible resource, which was to appeal to the congress that in a few months should decide the great European questions at Vienna. The armistice was sufficient for the present because it traced a temporary frontier, that of 1790; it stipulated that all parties should retire without hostilities to these frontiers; it restored us three hundred thousand men who could be held in readiness, and if the powers were in haste to decide those questions that concerned us, they could have no reason to allege for coming to a conclusion about our affairs, and at the same time come to no resolve on what touched themselves. We, on the other hand, could advance an unanswerable reason, which was, that the sacrifices required from France would assume a different aspect according to the use that should be made of the territories abandoned by her; and that, viewed in this light, the whole matter was resolved into a question of the balance of power, and that consequently, France, before accepting the position prepared for her, ought to learn what was intended for others. No reply could be made to such an argument, and France would have an immense advantage in appearing at Vienna with her fate still undecided, for in the midst of the divisions which would inevitably arise amongst her oppressors, she might find allies who would help her to obtain better conditions than those she had been offered. Of course this same reason ought to induce the other Powers to desire an immediate settlement for all that concerned France, but it was a reason that could not be easily avowed, and a little firm-

ness might have induced an adjournment of all the pending questions to Vienna. In any case France need not have signed, and it would have been impossible to compel her.

One man alone, in the royal council, saw the course that ought to be pursued, and that man was General Dessoles. "Why," he said, "conclude to-day? We shall not possess less influence at Vienna, because of appearing there without having our fate irrevocably decided: the other Powers will certainly not be able to decide about the portion each will wish to have; they will have need of us, and we will consequently find allies. There are therefore some chances of our receiving better treatment, and there is no possibility of our receiving worse." This observation, so pregnant with wisdom, was not comprehended by any present, because that minds filled by a dominant prejudice, refuse admittance to the simplest ideas. To conclude and publish a peace, to allow the country to enjoy its fruits, and assume to themselves the honour of the deed, was the passion of the moment, as the passion of the previous moment had been to obtain the evacuation of France. And yet, if there were any means of repairing the fault of over precipitation committed on the 23d of April, it would be by a wise tardiness at the actual juncture, and the courage to defer for six months the conclusion so eagerly urged at the present moment. M. de Talleyrand was ordered to yield to necessity, and to change the line of demarcation drawn up by our commissioners. The line in advance of the Belgian fortresses once abandoned, the frontier question lost all its importance. There now only remained to consider some amendments, which would give our frontier a more regular outline, and obtain us an increase of some hundred thousand inhabitants, together with two or three third-class fortresses, but none equal in value to Mons, Namur, or Luxembourg.

After several days' discussion, these unimportant rectifications were accorded us, nor were they to be despised. In 1790 our frontier line formed a sweep between Maubeuge and Givet, leaving Givet at the angle. The line now traced from Maubeuge to Givet, being made slightly convex, effaced the sweep, and gave us two additional fortresses—Phillippeville and Mariembourg. Leaving Luxembourg without the line, it was continued to Sarre, in such a manner as to preserve us Sarrelouis. In a word, without reaching the important point of Kaisers-Lautern, a medium course was taken between the line that we demanded and that of 1790, following the course of the Queich, by which we obtained an addition of some importance; for Landau, instead of being isolated, as formerly, in the midst of the German territory, was completely united to ours.

These augmentations, together with Montbéliard and Avignon, which the allied monarchs did not wish to give either to the Germanic empire or to Rome, did not give us half the promised million souls, of which we were only allowed to speak on condition of resigning our claim. The deficiency was sought to the east and south—that is in Switzerland and Savoy. We got some part of the country of Gex, around Geneva; then tracing a line that divided Savoy in two, we obtained Chambéry and Annecy. This frontier was of much less value than that demanded by our commissioners, and which we might have claimed in compensation for what we had lost; but such as it was, it was a little better than that of 1790, to which we have since been condemned in punishment of the events of 1815. These difficulties being got rid of—thanks to our compliance—others might arise on the subject of the general European arrangements, from which an effort had been made to exclude us by the treaty of Châtillon—a proceeding for which no excuse existed since the re-establishment of the Bourbons. Undoubtedly, the desire to exclude us was still the same; but those who entertained it, dared not avow the wish. Some general expressions were invented, which formed very vague guarantees as to the future balance of power in Europe. They were as follows:—

“The German states shall be independent, and united by a federal union.

“Holland shall be placed under the sovereignty of the house of Orange, and receive an increase of territory. It shall never pass under the rule of a foreign prince.

“Independent Switzerland shall continue to govern herself.

“Italy, except those portions restored to Austria, shall be composed of sovereign states.”

But touching these European arrangements, announced in so summary a manner, there was one point not immediately made public—and that was the proportions in which the territories taken from France should be distributed amongst the principal co-sharers. We had the mournful honour of receiving this confidence, but in secret articles, intended rather to shackle our actions than to give weight to our influence. These articles were as follows:—

“Holland shall receive the countries ceded by France, between the sea, the French frontier of 1790, and the Meuse.”

“The countries yielded by France on the left bank of the Rhine, shall serve as compensation for the German states.”

“The Austrian possessions in Italy shall be limited by the the Po, the Tessino, and the Lago Maggiore.”

“The King of Sardinia shall be indemnified for the portion

of Savoy ceded to France, by the possession of the ancient republic of Genoa."

Thus, by these articles, all Belgium was to be given to Holland; Bavaria was to receive a part of the ancient ecclesiastical Electorates, in exchange for the Tyrol, which was to be restored to Austria; Austria, besides her ancient possessions, was to have all the territory of the Venetian republic; lastly, the kingdom of Sardinia was to absorb Genoa; and thus the number of independent states would be considerably diminished. Not a word was said of Saxony or Poland, for that was a subject on which nobody dared to touch, so much avidity was anticipated on one side, and so much resistance on the other.

It only remained to decide about the colonies. There, it seemed, we should be compensated for our sacrifice on the continent, and that if we did not obtain an increase, we should not at least suffer any diminution. The restitution of our colonies ought, so to speak, to follow as a matter of course. But we had not yet reached the term of our sacrifices, and as M. de Laforest, one of our negotiators, said, "Wormwood was poured forth for us drop by drop."

Martinique and Guadaloupe were first mentioned, the latter was to be taken from Sweden and restored to us—Bourbon in the Indian seas was also mentioned, and these were spoken of with confidence, and as possessions of whose restoration there could be no doubt. But nothing was said of the isle of France, that Malta of the Indian ocean. What was to be done with it we were not told. At last an explanation was given. That power which had taken the Cape of Good Hope from her ally, Holland, which by a positive breach of faith had deprived Europe of Malta, declared that she must have the isle of France, because it was the route to India. We were allowed to keep the Isle of Bourbon, however, because it lay quite open; but the Isle of France, the great fortress of these seas, England was to have that. What could we oppose to such pretensions, when we had not a single ally, when the only one that we might have gained, the Emperor of Russia, had been offended by us and annoyed both in important and trifling matters. Our only resource would have been to break off the treaty, and at Vienna appeal with indignation to assembled Europe, against these repeated refusals to do us justice; to appeal to Europe that would be then enlightened by a careful inquiry into all these questions, and still more by the shameless display of such unlicensed ambition. Unfortunately, such a proceeding was not even thought of.

These new exactions were made known to the Royal Council, and the consternation there was general. It was then seen what it was to be dependant on foreigners, or

on their generosity. The English had also announced their intention of depriving us of some of the Antilles, such as Sainte Lucy and Tabago, which were of little consequence in comparison with the Isle of France. Louis XVIII., who did not foresee the value that the Isle of Bourbon would acquire by the development of commerce, said with apparent justice—"What could we do with Bourbon without the Isle of France? It is like giving us a fortress without the citadel that commands it. Let them take, if they will, Bourbon with the Isle of France, and leave us what we possess of the Antilles." These reflections contained some justice, but to whom were they to be addressed? who could be made to listen? Nothing remained but to yield, or obey, to the inspirations of despair.

We had recourse to private communications with Lord Castlereagh, who decided on all maritime affairs, and indeed on almost all continental questions. M. de Talleyrand found him calm and even gentle, but obstinate and immovable as a rock. He gained nothing. M. de Vitrolles endowed with less self-command, had a stormy interview with this minister, and obtained nothing but an almost cynical avowal of Britain's ambition. "Every position on the route to India," said Lord Castlereagh, "ought to belong to us, and shall belong to us." M. de Vitrolles recalled the fine-sounding declarations that had been made at the passage of the Rhine, and still more recently at the gates of Paris, declarations that promised to respect France and her dignity, and only deprive her of what she had taken from others, and which in her hands had become dangerous to the public security. Lord Castlereagh seemed to think that the Powers had fulfilled their promises, when they did not treat France as Poland had formerly been treated.

Again we were obliged to submit, for there was no means of resisting those unbridled ambitions all leagued against us. Only one reflection could suggest itself in contemplating such deeds, a reflection of which our oppressors took little heed, and it was, that by acting thus they rendered Napoleon much less guilty in the eyes of the world, and the Bourbons less popular in those of France.

There remained but one question to be decided—an important question, too; and most humiliating should it be decided against us—this was the question of the expenses of the war. Only one of the belligerent powers—Prussia—had pretensions on this point, which left us some chance of escaping oppressive exactions. During the last twenty years our armies had visited all the European powers, and inflicted on them all the evils attendant on the presence of an enemy, but, it must



be allowed, that Prussia suffered more than any other. She expected to be compensated, not only for the contributions which Napoleon had imposed upon her, but for the effects of our presence on her territories during the campaign of 1812. She consequently demanded, besides the restitution of the deeds representing the unpaid expenses, and which amounted to one hundred and forty million francs deposited in the *domaine extraordinaire*, an indemnity of one hundred and thirty-two millions, exclusive of the share she claimed in the sale of our arsenals and magazines. Prussia had, undeniably suffered a great deal during our long wars, but if we call to mind, that she took the initiative in the aggressions of 1792, merely for the sake of interfering in our home concerns, that in 1806 she abandoned herself to the wildest passion against France, and that quite recently during the invasion, the conduct of her soldiers had been most odious; it must be admitted that the wrongs between her and France had been mutual. We were therefore less disposed to yield to her demands than to those of any other power. Her King, honest but avaricious, held as firmly to the demands for money that he had made, as Austria for the Italian, as England for the maritime provinces. We were presented with Prussia's bill, and requested to look over it, and if we did not receive a summary demand for payment, we heard language that very much resembled it.

M. de Talleyrand peremptorily repelled these demands, and declared that he neither could nor would not subscribe to them. He referred the matter immediately to the Royal Council. None would suffer it, and that sensation of despair was at last felt, to which the ministers had been more than once on the point of yielding. The King expressed an indignation that was shared in by everybody, and said that he would spend three hundred millions in making war on Prussia, rather than spend one hundred in satisfying her demands. He added, that he knew how desirous France was of peace, and how much this desire had influenced the reception given to him and his family; but he knew that she would not brook the excess of degradation, now sought to be inflicted on her, and would not take it ill of him if he resisted strangers who thus abused the facility with which they had been received, and that for his part, far from thinking himself ungrateful towards the Cabinets of Europe, he believed them to be ungrateful towards him, for the Bourbons had been as useful in effecting their entrance into France, as they had been to the Bourbons in procuring their restoration to the throne. He therefore declared that he decidedly refused the new burden that the allied sovereigns wished to impose upon his subjects.

The entire council applauded this resolution, and again deplored the unfortunate convention of the 23rd April. The Duke de Berry exclaimed that with the garrisons and the returned prisoners, the King would have 300,000 men ; that he ought to put himself at their head and fall upon the allies who had but 200,000, and that this act of patriotic despair would for ever secure to the Bourbons the affections of the French people. M. de Talleyrand did not say no, but contented himself with remarking that the 300,000 men, with whom it was proposed to attack the allies, were owed to the much abused convention of the 23rd April.

M. de Talleyrand, whilst decidedly refusing the demands of Prussia, still felt that the project of 300,000 French attacking 200,000 foreigners was a serious matter, for the General, who knew how to lead the French to victory, was in the isle of Elba, so he determined to try whether the voice of reason would not be listened to. He had an interview with Lord Castlereagh, the Emperor of Russia, and M. de Metternich. He told them that the King and the Princes were determined to let the treaty of peace be wrecked on this question, whatever might be the consequences ; that besides, it was compromising for a miserable pecuniary consideration, not alone the great work of the restoration of peace, but also the restoration of order in Europe, for there was not a sovereign in Europe who was not deeply interested in the security of Louis XVIII. on his throne ; that to humiliate the Bourbons in this manner, to render them unpopular would be to act against the aim the allies had proposed to themselves ; and to sacrifice such important interests to the avarice of Prussia was neither wise, dignified, nor honourable. Lord Castlereagh, who was always reasonable when the Low Countries, the Cape of Good Hope, or the Mauritius was not in question, and M. de Metternich who was always ready to judge the conduct of Prussia without any flattering illusions, agreed with M. de Talleyrand. The Emperor Alexander, whose delicacy blushed at the avarice of his friend Frederick William, was of the same opinion, and all three forced Prussia to yield. The spirit of economy was in this prince a virtue that had degenerated into a vice, and he was capable of acting most unwisely, to gratify a passion that was originally the offspring of wisdom.

The contribution to Prussia was thus avoided. There still remained the common contribution founded on the right of conquest applied to the arsenals, the magazines, and other property of the state. According to the convention of the 23rd April, the foreign armies ought on the very day of the signing of this convention to have given up the administration of the occupied provinces, nor ought they to have levied



further contributions, nor longer retained any of our public property. But they pretended that for military effects, for captured magazines, for contributions levied but unpaid, and for wood ordered to be cut down in the state forests, there was due to them a sum which they did not blush to estimate at 182 millions. Of this sum, Prussia claimed the largest part; England asked nothing, for if this latter power had been severe, where territory was concerned, she was remarkably easy in money matters. For example, the Duke of Wellington's troops observed perfect discipline, in the south, and showed a scrupulous respect for all property both public and private. It was evident that in treating with England, we had to do with a great nation, ambitious but not avaricious.

The King's council showed equal firmness concerning this other ill-cloaked contribution of war. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Nesselrode supported M. de Talleyrand; two French commissioners, General Dulauloy and Baron Marchand charged with this arrangement, defended the French interests with great firmness, and it was finally agreed that we should pay a sum of 25 millions, which, according to the laws of war, was very nearly due.

The division of the naval armaments found in the ports yielded by France was deferred to the definite negotiation of peace. It is certain that all this *matériel*, consisting of twenty-five ships of the line afloat, and twenty on the stocks, besides a considerable number of smaller vessels, and a large quantity of stores dispersed in the ports of Hambourg, Bremen, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Flushing, Ostend, Genoa, Leghorn, Corfu, and Venice; it is certain, we say, that all this *matériel* had been procured with French money, that the labour and materials needed for the ships had been paid for, which was an advantage and not a burden, since the people [had been employed, and a market opened for the products of the locality. The only exception was the Dutch fleet, built before the union with the Empire, and which should in justice be restored to the Low Countries. It was therefore stipulated, that this fleet should be restored unconditionally, but that of the forty-six ships and other vessels of inferior rank, dispersed in the above mentioned ports, two thirds should belong to France, and one third to the different maritime localities where they lay. This decision was not quite just, but the loss was not much to be regretted, as France had in her own ports a larger naval force than she could employ.

The last question remained to be decided, that of our museums. The subject had never been mentioned, and the

omission was intentional. The sovereigns were accustomed to visit them daily, to admire them in the state in which Napoleon had left them, that is to say, containing the riches of civilized Europe, and they had almost considered it a duty to respect collections where they had been received with so much warmth, and for which they had expressed so much admiration. Besides, this was a question that principally concerned southern Italy and Spain, for both of which powers but little interest was felt by the allied monarchs, but the pride of France was at stake, and that must not be wounded. We were thus left the masterpieces conquered by our armies, left them as one may say by preterition, by neglecting to speak of them. But in private conversations, much stress was laid on the important concession thus made us, and it had, indeed, a considerable moral influence.

This labour, called the treaty of Paris, was terminated on the 30th May, and consisted of several deeds, identical but separate, signed by England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, who became security for all Europe. Sweden was joined to these signatures, on account of Guadeloupe, which she had for a short while possessed, and Portugal because of the portion of Guiana that was restored to us. The peace with Spain was to be arranged separately, as this power had no representative at Paris, owing to the position of Ferdinand VII., who had not yet made his entry into Madrid. Besides, the peace with Spain, thanks to the Pyrenees, could be more easily concluded than any other.

However much the excellent frontier was to be regretted, that we might have had in the direction of the Low Countries in compensation for that of the Rhine, and which might have been obtained, either by not having so precipitately signed the armistice of the 23rd of April, or by referring the definite conclusion of peace to the congress at Vienna, still this treaty, called the treaty of Paris, was not so disadvantageous as had been apprehended. We were exempted from paying the expenses of the war; we preserved the immense riches in works of art acquired at the cost of our blood; we had gained in addition to our possessions of 1790, Philippeville and Marienbourg near the Low Countries, Landau in the direction of the Rhine, and one half of Savoy in the direction of the Alps. The Isle of France was the only serious loss, and could not fail to affect our commerce. The treaty of Paris could only be considered unfortunate in comparison with those of Campo-Formio, and Luneville, which, without menacing the peace of Europe, seemed to have definitely assured our geographical frontier; and in reflecting that but for the faults of the Empire, these acquisitions might have been permanent, the sorrow of France ought to be universal and profound. We shall see presently

what effect the treaty of the 30th May produced on the public mind.

It was proposed to publish the conditions of the peace at the same time as the constitution, the framing of which had not been suspended during the negotiations. The allied monarchs, who were desirous of returning to their own dominions, wished to see all the affairs of France concluded at once, and insisted that Louis XVIII. should fulfil the engagements of St. Ouen, for which they considered themselves in a certain degree responsible, especially towards those who had surrendered to the allies in the hope of being protected from the passions of the emigrants. The drawing up of the constitution was consequently continued with great activity and in a spirit of liberality, truly meritorious on the part of Louis XVIII., especially when one considers the opinions of the royalist party at that period.

The royalists were not more deficient in talent than others, but they had not studied things in their essence, and did not possess the information that springs from such studies. It was only in the very lowest ranks of the revolutionary party that one could find such narrow and such obstinate prejudices. In the old military nobility there existed a blind hatred of everything that had arisen in France during the last thirty years, and the conviction that the old regime ought to be re-established by force. The parliamentary nobility better informed but not more enlightened, could only understand a constitution, such as that of the ancient parliaments, which sometimes contradicted but never checked the King. Amongst the most distinguished royalists, those whom misfortune and inaction had rendered studious, the love of the past and the hatred of the present, had been systematized and formed into singular theories under the influence of M. de Bonald, an excellent but paradoxical writer, who possessed the rather rare merit of developing false ideas in a healthy style. These theories, the inevitable and merited reaction consequent on the excesses of the French Revolution, consisted especially in a profound contempt for written constitutions, which were pronounced to be one of the most impertinent vanities of the modern mode of thinking. It is true, that when we consider the fate of the numerous constitutions, which had been put forth in writing during the previous seventy years, we cannot help concurring in the opinion expressed by the royalists. However, these feelings carried beyond a certain degree possessed their own share of vanity and impertinence. For example, M. de Bonald's disciples asserted that constitutions ought not to be written, that being the offspring of time and not of man, they, like the great works of nature, ought to grow gradually, some-

times taking the form of written laws, but being more frequently the result of custom, traditions, and habits, and that all these combined circumstances, constituting the idiosyncracies of a nation, formed its true constitution, the only one that would not pass away like a dream. Starting from this principle they asserted that the ancient France had had a constitution, which had endured for centuries, whilst the constitutions devised since 1789 had succeeded each other like the waves of an enraged sea. The embarrassment of these gentlemen was great when asked to define this constitution, which consisted of an absolute monarch sometimes contradicted by the parliament, from whose expostulations he escaped by having recourse to the *lots de justice* or the Bastille; assembling the States General once in a century and obliged to dismiss them immediately after, and so little capable of profiting of these institutions when involved in either political or financial difficulties, that it was in consequence of seeking to bring them into operation that the deplorable disorders of 1789 had come to pass. And in fact, what had this so much boasted constitution produced, when set to work in 1787 by the convocation of the notables, and in 1789 by the assembly of the States general? the French Revolution.

It was certainly a strange idea to eulogize a constitution which had produced such results. Great would have been the confusion of its admirers, had a proposal been made to re-establish this constitution. Where were the nobility, the clergy, the parliament, the *Tiers état*, the nation of 1789? Instead of a wealthy *noblesse* enjoying many privileges, and holding all the high military employments, there was left only a scattered, half-ruined nobility, that had no other means of becoming rich than by the consequences of the French revolution; strangers to the army by whom they were not loved and whom they did not love (we speak of 1814), and possessing, in a word, no influence; instead of a clergy, proprietors of landed property, noble, eloquent, talented, and at that time of such distinguished merit that the clergy furnished France her ablest statesmen and greatest ministers; instead of such men there was now a clergy, poor, restricted to the discharge of professional duties, taken from every class of society, and entirely dependant upon the government; instead of an opulent hereditary magistracy who enjoyed the administrative functions, as the nobility did the military by privilege, and who were competent to the discharge of these functions; instead of these we had a magistrate exclusively selected from amongst the citizens of moderate fortune, and appointed like the other functionaries by the executive power, upright but incapable of offering other resistance than a rigorous observance of the civil laws; and in short, underlying all this was a people entirely transformed, that had attained a sort of absolute

unity, no longer admitting distinctions of class, or recognizing privileges, having all the same ideas, the same habits, the same ambition: such was France in 1814 and the systematic royalists would have been sadly embarrassed if, taken at their word, they had been charged to reconstruct the old constitution. They would be as embarrassed as an architect who having full liberty to build upon what plan he pleased, should be condemned to employ materials that were nowhere to be found.

All these theories were in reality only satires on the French revolution, often indeed just, and even eloquent, when they were directed against its excesses, but vain as the wailing or regret for that which is no more, when they tended to the re-establishment of a past that no power on earth could call back from annihilation.

Amongst these adversaries of written constitutions, even those who were most deficient in practical sense, when they were asked to decide and commence the work declared, as every body did, for a limited enlightened monarchy restrained and strongly influenced by the Chambers; in short what is called an English Monarchy, because the English were the first who established this form of government. These royalists only desired to gather from the vast rubbish of the old edifice, a certain number of ancient materials more or less recognisable, and make them figure in the new building. Thus they wished, that the ancient nobility and clergy should be restored and formed into a Chamber of Peers, and that the Lower Chamber should consist of those who formerly constituted the *Tiers état*, divided into classes according to their trades. Thus far and no further went the pretensions of those, who were compelled to emerge from their perpetual lamentation over the past. But this would have been to impose upon themselves the task of recovering and recombining the destroyed elements, which would have presented a ridiculous contrast with modern society, and shattered that great national unity in which consists the strength of modern France; and it would have been a profitless insult to the existing spirit of equality, for the advantage of a system that could produce no beneficial result, for the Chambers thus constituted would have put forward as strong pretensions as the others and would have as certainly struggled with the monarch for ascendancy—a struggle that would have terminated as fatally under such conditions as it had done under others, did the monarch conduct himself in the same manner. In fact what these royalists desired would be a kind of modern edifice bearing on its front some ornaments of the middle ages, which would have no real influence on the construction, arrangement, or destiny of the monument.

There was, therefore, nothing serious in these theories, which were only the prejudices of the past, systematized too late, by some eminent and melancholy minds. It must be admitted, however, that the King and his nephews, obliged to be more practical than their party, and fortunately having just returned from England and not from one of the continental states, did not share in these false doctrines, or if they did, acted as though they did not. Without fully acknowledging, and above all, without admiring the empire of public opinion, they were determined not to come in contact with its strongest points. Now, there were two points, which no power on earth could induce public opinion to yield—first, civil equality, which consists in every man enjoying in the eyes of the law the same rights, and being liable to the discharge of the same duties, in paying the same taxes, performing the same military service, being judged according to the same laws, by the same judges, being eligible to the same public employments whatever the birth, religion, or fortune of the individual; secondly, constitutional royalty, that is, limited monarchy, restricted more or less by two chambers. The first of these opinions was the work of the eighteenth century, the second, the result of Napoleon's despotism; both were invincible.

Nothing now remained to be considered but questions of form or style. As to the form, the Bourbons, as we have seen, had brought with them into France an almost insurmountable prejudice. Pretending that they were recalled to the throne not by an act of the senate, but in virtue of their own right, they wished to *grant* and not *receive* a constitution, and on this point, the public, foreseeing as little as the dynasty the danger of this absolute principle, which involved the power of modifying this *granted* constitution, was prepared to admit a pretention that only seemed a subtlety of theory, or an affair of self-love. Provided that the essential principles of the constitution were granted, the public cared little whether the constitution proceeded from the King or the senate, whether it came from above or below. Once arrived at this point, all things must go on smoothly.

The King had confided the task of drawing up a sketch of the constitution to MM. de Montesquiou and Ferrand, certain that the only principle to which he was firmly attached, monarchical supremacy, would not be in danger in the hands of those old royalists. As to the other points, he felt more confidence in his deputies than in himself, for he cared little about the matter: with these gentlemen he associated M. Beugnot, who possessed an easy and facile style, and knew how to choose expressions calculated to conciliate conflicting opinions. He recommended M. de Beugnot to observe the most absolute

secrecy towards M. de Talleyrand. Although more inclined than Kings in general to allow his ministers to govern, still Louis XVIII. was not desirous of the presence of a minister who wished to interfere in every thing. He wished M. de Talleyrand to confine himself to foreign affairs, M. de Montesquiou to occupy himself with the home department, and M. de Blacas to devote his attention to affairs of the court; he hoped thus to diminish by dividing the power of his ministers. Neither did he wish that in case of difficulty, M. de Talleyrand should call the Emperor Alexander to his assistance, and influenced by all these reasons he did not wish him to have any part in the formation of the constitution.

The sketch of the constitution being made was submitted to Louis XVIII, who without making any or scarcely any alteration referred it, conformably to the declaration of Saint-Ouen, to two committees, one appointed by the Senate and one by the Legislative Corps. The committee appointed by the Senate was composed of M. M. Barthélemy, Serrurier, (the Marshal) Barbé-Marbois, de Fontanes, Germain Garnier, de Pastoret, de Semonville, Boissy d'Anglas, and Vimar. The committee appointed by the Legislative Corps was composed of M. M. Lainé, Felix Faulcon, Chabaud-Latour, Bois-Savary, Duhamel, Duchesne de Gillevoin, Faget de Baure, Clausel de Coussergues, Blanquart de Bailleul. No objection could be made to these persons, who corresponded to the moderate and liberal ideas of the time. The King recommended as much unity as possible in their labours, and reserved to himself the decision of all contested points, more for the honour of his prerogative, than for the value of the things themselves.

The Chancellor laid the subject before the two committees assembled at the Chancery, read the plan, and then commenced the discussion of the different articles.

In drawing up this plan, great care had been taken to use expressions which would show that the new constitution emanated from royalty alone, from royalty understanding the wants of the time, and acting under the impulse of its own wisdom, as it had already done in emancipating the *communes*, in instituting the parliaments, in reforming the civil legislation. Consequently no mention was made of the return of the Bourbons to the throne, the causes of this return, the nature of the monarchical principle or its hereditary descent from male to male in order of primogeniture, all of which subjects were spoken of in the constitution of the senate. M. Boissy d'Anglas remarked this circumstance, and regretted it as an omission injurious to the interests of royalty. He was told immediately, and without hesitation, that these omissions were intentional, that the right of the Bourbons to the throne

needed no enunciation, that it existed anterior to every other right, and that even when absent and physically replaced by usurpation in France, they still had not ceased to reign there; neither did the principle and manner of inheritance require to be mentioned, for they were co-existent with the ancient constitution of the French monarchy; that the question at issue was merely the modification of certain parts of this constitution, and granting the French people some rights not formerly recognised; that, therefore, it was only necessary to announce the new enactments, without occupying themselves with those which, amidst all the vicissitudes of time, had not ceased virtually to exist.

M. de Fontanes, anxious to efface the memory of the services he had rendered Napoleon by his compliance with the wishes of the Bourbons, hastened to support this doctrine, saying, that the origin of power ought to be allowed to remain wrapt in shadows, in order to preserve its venerable antiquity; endeavouring to approach too near the source, would be to destroy the reverence it inspired. As if a *prestige* once destroyed, could be restored at will, or by convention. These remarks elicited no reply, and silence was certainly the most prudent part. Assuredly the committees ought, had it been possible, even for the sake of the dynasty itself, to have insisted on these omissions being supplied, in order to deprive the Bourbons of the means of one day breaking the contract that bound them to the nation. But how could the future, which no one penetrated at that time, be unveiled for them; that future hidden alike from the restored dynasty, and those who sought to limit its rule.

The examination of the different articles of the constitution was then proceeded with. The first referred to what was called the public rights of the French, consisting of equality in the eyes of the law, of the equitable divisions of public employments, individual liberty, liberty of conscience, liberty of the press, respect for all kinds of property, equality in the form of military service, and finally a complete oblivion for all acts and opinions since 1789. On the greater number of these points, there was no difference of opinion. However, there was a discussion about some, and even in some cases a change of form. After admitting an equal protection to every form of worship, it was added that the Catholic religion was the religion of the state. MM. Boissy d'Anglas and Chabaud-Latour desired that the meaning of these words should be defined, and asked what they meant, if, for example, they did not give some advantage of position to the Catholic religion, and whether the other forms of worship would not be placed in a sort of dependance by this advan-



tage. They were told that France was Catholic and must not fear to avow her religion. It was then purely and simply an act of deference to the Catholic faith, a sort of apology to that creed for the equality granted to the other forms of worship. No objection was made, for nothing would have been gained by discussion. There was scarce any discussion on the question of individual liberty and the liberty of the press. As to the liberty of the press, all were of opinion that it ought to be granted, only restraining the excesses into which the press was only too much inclined to run. At this period, for want of experience, nobody thought of the distinction, which was afterwards established between newspapers and books, nor did any one think of submitting either to a preliminary examination—that is, to a censorship.

The respect promised to property, no matter whence derived, was the most important question of the day. It concerned, as may be divined, the property called *national*, which was no other than the confiscated property of the emigrants or that taken from the church, and which had been sold at different periods of the Revolution for larger or smaller sums according to the state of the times, and so passed into the possession of millions of Frenchmen. The anxiety of the possessors was natural, when they beheld the emigrants, proud of their triumph, confident in their strength, and very much irritated against the detainers of their property, which had in many cases been purchased at a merely nominal price, sometimes for a handful of worthless assignats, and not unfrequently obtained by dishonourable means. But the tranquillity of the kingdom depended on maintaining the validity of these sales, and neither the King nor the Princes entertained a doubt on the subject. Their desire to see the emigrants in possession of their property was not inferior to that of the emigrants themselves, but the certainty of an immediate political convulsion restrained them, and the King had consented to this clear and positive announcement, "*All property is inviolable, not excepting that called national, the law recognising no difference.*"

This mode of expression was perfectly satisfactory, and better could not be desired. But it was too significant for some members of the committee, who, on this occasion, revealed the secret designs of the royalist party, and, especially, the *ruse* by which this party wished to escape from the necessity that weighed upon the Bourbons, and which was the chief condition of their return. M. de Fontanes, pursuing the expiatory system on which he had entered, exclaimed warmly against the proposed enactment. According to him, custom had established a marked difference between patri-

monial property and that called national; and if this difference existed essentially how could the law dare assert that none ought to be made? Until this time even the laws of the Revolution had confined themselves to proclaiming the inviolability of national property, but they had never carried their zeal so far as to seek to give it a moral value which it did not possess. What folly, then, to choose the very day on which the Bourbons returned to France to render still worse the condition of these unfortunate persons who had been stripped of their property?

It was easy to reply that these unfortunate persons—not all, indeed, but a great many—had fought against their country, and that, therefore, they could not inspire an unreserved interest; and that the return of the Bourbons naturally exciting their hopes, it was necessary to choose the moment of that return for strengthening the guarantees given to the purchasers of national property. However, the authors of this project were silent, as if to show that they yielded to the necessity of the times, whilst cursing it in their hearts. But M. Lainé rent the veil. He had warmly espoused the cause of liberty twenty years before, and, like many others, had been violently repulsed by the excesses of the Revolution, so far as almost to adopt the sentiments of the emigrants themselves. "Let us speak frankly," said he; "let us admit that we must humour the holders of national property,—but even whilst humouring them, we are desirous that the property they possess should return to its ancient owners. Morality, justice, and the true monarchical spirit, dictate these wishes. Now, this cannot be effected without compromises between the old and new proprietors. Such compromises are being made in many quarters, and they are the effects of public opinion on the new proprietors. Why, then, seek to lessen the moral force that is inducing them to make restitution?"

This was simply announcing a wish to intimidate new proprietors into yielding the property they held to its ancient owners, for some trifling sum. Amongst the actual holders of such property there were certainly some who had purchased for almost nothing; but many had paid ready money, and at a rate approaching the full value. Besides, thousands of sales had already transferred a great part of this property into new hands, and almost on terms equal to its full value. The project, therefore, of restoring this property to its ancient proprietors was morally unjust as well as politically unwise.

Those who had drawn up the plan of the constitution, persisted in remaining silent, when M. Beugnot, Minister of State, Commissioner of Police, and compiler of the article under discussion, spoke in its defence. He knew, by the reports which

he daily received, in what degree the indiscreet hopes of the emigrants had become serious threats for the holders of national property; and he gave such a description of the present state of affairs, as seriously alarmed the two assembled committees. However, he could not have carried his point, if he had not used a subterfuge. The series of general guarantees contained the article which said,—“The state can exact the sacrifice of a property for the public benefit, if such be legally proved, but with a previous indemnity.” He placed this article immediately after the one in dispute, and he presented it, thus placed, as though it would hereafter give an opening for an indemnity that the State itself would pay to the ancient proprietors. This subterfuge, which was only a pretext for some, though a reason for others, terminated the discussion, and the proposed form was adopted.

To this series of general claims and duties had been joined the article relative to the military duty, to which every citizen was bound. The expedient already employed for the abolition of the conscription was adopted, in announcing a law intended to define, at a later period, the mode of recruiting, which would naturally bring back the old form without its abuses, which resulted less from the nature of the institution than from the character of the government called upon to employ it.

The general claims being once decided, the next subject to be considered was the form the royal government was to assume. Upon this subject there was not a single dissentient voice, excepting when extreme measures were proposed. An inviolable king, entrusted with the entire executive power, was universally admitted, and who was represented by ministers responsible to two Chambers of different origin. Whilst the emigrants cherished the most extravagant ideas, the men of the revolution—emigrants of another kind—did not entertain juster notions; and still fervent adorers of the constitution of 1791 desired but a single Chamber. There was not a man in either of the committees, or amongst enlightened persons, who entertained these opinions. There was, therefore, no discussion on this point. The fourteenth article, which gave the King the right of regulating the execution of the laws, was taken in its natural and simple sense; and although these words were added—“For the safety of the state”—it did not imply that the King should use the regulative power, in order to place himself above the executive, and be able to overturn the constitution when he pleased. Nobody had any other idea than to accord to the royal power the initiative in all measures of defence at home and abroad—a privilege which necessarily belonged to the King—and to

unite the regulative power with the executive, which is not less indispensable, the laws, however perfect they may be, leaving a number of details to be regulated, which must, of necessity, be abandoned to the authority charged with their execution. The dictatorship was not perfidiously concealed in the fourteenth article, because, we repeat, it was drawn up in all simplicity and good faith.

There was one question, that of initiative legislation, to which at that time much more importance was attached than there would be now-a-days, because experience had not yet shown that the true initiative for a country is to be able to appoint to the ministry the men of its own choice. Ministers appointed in this way introduce those laws of which a country has most need. At the period of which we speak the initiative was highly prized, the royalists wishing to secure the privilege for the King, the liberals for the two Chambers. To deprive the Chambers utterly of the initiative, as was proposed, and reduce their power simply to the privilege of adopting or rejecting the measures proposed by the King, appeared even to the authors of the projected constitution, a rigorous proceeding. To get rid of this embarrassment that everybody, even the royal commissioners themselves seemed to feel, a compromise was proposed. This consisted of giving the Chambers the power of addressing the King and requesting him to present the sketch of the proposed laws, with the certainly wise precaution of requiring that the request should not be transmitted to the crown until it had received the assent of both chambers. It was the initiative itself under a very respectful form, which neither diminished its value nor its authority.

The right of amending the laws submitted to the consideration of the Chambers was thus in some degree ameliorated, but this right could only be exercised after being discussed in the *bureaux* and after the consent of the ministers or royal commissioners was obtained. In all cases, it was the privilege of the King to ratify the law. These precautions against the right of amendment were superfluous, for discussing laws without the power of modifying them is but a useless expenditure of time. To leave the Chambers no choice between absolute adoption or rejection, was reducing them to extremities, and destroying that spirit of debate which ought to be the actuating spirit of a free country. Besides, the definite sanction being vested in the crown guaranteed the royal prerogative in its full extent.

The changes made in the plan of the constitution by the two committees were, as a matter of course, to be submitted to Louis XVIII, and could only be inserted in the series of



articles after receiving his consent. The four royal commissioners presented these amendments to the King, and he admitted them without difficulty, saying, that he wished the plan should be as far as possible unanimously approved by the two committees.

Instead of a senate, it was resolved that the upper chamber should be a Chamber of Peers to correspond better with the old French monarchy, it being understood that the King should select from the senate, not all the members, but those who by their services, their reputation or position, could appear without objection in the new order of things, and that even those members who were not elected should still preserve their salaries. It was decided that the princes should be peers by right of birth. At the suggestion of M. de Semonville who, from a desire to please, plainly meant the Duke of Orleans, it was decreed that the princes could not take their seats without the King's express permission. As this precaution was contained in the original plan, it was necessary to refer it to Louis XVIII., who simply approved it, without making any sarcastic remark on the Prince against whom the measure was directed.

The second Chamber was called, the Chamber of Deputies. It was to be composed for the present, and until remodelled, of the entire legislative corps, which, as we have seen, had won the royal approbation, because the legislative corps was jealous of the senate, and because it had shown more zeal for the Bourbons. It was decided, that the deputies should be chosen from the communal of the different wards by electors qualified to vote by the payment of taxes to the amount of 300 francs; the qualification of the candidates consisting in the payment of taxes to the amount of 1,000 francs. Many questions arose on this point. In the first place, should there be a property qualification for the electors and the candidates, and what was to be the amount of the qualification? Nobody hesitated as to the electors. There were doubts about the property tax. M. Felix Faulcon, a worthy man, and much respected, who had for twenty-five years occupied a seat in our assemblies, objected to the property qualification for candidates, and cited himself as an example of the difficulties that would arise from such a condition, for he did not pay the required amount of taxes. His observations were rejected, but with all the deference due to his character, and it was replied that in giving liberty to a country, guarantees should be sought amongst the holders of property, and in their hands should be placed this novel and capacious liberty, of which the perilous trial was now about to be made. These reasons prevailed. There now remained to be considered the nature of the qualification.

The expression *Contribution foncière* or "land tax" was thought too restricted, and it was proposed to add *mobilière* or "personal," because the tax implied by the latter term had a good deal of analogy with the other. After some discussion the words "assessed taxes" were substituted for "land tax," without any suspicion that by this means the order of things was changed, by introducing amongst the electors the class *patentables*, who are taxed, not for the property they possess, but for the profession they exercise. The question of whether the debates of the Chambers should be published was not discussed.

With respect to the manner of forming the second Chamber, M. de Montesquiou acting on his own authority, wished that the power possessed by the senate under Napoleon should be vested in the King, namely, the power of choosing the members of the legislative corps from a list prepared by the electoral colleges. In order to prove that such an assembly would not be more subservient than another, he cited the assembly of notables, which in 1787 rejected all the propositions of the King. He did not find one to support his opinion. M. de Montesquiou's proposal involved the serious inconvenience of depriving the most popular of the Chambers—that which was supposed to represent the country—of the appearance of independence, which is of as much importance as independence itself,—and the example he had cited proved that in the days of the revolution the King's appointment had been no guarantee, whilst that in ordinary times it possessed all the imputed disadvantages, and caused it to be said that France was again about to be put under the Imperial Constitution. This idea, originated by M. de Montesquiou, was not carried into effect.

The initiative in financial measures was granted to the Lower Chamber without opposition, and to the Upper Chamber the judicial power in certain special cases, when, for example, ministers were arraigned. The Chamber of Peers left to the King's nomination was to be, as a general rule, hereditary, excepting in cases where the King conferred a peerage for life. Not a voice was raised against hereditary rank, which was regarded by all as a guarantee for independence of conduct and stability in the form of government.

It was then stipulated that the King should summon the Chambers every year, that he could dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, but under the condition of summoning fresh members in three months, and it was moreover decreed that every petition presented to either Chamber, should be in writing. These points being decided, the next consideration was the

judicial order based on those principles of independance which have not varied in France since 1789 ; and lastly, the guarantees, transitory in their nature, which related to the maintenance of the public debt, the Legion of Honour, the military grades and pensions, the two nobilities, &c., &c.

There was scarcely a discussion on these subjects, and touching those points, in which it was agreed that some alteration should be made, and which were consequently submitted to the King, his Majesty showed an extreme desire to please, as he considered the monarchical principle quite safe, since he gave and did not receive a constitution. He even consented that it should be made a condition, that the kings at their consecration should swear to observe the constitution faithfully, which was not a contract with the nation, as we have since seen, but with God, and of which he who took the oath, and his confessor, were to be the judges. Whilst these questions were being decided one after the other in the commissions, the King scarcely spoke of them in the royal council, merely saying the work was advancing, and that he was satisfied with the spirit in which it was performed. Only on two or three points, such as the conscription and the initiative legislation, did he submit the difficulty to the council, but in a few words, as a subject that concerned him personally and exclusively.

Four days longer than the time first appointed, that is, until the 4th June, were accorded for the promulgation of the constitution, and M. Beugnot asked four more, which would extend the time to the 8th, to put the articles in order, to give a last polish to the work, to prepare the preamble, and above all to arrange some general principles which would serve as a basis to the electoral law, a subject not yet touched on. M. Beugnot would have obtained the desired delay, but that the allied monarchs, anxious to depart since the peace had been concluded (an event that occurred on the 30th May), desired that all should be finished on the 4th June at the latest. The allied monarchs, it was evident, considered themselves bound in honour to see this constitution promulgated, without which the men who had trusted in them would be without guarantee, the emigrants would be under no restraint, and France, that is to say Europe, would remain exposed to fresh storms. M. de Metternich said that urgent affairs summoned the allied sovereigns to their own kingdoms, and that their troops were gaining nothing by remaining in France, their officers were ruining themselves there, and that they could not remain any longer. The King's Council appeared both surprised and offended at this demand. "Let them go," hastily and impetuously cried the Duke de Berry,



"we do not need their assistance to give a constitution to France; and when they are gone, the concessions that the King is about to make to the country will assume a higher and more independent character." This Prince showed an especial desire to get rid of the Emperor of Russia, who was the most exacting of the allied sovereigns. But the foreign ministers declared, that, having kept as few troops as possible in the capital, the last should not be withdrawn until the very day fixed for the royal session, and the fulfilment of the promises made at Saint Ouen put beyond all doubt. The council was obliged to yield, and the royal session was fixed for the 4th June. What remained to be done seemed of little importance to the King.

The articles relating to the election of deputies might be referred to the electoral law; the revision of the articles and the drawing up of the preamble were details that could be finished in one night; and orders were given to M. Beugnot to be ready for the appointed day. Two questions remained to be decided—the date of the new constitution and its title. As to the date, Louis XVIII. would not allow a discussion. In his own opinion, he had commenced to reign the day on which the son of Louis XVIII. died; he had reigned even whilst Napoleon, raised to the Empire by the will of the French nation, was gaining the victories of Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, and Wagram, and signing the treaties of Presbourg, Tilsit, and Vienna. These were only different phases of usurpation which disappeared before the immutable principle of legitimacy. Consequently, Louis XVIII. wished that the constitution should be dated from the nineteenth year of his reign. He listened to the opinion of each member as to the title. M. Dambray thought it ought to be called "Ordinance of Reformation," like the ordinances formerly issued by the kings for the reformation of certain parts of the French legislation. Louis, at first, approved of this title. However, M. Beugnot proposed another. When the kings of France granted a legal existence either to the commons or to different civil or religious establishments, they did so by means of a deed called a "charter," a word taken from the Latin. There was an analogy between the business under consideration and what Louis le Gros had done, which pleased the feelings as well as the kingly pride of Louis XVIII.; and he adopted the word "*charter*," since become so famous, adding to it the epithet *constitutional*, to indicate more clearly its object. These two questions being decided, M. Beugnot had only to consider the minor details of form, and it was expected from his known expeditiousness that all would be finished in a few hours. The King himself wrote the speech which he intended to pro-



nounce ; he learned it by heart, and his speech seemed to form the sole object of his thoughts. When the King should have spoken, the Chancellor (Dambray) was to explain the principles of the charter, and M. Ferrand was to read the original. Several royal ordinances were then to be promulgated in presence of the two great bodies convoked for the inauguration of the new institutions. The list of peers was to be read, which contained eighty-three of the old senators, forty of the ancient dukes, and some marshals, who were not members of the senate. Fifty-five senators were excluded from the peerage—twenty-seven because they were aliens—and twenty-eight because of being regicides, or having taken a leading part during the Revolution and the Empire. The ancient senators, whether comprised in the Chamber of Peers or not, were to hold their emoluments under the title of pensions. The Legislative Corps was to be converted into a Chamber of Deputies, and to sit until a fresh election.

On the morning of the 4th a grand display of French troops, where the National Guards made a conspicuous figure, preceded the royal session in which the great promise of Saint Ouen was to be fulfilled. The larger portion of the foreign troops was already *en route*. The remainder were preparing to depart on that day and the following. The Emperor Alexander, who was anxious to visit the Prince of Wales before returning to his own dominions, had left Paris before the royal session. On the very day of his departure he had insisted that the children of Queen Hortense, whose protector he had constituted himself, should receive the Duchy of Saint Leu, with a large income. He also wished to secure a suitable position for Prince Eugene, but this matter was referred to the Congress at Vienna. He had departed, delighted with the French, whom he had charmed by his grace and amiability, and but little pleased with the royal family, who did not admire his tone of mind. The King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria left about the same time. On the very morning of the ceremony there was great excitement at Court. A report was spread that a plot had been laid to blow up the royal family by an explosion of gunpowder. The official agents who had hastened to offer their services to the Count d'Artois, and who, under MM. Ferrier de Montceil and de la Maisonfort, had commenced to form a kind of voluntary police around him, had seen masses of powder on the quay of the Seine, which appeared to them suspicious. They immediately became excited and filled the château with their rumours. M. Beugnot was called upon, who was at the time hurrying with the preamble of the *charter*, and he was called to fling aside his pen and see to his duties as Director of Police. When inquiries were

made, it was found that it was the Russian artillery that were loading their powder on the Seine quay, preparatory to taking their departure.

This excitement being calmed, all assembled at the Tuileries. M. Beugnot wished to read the preamble to the King. But the monarch, entirely occupied in repeating to himself the speech that he was to make before the Chambers, refused to listen, saying that he confided the affair implicitly to him. They then left for the Bourbon palace, talking lightly of serious subjects, because they had not yet learned by the experience of a free government how much influence words have on the public mind. The fear of an explosion having passed away, another succeeded. It was dreaded that either in the Senate or in the Legislative Corps some objection might be raised against the manner in which the charter was about to be promulgated. The Chancellor had orders to silence any who would be so imprudent as to speak; it would have been a disagreeable scene, annoying to the royal dignity, and very much to be regretted, had it taken place. But quickly engrossed by the preparations for the ceremony, all set out for the Palais-Bourbon, without thinking any more of these possibilities.

The King passed through the garden of the Tuileries in his carriage, surrounded by the Princes and Marshals, and arrived at the Palais-Bourbon about three o'clock. He was received therewith the old royal pomp, and entered supported on the arm of the Duke de Grammont. He took his seat on the throne, having on his right and left, on lower seats, the Duke d'Angoulême, the Duke de Berry, and the Duke d'Orleans, and the Prince de Condé. The only person absent from the assembly was the Count d'Artois, who was ill from an attack of gout and vexation, of which we shall presently tell the cause. The public, weary of great military exhibitions, of which they had seen so many, and beginning to acquire a taste for political spectacles, had assembled in crowds. The most respectable persons of Paris had been admitted into the body of the hall; and on the benches of the two chambers sat the future members of the peerage and the entire legislative corps. When the King appeared, he was received with unanimous acclamations, and for some time the cries of "*Vive le Roi*" were repeated with a kind of frenzy. At once moved and re-assured, and calculating on a favorably-disposed audience, he pronounced, in a sonorous voice, and with great rhetorical skill, the following speech, adapted with much tact to existing circumstances:—

"Gentlemen," said the King, "now that, for the first time, I have assembled around me in this building the great bodies

of the state, and the representatives of a nation that does not cease to lavish the most touching marks of affection upon me, I felicitate myself on having become the dispenser of those benefits which Providence deigns to grant to my people.

"With Austria, Russia, England, and Prussia, I have made a peace, in which their allies are included—that is to say, all the princes of Christendom. The war was universal, and so is the peace.

"The rank that France always held among the nations has not been transferred to another, it is still undividedly hers. The security acquired by other states increases hers, and consequently adds to her true power. That part of her conquests which she has not retained should not, therefore, be considered as any diminution of her real strength.

"The glory of the French armies has not been dimmed; the monuments of their valour shall remain, and the *chefs d'œuvre* of art are henceforth ours, in virtue of rights more stable and more sacred than those of victory.

"The paths of commerce, so long closed, are about to be opened. The markets of France shall no longer be exclusively open to the productions of her soil and industry. Those articles which habit has made a want, or which are necessary for the arts she practises, will be furnished by the possessions she recovers. She will no longer be debarred these things, or forced to purchase them at an exorbitant price. Our manufactures will flourish again, our maritime towns spring up anew, and all promises us that a lasting calm abroad, and an enduring tranquillity at home, will be the happy fruits of the peace.

"Still a painful remembrance troubles my joy. I was born, and I flattered myself that I should continue all my life, the faithful subject of the best of kings, and to-day I occupy his place! But, at least, he is not altogether dead; he lives still in this testament that he intended for the instruction of the august and unfortunate child to whom I have succeeded. It is with my eyes fixed on this immortal work, penetrated with the sentiments that dictated it, guided by the experience and aided by the counsels of many amongst you, that I have drawn up this constitutional charter which is about to be read to you, and which places the prosperity of the state on a solid basis.

"My Chancellor will acquaint you more in detail with my paternal intentions."

This discourse, simple, dignified, adroit, and as gracefully pronounced as it was well written, in which as much was said of the peace as of the charter, was at first received in religious silence, which was succeeded by clamorous applause. The King appeared enchanted by a success which was not alone

political but personal. The Chancellor next read a discourse, in which he explained the object of the charter with the evident intention of showing the royalists that it was inevitable, as also to prove that it emanated fully and entirely from the royal authority. M. Ferrard afterwards read the original of the charter in a rather low tone, and, as far as could be judged during a rapid rehearsal, it satisfied even the most critical; for except in its origin—which was exclusively monarchical—it was nearly a transcript of the constitution of the senate. When he had finished reading, the Chancellor admitted the peers and deputies to take the oath, amidst a profound silence and a lively curiosity sometimes excited by the great names of the ancient monarchy which had not been heard for so long a time, and sometimes by the great names of the empire which had so often resounded in the glorious bulletins of Napoleon, and which were now so suddenly inscribed in the list of those who swore inviolable fidelity to the Bourbons.

The ceremony was concluded in perfect order, and without any of the anticipated incidents. Louis XVIII. returned to the Tuileries, loudly applauded by the two Chambers, and personally congratulated by all those whom etiquette permitted to address a compliment to the King. In this solemn spectacle he saw but one thing, his discourse; he was conscious but of one result, his personal success. It is sometimes very wise to applaud princes, as it is also very wise to know when to be silent in their presence. On this occasion the applauses of the Chambers and the people were most apropos, and made the King as contented with the charter as though it had been the offspring of his fondest wishes. He had consented to it without reluctance, which was a great deal, and he was ready to put it into execution, which was still more. But, in justice, we must admit that it was principally the work of the Senate, that is, of the old representatives of the French Revolution, who had recovered the faculty of expressing their true opinions on the day of Napoleon's downfall, and who did not wish that the downfall of that wonderful man should be also that of the principles of 1789. It must be added that the charter was also, in some measure, the work of the allied monarchs, not that they loved constitutional government, but they considered it a point of honour to keep their word with the Senate that had rendered such services; they also feared the folly of the emigrants, and thought it necessary to restrain them, not only for the sake of France, but of Europe. From this we may conclude that the charter, like all acts that are not the result of a transient party feeling, was everybody's work.

However, appearances, whether deceitful or not, must often be taken as reality, and it was well done to attribute the charter

to Louis XVIII., who had more or less part in it. He got the credit of it, and all enlightened men felt indebted to him for it. The Senate had no reason to complain, although some of its members were excluded from the peerage, for those who were excluded could by no means appear in the new order of things, with the exception, however, of certain persons, whose omission was much to be regretted, such as Marshal Massena, not admitted because he was born at a league beyond the frontier of 1790—a circumstance that ought to have been ignored; and Marshal Davout, because that his defence of Hamburg had offended the allies. As to the rest, all, whether excluded or admitted, preserved their old emoluments. The legislative corps was to continue undisturbed until the legal time for re-electing a fifth of the members should arrive.

The charter, putting aside the question of its origin, which seemed at that time only a dispute about words, contained all the principles of a true representative monarchy, and was disapproved by none but extreme royalists. It received the approbation of Sieyès, the best of judges, and the least to be suspected, for he was of the number of excluded senators, and he did not hesitate to say, that with this charter France could be free if she would; and that no advantage gained by the revolution had been lost in the ruin of the empire, except, indeed, our frontiers, the only serious loss, and deserving of long regret.

The treaty of Paris, published at the same time as the charter, did not meet with equal success. Certainly, peace could not be more desired than it was at that time by France, and with very good reason; but the treaty of the 30th of May, which was now published, was not the peace itself, for the country had been enjoying peace since the 23rd April; it was the price of the peace, and a very painful price it was. Consequently the perusal of this treaty produced a most saddening effect, not alone upon the men compromised by the last revolution, but upon the most impartial and disinterested classes of the nation. To their eyes the cruel hand of the stranger was visible in these transactions, especially in the tracing of our frontiers. These men had not certainly flattered themselves that France could preserve her geographical limits; they had not hoped that victorious Europe, having marched to the gates of Paris, would leave us the Rhine frontier, but hearing it incessantly repeated on every side that France, under the Bourbons, would obtain much better conditions than when under Napoleon, people did cherish illusory hopes. But suddenly seeing the sad reality revealed, seeing France alone, of all the European powers, reduced to the position she held in 1790; above all, seeing us in part deprived of our colonies, whose restitution

was to be the recompense of the possessions we abandoned on the continent, a deep feeling of irritation was engendered, particularly in the seaports, where, however, the desire of peace was stronger than in other places. The loss of the Mauritius was most sensibly felt, and was the source of much irritation against England, who was accused of wishing to prevent the revival of our commerce. The bitterest expressions of feeling were uttered against this ever-present rival. Next to England, the nation most execrated was Austria. The conduct of this power, so justifiable when considered in a political point of view, appeared highly blameable when viewed as a question of natural feeling, and rendered Austria very unpopular. Every evil design was attributed to her influence, and the bad feeling thus engendered was exhibited to her sovereign, whom the French received wherever he appeared with extreme coldness.

It would assuredly have been better policy not to refer to the cause, whether true or false, of our misfortunes, but to confine ourselves to seeking the means still within our power of repairing them. But as usual, people took more pleasure in reproaching each other, and seeking in these reproaches subjects of bitter recrimination. The revolutionists and imperialists reproached the Bourbons with having returned to France in the train of foreigners, and returned only to consummate the humiliation of the country. The royalists, instead of replying that if they had come in the company of foreigners, they had not brought them, and that it was Napoleon, who, by his ambition, had opened to them an entrance into France—the royalists, we say, instead of defending themselves by this simple and incontestible truth, did all in their power to turn into ridicule those patriotic lamentations which they ought to have respected, even if they did not share in them. They laughed at the idea of natural frontiers, that fantastic object, as they said, which would cost so much blood to nations if seriously pursued; as if all nations did not propose to themselves a certain territorial limit, more or less legitimate, more or less restricted, to which they tend with more or less prudence, skill, or consideration for others, but which is the ever-acting motive force of all their efforts. As if England had not always laboured to fuse into one the three Britannic kingdoms, without mentioning the Indies, and all the other objects of her ambition! As if Russia had not always endeavoured to obtain possession of Finland, Bessarabia, and the Crimea; and Austria to obtain the sovereignty of the course of the Danube and the shores of the Adriatic; Prussia to extend her empire to the centre of Germany; and lastly, has not Spain always sought to unite under her sceptre as much as she possibly

could of the Peninsula? The royalists said that if France had lost certain territories, she had at least secured a staple peace, which we must admit is the incontestible advantage of all defeated litigants; and they added that France would now be delivered from those false Frenchmen, with the foreign accent, who were putting in claims for public posts; as if it were a subject of self-congratulation to get rid of such Frenchmen as the financier Corvetto, the jurisconsult Lasagni, the mathematician Lagrange, the seaman Verheuel, and the warrior Massena! The royalists added, that if they had lost arable land they had acquired sugar, coffee, and cotton plantations, which were not less needed. They laughed at the idea of the commerce carried on under the empire, and which was condemned to drag its slow course across the whole extent of the empire on carts, and they proudly instituted a comparison between that and the winged maritime commerce that was about to be restored to us. The royalists thus committed the double wrong of mocking high-minded grief, and of displaying in vexing contrast their party triumphs, as they were also wrong in reproaching their opponents with the disasters caused by Napoleon, and not by his admirers. They ought to have consoled themselves with the thought, that if Napoleon had contracted the limits of France in endeavouring to extend them too far, there still remained to us an immense glory, our powerful unity, and the progress of every description which we owed to the revolution and the empire, and, in short, the vitality of the French genius; and that with a few years of peace and a prudently liberal government, we should soon recover the moral and physical superiority which was always essentially ours, and never depended on the possession of a province more or less. This was the real and sole consolation left us. But men in affliction often find a greater comfort in complaining than they could find in the alleviation of their woes, or even in actual cure. Complaining consoles them, and the more bitter the more consolatory. It is best to leave them to their consolation, at the same time reserving to ourselves the privilege of not giving credence to all they say, especially when we have the honour of holding in our hands the scales of history

## BOOK LV.

## GOVERNMENT OF LOUIS XVIII.

**CHANGES** effected in the public mind during the months of April and May—**Revival of parties**—The ultra-royalists throng round the Count d'Artois—This Prince, ill and vexed, makes a long stay at Saint Cloud—Return to France of the Duke d'Orleans—The friends of liberty place their hopes in him, whilst the royalists already make him the object of their attacks—Great reverse of this Prince—The Bonapartists, their dejection and their dispersion—The revolutionists, who were at first pleased at the fall of Napoleon, are, by the violence of the emigrants, induced to join the Bonapartists—M. de Lafayette, M. Benjamin Constant, and Madame de Stael return to Paris, and a constitutional party is formed—Prudent arrangements of the *bourgeoisie* of Paris. The opinions of the capital reflected under various aspects in the provinces. State of Le Vendée and Brittany—The old insurgents again take up arms, refuse to pay certain taxes, and disturb by their threats the holders of the *biens nationaux*—Irritation of the cities in the east of France against the Chouans and the Vendéans—State of the city of Nantes—Dispositions of the southern provinces—Spirit that prevails at Bordeaux, Toulouse, Nîmes, Avignon, Marseilles, Lyon—The presence and ravages of the enemy exasperate the eastern provinces and attach them still more to Napoleon, whom they regard as the energetic defender of the land—Return of the troops from remote garrisons and prisons in England, Russia, Germany, and Spain—Exasperation and arrogance of these troops, who are persuaded that a dark treason has betrayed France into the hands of the enemy—Embarrassment of the Bourbons, who are obliged to reduce the army to a painful extent, and try to keep well with all classes, particularly those who are hostile to them, and obliged (so to speak) to govern by the aid of their enemies in opposition to their friends—First resolutions relative to the finances, to the army, and the navy, &c.—Louis, the minister of finance, finally succeeds in passing a resolution that all the state debts are to be paid, and the *droits réunis* kept up—Limits within which he obliges the war and navy ministers to confine themselves—Project of organizing the army: conservation of the Imperial Guard and re-establishment of the ancient royal military household—Difficulty of reconciling these different institutions, and, above all, of supporting the expense—Maintenance of the Legion of Honor, with a change in the insignia—Great military posts bestowed on the principal marshals—Discontent with which the army receives intelligence of the new system of organization—Meeting at Paris for an immense number of half pay officers and unemployed functionaries—Whilst the military men are hurt by the reductions to which they are obliged to submit, those attached to the principles of the revolution are rendered discontented by imprudent manifestations—Funeral service for Louis XVI., Moreau, Pichegru, Georges Cadoudal—Attacks of the clergy against the possessors of national property—The concordat not having been guaranteed by the charter, the Bourbons determined upon demanding its revocation—Mission to Rome for this object—The Pope is requested to revoke the concordat, and the Pope asks Louis XVIII. to restore Avignon—Police regulations, which render the



observance of Sundays and holidays obligatory—Effect produced by the regulation—The government, by yielding to the party feelings of its supporters, had, within a few months, alienated the military men, the revolutionists, the priests who had taken the oath, the possessors of national property, and the citizen class—The meeting of the chambers, animated by a monarchical and liberal spirit, infuses a better tone into the state of things—M. Durbach denounces in the Chamber of Deputies the regulation touching holidays and Sundays, and the system of legislation that places the daily press under a censorship—The Chamber of Deputies, though condemning the language of M. Durbach, demands a law for these two objects—The King yields to the wishes of the chamber; he orders a law regulating the press to be drawn up, but a law that confirms the censorship—Public excitement—Dawning taste for political discussions—After long debates, it is acknowledged that a censorship is not mentioned in the charter, and the law concerning the press is only adopted as a temporary measure—The King accepts the presented amendments, and sanctions the law such as it has issued from the Chamber of Deputies—The question of Sundays and holidays is referred to a special commission—Several publications against the national sales having been denounced to the chambers, the Chamber of Deputies condemns these writings, and again solemnly confirms the inviolability of the property called “national”—Bills relative to financial measures—M. Louis presents the financial schedule of the empire—Incorrectness of this schedule, but excellence of the minister's principles—He proposes the integral liquidation of the state debts, the maintenance of the indirect taxes, and the payment of arrears by means of temporary bills bearing an interest of 8 per cent—The royalist oppositionists declare against the propositions of the minister, and without venturing to speak of bankruptcy, wish that the state creditors should be paid—They find some support from the liberal opposition, who, not comprehending the designs of the minister, exclaim against stock-jobbing—M. Louis, by his energy and unstudied eloquence, triumphs over all resistance, and gets his projects adopted, which become the basis of public credit in France—Prudent commercial measures calculated to effect the transition from a state of war to a state of peace—Though the liberals accuse the chambers of timidity, they acquire by a mixture of moderation and firmness the respect of the government and the confidence of the public—Their discussions produce a certain calm—Fête at the Hotel de Ville in honour of Louis XVIII—The body guards dispute with the national guard the honour of guarding the king—Effect of this fête—Defect in the administration, resulting from an error of M. de Montesquieu—This talented minister, who possessed the art of pleasing the chambers, was unfortunately unfit for business, and could neither modify or direct the personal administration—The provinces, left to themselves, adopt the tone of the local passions—Proposed journey of the princes to rally the supporters of the Bourbons—Danger of these journeys, which excite instead of allaying the popular passions—Journey of the Duke d'Angoulême into Lower Normandy, Brittany, Vendée, and Guyenne—His reception at Brittany, and particularly at Nantes—This Prince passes into the heart of Vendée—Sentiments and conduct of the Vendéans of the *Bocage*—Bordeaux; change that had taken place in the disposition of the inhabitants—Return of the Prince through Angers—His journey, a mixture of good and evil, finishes in August—Departure of the Count d'Artois for Champagne and Burgundy—He promises many consolations to all places that have suffered from the effects of the war, lavishes military decorations, and encourages at Dijon the intolerance of the *petite église*—His stay and his imprudent conduct at Lyons—His arrival at Marseilles—Enthusiasm of the Marseillais—Their ardent desire to obtain the *franchise* of their port—The Count d'Artois promises it and departs, leaving the people intoxicated with joy—His journey to Nîmes, Avignon, Grenoble, and Besançon—Unbecoming conduct with regard to the Archbishop Lecoz—Return of the Count d'Artois to Paris—His journey has only produced evil, without any admixture of good—Journey of the Duke de Berry into the frontier provinces—This Prince, irritated by the opposition offered by the army, gives way to injudicious anger—After a short interval of quiet in August, the passions of the people are again awakened in October and November by the journeys of the princes, and by the imprudent measures of the government with regard

to the pensioners, to the orphan daughters of the officers of the Legion of Honour, and the military schools—The intervention of the chambers induces a modification or revocation of these measures—Affluence and increasing opposition of the military at Paris—Disagreeable incident with regard to Gen. Vandamme, and commencement of General Exelmains affair—Disgrace of Marshal Davout—Great sensation produced by the proposition of restoring to the emigrants their unsold property—The principle of the proposed measure is admitted, but the language of the minister Ferrard offends everybody—The chambers censure the minister and pass the law, with various amendments—Amid all this excitement, the party called the chouans, and that of the half-pay officers, experience mutual alarm, each accusing the other of imaginary conspiracies—The official police endeavour to reduce these conspiracies to the simple truth, whilst the officious police of the Count d'Artois try to exaggerate them—Weariness and perplexity of Louis XVIII., beset by the reports of his brother—Part performed by M. Fouché under these circumstances—The King, intending to be present at a representation at the Odeon, a conspiracy against the royal family is immediately talked of, and extraordinary precautions taken in consequence—Affected zeal of Marshal Marmont, who commands the body guard—Outcry against the war minister and the director of police—The King yields to the entreaties of the Count, and replaces General Dupont, war minister, by Marshal Soult, and M. Beugnot, director general of police, by M. d' Andre—He indemnifies M. Beugnot, by appointing him minister for the navy—This palliative infuses great confidence in the court party and the ultra-royalists—State of things in December, 1814.



## BOOK LV.

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### GOVERNMENT OF LOUIS XVIII.

SCARCELY two months had elapsed since the return of the Bourbons, and France already presented the strongest contrast with what she had been or had appeared to be, during the previous fifteen years. At the termination of a sanguinary revolution, during which men had fallen on each other with actual frenzy, we saw them suddenly seized by the powerful hand of Napoleon, and under the empire calmed down into a complete moral and physical immobility, and soon despairing of being able to effect any thing against each other, they fell into a species of forgetfulness of themselves, their passions, and their opinions, and renouncing all interest in public affairs, cast, at most from time to time, an anxious look at the heroic drama that was being enacted before their eyes. The sudden fall of Napoleon, freeing them from the grasp of his iron hand, had awakened in different classes sentiments as diverse as their positions; the royalists experienced an unmixed joy, the revolutionists a joy mingled with anxiety, and the Bonapartists the stunning effect of a sudden and violent blow. But these sentiments soon underwent some modification. The royalists, when the first flush of joy was passed, found that the reality fell much short of their hopes, and they were filled with jealousy, disputing amongst themselves who should have the largest portion of the booty. Taking advantage of the return of liberty, which at the first return of the Bourbons existed only for their advantage, and making use of it to pour forth their hate against the revolution and the empire, they soon made the revolutionists regret their momentary joy, and extinguished in the Bonapartists the stunning effect of their fall, which had suspended the power of self-defence. The appa-

rent unity that had subsisted under the Empire was thus suddenly exchanged for extraordinary commotion, and as if our history had retrograded seventy years, there were now seen confronting and measuring each other with angry eyes nobles and citizens, religionists and philosophers, priests who had taken the oath and priests who had not taken the oath, soldiers of Condé and soldiers of the Republic, all ready to come to blows, if the government, instead of restraining and calming them, by giving an example of cool good sense, had excited or even allowed them to follow their own inclinations.

In the first place, the spectacle of these dissensions was presented in the court itself. The Count d'Artois, deeply touched by the censure poured out on his short administration, afflicted at hearing the disastrous peace that had been concluded, attributed to the convention of the 23rd April, and his imprudent promises, blamed for the difficulty experienced in collecting the taxes—and these reproaches were encouraged by the King—had taken refuge at Saint Cloud, where he was more vexed than sick, and allowed his friends to form a group of malcontents, around whom all those rallied who thought that too much had been conceded to the revolutionists. And these malcontents did not hesitate to say publicly that the King was a kind of Jacobin, who had again adopted the ideas he had entertained in his youth. The higher classes of the nobility, who, though filling nearly all the high offices of the court, wished to hold also the state appointments, which they were forced to share with the imperialists, were far from being satisfied. They mingled their grief with that of the nobility of the bar, who, it must be confessed, had seldom any sympathies in common with the higher nobility, but who were now offended that they had not been allowed to draw up the new constitution, which they would have done according to their own ideas and for their own advantage. In the same way the surviving members of the ancient parliament had addressed a secret protest to Louis XVIII. against the charter. The provincial nobility, at least those who were not rich, had come in crowds to Paris, to petition for the restitution of their property, and to solicit, *en attendant*, places of every kind, and of every amount of salary. But the minister of finance received these gentlemen very roughly, for he believed that public offices ought to be given to those who had experience in business, and they were received with disdain by the minister of the Interior, who found them a bore. They consequently flocked round the Count d'Artois, saying that the government was abandoned to revolutionists, and that if things went on in that way a little longer, France and royalty would be again sacrificed.

Whilst that within the walls of the Tuileries there was thus formed a royalist party, *more loyal than the King*, as was remarked at the time, an entirely opposite species of party was being formed at the Palais Royal, but, it must be said, without the personal sanction of him who was reported its chief,—this was the Duke d'Orleans' party. This prince, an old and valiant soldier of the republic, well-informed, talented, and prudent, had acquired in an eventful life a precocious experience. He understood the character of the emigrants thoroughly, laughed at them without compunction in the retirement of his own family, and was so happy at revisiting his native land, and recovering there a princely rank and a large fortune, that he thought little of any thing else, his sole solicitude being to protect himself against the malice of the royalists, who were as inimical to him as they had been to his father. Whilst that he was solely occupied with his children, with their education and their scattered patrimony, taking especial care to avoid making partizans, the royalists made them for him in thousands, by persecuting him with their hatred, and so rendering him an object of interest and confidence to revolutionists of every shade. Thus on the right hand of the King was the Count d'Artois, surrounded by the malcontent royalists, and on his left the Count d'Orleans, surrounded by the malcontent liberals, whom he did not seek after, for he thought only of his family affairs, whilst the royalists were unintentionally working out serious political events.

In another sphere, the high dignitaries of the empire, who could not have consistently rallied round the Bourbons, or who had not wished to do so, having recovered a little from the effects of their fall, began to unite, but prudently, and without making any hostile demonstration. There were M. de Caulaincourt, whom even the patronage of the Emperor of Russia had not been able to get admitted to the peerage, and who kept aloof, deeply touched by the disasters of France and the calumnies of which he was the object, in connection with the abduction of the Duke d'Engbien; the Prince Cambacères, more taciturn than ever, and making no greater display than receiving at his table some old friends, as discreet and sensual as himself; the Dukes de Bassano, de Cadore, de Gaëta, de Rovigo, the Counts Mollien and Lavalette, talking within their own circle of the catastrophe they had witnessed, regarding with pardonable satisfaction the embarrassment of their successors in power, and visiting, but with considerable precaution, the Queen Hortense, who had remained at Paris to defend, under the patronage of the Emperor of Russia, the interests of her children. This princess had lately lost her

mother, the Empress Josephine, who died of a chill to which she had exposed herself in receiving the Emperor Alexander at Malmaison. She was universally regretted by those who knew her, on account of the elegance of her manners and the goodness of her heart; she was regretted by the public, who saw in her death an additional calamity amongst many. In fact, of the prisoner of Elba's two wives, one had just died of exhaustion and trouble of mind, the other had returned crownless, and with a portionless child, to the dominions of her father, scarcely acknowledged as a princess, though Archduchess of Austria by birth, and already half forgetful of the husband with whom she had shared the sceptre of the world!

Marshal Soult had also come to Paris, deprived of his command, and deeply irritated at the preference shown to Marshal Suchet, of which he complained with a want of prudence that he seldom displayed. Marshal Massena, too, was at Paris almost forgetting the injustice of Napoleon in beholding the misfortunes of France, offended at being treated as a foreigner who should be naturalized in order to become a Frenchman, and living in silence and isolation, never seeking at the Tuilleries the flattery which all the marshals were sure to receive, and lastly, there was at Paris the Marshal Davout, proud of the resistance he had made at Hambourg, caring little about what the royalists and the adverse generals said, and preparing in his estate at Savigny, whither he had retired, a memoir, in which he narrated with daring frankness all he had done in fulfilling his military duties.

In the same class with these men, but not mixing with them, were the revolutionists of every shade of feeling, who, though by no means hostile to the army, lived apart from it, and especially from its chiefs. Pleased for a moment, as we have said, at the downfall of the empire, they now began to regret it. The revolutionists who had most compromised themselves, such as Tallien, Merlin, and others, assembled at the house of Barras, who was still tolerably rich, and deplored in common the destruction of liberty, which they attributed to Napoleon. With these were united some few military men, such as Marshal Lefebvre, who, though distinguished and rewarded by Napoleon, had conserved his ancient opinion and beneath whose glittering marshal's uniform there beat the heart of a republican. The personages we have just named found in the suburbs a certain number of the lower classes who sympathized in their opinions, the old bound by memories of the past, the young by tradition, less daring than they had once been, but ready to resume their former attitude under the influence of events, and the excitement of political discussions. Above and apart from these were the more

decided revolutionists, who had been at first well treated by Napoleon, but who were afterwards separated from him, either in consequence of their convictions or some error in conduct. The greater number of these were senators, excluded from the peerage because they had voted the death of Louis XVI., and on this account called *the voters*. The two most important were MM. Sicyès and Fouché, the former ever morose and solitary in his habits, approving the charter, but doubting whether it would be put into execution; the latter, on the contrary, always untiringly active, keeping up an acquaintance with all parties, endeavouring to win the confidence of all, and though ill-recompensed for the services he had rendered the Count d'Artois, he sought the count's friends in private, and endeavoured to persuade them that he alone, amidst existing difficulties, was capable of guiding and saving the Bourbons.

But France was not exclusively composed of partizans, dreaming of the re-establishment of the ancient régime, or regretting the excesses of the revolution, or deploring the rich appointments held under the empire. There were both amongst the middle-aged and the well-informed young men brought up in the imperial schools, a considerable number of distinguished persons, who turned their thoughts to the future, uninfluenced by the prejudices or interests of any epoch, and seeking liberty under the Bourbons, whom Napoleon's errors had reinstated on the throne of France, a circumstance not to be regretted, should the restored dynasty only know how to accommodate themselves to the opinions and circumstances of the French people. These men assembled most frequently at the house of Madame de Staël, who had returned from the exile in which Napoleon's gloomy suspicions detained her. She pined for Paris, and Paris longed for her, for she was the soul of the French intellectual world, receiving in her *salons* conquerors and conquered, and endeavouring to persuade both parties that they must try to acquire, under the restored Bourbons, British liberty. M. Benjamin Constant had also returned from exile, and was preparing, with his fluent and brilliant pen, to throw light on constitutional questions. M. de Lafayette had issued from his retreat at Lagrange at the appearance of the first ray of liberty, and it was not without some degree of pleasure that he again beheld the Bourbons, under whom he had passed his youth, and whom he was disposed to serve if he found them inclined to serve the country. These were the most distinguished members of this society, which was frequented by the most talented and most esteemed men in Paris, and it was here that party took its rise which has been since known as "the constitutional party."

The well-minded citizens of Paris sympathised with this

VOL. XVIII. K



class more than with any other. The bourgeoisie were peacefully disposed, moderate, and disinterested, not seeking government places, but solely anxious for the prosperity of trade. They had become familiarized with the idea of the return of the Bourbons, since the necessity of their return had been proved; they had placed their hopes in them, especially in the King, desiring, with peace, a prudent liberty—that which consists in being able to prevent governments from destroying themselves. The bourgeoisie of Paris offered up their best wishes for the Bourbons, and were ready to afford them an efficacious support by means of the National Guard, of which they formed the principal part, provided that their opinions, sentiments, and dignity, were not too rudely hurt. Offspring of the revolution, but unsoiled by guilt—not having contracted either criminal habits or dangerous ambition—having no other interest than the public welfare, the bourgeoisie of Paris was at this moment the truest, the best, and most popular expression of opinion in France.

In the provincial parts, the same shades of politics, but more decided in the colouring, were to be found; and the same passions, good and evil, with fewer modifications. In Lower Normandy, in Brittany, and in Vendée, the rural populations, so profoundly tranquil under Napoleon, were, so to speak, “up.” The Chouans had assembled with incredible celerity under the leadership of their surviving chiefs; they replaced those that were dead, and had, in fact, assumed arms, without knowing what they were about, merely for the pleasure of taking them up and threatening their old adversaries, or, as they said themselves, for the purpose of supporting the King. In their eagerness to obtain arms, they had rushed into the houses of those they called “blues,” and taken forcible possession of their muskets. The local authorities entreated them to remain quiet, assuring them that the king was not threatened with any danger, and consequently did not need their assistance; but secret intriguers, for the most part emigrants who regretted their lost property, or who were ambitious of government employments, assured them that they must not believe the prefects, and that the princes were desirous that they should hold themselves in readiness. Their ill-will was especially directed against the holders of national property. This class of persons was much more general in the country districts than in the large cities, though even here there were many who had purchased ancient mansions and convents. Nearly all who had favoured the revolution of 1789 looked upon the priests and nobles as enemies, and had had little scruple about becoming possessors of their property, which they purchased at a low price, and afterwards rated at its full value.

Such persons were especially numerous in Normandy, Brittany, Vendée, and the southern provinces, and now became alarmed for their personal safety, as well as for their property. Placing little trust in the sincerity of the local authorities, they had not yet taken up arms, but were on the eve of doing so. The inhabitants of the cities, both great and small, even without being holders of national property, but having still fresh in their memory all the horrors committed by the Chouans, sympathised on this account with the holders of national property, and constituted what in the west of France were called "*the blues*," in opposition to the party called "*the whites*." As to the latter, they employed their time in smuggling, waiting a favourable opportunity for engaging, in something more congenial to their taste; they refused to pay the tax on salt, and carried off immense quantities of this commodity from the salt marshes without paying the dues. To all these causes of commotion must be added the passions of the clergy, who were a hundred times more imprudent than any of those who hoped the return of the ancient order of things. The old quarrel between the priests who had *taken the oath* and those who had *not taken the oath* sprang up under a new form, that of submission or resistance to the concordat. Where there existed, (as in the diocese of Rochelle, for example) an ancient titular bishop who had not given in his resignation at the command of the Pope in 1802, and had retired into England, the people refused to obey the bishop appointed by the Emperor and sanctioned by the Pope. Touraine, Mans, and Perigord offered several cases of this kind. The concordat was in these places trampled under foot, and denounced as the fruit of the revolution. The priests who sanctioned it, and who had for the most part taken the oath, fell into great disfavour; people said, that having accepted the civil constitution of the clergy, it was no wonder they found the concordat quite to their taste. In short, the restitution of church property was publicly announced. The clergy and nobility declared openly that if the Bourbons, immediately on their return, had not been able to do them justice, it would soon be done; and that, in any case, the Count d'Artois and his sons ardently desired it, and would ultimately bring over the King to their opinion.

This position of affairs began to cause uneasiness to the bourgeoisie; even to those who, though they had no personal interest in the question of national property, were not uninterested in the question of public order, and would have beheld with alarm any attempt to restore the ancient régime. In the space of two months, things had arrived at that point that Nantes, one of the maritime cities most attached to peace and the Bourbons was become, on account of the chouanism arising on

every side, almost hostile to the restoration. Descending in a southerly direction, there was Bordeaux, which had assumed the title of the "city of the 12th March," because on that day its gates had been opened to the duke d'Angoulême. Bordeaux was not changed in sentiment, but certainly set up pretensions that did not harmonize with the general interest. In the first place, the inhabitants positively refused to pay the *droits réunis*, asserting that they had not supported the cause of legitimacy to submit to the ordinances of usurpation; they complained bitterly that the Mauritius had been abandoned, and burst into violent invectives against the English, whom they had at first received with the warmest enthusiasm. The same feelings prevailed at Toulouse, but with certain differences. In this city there was less animosity manifested against the English because no maritime interests were at stake, but on the other hand there prevailed a violent hatred of class against class, of royalists against revolutionists, because that the nobility, richer and more powerful in an agricultural than in a maritime province, were more frequently placed in antagonism with the bourgeoisie. Throughout the remainder of Languedoc, at Montpellier and Nîmes, the same sentiments prevailed, heightened by the bitterness arising from religious quarrels. The Catholics detested the Protestants, and said they had been excluded by them during five-and-twenty years from all the advantages arising from the possession of power, and wished to proceed to acts of extreme violence, from which they were with difficulty withheld. On the other hand, the Protestants began to take up arms in self defence. Nîmes was like a volcano ready to pour forth flames. Some persons of low birth, assuming the right of representing the Catholic nobility, some through natural excitability of character, and others through love of office, pretended to overrule the magisterial authority and follow no will but their own. They had publicly and in the bitterest language condemned the senatorial constitution, poured forth a thousand imprecations against the senate, demanded an absolute royalty, and protested against the charter. At Arles the same line of conduct was pursued, and in the environs the holders of national property had not merely been threatened but some of the former proprietors had taken forcible possession of their property.\*

Marseilles surpassed, if possible, all that we have related of the other cities of the south. It was natural enough that the Marsellaises should refuse to pay the *droits réunis*, but they required besides that the entire commerce of the Levant should be placed in their hands, and to effect this, that they should

\* In this description of the state of France, I follow the reports of the police which were every day laid before Louis XVIII.

be emancipated from all the commercial laws that bound the rest of France, that Marseilles should be declared a free city, with permission to trade with the entire world, without being subjected to any of the restrictions established for the protection of the national commerce. Every ordinance that opposed the fulfilment of these wishes ought to be trampled under foot as the work of usurpation, and in order that the King should be free to do what was suitable to his most faithful subjects, it was necessary that he should possess absolute power, unrestrained by chambers or any other institution of revolutionary origin. Consequently Marseilles execrated the charter, and with the charter the English, who had deprived us of the Isle of France. In combining all the follies that triumphant royalism gave vent to in Vendée, at Bordeaux, Nîmes, and other places, it would be difficult to equal the extravagances that found expression in the city of Marseilles, at present so enlightened and so prosperous, but at that time wrought to madness by twenty-five years of fearful sufferings.

Advancing towards the Rhone we find the same violence exhibited at Avignon, with a spirit of vengeance easily conceivable in a district that had witnessed the crimes of *La Glaciere*. Mounting still higher, along our great southern stream, that is to say, at Valence and at Lyon, these sentiments gradually assumed an almost opposite character. Though there were at Lyon ardent royalists filled with the remembrance of the siege of 1793, and united under M. de Précy, who had gloriously directed that siege, and had on that account been invested with the command of the national guard, there were also numerous imperialists strongly attached to Napoleon through gratitude for the benefits he had conferred on their city, and the prosperity of their manufactures during his reign, and these dispositions were confirmed by the presence and bad conduct of the foreign troops. More north still, in Franche-Comté, Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, and Burgundy, provinces that had been the theatre of the war, the spirit of patriotism had suffered so severe a check that the people had become *Bonapartists*. During the revolution these provinces, which were generally more tranquil than those of the centre and south of France, had never fallen into extreme opinions, but had maintained the moderate sentiments of 1789. Though they had once admired Napoleon as the regenerator of France, and the conqueror of Europe, they had afterwards deplored his errors, and separated from him without hesitation. But seeing him in 1814 struggle with so much glory and perseverance against the European coalition, sharing with him the anxieties and sufferings of the war, they had become again attached to his government. They had conceived an abhor-

rence of the foreign armies, and had grown cold towards the Bourbons, because they had returned in company with the foreigners.

The eastern provinces exhibited towards the King's government a positive coldness, less injurious, however, than the ill-regulated zeal of the royalists in the west and south. To all these elements, fermenting at the same time, there was now added another, in the number of old soldiers who returned to France, either as discharged prisoners, or because of the evacuation of the foreign fortresses. About twenty thousand men had returned from Spain by Perpignan; twelve thousand had returned through Nice and Toulon from Genoa and Tuscany; more than thirty thousand, composing the Italian army, had returned through Chambery; eighty thousand at least, that had evacuated Wurzburg, Erfurt, Magdebourg, Hambourg, Antwerp, Berg-op-Zoom, returned by Strasbourg, Metz, Maubeuge, Valenciennes, and Lille. More than forty thousand, who had outlived the horrors of the English hulks, had landed at Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, Havre, Cherbourg, and Brest. A large number of prisoners to be restored by Russia, Germany, England, and Spain, was also expected. All these men wore the tricolour cockade, which no remonstrance could induce them to lay aside. Old soldiers, for the most part, who nourished in the depth of their hearts the sentiments that prevailed in their country when they quitted it, they could not cease, though they had been often irritated against Napoleon, to regard him as the representative of France, of her greatness, and her independence; whilst in the Bourbons they saw the very opposite. The idea that had taken root in their minds was, that in their absence foreigners, aided by some nobles and priests, had effected a revolution, alike disastrous to France and the army. This idea infuriated them, and filled them with contempt for a government which they declared was the tool and accomplice of foreigners. These assertions, though apparently true, were radically unjust, for, as we have already remarked, if the Bourbons in 1814 returned to France in the train of foreigners, it was a misfortune not attributable to them, but to Napoleon, whose fault it was. But this evident truth was disregarded, and the Bourbons were looked on by the old soldiers as the agents and allies of the European coalition.

From what has been said, it is easy to conceive the difficulty the King's government had to encounter in endeavouring to bring under its authority the troops that were returning to France. At Strasbourg some officers, who were present at a theatrical representation got up for the occasion, jumped upon the stage and silenced the royalist songs that displeased them.

At Metz, and in other cities, the tricolour flags and the eagles were displayed in the processions of the *Fête Dieu*. On the sea coast, where these soldiers had landed from England, they carried their violence so far as to wish to remove the cross of Saint Louis from the breasts of our old navy officers. At Rouen they hooted General Sacken, who, however, as governor of Paris, had acted with extreme moderation. They entered the shops of print sellers, and tore up the caricatures that ridiculed Napoleon, and frequently did not respect the portraits of the King and the princes. They sometimes went so far as to sing seditious songs, and at Paris, especially, there was much difficulty in restraining them. The Austrian troops having stuck branches of foliage in their caps, the French soldiers took offence, believing the manifestation was intended to indicate a triumph over them. The Prince de Schwarzenberg deemed it necessary to publish a note, explaining that the manifestation was not meant as an offence, but was merely a customary usage amongst the Austrian troops when in the field, which, however, would be now interdicted them.

The greater part of these soldiers had returned to France after having suffered severely. There were many amongst them who had not received their pay during six, twelve, and eighteen months. They did not blame the empire, but the restoration, for this, because payments were not made at the war office as quickly as they wished, and as their wants demanded.

The system of flattering the heads of the army did not produce the effect of calming and subduing the army itself. Our soldiers did not think themselves at all honoured in the persons of their generals, when they saw Berthier, Oudinot, Ney, Macdonald, Moncey, Augereau, Serurier, and Mortier, seated at court between the King and the Princes. They, on the contrary, looked on these honours as the price of a dark treason. Marmont, who was certainly guilty, but much less so than was believed, was in their eyes the type of this imaginary treason, to which they attributed our reverses; and reports were every day circulated of his having been killed in a duel, false reports, which were constantly contradicted, and constantly renewed, but which expressed the wishes of those with whom they originated. The King and the Princes, in flattering the heads of the army whom they did not love, only compromised their own dignity and that of the marshals, without gaining the affections of the officers and the soldiers.

Numbers of officers had flocked to Paris to learn their fate, and enjoy the consolation of lamenting together over the change that had taken place in their condition. The repeated commands of the war minister, ordering them to return to

their regiments, and threatening them with the loss of their commissions if the military inspectors did not find them at their posts, were disregarded. The officers took advantage of the general confusion and remained at Paris, flocking to the theatres and public places, where they ridiculed and insulted the Bourbons beyond measure. In the same category were numerous government functionaries, who had returned from the surrendered provinces, custom-house officers, tax gatherers, and police agents, who, far from laughing and jesting, wept over their misfortunes. Altercations were of daily occurrence, and in these affrays our soldiers were not worsted, whilst the government, not daring to employ foreign troops to re-establish order, made use of the national guards, who, with their pacific and respected uniform, restored peace by their presence and advice. The rioters obeyed, because this guard was in their eyes the representative of the nation assembled to protect the public peace, frequently participating in the sentiments of the young men whose sallies they repressed, but who appreciated better than they, the necessity of submitting to circumstances, and of looking to the future, and not the past, for the happiness of France.

We may judge from this plain description the state of the public mind, the embarrassments of every kind that threatened the new government, the difficulties of the task they had to fulfil, and the serious errors into which they were liable to be betrayed. The first object to be considered was the army, which was to undergo reductions, inevitable in a country passing from a state of war to one of peace, and at the same time manage the more difficult operation of reducing an immense military establishment to a very limited one, and effecting these changes in a manner that the army should attribute them neither to ill-will nor a partiality for the principles of the emigration. The government required equal caution not to offend the revolutionists, whose presence recalled so many calamities, and who, if offended, might join the imperialists, which they had not yet done. It was necessary to tranquilize the holders of national property, who constituted a considerable portion of the landed proprietors, and not make them Bonapartists. It was necessary to restrain the clergy who had remained faithful to the Bourbons, and prevent them from maltreating the clergy who had taken the oath, and who formed the larger number, and not alarm the latter about the concordat, which was their sole guarantee. In fact, the object of the government was, not to make implacable enemies of these divers restless classes, all ready to become malcontents, regretting the empire which they did not love; and these precautions were doubly needed whilst the principal and almost

sole support of the government was the wise and prudent bourgeoisie, who entertained only moderate wishes, and who, were their good sense, justice, and love of equality wounded, might be tempted to join the malcontents. But, considered dispassionately, what a severe task was imposed on the Bourbons and the emigrants which had returned with them. They were called upon to prefer the soldiers of Napoleon to the soldiers of Condé; they were expected to show a preference to men who had been the executioners of some of their friends, or who had purchased the property of others for a trifle; they were expected, we say, to prefer these men to their own friends! They were expected to prefer the priests who had conformed to the principles of the revolution to those who had refused to recognise such opinions. They were expected to feign for classes that had sprung up in their absence as much regard, because they were rich and intellectual, as they felt for the nobles, with whom they had lived at court in their youth, and in exile in their riper age! In short, in one word, it was expected that the Bourbons should extinguish in their bosoms memory and feeling, in order to appear in the eyes of France what they were not! It must, therefore, be admitted, even whilst animadverting on the faults of these princes, that it would have been very difficult for them to do otherwise than they did. Revolution, counter-revolution—alas! terrible events, alike distant from the True, the Just, the Possible. The one over-shoots the mark, the other falls short of it; neither stops at the right point. But, as an excuse for both, it must be admitted that if the former has the merit of embodying the spirit of the times, the latter possesses that of obeying the noblest sentiments of the human heart, respect for antiquity and a tender affection for the past.

The question that pressed most on the consideration of the government was what concerned the army. It was first proposed that the soldiers should receive their arrears of pay, of which they stood very much in need, and which brokers sometimes advanced them at the very door of the war office at a profit of 50 per cent. But though the minister of finance intended to discharge all the debts of the state, he could not hope to discharge arrears out of the current resources, which scarcely sufficed for the most urgent necessities. Of these arrears a sum total had been formed, which it was proposed to pay by raising credit, which would necessarily involve some delay. However, an exception had been made in favour of the soldiers' pay, and M. Louis had determined to devote immediately to that object thirty or forty millions in ready money. For this purpose he had opened to the war minister the necessary credit; but two causes delayed the employment of these



means. In the first place, the difficulty of bringing from a distance the accounts of the different regiments; and secondly, the difficulty of reorganizing the war office. General Dupont had not hesitated a moment to restore the mansion occupied by the war office to its former owner—it was the unsold property of an emigrant; he had transferred his offices, and this removal, together with changing several clerks, and combining into one the two departments of the *personnel* and the *materiel*, which under the empire had been kept distinct, had occasioned a momentary confusion in the administration that had retarded business. However, General Dupont had made every effort to pay some accounts sent in from remote garrisons, and he also assisted the discharged prisoners that were thronging into France.

These preliminaries concerning the army having been arranged, it was necessary to proceed to its definite organization, and reduce it to proportions more suited to the extent of our territory and the state of our finances. At one time, by reason of desertions, a fear was entertained that there would be a dearth of soldiers. The conscripts of 1815 had been authorized, as we have seen, to return to their homes; and as to the conscripts drawn anterior to that period, and who had deserted in crowds, the ingenious pretext had been devised—in order to avoid severe measures, and to retain the right of recalling them in case of need—of considering them on a limited leave of absence. But the return of the garrisons and prisoners had soon dissipated the fear of suffering from want of men and had restored to France 400,000, that would enable the government to dispense with the conscription for a long period, and declare the system provisionally abolished, deferring to a later period the passing of a law on the subject of recruitment. By granting to a portion of these men—for example, the most fatigued—a limited congé, and keeping the others under arms, France would possess a superb army, composed of the best soldiers in the world. But was the government in a position to pay these men and make a provision for forty or fifty thousand officers, the glorious remains of our long wars?

This question was warmly debated in the Royal Council where as we have observed, the members of the old provisional government and the ministers had seats. General Dupont was summoned to present his project and he forwarded the command to Baron Louis, in order that the latter might declare what amount of money he was disposed to devote to the army. The Minister of Finance declared that he could not give a definite answer, until he should receive the budget of the different departments, and until he should have succeeded in re-establishing the collection of the taxes.

The Duke de Berry, the youngest and most active of the royal princes, and who exhibited a sincere zeal for the interests of the army, pressed the Minister of Finance to be explicit, and the latter declared he could not promise more than two million francs. For a military establishment comprising more than 400,000 men, soldiers and officers, this was very little, though a soldier does not cost and certainly did not cost at that time a thousand francs.\* With great economy, 200,000 men might have been kept on service, but with the inevitable expenses attendant on the transition from a state of war to a state of peace, it was almost impossible, and the utmost that could be done would be to keep 150,000 men on service. A rigorous economy was imperatively called for, that would not permit any sacrifice to luxury or party-feeling.

The next question brought under consideration was the Imperial Guard; what was to be done with it? To dissolve it seemed difficult and dangerous; to retain without confiding to it the care of the sovereign's person, and thus keep the Imperial Guard in a species of semi disgrace, was still more dangerous. However, General Dupont and the princes believed they had found a solution for the difficulty, at once prudent and pleasing. They proposed that the Old Guard should be retained as a *corps d'élite*, with the same high pay, the same privileges, and an honourable title, without, however, being entrusted with the guard of the King's person, an honour reserved for the household troops. The Young Guard having been almost destroyed during the war, and the remains consisting of only a single regiment, originally drawn from the Old Guard, with which it could not be again incorporated, the remnants of both were fused into two infantry regiments, each consisting of four battalions; one regiment of grenadiers, to be called the "*Grenadiers de France*," another regiment of light infantry to be called "*Chasseurs à pied de France*." The

\* It is a generally received opinion that in France a soldier costs 1,000 francs, and that 100,000 cost one hundred million. This is an erroneous idea. His calculation was based on the state of our military establishment during the first half of the present century, because at that time a budget of three hundred millions only maintained 300,000 men. But in this sum were comprised all the expenses of our military establishment, that is to say the fortresses, the staffs, the material, the pensioners, the gendarmerie, and it was by estimating this expenditure as the cost of the men alone, that each soldier was rated at 1,000 francs. But if, on the contrary, we consider a man, draughted into an existing and paid regiment, where the expenses of the staff and material are already liquidated, a soldier under such circumstances is far from costing 1,000 francs. Eighteen years ago, a soldier was maintained in time of peace for about 400 francs. Calculated in this way 100,000 men, recalled from furlough and draughted into existing regiments, ought to cost 40 and not 100 million francs.

cavalry was distributed in the same way, into four regiments, one of cuirassiers, one of dragoons, one of light horse, and one of lancers, enjoying the same advantages and with similar titles, of *cuirassiers*, *dragoons*, *chasseurs*, *lanciers de France*. As to the reserve of artillery, that was broken up and re-incorporated with the regiments from which it had been originally drawn. The entire might amount to about 800,000 men, horse and foot, which would cost some fifteen or eighteen million francs. It was a serious question to consider whether in a great state, there ought to be any *corps d'élite*, but the men who governed in those days solved the question, as we shall see, in a strange manner, by creating two of these bodies, one to guard the person of the sovereign and the other to guard nothing at all, excepting it might be the shade of the glorious monarch, under whom they had served, whose memory they incessantly recalled to others, and which they could never forget themselves.

The next military question was concerning the troops of the line, and it was necessary to reduce the entire to dimensions commensurate with our finances. The minister proposed to retain 90 infantry regiments of the line, each consisting of three battalions of six companies, and 15 light infantry regiments, which would make 105 infantry regiments comprising 300,000 foot soldiers fit for service. These 300,000 soldiers actually existed, and were about being organized when all our soldiers who were detained in foreign parts returned to France; the government not being able to pay more than half, the others were dismissed on unlimited leave, and the men were thus exposed to die of hunger if they did not adopt some trade, and if they did, they would be lost to the army, which would be thus deprived of so many veteran soldiers. How to dispose of the officers was a question that presented still more serious difficulties.

According to the proposed organization, thirty thousand officers would remain without employment. The war council was deeply perplexed. The Duke de Berry insisted that some means of employing them should be found, but it did not occur to any one, that by cutting off the expense of the Imperial Guard and the King's military household, 60 or 80,000 additional soldiers might be retained in service, the number of officers being increased in proportion. A middle course was adopted for the officers, as there had been for the Imperial Guard. Those officers that could not be incorporated in the proposed organization, were attached to the regiments; they were promised half pay with a right to two-thirds of the vacancies that might occur. This procedure involved the double disadvantage of creating a large class of malcontents, and cut-

ting off nearly all chance of promotion from the officers on actual duty. It may be said that the evil was almost inevitable, but it ought not to have been aggravated by useless expense.

The same system was pursued with regard to the cavalry, but not carried out so strictly. Fifty-six cavalry regiments of four squadrons each were formed of which 14 were heavy horse, 21 *cavalerie moyenne*, and 21 light horse, the entire forming an effective force of nearly 36,000 horse. Twelve artillery regiments were retained, of which 8 were infantry, and 4 cavalry, comprising 15,000 artillerymen and three regiments of engineers, the entire amounting to about 4,000 men. In this service as for the infantry, the unemployed half-pay officers were attached to the regiments with a right to two-thirds of the vacancies.

These different services taken together amounted to about 206,000 men; 214,000 including the Imperial Guard, involving an expense which the Minister of Finance estimated at two hundred million francs. This minister, for want of administrative experience, deceived himself strangely, as we shall soon see, for this sum would not suffice to maintain 150,000 men on service. This was evidently not the time to carry out the project of re-establishing the ancient royal military household, and thus creating a body of military nobles, horse and foot, that would cost as much as 50,000 soldiers on actual service, and who would furnish by their luxurious manner of living, painful comparisons with the misery endured by the rest of the army. But there were old gentlemen of ancient family who were devoted to the King, and through poverty, in want of employment; there were young men, filled with enthusiasm, who were desirous of entering by this means on a military career; it was believed that a few thousand brave nobles would be an infallible preservative against future revolutions; moreover, each of these nobles had been allowed to resume the title and rank he had formerly held in the King's household, and there was no need of further discussion—nothing remained but to seek the means of accomplishing a fixed resolution. As to the rest, it was said that a portion of the expense would be borne by the civil list, which certainly might be done, for the civil list amounted to 33 millions, which were equal to 45 millions at the present day. But this was only a weak excuse, for if the civil list could bear such an expense, it would have been wiser to reduce it by that amount, or better still, make it available for the Imperial Guard, which would have remained faithful, had some little effort been made to win the affections of the men, and the expenses of the guard thus transferred, would have afforded a great relief to the army budget. None of these simple ideas occurred to the stultified minds of those who were engaged in the discussion of these grave subjects.

General Beurnonville, who had served both before and after the Revolution, was commissioned to organize the royal household. The ancient red companies were re-established under the names of "gray musketeers, black musketeers, gendarmes, and light horse." Each company was to consist of three or four hundred gentlemen, holding the rank of officer, who were only to perform honorary service on days of ceremony, and these were commanded by the highest nobles of the court. The Body Guards were also re-established, that formerly numbered four, but which were now increased to six companies, because MM. d'Heavré, de Grammont, de Poix, de Luxembourg, titulars of the ancient corps, had resumed their command, and it was thought desirable to confide two companies to marshals of the Empire. The two marshals selected were Berthier on account of his high position, and Marmont, whom it was necessary to recompense in some manner for the service he had rendered. This unfortunate man was already much disappointed in his hopes, and not to give him this appointment would have been to justify those who condemned him without mercy.

The officers commanding the six companies of Body Guards were ordered to form their corps by enlisting the provisional royalists and the disbanded guards of honour; they had even permission to take young brave soldiers from the army, with injunctions to select those who, to military proficiency, added sound political opinions, and who would be attracted by the rank of sub-lieutenant which was assured to them. These six companies, each comprising three or four hundred men were to perform an effective service about the person of the King, dividing amongst them the twelve months of the year. The company of horse grenadiers was re-established, and was given to M. de la Rochejaquelein. There were also re-established the *gardes de la porte*, the *gardes de Monsieur*, &c. &c. To these cavalry troops we must add an infantry corps of about 4,000 men, with fifty or sixty cannon. This list, had it been complete, would not have comprised less than from nine to ten thousand men holding the rank of officer in the cavalry, and of subaltern at least in the infantry.

We may easily suppose what annoyance the pride and luxury of such a corps were likely to occasion the mass of the army, especially in comparing the prodigality of which this corps was become the object, with the parsimony with which those that were not *corps d'élite* were necessarily treated. A few fortuitous meetings between the officers of the royal household and those of the army were sufficient to involve unfortunate collisions and implacable hates. If to all this we add the restoration of the Swiss guards, which under the Empire had

only enjoyed a nominal existence, and whose actual re-establishment was certainly desirable, for it was the only means of associating with us a valiant people, obliged by the law of nations to remain neuter, if, we say, we consider all these circumstances we shall see what a multitude of grievances was heaped on the government, some certainly inevitable, others created voluntarily for the mere gratification of party spirit.

Some other changes were introduced into the army, in order to restore the exterior forms of the period previous to 1789, and to obliterate as far as possible all recollection of the Emperor and the Empire. In the list of regiments many numbers were unrepresented, because several had been destroyed during the war, others had been disbanded. This circumstance was profited of, to change the numbers of all, by transferring the vacant number to the next regiment, and the number thus left vacant to the succeeding regiment, which induced a general displacement in the series, and entailed on all the regiments the loss of the number under which they had distinguished themselves. This was an attempt to diminish their glory by endeavouring to efface from their minds and those of others, undying memories. With the intention of attaching the army to the monarchy by means of certain honorary titles, the first regiment of the time was called: "the King's regiment," the second: "the Queen's regiment," the third: "the Dauphin's regiment," and so through all the royal princes, whose names could be given to regiments. In order to furnish the Princes with a motive for interfering in military affairs, they were made colonels in the different services. The Count d'Artois was nominated Colonel of the National and Swiss Guards. The Duke d'Angoulême was appointed Colonel of Cuirassiers and Dragoons, the Duke de Berry Colonel of the Chasseurs and Lancers. The old Prince de Condé was made Colonel of the Infantry of the Line, the Duke de Bourbon Colonel of Light Infantry, and lastly the Duke d'Orleans, Colonel of Hussars. These titles had been granted by Napoleon to the most distinguished lieutenant generals of the service, and these gentlemen could not feel otherwise than deeply offended at being thus dispossessed. To soothe their feelings they were allowed to retain the emoluments and to exercise the functions of the rank of which they were deprived. They were appointed Inspectors General of the different regiments of which the Princes were made colonels.

But it was not the army alone which needed a reduction proportioned to our territory and our finances, the navy was to undergo a like change, and in this department of the public service, the retrenchments were to be still greater than in the sister service. Instead of one hundred ships of the line, and

two hundred frigates, which Napoleon had laboured to construct, and which with the immense extent of coast he commanded, he would have been able, in two or three years of peace, to equip fully, we, in time of peace and in the actual state of our finances, could hardly keep up two or three ships of the line and eight or ten frigates, and it was necessary to make proportionate reduction in the *materiel* and *personnel* of our navy. As to building new ships that was not to be thought of for a long time, for the vessels built under the old régime and those remaining from imperial France would be more than sufficient for a war armament. As to the sailors and workmen, maritime commerce offered them a certain means of employment. But the navy officers and engineers would be placed in a most difficult and painful position. For them as for the military officers, the expedient of half-pay was employed, with a right to two-thirds of any vacancies that might occur. They were also allowed to serve on board merchantmen without injury to their rights and rank in the Royal Navy. But these were poor palliatives, wholly inefficacious to soothe the distress of the two services.

One of the dearest interests of the army was yet to be discussed—the Legion of Honour. The charter had decided that it should be maintained and nobody would have dared to propose its suppression. But it was necessary to reconcile the existence of the Legion of Honour with that of other orders, ancient and modern, about which it was imperative that some regulation should be made. The Archbishop of Malines—M. de Pradt—who had become Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honour, proposed that a new order should be created, entitled, “the Order of the Restoration.” This order which would have become within a few days as ridiculous as that of the “Lily,” which was conferred on 500,000 persons, was unanimously rejected by the Royal Council. The Order of Saint Louis gave rise to more serious discussion. This was a respectable order created by Louis XIV., for the special reward of military merit, and the insignia of this order still figured on the breasts of some of our old officers who had served in the wars of the previous century. It would be scarcely possible for the Bourbons to abolish the order. M. de Blacas proposed that it should be amalgamated with the Legion of Honour and the two fused into one order, of which Louis XVIII should be the creator, the patron and legislator. The Chancellor Dambray remarked very honestly that such a proceeding would be violation of the Charter, which had stipulated the unconditional maintenance of the Legion of Honour. The Royal Council coincided in this opinion. It was decided that the two orders should exist simultaneously,

and that in order to popularize the cross of Saint Louis, it should be conferred on some of the most distinguished officers of the imperial army, who would thus have two crosses instead of one, and would have the satisfaction of seeing their newly-acquired glory consecrated by the justly-honoured insignia of the glory of former times:

It was also decided that without proscribing the cross of *la Réunion* which recalled vain and even dangerous recollections—the union of territories which under Napoleon had so alarmed Europe—this decoration should not be again conferred on any one. This was a certain means of extinguishing the order. As to the order of the iron crown, which now belonged to the sovereigns of Lombardy, that as well as other foreign orders, could not be worn in France without the king's permission.

In maintaining the Legion of Honour, it would be necessary to modify the decoration, for Louis XVIII., and the princes of his family could not be expected to wear upon their breasts a likeness of Napoleon. M. de Talleyrand was the first member of the Council who spoke on this subject. Treated in general by Louis XVIII. with a politeness unmingled with the slightest shade of gratitude, he felt that to maintain his position he must endeavour to please, and spite of his personal haughtiness, he did not disdain to give himself the trouble. He proposed that the likeness of Louis XVIII. should be substituted for that of Napoleon on the *plaque* of the Legion of Honour. Marshal Oudinot, with great simplicity, eagerly adopted this opinion. The other members of the Council entertaining grave objections to this proposition, but not daring to make them in presence of the king, observed a profound silence. This silence soon became embarrassing for the flatterer who had been so ill supported, and might have become embarrassing to the king himself, had not Louis, with a rather sarcastic smile, appeared to enjoy the confusion of the others without participating in it. Wishing to put a termination to the irksomeness of this mute scene, General Beurnonville proposed that the question should be referred to a special commission selected from the members of the Council. This proposition did not put an end to the silence which still prevailed, as if the members of the Council entertained sentiments which could not find expression in the king's presence. The Duke de Berry—the only member of the Council who was never embarrassed, and the only one for whom, either through affection or fear, the king showed any consideration—spoke out boldly, and made no scruple of saying, that it would appear very strange to see a likeness of Louis XVIII. decorate an order created by Napoleon, for services performed under Napoleon, and proposed the likeness of Henri IV., which might, without fear of instituting comparisons,



replace all others. The hardihood and good sense of the prince untied the fettered tongues, and M. Ferrand with a frankness becoming in friends, adopted and supported the opinion of the Duke de Berry. M. de Blacas then proposed, not a likeness of any king which might suggest comparisons not agreeable to Louis XVIII., but a figure of France. This proposition was too suggestive of republican ideas. Louis XVIII. at length broke the silence which he had hitherto observed, thanked his nephew very much, observed that he was not one of those princes who were desirous of statues whilst they were yet living, and that were he capable of such weakness, the fate of him whose likeness they were about to set aside would be sufficient to correct the folly, but that after having maturely considered the proposal of the Duke de Berry and that of M. de Blacas, he approved the project of adopting the likeness of Henri IV. The skilful flatterer who had sought to please, saw his flattery rejected on every side—rejected even by him to whom it was personally addressed, but he was not a man to be embarrassed about such a trifle. Like the others, he adopted the opinion of the king, and it was agreed that on one side of the medal of the Legion of Honour, the likeness of Henri IV. should appear, and on the other, three *fleur de lis*. It was also arranged that as soon as the change was effected, all the Bourbon princes should wear the cross of the Legion of Honour on their breasts.

The different measures we have just recorded, though dictated, for the most part, by imperious necessity, would have deeply offended the army, even had they not furnished any pretext to malevolence. But considering all that the Bourbons had done merely to please their friends, and the irritation that prevailed amongst military men, and the spirit of injustice, consequent on this irritation, it is no wonder that these proceedings were taken in bad part, provoked bitter criticisms, and often even dangerous resistance. The imperial guard still resided at Fontainebleau. The old guards had not been disbanded, but as they were no longer to guard the sovereign's person, neither should they reside at Paris—a privilege so ambitioned by the troops in general. A report was circulated, which was certainly well founded, that even at Fontainebleau the guards were thought too near the capital, and that the infantry would be sent to Lorraine, and the cavalry to Flanders, Picardy, and Touraine. This intelligence produced a great commotion in the ranks, and a number of the soldiers traversed the streets of Fontainebleau, exclaiming, "*Vive l'Empereur.*"

To the Duke de Berry was confided the task of establishing a good understanding between the army and the house of Bourbon, and no person could be better suited to the task.

He went to Fontainebleau to visit the guards, who had not yet been honoured by the presence of any member of the royal family. Officers whose good-will had been won by flattering their ambition, endeavoured to prepare him a reception. He was received respectfully and in silence. Cries of *Vive le Roi* were uttered by some partizans, but met with no response. However, the prince, accompanied by Marshal Oudinot, who commanded the infantry of the guards, and by Marshal Ney, who commanded the cavalry, was easy and familiar in his manners, and paid many compliments to the old soldiers. The pains he took had the effect of making them conceal the sentiments which sometimes burst forth imprudently, but did not change them in any degree. It is possible that the king might have won the affections of the guards had he frankly confided his person to their keeping, conferring on them exclusively the privileges and title of a *corps d'élite*; at least he would have obtained sufficient influence over them to have been quite safe in their hands. But in re-establishing the household troops and confiding the care of his person to them, he had irrevocably rendered back to Napoleon the affections of the imperial guard.

Since the departure of the foreign troops, especial care had been taken to garrison Paris with the regiments favoured with new titles, such as the regiments of the King, Queen, Monsieur, &c. These precautions did not tend to excite a better feeling in the barracks. In these places cries were every day heard of *Vive l'Empereur*. The Duke de Berry made a point of visiting the barracks frequently, but that did not prevent his frequently hearing seditious cries. Not deficient either in presence of mind or quickness of repartee, when able to control his temper, he drew near a soldier, who during one of his visits had cried *Vive l'Empereur*, and asked him why he uttered that exclamation. "Because Napoleon has a hundred times led us to victory," replied the soldier. "A great miracle, indeed," said the prince, "with soldiers like you." The reply made an impression, and was quickly circulated through the barracks. The prince was highly complimented on his wit, but the sentiments of the army continued unaltered.

But things assumed another aspect when the young men of the household troops appeared in the streets of Paris. Their uniform was very handsome; of this they were proud, as was natural enough; and as they enjoyed the rank of officer, they had a right to the military salute. More than once the soldiers refused this salute, and military punishments had no effect in changing their dispositions. What was still more serious, the national guard became engaged in the quarrel. No sooner was the first corps of the household guard organized, than

this body supplanted the national guard in the interior of the palace, leaving the latter only the external posts. This was, so to speak, giving the national guards the door, and it would have been better either to deprive them of all their privileges, or leave them all. But a fortuitous circumstance aggravated this exclusion from the interior of the Tuileries. The day the body guards were first put on duty, they repaired to their appointed post, at an hour when the greater number of the national guards were gone to dinner. They took possession of the post without ceremony, putting the arms of the absent soldiers outside. When the latter returned, they found their place taken, and their arms displaced without any of the forms usually observed by soldiers towards each other under such circumstances. The national guards complained loudly, and went about communicating their discontent to the neighbouring detachments. Though what had occurred was only the effect of awkwardness, and not of any intention to offend, nevertheless a general commotion was excited through the ranks of the national guard. The legion, generally posted at the Tuileries, declared that they would not mount guard there again, either within or without the palace, and the effect produced was such that M. de Blacas was obliged to write a letter to General Dessoles, thanking the national guards in the king's name and in the most flattering terms for their services. A banquet was even got up between the body guards and a select number of the national guards, but all these measures only served to publish, not to appease the discord.

The king, on his side, continued to show the most marked attentions to the heads of the army. He received Marshal Massena, complimented him largely on his great exploits, and informed him that he should soon be naturalized by an act of the two Chambers. The king also received Carnot in his quality of head inspector of engineers, and Admiral Verhuel as a navy officer, who had remained in the French service, without seeming to remember that the former was a regicide, and that the latter had defended the Texel to the last extremity. After having made so many sacrifices, it would seem that the Bourbons had need to soothe their wounded feelings at the expense of some great military hero of the day. Marshal Davout was the victim devoted to satisfy the resentments of royalty. His resistance at Hambourg, as we have already said, had offended the allied sovereigns; and, as we have observed, this marshal had fired on the white flag, seeing it associated with the Russian. Actuated by these different motives, the Bourbons were strongly irritated against him, and besides, they believed him devoted to Napoleon, which proves how badly they were informed, for the marshal had been in dis-

grace since 1812. He was consequently the only one amongst the marshals whom the king would not receive. The war minister was commissioned to inform him that having compromised the French name on foreign service, it was necessary that he should explain his conduct before he could be admitted to court. The marshal received this intelligence with great indifference, and proceeded with the memoir he was writing, to show France and Europe what his conduct had been at Hambourg.

From this moment Marshal Davout, who had been always much respected, but very little loved by the military, became suddenly their idol. The Boulevard des Italiens and the Palais Royal constituted a kind of public meeting-place for the officers who had left their regiments, and who were not in a hurry to return, notwithstanding the repeated orders of the war minister. Some were possessed of personal property, and spent at Paris the money they received from their families; others had no private fortune, and consumed in a few days their arrears of pay, but preferred remaining in the capital and giving vent to their discontent than to return to their regiments and become what was called half-pay officers. They crowded the Palais Royal and the Boulevard, put their own construction on every act of the Government, ridiculed the impotent king, and contrasted his lumbering heaviness with the rapid movements of the man whose diabolical activity they had lately cursed; they laughed at the king's household troops, and still more at the old emigrants who daily repaired in deputations to the Tuileries, and who certainly afforded abundant food for laughter. Sometimes it was a deputation from one of the Vendean armies, or from the army of Condé, that served so long on the Rhine, or representatives of the celebrated camp of Jales that appeared in the provincial costume of their time; they visited the king, and then visited Monsieur, and poured out all the feelings of their hearts to the latter; they presented petitions, and returned decorated with the order of the lily, or gratified with the promise of a pension. Here was continual subject of merriment for our young officers; and some with the heedless folly of their age, went so far as to borrow the costume of the soldiers of the old régime, and walked through Paris, followed by crowds of their comrades, whom the sight of this disguise threw into roars of laughter. But these scenes did not always end so jocosely, for duels sometimes ensued, but happily not often, few daring to seek a quarrel with officers of the imperial army, and the princes restrained those who would have ventured. But mingled with these wild jests was a well-founded sadness. We have already spoken of the hundreds of government functionaries, custom-house officers, tax-

gatherers, and police officers, who had accompanied the troops on their return, shared their dangers, imitated their heroism, and who were, with their wives and children, dying of hunger at Paris. It was only natural that they should join the groups of discontented officers, and the gaiety of the latter heightened the desolating spectacle of their misery. Baron Louis, more solicitous to establish order in the financial department, than to relieve these unfortunate men, had the folly to refuse them the assistance, which, without adding much to the budget, would have solaced unmerited misfortunes; the consequence was that many committed suicide. This strange combination of scenes, some burlesque, others heart-rending, produced an unfavourable effect upon the public mind, and caused much disquiet.

One of the means devised for re-establishing military discipline, and furnishing high appointments to the marshals who had not obtained offices at court, was to place them in the principal military divisions, with increased powers and rich emoluments. In the first place, the government thought it prudent to disperse the marshals; secondly, the government was well aware that, if the marshals were not always pleased with a court where they felt they were strangers, though highly flattered, yet they did not desire the return of Napoleon, and that, if dispersed through the provinces, they would endeavour to exercise their authority over the troops, and labour to bring them back to their duty. It was therefore determined to send the marshals to the provinces. At Paris, the commander of the military division was placed too near the royal authority to possess much importance. However, a man of determination was needed, and General Maison was chosen, who, at Lille, had displayed such extraordinary energy, and was not reputed a friend of Napoleon's. The marshals were differently disposed of. Marshal Jourdan was sent to Rouen, where he had unfurled the white flag; Marshal Mortier was sent to Flanders, Marshal Oudinot to Lorraine, Marshal Ney to Franche-Comté—the three latter to the provinces where they were born; Marshal Kellerman was sent to Alsace, where he had always had the command of the depots; Marshal Augereau to Lyon, where he had recently commanded; Marshal Massena was appointed to Provence, where he was stationed at the time of the Restoration; Marshal Macdonald was sent to Touraine, and Marshal Soult to Bretagne. The latter, who had fallen into disgrace after the events at Toulouse, had at first shown considerable irritation; but afterwards, yielding to the good advice of General Dupont, had become gradually calmer, and had sent assurances to the king of his sincere loyalty. He had, consequently, obtained the command of the most royalist province in France, where

it was thought his good faith might without risk be put to the proof. We shall soon see the result of these brilliant appointments, of which in the commencement such sanguine hopes were formed.

Whilst such little influence was gained over the soldiers, even in making such great efforts to gain the good will of their chiefs, there was still less success achieved with other classes, whom it was necessary to manage carefully to prevent them joining the discontented military. Scarcely was the royal family established in France, than a funeral service was ordered for Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and the other august victims who had perished on the scaffold. There was certainly no event of the revolution more calculated to inspire sad reflection than the death of the unfortunate Louis XVI., whose good intentions had been repaid by an iniquitous condemnation, and celebrating a funeral service for him was merely rendering homage to his misfortunes. But when party spirit runs high, what some do in all simplicity others do maliciously, and the public pay especial attention to the latter. It was to be feared that this homage to great misfortune might become the source of fresh discord. However this may be, the 16th May was chosen—the anniversary of the death of Henry IV.—and a funeral service was celebrated in all the churches of Paris, in honour of the royal victims immolated in 1793. Conformably to the doctrine of forgetting the past, the will of Louis XVI. was read, in which, on the eve of his death, he pardoned in such touching terms all his enemies. But in the provinces, the example which was followed with regard to the ceremony was not observed with regard to the manner of celebrating it. The clergy pronounced funeral orations, and gave utterance on the occasion to incendiary language. The entire revolution was represented as one long crime, where all, both men and things, were stained with guilt, where everything was to be condemned, even the principles of justice, in whose name the revolution had been effected, and which had just been consecrated by the charter.

The royalist press envenomed still more the quarrel, by replying to those who appealed to the oblivion promised by the charter, saying that the sense in which the government had promised the act of oblivion was, that the authors of the revolutionary crimes should never be judicially punished, but that no promise had been made to silence the public conscience in their regard, or to consider as indifferent, acts which were in themselves atrocious, or to suppress, in the eyes of France, tears due to noble victims; that if these testimonies of grief offended the perpetrators of certain crimes, their susceptibility could meet with no attention, as, on the contrary, those persons

ought to consider themselves happy in being allowed to exhibit on the soil of France their barefaced impunity, but that they could not be promised either the esteem or silence of honest people; and that if the days of public mourning were disagreeable to them, it was the duty of criminals, and not of the expiators of crime, to hide themselves during those days, which were so short and so rare. We may easily suppose the effect produced by such language, both on the men directly attacked, and on those connected with them, if not by a community of acts, at least by a community of principles.

Having once betaken themselves to inopportune recollections, the royalists did not know where to stop. After Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, came Madame Elizabeth, the Duke d'Enghien, Moreau, Pichegru, and—can it be believed?—even George Cadoudal, who, before the bar of public justice, had confessed his intention of killing the First Consul on the road to Malmaison. The priest who assisted him in his last moments was sought out, and commissioned to officiate at the funeral ceremony. The royalists went further, and had the impudence to announce that the king would defray the expense of the ceremony. This was gratuitously compromising Louis XVIII., with the moderate liberals, who were disposed to regard him as more prudent than his family and his party. This ceremony produced a great commotion amongst the military, who did not conceal their indignation, and so alarmed the police that they thought it their duty to acquaint the king with the circumstance.

Acting in this manner was sure to bind in a common and close bond the revolutionists, even the most moderate, with the military and all the partizans of the Empire. Nor were the holders of national property and the priests, who had taken the oath, treated with more circumspection. In reality, the Bourbons were deeply grieved that, being re-established in France, they were not able to restore to the emigrants their property; and they were vexed to hear it said that, now in possession of the Tuileries, they did not bestow a thought on those who were starving because of their devotion to the Bourbon cause. The princes need only possess good and grateful hearts, to adopt these opinions and sentiments. But the science of politics, without being either ungrateful or immoral, and solely because it is reason applied to the government of states, is often condemned to make painful sacrifices. But when we consider that the church property might have been legitimately alienated; when we reflect that the property of the emigrants might have been as justly dealt with—for the emigrants had made war on their country—and that the power of confiscating property, since justly abolished, but which was

at that time the law of the land, might have been correctly applied to the acts by which these persons had rendered themselves guilty; and especially when we consider that a general subversion of the ownership of property would have followed the revocation of the national sales, state policy, which was not supposed to feel and reason like the Bourbons, was right to sanction these sales by an irrevocable act. But the Bourbon princes thought as M. Lainé, and wished that the holders of property, sanctioned by law but opposed by public opinion, should restore this property to the ancient proprietors for a pecuniary consideration. Holding these opinions, it was only natural that the Bourbons should encourage or permit every act conformable to such ideas.

The clergy, still more imprudent than the emigrants, began to hold in the provincial pulpits a language still more dangerous. They preached publicly against the Concordat, against the sale of church property and the sale of emigrants' property, and carried their temerity so far as to refuse the sacraments to the holders of such property, who refused, when dying, to *make restitution*, according to an expression at that time in general use.

But they did not limit their attacks to the holders of national property: they were equally severe against the moderate clergy—against those that had accepted the Concordat, and they thus awakened dissension in the bosom of the church. Unfortunately, the constitution drawn up by the senate had not guaranteed the maintenance of the Concordat; and if anything can give an idea of the service rendered by this body in sanctioning afresh the social and political principles of the French Revolution, it is the subversion that now threatened the religious order of things, because the senate had neglected to ratify the Concordat. In fact, nothing less was contemplated than the abolition of all the changes that the revolution had effected in the church, and which had been sanctioned by time, by the law of the land, and by the approval of enlightened men.

We have not forgotten the state in which the First Consul found religion in 1800. A considerable number of priests had accepted the civil constitution proposed to the clergy, either through meekness of temper, through love of peace, or through sincere approval of what was reasonable in this constitution. Others had refused through conscientious scruples, and some through party spirit. The priests, who had sworn to observe the civil constitution, had at this price retained the right to celebrate public worship. Those who refused had incurred the interdict of the government, but preserved the confidence of the faithful. The former celebrated public worship in the churches, in absolute solitude; the latter officiated in private



houses, surrounded by large congregations. The latter declared every official act of the priests who had taken the oath to be void, and re-married and re-baptised all those for whom the others had performed such services; and so of all the acts of civil life in which religion had a part. But the dissonance did not stop here. Many bishoprics had remained vacant, because the Pope refused to consecrate bishops nominated by the temporal power; and in this confusion of opinions, since believers did not know to whom they ought to listen, the unbelievers took occasion to despise alike the priests who had taken the oath and those who had not taken it. They went so far as to proscribe all, as we have seen during the epoch called the Reign of Terror. But whilst the convention proscribed the priests, the royalists in Vendée made use of them to excite, keep up, and foment the civil war. Such was the state of the church immediately previous to the passing of the Concordat. The First Consul, exulting in his then stainless glory and unlimited influence over the public mind, and his then unrivalled power in Europe, had induced the Pope to sanction all that was reasonable in the civil constitution of the clergy, to make the diocesan circumscriptions coincide as nearly as possible with the administrative, to diminish the number of bishoprics (which was excessive), and proportion them to the number of departments, and accept the double principle of a temporal nomination of bishops by the head of the state, and their spiritual consecration by the Holy See. He induced the Pope, moreover, to recognise the principal social changes that had taken place; such as the discharge of civil functions by civil magistrates, the abolition of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and the alienation of church property, &c. &c. The First Consul had promised, in return, that the state should protect the Catholic worship, give the clergy suitable incomes, and in a word confer on them all the distinction to which they are entitled in a country at once religious and enlightened. In short, wishing to put an end to a deplorable schism, the Pope and First Consul had agreed to abolish the ancient *personnel* of the French church and reconstitute it, by selecting from amongst the *assermentés* and the non-*assermentés* clergy—that is, from amongst those who had taken the civil oath and those who had not taken it—those who were most virtuous, pure, and attached to religion and to France. Such was the great treaty of peace with the church, which did so much honour to General Bonaparte and to Pius VII., because it was conducive alike to the good of the country and the church; a treaty more glorious and more solid than those of Lunerville, Presbourg, and Tilsit, for whilst the latter, the offspring of victory and short-lived as the source from which they sprung,

have been effaced from the national law of Europe, the latter, founded on immutable reason, still subsists, and spite of the exaggerations of certain men, will subsist as long as public worship exists in France, because it is the only rule that an enlightened religion and a policy at once pious and independent can accept.

If there was any single act which tended to strengthen the power of the First Consul and to abridge his passage to the throne, it was incontestably the Concordat. Peace with the church, peace with Europe, and the civil code, had been Napoleon's three dazzling titles to the empire. The Bourbons in their exile had felt the full force of the Concordat. They had feared, opposed, and hated it more than any other act of Napoleon; and they had, by their influence, contributed very much to prevent the bishops from giving in their resignation to the Pope, as he demanded. In fact, thirteen bishops had refused, and ten or twelve of these were still living. But so conformable was the Concordat to public opinion that these recusants retained no authority, and the prelates nominated by Napoleon and Pius VII. to the sees whose former occupants had not given in their resignation, had been recognised, respected, and obeyed like those who had been nominated to vacant sees. Some unbending priests obstinately refused to recognise the bishops whose predecessors had not resigned their functions, and were living in London: these received the ridiculous and deserved appellation of *the little church*—a title that corresponded with their position and importance in the religious world.

Napoleon having, through his own fault, put the Bourbons in possession of the throne, his wisest work was threatened to be involved in the same ruin as his most foolish. In fact, the Bourbon princes, bound by the senatorial constitution, since called *the charter*, were obliged, by policy as well as by law, to respect certain principles; but they were free in religious matters, because no provision had been made for the maintenance of the Concordat, and they wished in this particular to restore absolutely the past form of things. And this mode of thinking on the part of the Bourbon princes was very natural, for besides that their religious principles had that tendency, they were urged to it by the importunities of their friends, against whose arguments they could not, in this case, allege the obligations of an article of the charter. Add to this that the Bourbons not only detested the Concordat, remembering the evil it had caused them, but they detested the Pope himself, whose complaisance to Napoleon they had not yet pardoned; and whom they regarded in the light of a priest who had taken the civil oath, but to whom they were obliged to be

civil, because that his power like their's was based on legitimacy; but they were at the same time determined to abolish all of his works that they could. Let us only imagine the consequences of such an undertaking. We should see the Pope abolishing the existing ecclesiastical dioceses to re-establish the ancient, and a second time demanding their resignation from the bishops in order to restore those he had formerly dispossessed, thus reorganising the clergy of a country in a spirit of blind reaction, which would be in other words, only to fall back on the former distinction between priests *assermentés* and non-*assermentés*, which would be reviving schism in the church, setting the priests at war, and putting the faithful in confusion; whilst the Pope, belying by his own act his infallibility, would have proclaimed himself the most fallible of princes, and the church would have resold, under threat of excommunication, the ecclesiastical property which the Bourbons had pledged themselves, by the conditions of the charter, to leave in possession of the actual holders! Nothing but the profound ignorance of the emigrants with regard to all that concerned France, could excuse an enterprise which, at every step, would have plunged them into inextricable embarrassment and immense danger.

However, being free to make the attempt, the Bourbons were determined to do so; and they began by refusing to recognise certain bishops, or hold any relation with them. Cardinal Maury had already been expelled from his see, because the Count d'Artois had declared that he would not be received by him at Notre-Dame the day he entered Paris. Cardinal Maury was not certainly, even according to the conditions of the Concordat, in a regular position; but a like resolution was adopted with regard to many whom the Pope had nominated, under pretext that some had taken the civil oath, and that others occupied sees whose ancient titulars were living in London, after having, in 1802, refused to give in their resignation to the Pope. These bishops, who had not given in their resignation, quitted London and hastened to Paris, where they were made acquainted with the project, which indeed was no longer a secret, of overturning the conditions of the Concordat. All the clergy were informed of the projected change, and immediately, in all the sees where there were two titulars, schism again sprung up. For example, at Rochelle, as we have already said, the titular appointed by Napoleon in virtue of the Concordat, and installed by the Pope, and consequently possessing the double investiture, temporal and spiritual, was opposed by the ancient titular, who had not given in his resignation. A species of sedition sprung up amongst the clergy. The greater number refused to ac-



knowledge the authority of the modern, but accepted that of the exiled bishop, who opposed the Concordat. This species of schism had made rapid progress in the two Charentes, Dordogne, Vendée, the two Sevres, the lower Loire, Loire-et-Cher, Sarthe, and Mayenne, so that the people no longer knew what religious authority they ought to obey. Consequent on this disorder was the rule of passion, the only influence that then obeyed. Sermons were preached against the Concordat, against the priests who had taken the civil oath, and against the holders of national property; so that, to the ebullitions of political zeal were added those of a religious character. At the other extremity of France—that is to say, in Franche-Comté—where the public mind, though moderate in political matters, was violent in religious, there arose disorders of a somewhat different character, but quite as serious, and more scandalous, if possible. Lecoz, bishop of Besançon, an ancient constitutional prelate and a priest of high character, had, owing to the firmness of the First Consul, been consecrated by Pius VII., and recognised as one of those elected in virtue of the Concordat. He had thus received the twofold installation of the temporal and spiritual powers. He administered his diocese with piety and propriety, but he had given asylum amongst his flock to several priests who had taken the civil oath, without displaying either vindictiveness or partiality towards the others. In short, in his case there did not exist the pretext which the existence of an ancient titular who had refused to give in his resignation, might furnish. Yet a kind of interdict had been pronounced against the Bishop of Besançon, and the people, without refusing him a material obedience in favour of a non-existing competitor, shunned him as a criminal, and refused to see, not only him, but all the priests belonging to the accursed class of *assermentés*. The prefect was the first to give this lamentable example.

Though the French clergy, throughout the kingdom, in the thoughtlessness of their conduct only acted in conformity with the proceedings of the Government, yet they carried things so far as seriously to annoy and embarrass the Government. In fact it was impossible to revoke the Concordat without the sanction of the Pope, and those who through zeal for the church had revolted against her decrees, could not, however, so far ignore her existence as to wish to act independently of her authority. It was, therefore, a matter of absolute necessity, whilst the revocation of the Concordat was being negotiated with Pius VII., that the existing religious authorities should be recognized, under penalty of inducing a general anarchy, for in some parts of France there were persons ready to expel certain priests by violence, and to dis-

possess the holders of national property.\* The Abbé de Montesquieu, who clearly foresaw the consequences of such conduct, pointed out the danger to the King, and obtained authority to write a letter to the Bishop of Rochelle, who was actual titular in virtue of the two-fold nomination by the Emperor and the Pope, telling him that he ought to exact obedience from the priests of his diocese, that those who entertained scruples had only to resign their functions, and that if secular authority was needed to secure their obedience, this authority was at his command. But the silence observed in this letter with regard to the Concordat, proved that the Government regarded this treaty only as a provisional regulation of temporary obligation, and that they were inclined to afford the unfortunate Bishop a purely physical, and by no means a moral force. Consequently the letter, written rather for the information of Paris than of Rochelle, had no influence whatsoever, and the police found it necessary to notify to the King its complete inutility.

Meanwhile negotiations were being carried on at Rome. The King had selected M. Courtois de Pressigny, the venerable Bishop of Saint Malo, and appointed him ambassador extraordinary to the Holy See. His instructions were as follows:—Whilst conserving towards the Holy See, the respect which the house of Bourbon could never refuse, Pius VII. was at the same time to be made gently to understand that he had been too indulgent towards the usurper, but that the Bourbons, in consideration of his sacred character and his misfortunes, were willing to forget this; but that if they showed such consideration, he would be expected on the other hand, to erase all traces of his weakness, by ignoring what had taken place, even with his concurrence, since the entrance of the French into Italy, a proceeding that would wholly nullify the Concordat. As the immediate consequence of such an act, the Pope was required to immediately reconstitute the ancient sees to the number of 135, to re-establish in these sees the bishops who had refused to resign in 1802, and who were still living, for, as the court of France said, they had been persecuted and exiled during five-and-twenty years for the true faith, and they had as good a claim to return to their diocese as Louis XVIII. had to return to Paris, or the Pope to Rome. Pius VII. was in fact requested to re-establish a circumscription, that the church herself had pronounced to be unreasonable; he was asked to dispossess bishops that he

\* It has sometimes been denied that things had reached this extremity, especially in what regarded national property. It is only necessary to read the police reports laid before Louis XVIII., and the correspondence relative to ecclesiastical affairs, to perceive that there is nothing more than the exact truth in the description we have made.

had himself invested, to reinstate those whose dismissal he had demanded, and who had disobeyed him, and he was required to act thus a second time in twelve years by those who had declared his conduct overweening and illegal, when he had first attempted to put these measures into practice ! What deplorable and scandalous contradictions to impose upon an unfortunate pontiff, whose moral authority ought to have been dear to princes whose interest it was to exalt that divine right from which they pretended kingly power had emanated !

But whilst this embassy was in preparation, reason was not more influential at Rome than at Paris, and Pius VII., wishing to modify the Concordat on some points that touched the Church of Rome intimately, sent a messenger to Louis XVIII., who arrived at the very time that the ambassador whom we have mentioned was leaving for Italy. After having congratulated the head of the house of Bourbon on the re-establishment of his family on the throne of France, the Pope expressed the greatest confidence in his religious sentiments, and advised him not to accept the senatorial constitution (the promulgation of the Charter was not yet known at Rome), he begged him to refuse freedom of religious worship, and to restore to the French Church endowments in landed property. He moreover implored his influence with the other Powers to procure the restoration to the Holy See of the Legations, Ponte-Corvo, and Benevento. (Benevento belonged to M. de Talleyrand, through whom this message was to be transmitted to the King.) He lastly demanded the restoration of Avignon, which was in the hands of the French, and which Louis XVIII., Pius VII. said, could not, as eldest son of the Church, refuse to restore to the Holy See.

It must certainly be admitted that those revolutions that have for their object a remote future, and make no account of the present, are often very unreasonable ; but these counter-revolutions that pretend to recall an irrevocable past, are not less so ; and one is unavoidably struck with this truth in beholding Louis XVIII. demanding from the Pope the revocation of the Concordat, whilst the Pope in return requires of him the restoration of Avignon !

Fortunately the pretensions of neither the one nor the other had any chance of meeting serious attention, but the agitation excited in many parts of France had not yet subsided, and there still remained the bad effects of many imprudent acts committed in religious matters, which France was disposed to take in very bad part. Of this there was at the very time a sad and vexatious example.

The Count d'Artois, and the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême, had been much grieved on their return to France to see

the Sabbath so ill observed, and to see on this day appointed for rest and prayer, the shops open from early morning, and men often engaged in the public works until evening; besides places of public amusement were more accessible and more frequented on the Sunday than on any other day of the week. They were surprised, returning fresh from England, where life is, as it were, suspended on Sunday, to find Catholicism less observant of the precepts of Scripture than Protestantism; and they several times declared to M. Beugnot, chief of police, that it was a revolutionary scandal that ought to cease with the return of the legitimate princes. M. Beugnot, touched by these reproaches, and besides looking upon Sunday as an institution as respectable in a social as in a religious point of view, carefully rummaged all the edicts of the monarchy, and even all the ordinances of the republic, touching the observance of the *décadis*, and in his researches brought to light enactments which he believed he had a right to revive. Consequently, on the 7th June he issued a police ordinance, prescribing the rigorous observance of Sundays and holidays. In virtue of this decree, the shops were to be closed on Sunday from morning to evening; no workmen would be allowed to appear on scaffoldings or in workshops, and vehicles used for the transport of goods were forbidden to travel. Public houses and cafés might be opened after noon, and rooms for public dancing in the evening; chemists only and herbalists were allowed to keep their doors open the entire day. These regulations were enforced under penalties varying from one hundred to five hundred francs, and the confiscation of the prohibited goods.

These decrees proved a total ignorance not alone of the spirit of young France, but of France at every period of her history, for she had always preferred personal to political liberty, not brooking restraint in her easy and often careless gait of going when it pleased her to assume such; inclined to find fault and offer opposition still more in little than in great things, sometimes permitting her Government to perpetrate without opposition, an act that might decide her fate, and suddenly taking fire about a public show of which she was debarred; ready to become pious under an infidel Government, and almost impious under a religious one, and yet in reality more sober-minded than any one could suppose who considered only these singular contradictions. A great commotion was raised in Paris, when on Sunday an attempt was made to force the shops to shut in the morning which were generally closed only in the afternoon, and to expel the artisans from the workshops which were usually open for the greater part of the day, and to stop vehicles under pretext that what they carried was interdicted, and enforce for these

delinquencies severe penalties, adduced from edicts published a century before. To call out the national guard for the enforcement of these regulations was scarcely possible, for the men were already fatigued with repressing disturbances of another kind. It was the municipal guard of Paris, though fully occupied with other duties, that was employed on this, which they executed amid the outcries of an active and industrious population.

The effect was nearly the same on all classes, and the government which the people called a government of foreigners, of nobles and emigrants, was now called, in addition, a government of bigots; and the fault-finders who already laughed at its policy, now sneered at its devotion. The public excitement became so strong as to alarm the Council, and bring down upon M. Beugnot from the Duke de Berry, severe reproaches, couched in a soldierly style.

"You wish," he said, "to get us the reputation of being bigots, and you could not select a more certain means of rendering us unpopular in France."

Louis XVIII, who, without being a bigot, was desirous of the abolition of the Concordat, said that on this occasion measures had been too promptly adopted, and were, to say the least, imprudent.

It was scarcely three months since the Bourbons had returned to France, and already without any bad intention, but solely because they had not been able to restrain themselves and their friends, they had alienated the army by reductions which were certainly inevitable, but maladroitly effected at the same time as the re-establishment of the king's military household; and they had hurt the feelings of the men still attached to the Revolution by pious ceremonies, certainly due to the memory of Louis XVI, but accompanied by some serious inconveniences, and induced them to join the Bonapartists, to whom they were by no means attached; the Bourbons had completely alienated the moderate-minded clergy, by far the most numerous of their class, by extravagant attacks against the priests who had taken the civil oath, and against the Concordat. The holders of national property had been alarmed by orations, sanctioned from the pulpit, against the sale of church property, and by numerous remarks that had their origin at the Tuileries. And ill-judged police regulations had exasperated the influential middle-class, whose members without being irreligious, wished to remain free to choose their form of worship or customs of life; to be religious if they wished, or the contrary, if it suited them. And so the Bourbons proceeded, establishing an opposition in all things—not alone against the



personal interests and intelligence of the people, but against their customs and tastes, and even the peculiarities of the time and country.

These different acts following each other in quick succession were to be submitted to a very high tribunal, fortunately a very prudent one, and by no means inclined to bend to court influences; this tribunal was that of the two Chambers constituted by the Charter. The king, it must be remembered, had assembled the Chambers on the 4th of June, to communicate to them the conditions of the Charter, and put them in a position to proceed with their labours. From that period they had regularly met, and had in the first instance laid down regulations by which their debates were to be governed, a labour which ought of necessity to proceed all others, for before commencing to deliberate, it would be necessary to determine the form of their deliberations. After some discussion, this question was decided, and that form of proceeding was adopted which seemed most favourable to the peaceful and serious examination of business. The terrible memories connected with the committee of public safety had brought everlasting odium on permanent committees, which, seizing on certain departments of the government, such as the financial, the war department, foreign or home policy, the magistracy or the police, had established in these departments a kind of sovereignty, and exercised a dangerous, often a sanguinary despotism. But as every assembly must of necessity be sub-divided in order to examine each question in the calm of private meetings, the Chambers adopted the system of selecting committees of twenty or thirty members, to be changed every month by lot, and these were to examine in a summary manner the affairs submitted to them, and transfer to a commission appointed for the purpose, the care of entering more minutely into details and making a report to the assembly in full sitting. This form of proceeding having been adopted, the rest followed, as a matter of course, and it is this mode which has since prevailed, and must always prevail, where a determination exists to escape the tyranny of parties.

These regulations having been agreed to, the two Chambers commenced their sittings, and notified the fact to the king. The Chamber of Deputies, formerly the legislative corps, presented five candidates, from amongst whom the king, according to the conditions of the Charter, was to select a president. The king chose M. Lainé, who had the largest number of votes, and who was indebted for this two-fold preference to his high talents, his good sense, and the part he had played the preceding December, when, acting as representative of the

Legislative corps, he so highly excited the anger of Napoleon. The Chamber of Deputies being now fully installed, set to work.

Amid the revival of political passions so long suppressed, the assembling of the two Chambers for business was a grave circumstance; and though they were the same that assembled under the empire, the one consisting of two-thirds, and the other of the entire of the former members, they held in abhorrence the idea of resembling the former assemblies, and were determined not to relapse into the submission with which they had been so often reproached. Happily, the Chambers were composed of prudent, experienced men, imbued with the spirit with which the government ought to have been penetrated. These men had not wished the return of the Bourbons, but Napoleon had become an impossibility; they had recalled the Bourbons as a necessity, and they sincerely wished that these princes should become one with France, such as a prodigious revolution had left her. These men did not wish to hasten events, they had even come to the determination of tolerating many errors, but on condition that the general direction of the government should be rational and directed towards the proper object.

On the other hand, the government, seeing the Chambers in full operation, preparations for which had occupied the month of June, and conscious that certain thoughtless acts would be severely judged in the Chambers, began to consider what line of conduct should be adopted with respect to them. M. de Montesquiou, who, as minister of the interior, had a right, and as ancient member of the Constituent Assembly, believed he had a claim to appear before the Chambers and obtain a hearing, gave it as his opinion that the ministers ought to observe an extreme reserve with regard to the Chambers, to bring few matters under their consideration, and avoid as much as possible bringing forward questions in which they had a right to take the initiative; and the budget once passed, and the financial system accepted, it would be better to adjourn the sittings to afford rest both to the members of the Chambers and the ministers.

The advice thus offered was founded on an opinion more false than true, though very generally received, that the ministers not possessing the patronage which exists in England, would not be able so easily to manage the French Chambers, and not being sufficiently powerful to guide, ought to treat them cautiously.

The Duke de Berry exclaimed against a mode of proceeding which would annul or at least diminish the royal authority, but his remonstrances were disregarded; the ministers were



accustomed to his outbursts of feeling, and the advice of M. de Montesquieu was adopted, with the exception that the mode of conduct traced by that minister was to be modified according to circumstances.

But the Chambers were determined, under any circumstances, to make the ministers act openly, and declare their policy; and their mode of effecting this object, was by acting with vigour themselves. No sooner had the Chamber of Deputies met for business, than notices of motions followed each other in quick succession. M. Bouvier-Dumolard—an ancient prefect of the Empire, and formerly a member of many public bodies, an honest but hot-tempered man, fond of noisy declamation, and more inclined to speak than his auditors were to listen—proposed a petition to the king, requesting that a law should be passed, declaring that the two Chambers were the real parliament of France, and the only public body that had a right to be so called. M. Bouvier-Dumolard wished by this measure to place the two French Chambers in the same position as the English Chambers, and at the same time reply to a protestation said to have been made against the Charter, and much talked of at the time, which was believed to be the work of the surviving members of the ancient parliaments. M. Bouvier-Dumolard's vague proposition produced no effect, but it might have had, had the protestation to which we have alluded possessed a more serious character. Two propositions followed, which met with more attention.

M. Durbach, one of the members for Alsace, a man devoid of all personal pretensions, but full of fervent feeling, and closely connected with the revolutionists, condemned, as contrary to the spirit of the Charter, the proclamation of the police concerning holidays and Sundays, and the royal ordinance, which placed the press under the same regulations as existed in the time of the Empire. He maintained that an inspector of police had no right to levy fines under the pretended sanction of ancient edicts, and that the Charter having promised liberty of the press, it was not conformable either to the text or spirit of that document that the daily press should remain under a censorship. The journals and pamphlets were indeed submitted to a preliminary inspection, which was certainly exercised with much prudence, for the duties of the censorship were discharged by an illustrious philosopher, M. Royer Collard, who became one of the most distinguished personages of the time and a writer of great ability. He was a decided partizan of the Bourbons, but a proud, independent, and liberal-minded man. He certainly would not have lent the sanction of his name to a tyrannical exercise of the censorship. Still the censorship did exist; the director of police

sometimes summoned the chief editors of the journals, and though limiting himself to admonition, he held them to a certain degree in check, which, however, did not prevent the royalists' journals from frequently indulging in the most violent language.

M. Durbach denounced the regulations relative to the press and the proclamation concerning the observance of Sundays and holidays, with a coarseness of language to which the assembly was not accustomed, and in consequence of which his propositions were rejected. Still a general feeling prevailed that these propositions were well-founded, and would have been supported had they been presented and advocated with more moderation. Some days after, M. Faure, incited by a powerful party in the Chamber, brought forward a motion relative to the press alone, begging the king to give instructions for the passing of a law regulating the right of publication. This was saying very plainly that the regulations which had placed this right under a censorship were looked upon as illegal. M. Faure's motion was carried without a dissenting voice.

As to the proclamation concerning the observance of Sundays and holidays, the Chambers were embarrassed as to the line of conduct they ought to adopt, for it was a question which did not admit of definite legislation. In passing a law on the subject, it would scarcely be possible to insert any other conditions than those set down in M. Beugnot's proclamation, for the Chambers could not declare officially that Sunday should only be half observed, neither could they embody in a legal act, the prescriptions that had already so much indisposed the public mind. Not daring to annul them which would seem like abolishing Sunday, and not venturing to support them which would have still more strongly excited public opinion, the question was referred to a commission to be examined seriously and dispassionately.

This promptitude of the deputies in immediately discussing those subjects which occupied public attention, proved how much those were mistaken, who believed that it would be easy to measure out to the Chambers their share in public affairs, and that by a little reserve they could be kept at a distance like a forward person of whom we disembarass ourselves by not speaking to him on the subject which he is most anxious to discuss. When a legislature decides upon introducing the system of representative assemblies into the government, it must not be done by halves, for these assemblies force the doors that are only half opened to them. If these representative assemblies are to be recognized by a government, let them be recognized frankly, let ministers act towards

them with confidence and determination, and they will be able to direct their branches. That is if ministers themselves understand what they desire, and if what they desire is avowable, if they wish in strength, and if they possess an eloquence powerful enough to inspire in others, wishes correspondent with theirs. Under such circumstances, these assemblies combine with the government, become interested in its success, advocate measures brought forward by ministers, and are converted from impediments into a sustaining government force.

The government saw clearly that it was impossible to evade the difficulty, and that the Chamber of Deputies, urging the 8th article of the Charter—which declared the press free, with a proviso that abuses should be legally repressed—could not be hung aside like the author of a motion that did not represent the feeling of the country. The first motion, that of M. Durbach, having been rejected on account of the form in which it was couched: and the second, M. Faure's, having been passed unanimously on account of its moderate tone, it was evident that the motion for a law to regulate the press would be incessantly revived, that this motion would be favourably received by the Chamber of Peers, and would inevitably reach the foot of the throne.

The King felt these truths, and the privy council having been convoked on the occasion, the King said:—"The first motion was rejected because Durbach spoke too boldly, but the second, being more moderately expressed, passed unanimously. We must therefore yield with a good grace, if we do not wish to be forced."

The King's prudent advice was followed. There was a mode of proceeding peculiarly agreeable to the King, which was to confirm by the passing of a law the existing régime. This régime was that of the Empire, which submitted books to a censorship, and as to journals, they were abandoned as vulgar things to the surveillance of the police, who, during Napoleon's reign, scarcely meddled with their insignificance. But since the fall of the Empire, passions had been awakened in the public mind, and the journals which were their daily expression, having acquired an importance which pamphlets shared according to their different degrees of merit, the police had been obliged to pay more attention to this class of publications than they had previously done. The police endeavoured, but in vain, to moderate the tone of the royalist press, and treated with great indulgence the liberal press, which was still timid, but in both cases frequent interference was needed. This frequent interference soon became annoying and almost insupportable.

M. de Montesquieu, who was commissioned to draw up the bill, did not hesitate to take the imperial regulations as the basis of the measure. He established a distinction in favour of books, which he proposed to treat differently from pamphlets and journals. Books were distinguished from pamphlets and journals by bulk, whose limit was fixed at 480 octavo pages. Every volume of this size was considered a book, and as such exempt from the examination of the censor before being printed. This privilege was accorded to books in consideration of the reflection the author was supposed to bestow on his work, and to the fact that his readers would be of the more reflecting and least numerous class. Those works that consisted of less than 480 pages, whether periodical or not, should undergo a preliminary examination, that is to say, they should be submitted to a censorship, and the publication deferred, if it were believed that their immediate appearance would be attended with any inconvenience. In order to mollify the rigour of this preliminary examination, it was said that the prohibition to publish was only temporary, and that at the commencement of each session a commission of three peers and three deputies should inquire how the censorship had been exercised. This amelioration was of little avail, because as far as concerned newspapers and pamphlets, an adjournment of a few months was equivalent to an absolute interdict. Moreover, the printers were made accountable to the police, and in case of misdemeanour could be deprived of their licence, an arrangement which constituted them preliminary censors of the writings they were employed to print.

This law might not have given rise to any serious difficulty, had the Government announced that it was a temporary measure, and called for by circumstances at once novel and grave. But the desire of making the censorship pass for a fundamental institution authorized by the Charter, was founded on groundless pretensions, such as the presumptuous Abbé de Montesquieu could alone have put forth. He was confident of success, and received the royal sanction to bring in the bill, whose bases we have enumerated.

He entered the chamber of deputies with the bill, accompanied by M. de Blacas, Minister of the King's household, and M. Ferrand, Minister of State. M. de Blacas appeared as deputy for the King, and M. Ferrand as publicist of the royalist party. The bill could not be introduced under a more respectable escort. The Chamber of Deputies was very much flattered at seeing the Crown yield so readily to its wishes, and even before these wishes had received the sanction of the peers. The Chamber received the bill gravely

and respectfully, and immediately referred it to a committee.

No sooner was the object of this bill made known than the public mind became violently excited. Hitherto the most important questions had turned upon quarrels consequent on the transition from one regime to another. It was the military who complained of the partiality exhibited towards the soldiers of Condé or Vendée, or revolutionists taking offence at the re-crimination of royalists, or holders of national property becoming alarmed at the attacks to which an entire class of proprietors was subjected. Or, on the other hand, it was the officers of the ancient regime, the priests or the emigrants who complained that the Government paid too much court to the soldiers of the empire, or were too indulgent to revolutionists covered with blood, or too patronizing to holders of usurped property. But there now arose a question of principle which touched neither the interests nor passions of any party. This measure excited, as we have said, a profound but not stormy commotion in the public mind, and occupied in an especial manner the attention of enlightened men, who were anxious to see all the principles laid down in the Charter carried into operation.

The mode of considering public questions depends in a great measure on the impressions of the moment. The liberty of the press, which has experienced so great a variety of fortunes in France had at that time a greater number of advocates than even at present, because instead of having just escaped from the convulsions of the revolution, the nation was just delivered from the despotism of the empire. The people had learned what uncontrolled authority was capable of achieving, and said that had the public bodies of the state or the journals enjoyed freedom of speech, an ambition-blinded conqueror would not have been permitted to sacrifice in Spain, in Russia, and in Germany, a million Frenchmen, abandon our natural frontiers, and at the same time destroy himself. In reviewing the past, the disorders of the revolution certainly stood out conspicuously. But these disorders could not be imputed to the press. In our own days we have seen the press, while the country was quiet and the public mind unimpassioned, excite the strongest commotion, but in 1792 and 1793 the people were moved by the working of their own passions, and their errors were entirely attributable to that source, and the press, when free, reproved the faults of the excited people. Neither the records of the revolution nor the empire offered any argument against the liberty of the press. Besides, the great events that had recently occurred were a powerful argument in favour of all kinds of liberty. The

French revolution, setting out with ideas the most simple and most just, had in a very short time adopted the strangest views of things, and traversing successively the entire circle of human errors, had ultimately returned to its starting-point of truth, and carried the spirit of repentance so far as to recall the dynasty whose chief had perished on the scaffold. In contemplating such a spectacle, the opinion was universally adopted, that allowing truth and falsehood to enter into open competition, truth would ultimately triumph, and the result of this opinion was a wide-spread confidence in the good effects of liberty—a confidence, unfortunately, much weakened in the present day.

We do not now allude to the emigrants, who regarded every free institution as a return to the regime of 1793, nor to the revolutionists, whom the mere aspect of the Bourbons filled with a species of fury. We speak of the peaceful, impartial masses and of the more intelligent class of men that wished to see France enter on the pathways that had conducted England to liberty and glory. As to the former, they were confiding, and did not think of shackling the press. The enemies of the press existed rather amongst the members of the government, who, adducing their experience, demanded that the press should be restrained in its operations. But the peaceful masses, offspring for the most part of the revolution and the empire, seemed rather to defend their personal position than to maintain a principle. Many royalists even were well disposed towards the daily press, of which they made use against the revolutionists, and many young men, who were at the same time royalists and constitutionalists, did not hesitate to say, that the most precious species of liberty that the country possessed should not be sacrificed to protect some upstarts, whose sole anxiety was to secure their own importance and comfort.

In the numerous salons of Paris, where politics excited a lively interest, this question was warmly discussed, and, in general, with sentiments favourable to the press. M. Benjamin Constant defended the interests of the press with pointed wit and powerful argument. The *Journal des Débats*, a journal that had acquired great popularity in the time of the Empire, by the only merit then possible, that of literary criticism, warmly advocated the liberty of the press, arguing that the press ought to be particularly dear to the royalists, for had it been free under the empire or under the committee of public safety, a million of Frenchmen would not have perished on the scaffold or in unwise wars.

The committee appointed by the Chamber of Deputies examined the law in this spirit, and pronounced against it. Affecting to find authority for a censorship in the 8th article



of the Charter, appeared a very insincere assertion. Had the opponents of the press said frankly that the author of the Charter had intended to grant liberty to the press, that he still intended it, but that for the interest of the new order of things, a temporary suspension of this liberty was required: if in this way it was admitted that the censorship was regarded not as a permanent regime, but a merely temporary suspension of a recognized right, the argument might have been listened to.

But the members of the committee were offended and annoyed at hearing it asserted that the censorship was sanctioned by these words in the 8th article of the Charter: "The French have a right to print and publish their opinions, observing at the same time the laws which repress the abuse of this liberty."

This was, in the first place, wishing to make the censorship considered as a principle of the Charter, and next, it was calculated to inspire a doubt as to the sincerity of those who interpreted the text of the Charter, and it was besides a puerile subtilty to assert, as was done, that by *repress* was meant *prevent*. In fact, according to the arguments of those who defended the bill, every law, which merely punished, but did not prevent offences, operated in the spirit of vengeance and not with a regard for the public welfare. To *repress*, therefore, in the true legislative language, meant to *prevent*. This subtilty irritated by its want of frankness.

In reply to these objections it was said that every law prevented by the fact of repressing crime; that in punishing past misdemeanours the law prevented future offences by the fear of punishment; that the law could in no other way prevent offences; that every action must be accomplished before it could be legally pronounced either good or bad; that, otherwise, all human actions should be arrested at the commencement, lest they might terminate in evil; that all free action should be interdicted to mankind; that life should be, so to speak, suspended, did the law take cognizance, not of an accomplished, but a possible act. But putting aside all these quibbles, the question was boldly asked, what was meant by the censorship? and whether it was not a suppression of the liberty of the press? whether, in those countries where the liberty of the press was ignored, the intervention of the government was not limited to a preliminary inspection of works, in order to pronounce upon their fitness for publication? But did not the Bourbon government, in imposing a preliminary examination, annul the liberty of the press, which was a fundamental principle and almost identical with parliamentary freedom of discussion: and did not this government,

within two months after the publication of the Charter, abrogate one of its most essential articles, and that, too, when no important change had taken place in the country, nothing that could reasonably alarm the government, but on the contrary, when the most fortunate revulsion of feeling had occurred—when, notwithstanding the many interests injured, and the many acts of imprudence committed by the dominant party, France, though at first astonished at the return of the Bourbons, had submitted to their sway, and had given efficacious support to their government.

These were powerful arguments; but the committee was offended by the obstinacy exhibited in maintaining that the censorship was sanctioned by the charter, for apart from the falsehood, there was the wrong of wishing to give the censorship the weight of a principal and permanent institution. The committee might have been appeased by a sincere avowal of what the government desired, and by the request of a temporary suspension of the liberty of the press. There was amongst the members of the committee a man, who, though advanced in life, was full of vigour, endowed with high intelligence, sincere, courageous, possessing all the southern vivacity of temperament, and enjoying a brilliant literary fame. This man was M. Raynouard. He had shared with M. Lainé the honour of opposing Napoleon in the session of the preceding December, on which occasion he had given utterance to sentiments as inflexible as high-minded. He was one of those enlightened men, so numerous at that time, who were desirous of a monarchy tempered with liberty, who wished the return of the Bourbons, but wished to see them restrained by the conditions of a judicious constitution. He was, besides, an author, and as such interested in the liberty of the press. He possessed great influence with the other members of the committee, and proposed, as a punishment for the obstinacy exhibited in maintaining the bill in its original form, that it should be rejected. Some of the members, though acknowledging that he was right, feared to give the government too severe a check, and proposed to do what the ministry ought to have done, that is, to declare the liberty of the press a fundamental principle of the Charter, but that, under existing circumstances, it would be temporarily suspended. But M. Raynouard was not satisfied with such a concession. He persevered in his motion, carried the rejection of the bill by a majority of one, and was appointed to make a report of the resolution come to by the committee.

The minority, on the contrary, proposed the adoption of the law, with the three following amendments:—1st, That the line of demarcation between works exempt or not exempt from the

ensorship, should be changed ; that works of twenty instead of thirty sheets (320 pages instead of 480) should be dispensed from the preliminary examination ; 2nd, That the censorship should only last to the end of 1816 ; and 3rd, That the opinions of the members of the two chambers should not be obnoxious to the censorship.

Great numbers flocked to the palace, where the sittings of the chambers were held, on the day M. Raynouard presented his report. A like interest had never been exhibited in the deliberations of the legislative corps. The crowds that flocked on the present occasion to the chambers exhibited a thousand different shades of politics, as France herself had exhibited during the last three months. Amongst the throng was the more educated portion of the emigrants, who had accepted the charter through necessity, but whose intellectual tastes were based on a standard as ancient as the French nobility. There were also the friends of liberty—modern men—who accepted the Bourbons as the others did the Charter, through necessity. They were willing to receive liberty from the hands of the restored dynasty, and were resolved to be faithful if the others proved sincere. The malcontents, too, presented themselves—the revolutionists, the military men, and the partizans of the Empire, affecting to be friends to liberty, and becoming really such without perceiving it. All were attracted by different motives : some by the interest they took in the affairs of government, others by the pleasure they took in seeing the ministers opposed. Many were influenced by zeal for the success of the question under discussion, all were actuated by curiosity ; and it must be said, an enjoyment in the eloquent discussion of public affairs, a taste that began to be developed in France. When a people of lively temperament lay aside a long dominant taste, they almost immediately adopt another. If France had long indulged a passion for military glory, she had had, unfortunately, during a lengthened period, opportunities of satisfying the feeling. During eighteen successive years, she had kept her eyes fixed on one man : and at a signal from this man, she had seen blood flow in torrents, with no other final result than his own ruin ! But the patriotism and the intellectual wants of the people now demanded different scenes. The spectacle of men distinguished by their moral character, intellectual power, and varied accomplishments, holding different opinions, and expressing these opinions boldly ; rivals certainly, but not rivals so implacable as those generals who, in Spain, immolated whole armies to satisfy their personal jealousies ; these men, ever occupied with the gravest interests of the nation, and often inspired by the vastness of these interests with the highest eloquence ; these men,

grouped around some leading minds but never enslaved by any, and presenting in this way a thousand intellectual phases, animated, intense, and true as nature always is in a state of liberty—this intellectual and moral spectacle began to lay hold of and fix the attention of France. Even the military men were weary of pouring forth their blood, and were not amongst the least eager to witness these debates and take part in them. Great statesmen had not yet appeared, but they were looked for, hoped for, and their coming believed in; for the French were accustomed to see their country produce whatever she needed. She had produced generals in 1792, and the people felt certain that she would not fail to produce statesmen and orators in 1814. The report drawn up by M. Raynouard was a little diffuse, a little stiffly academical, and did not possess the nervous eloquence of business-like language which practice alone can infuse into French oratory; but the report was listened to with religious attention. It certainly put forth every argument, direct or ancillary, that could support his views, and produced a great effect. That evening, the report formed the general topic of conversation in Paris.

The discussion was adjourned to the 5th of August. On that day all the galleries were filled; so numerous was the attendance that even the hall and the seats reserved for the deputies were encroached on by the public. Remembering what had occurred during the Revolution, the members of the Chambers had made a standing rule that no person but a deputy should enter the main body of the hall. This rule was appealed to by some deputies, who became alarmed at the spectacle presented by the Chamber, and the president ordered all strangers to withdraw. In consequence of this incident the debate was adjourned to the following day, to the great vexation of the crowds that had thronged to witness a spectacle so novel and attractive.

The following day—the 6th—the debates commenced. Parliamentary eloquence, then in its infancy, could not dispense with written speeches, nor maintain a discussion, by replying to unexpected observations with a prompt elocution, inspired by the circumstances of the moment. Each member appeared with his written speech, read it, and received the attention which he was expected to repay to his fellow-readers. But whatever be the mode of discussion adopted, every reason for and against a measure can be adduced, and by patient inquiry a subject will be ultimately placed in the clearest point of view.

The opponents of the law rejected with a severity that prohibited their re-appearance, the subtilities, to which the words *repress* and *prevent* had given rise. They insisted that the

liberty of the press was guaranteed by the 8th article of the Charter, that a censorship would annihilate this liberty, and that the establishment of such an institution was a strange proceeding within a month after the promulgation of the Charter. They asked what had occurred that a right, the spontaneous gift of royalty, should be so quickly annulled. After these observations, based on the spirit and text of the Charter, common sense, of which the orators of the liberal party were most frequently the exponents, was adduced to prove that within twenty-five years everything that could be said had been said; that every imaginable folly had been put into operation; that it would be impossible to conceive a folly that had not seen the light during that time either at the clubs or in the pages of the public journals; that if the public mind could have become a prey to madness, it would have been overtaken by that calamity, but it had remained rational and prudent, and the best proof of its sanity was its present recognition of all that was best in the monarchical and liberal opinions of 1789; in the almost universal adhesion to the Bourbons and the Charter. The opponents of the censorship maintained that it was better to trust to liberty than always to stand in awe of her; that besides, in past times, when the liberty of the press had an existence, that liberty had been used to check the excesses of democracy and despotism; that had the press been free, it would have resisted Robespierre and Napoleon; that even in England the press put a limit to the omnipotence of parliament, an omnipotence to which no other counterpoise could be found; and that in France, where the English form of government was about to be adopted, it would be prudent to raise up against ministers that powerful corrective, the only imaginable check that could be opposed to them.

All these arguments were founded on the opinion that the Revolution was finished, and that we were on the morrow, not the eve of its convulsions. The partizans of government took part with the minority of the members of the committee, who dared not support the bill except with amendments, and who quoted, but with little effect, the ordinary arguments against the liberty of the press, against that capability, as they said, of continually agitating the minds of the public, and urging them to all kinds of excess. They only produced a sensible effect by appealing to personal interests, and alleging in this regard arguments to which, unfortunately, the press has not yet replied under any regime, in a steady and moderate tone.

"Who," said the government supporters, "will protect the public against the attacks of the press, if it be not previously submitted to the inspection of well-meaning men, of acknowledged prudence, who would be themselves responsible to a

committee of the two Chambers?" "And in order to live in peace, is it necessary that a man should be able to defend himself—with the pen or sword?" "Let us suppose," said a deputy, "let us suppose a pamphleteer endowed with Beaumarchais' abilities; should a man in order to escape his attacks, be possessed of his rancorous talent?" Let us suppose an assassin writer—and there are such—must a man be skilled in fencing in order to make himself respected? A public verdict is but a weak indemnification when the character of a man's wife or daughter is attacked, or when he is himself made the subject of accusation, the bare mention of which is an insult, and leaves in the mind recollections whose bitterness is never effaced!"

To these powerful arguments no other reply could be made than an appeal to that contempt for calumny which habit alone can give, a habit, which at that time nobody had acquired, and which is only purchased at the price of bitter suffering; consequently, these arguments produced a certain effect, but were not sufficiently strong to efface a dominant popular idea, which was that the liberty of the press was guaranteed by the Charter, which made no mention of a censorship, and that, consequently, a temporary law only could be passed on the subject. The majority of the Chamber being of a compliant disposition, did not wish to oppose the majority of the committee, who were certainly right, but, at the same time, they did not wish to give too severe a check to the crown in the first proposed act of legislation emanating from that source. They also appreciated, to a certain degree, the danger of suddenly unshackling the press at a period when the public mind was still ruled by passion. The majority of the Chamber was evidently inclined to adopt the opinion of the minority of the committee—that is, to pass the proposed bill with amendments.

This was the opinion which all the partizans of government gave the ministers, who transmitted the intelligence to the king. And after all, two years' censorship was a great amelioration in the first moments of freedom, and represented a considerable space of time in our agitated century. It was, besides, a sort of conciliatory measure, that spared the government the mortification of a defeat. The king, with a moderation that cannot be too highly praised—for in France, royalty has rarely shown so much good sense—consented to the amendments proposed by the minority of the committee, and thus admitted that the law should die a natural death in 1816; if the Chambers did not renew it; that the line of demarcation between writings liable or not to the censorship should be fixed at twenty instead of thirty pages; lastly, that the opinions

of the members of the Chambers should be exempt from all preliminary examination.

M. de Montesquieu, at the termination of a discussion that had lasted five days, rose and announced the adhesion of the king to the amendments proposed by the minority of the committee, and then in a speech flowing in style, moderate in sentiment, delivered with ease, and apparently extempore, he eluded the principal difficulty—that of determining whether the censorship was or was not embodied in the Charter—and claimed the benefit of the doubt for the crown; asserted that the government wished for liberty, but prayed for prudence in the manner of dispensing it: and concluded his speech by adducing very plausible reasons for a temporary censorship. The Minister of the Interior obtained, on this occasion, a signal triumph for himself and for the government. The amended bill having become that of the ministers, passed by a majority of 57 votes in a house of 217 members.

This result satisfied every reasonable man. The liberty of the press was acknowledged as a principle; its suspension was temporary, and necessitated by circumstances. An independent majority had stood forth, that did not seek to curtail the prerogatives of the crown, but would not allow the liberty of the subject to be sacrificed. The power of the king had been checked, without being humiliated; the chiefs of parties had waived their personal feelings in favour of the general interest, and began to feel an inclination to refer their differences to an equitable, firm, and independent tribunal, which was to found in the Chambers, and which, untouched by the rancour of party spirit, and entertaining no extreme opinion, would serve as a moderating power to the violence of all parties, and tend to arrange their differences by negotiations, not by battles.

The vote given on this occasion, followed by several others dictated by the same spirit, infused into the public mind a certain tranquillity, which unfortunately was not destined to be of long duration. The committee appointed to inquire into the police decree concerning the celebration of Sundays and holidays, made a report, in which all the reasons for and against the question under consideration were set forth with great impartiality. The report condemned the imprudent use which some persons sought to make of that article of the Charter that declared the Catholic religion to be the religion of the state, and denied that this article gave authority to submit all forms of worship to the practice of one. At the same time, the necessity of one day of rest in the week was acknowledged, which it was only natural should be the same as that observed

by the religion of the majority of the citizens. But the report added, that great precaution was needed in giving either to religious or social customs an obligatory character; and the report further declared that the law, the law alone, and that a new law embodying the spirit of the times, ought to decide so delicate a question.

Two advocates of considerable reputation, MM. Dard and Falconnet, ardently devoted to the cause of emigration, had written against the validity of the sales called *national*. These writings, which breathed extreme violence, contained some subtle reasoning. It was asserted that the king had not the power to declare sales irrevocable that had not been regularly effected, and that scarcely one of those in question was so; that in any case, there were things which the king could not promise, because impossible even for him. For example, the king could not forcibly take away the property of any of his subjects; whence it followed, that the article of the Charter relating to national sales was void, because not founded in justice. Both these pamphlets revealed the real and crafty policy of the emigration, which was a desire to induce individual negotiations between the ancient and new proprietors, and oblige the latter through fear to restore to the former, at the lowest price, property that the state had alienated. These pamphlets, received with transport by the emigrants, with uneasiness by the mass of the public, and with indignation by the persons immediately interested, were denounced to the chambers in numerous petitions. The Chamber of Deputies, the first called on for an opinion, declared null and void every attempt to injure the irrevocability of the sales called "national;" and the members of the chamber showed, by a unanimous resolution, that they were determined to enforce the observance of the articles of the charter in question. However, an appeal was made to the ministers on this grave question, and the Chief of Police caused MM. Dard and Falconnet to be arrested as disturbers of the public peace, and as having caused dissension between various classes of the citizens. It must be admitted that this demonstration produced no result: but for the moment it exculpated the government, and was of a nature to tranquillise those whose interests were immediately involved. The financial business was next laid before the Chamber of Deputies, and afforded the members a fresh opportunity of displaying their firmness, justice, and intelligence.

The royal council had been long urging M. Louis to bring forward his budget, and explain the means by which he hoped to defray the expenses of the state. The intrepid minister, who had the honour of being the creator of public credit in France, read his budget, and explained his system of finance,



as soon as his colleagues furnished him with a list of their wants. Assisted at first by M. de Montesquiou—who being the intermediary between the king and the Chambers was fully aware of their susceptibility in financial affairs—M. Louis persevered in restricting the expenses of the war department to 200 million, and the expenses of the navy to 51 million francs. M. Louis on this point alone erred; for he would have done better to brave the greatest parliamentary opposition than limit himself to an amount that was evidently insufficient, as by such a proceeding he compromised at the same time the authority of the government and the popularity of the Bourbons with the army. It is true that the budget of 1815 was alone in question, whilst that of 1814—that is, of the current year—remained open to any unforeseen necessity. Be this as it may, the minister of finance—who never lost sight of his main object, the establishment of public credit—remained inflexible, and persevered in fixing the expenditure of the two great departments at the sums he had named, and which were not to be exceeded. The sums allowed for diplomatic expenditure were also diminished. The Minister of the Interior was only allowed what was absolutely necessary for the support of the public roads; 33 million francs were allowed for the expenses of the civil list, which was an extravagant expenditure considering the value of money at that time; but this expense was created, though not acknowledged, by the cost of the king's military household, and by the benevolence of the Bourbon princes towards their former companions in misfortune. The total amount of the budget of 1815 was fixed at 618 million francs, exclusive of the expense of collecting the taxes. In these 618 millions were comprised 70 millions for *arrears*; that is to say, for the unpaid public expenses of 1813 and 1814, such as the pay, provisions, and clothing of the troops, which could not be liquidated by means of credit, and for whose discharge ready money was absolutely needed.

The most important project devised by the minister of finance, was that which related to the general discharge of the debts of the State, whatever their origin. M. Louis had, with rare firmness of principle, enforced his opinion concerning the collection of the taxes and the entire discharge of all the anterior debts of the State, whether incurred by *Bonaparte* or not, to use an expression then common. M. Louis had frequently, by his excitement under contradiction, provoked a smile from the king, but had uniformly won his approbation. "It is not here a question," said the minister, "of abstract theories, about which political economists argue without result. Here, consequences follow immediately on your resolves. I cannot provide for all the expenses of the State without having recourse to credit, for I only live and you only live on the

credit that I have succeeded in creating, the revenue being far from adequate to the daily expenses. Now, I can sustain this provisional credit, and convert it into definite credit only by two means—the rigorous collection of the taxes, and the entire discharge of the debts of the State. Without this two-fold condition, I shall be obliged to close the public coffers, and allow the State functionaries, the clergy, magistracy, and even the army, to die of hunger at the gates of the Treasury.”

In reply to this energetic declaration of principles, the Count d'Artois and the Duke d'Angoulême, who were always embarrassed by the promises they had made to the people on their return to France, endeavoured to fall back on the question of the *droits réunis*. But they were opposed, in the first place, by M. Louis, the vehemence of whose language touched those limits which respect for the royal presence would not allow him to overstep; they were opposed by the king, who cared little about the promises made by his brother and nephews; they were even opposed by the Duke de Berry, who had constituted himself champion of the army, and who, finding himself always met by the cry of financial distress when he advocated the interests of the army, would not on any account consent to a diminution of the resources of the treasury. This prince declared very plainly that those royalists of the South, who wished the abolition of the *droits réunis*, ought to be answered with a discharge of artillery. The tobacco monopoly, which began to yield considerable profits, gave offence in certain provinces, where it was described as a *revolutionary work*. Baron Louis, however, persevered in maintaining this monopoly, and succeeded by his usual arguments. As to the direct taxes, he simply proposed to legalize the decrees by which Napoleon had, in the preceding January, increased them by the addition of some centimes. These centimes having been originally laid on to defray the expenses of the war, it was only natural they should exist as one of the consequences of the war, even after the conclusion of peace. The *droits réunis* would fall heaviest on the cities; the superadded centimes would be felt most in the country districts. It was a general lesson, teaching all that great faults ought to be avoided, but that once committed or permitted, their inevitable consequences must be borne.

As to the question of the entire discharge of the State debts, no matter what their origin, there were no advocates of a national bankruptcy found in the royal Council. The necessity of establishing public credit was too fully recognized by all the members to admit of a single doubt. But these debts being acknowledged, the important point was to find the means of paying them. M. Louis had drawn up the balance-sheet of

his predecessors, M. M. de Gaëte and Mollien, whose portfolios he had received—those of the finance and treasury—in the way that the balance-sheet of a defunct government is generally drawn up—that is to say, with very little justice, not as to the actual figures, but as to their moral worth.

He had estimated the deficit at 1,308 francs, admitting that of this sum only 818 millions could be considered as immediately *demandable*. This acknowledgment alone was sufficient to prove the exaggeration, certainly unworthy of him, with which M. Louis represented the burden transmitted by his predecessors. He had, in fact, added 244 millions to the arrears, a sum which during the past ten years the *domaine extraordinaire* had justly contributed to the treasury; for the *domaine extraordinaire* owing its origin to the benefits derived from the war, it was only natural it should bear the loss, consequent thereon. Moreover, the *domaine extraordinaire* belonging to the State, it was the State that was indebted to the State, and there was no reason for comprising this sum in the total of the debt for which immediate payment could be demanded. Another sum of 246 millions had been also unjustly placed under the same head. These were monies deposited as security for the fulfilment of certain services to the State, and which during many years had been considered as part of the funded debt, for the depositors of such security had, when entitled to withdraw these monies, been always succeeded by others, who invested equivalent sums. Consequently, the State was never obliged to reimburse this money, which bore an interest much below the ordinary rate. It was, therefore, only the securities of depositors abiding in countries now severed from French rule, that could be justly comprised in the *demandable* arrears, and these amounted to a very small sum.

The *demandable* arrears could therefore be reduced to 818 million francs, from which was to be deducted a sum of 12 millions in ready money found in the treasury, and 70 millions added to the budgets of 1814 and 1815, because this sum formed portion of the arrears that were to be paid in ready money. There remained 736 million francs, whose payment could be instantly demanded; and a close inquiry will show, that from this sum many items may be deducted, which were unjustly comprised therein. It may be a matter of doubt whether a sum of about 700 million of francs could be considered a burden that the preceding government had neglected to discharge, when we reflect that this administration had not increased the taxes until reduced to the last extremity, and then only by the addition of some centimes, of which very little had been collected at the time of Napoleon's deposition; it rather becomes a matter of astonishment that two wars like

those of 1813 and 1814 left only a deficit of 700 millions. Whilst deploring the policy that brought allied Europe to Paris, we cannot help admiring the administrative genius that was able to confine within such limits the expenses of a fearful struggle; and we must acknowledge that the most rigorous order had been maintained in our finances, amid the horrors of war.

But M. Louis, though a great financier, was a partizan, and would not acknowledge these truths; for he thought more of his own fame than of the reputation of his predecessors. Be this as it may, it was necessary to provide for a deficit of about 700 millions; but as the claims on this sum would be made successively within two or three years, the entire might be cleared off within that time at the rate of 250 millions per annum.

There were two means of providing for this deficit. It could be met either by means of interminable annuities, or by bills of short date, such as exchequer bills, of which the minister had already issued some millions, and with good effect. But in having recourse to interminable annuities, a serious question arose. Should the interest given to the public creditor be fixed *au pair*, or fluctuate with the current price of the day? If fixed *au pair*, the creditor lost 35 per cent.; for at the actual date, the Five per Cents. were down to 65 francs. To fix the interest at the current price of the day, would be exposing the state to pay more than the real debt; because there were good grounds to hope that the funds would rise with the return of peace and the renewal of credit. The State would have been, besides, bound to pay a continuous interest of 8 per cent., without reckoning the inconvenience of throwing into the market a quantity of stock much greater than the demands of the market would meet. There was a much better means of providing for the emergency, which was to issue bills payable in three years, at an interest proportionate to the circumstances of the capitalists, amounting to about 8 per cent. These bills, favoured by peace and the confidence felt in the minister, were likely to keep pretty near par, and three years allowed leisure to provide for their payment. M. Louis wished to alienate gradually 300,000 hectares of wood: the state still possessed about 1,400 thousand. He also reckoned on the receipt of certain sums arising from the sale of the *biens communaux*. By steadily applying these various resources, as they fell in, to the liquidation of the lately-issued bills, there was a certainty of keeping up their value at about par, and in three years the credit of the state would be re-established, when it would be possible to issue bills at an advantageous rate, and discharge on easy terms the unpaid portion of the

arrears. The finance minister departed, on this occasion, from the principle he had had the honour of being the first to lay down clearly, and whose truth he had verified by experience, which is, that when the rate of money is very high, it is better to borrow on bills of short date than on interminable annuities, because by this means the state is subjected only for a short time to the increased rate of interest.

M. Louis therefore issued temporary bills, called *reconnaissance de liquidation*, bearing an interest of 8 per cent. and payable in three years. These were to be issued as the others were paid off, and the acceptors were to have as security the 300,000 hectares of wood, in addition to the price of the *biens communaux*. M. Louis did not entirely reject the resource of the interminable annuities, and he proposed to grant some to those State creditors who would accept them at par, an offer that would certainly be accepted, when, consequent on the revival of public credit, the stocks would rise. This project was sufficient evidence that the minister who conceived it was endowed with extraordinary perception and unerring forecast. M. Louis had already induced the public to accept some exchequer bills at 8 per cent.; but when, in presenting his financial project, the intention to pay the State creditors to the last farthing would be announced, and that as a guarantee of these payments 300,000 hectares of wood would be disposed of, which might be easily effected in three years, public confidence would revive, and the minister would be able to await the time when a government loan might be effected on favourable terms. This was a most able manner of reviving public credit, for had a quicker process been attempted, public credit would have been injured by a breach of faith, which would have been the inevitable consequence of an attempt to force the state creditors to accept stock at par; and this credit would have been burdensome to the state were the stock made to bear the current interest of the day; and in either case, the simultaneous issue of a considerable quantity of government bills would have damped public confidence. There was another and purely political consideration, which the minister abstained from pressing on the consideration of the king and princes, which was, that the alienation of the 300,000 hectares of wood, which had been the property of the ancient clergy, was a measure calculated to inspire the holders of national property with confidence, and to terminate, or at least diminish, one of those sources of uneasiness that most disturbed the Bourbon government. Considered in every point of view, M. Louis' plan was admirably well conceived.

The project was communicated to M. de Talleyrand, who had very just notions in financial matters, and to M. de Mon-

tesquieu, who, though he did not understand the subject, had sufficient good sense to appreciate the wisdom of M. Louis' views ; it was then laid before the royal council. The king, who was absolutely ignorant of financial affairs, seeing that the project was universally approved, and being moreover resolved to defer to his ministers in things that they understood better than he, gave his consent. M. de Blacas alone raised some objections. He, though a well-meaning man, was one of those who saw in the *arrears* the concentration of the debts incurred during the Revolution and the Empire, and who, on this account, was not very anxious for their liquidation. Indeed, he would have been very glad to pay "Bonaparte's creditors" with something else than money. Stock at par seemed to him sufficient payment for such creditors, and he made a proposal to that effect. M. Louis became warm, and replied, very justly, that to become bankrupt for the entire or part of a debt was still a bankruptcy ; that by such a proceeding, the government took a place amongst those who paid their creditors 50 per cent., instead of not giving anything ; that for his part, he did not wish to be classed with either ; and if the government acted in that manner, the funds would instantly fall, for two reasons—the breach of faith, and the too great number of bills issued ; and that instead of public credit being re-established, it would by such a measure be irrevocably destroyed. M. de Blacas replied, that the reduction in the funds, which the minister wished to prevent, would fall on the lately issued bills, which would be only changing the nature of the evil. But this mode of reasoning had no effect. It only proved that M. de Blacas, who was no financier, had not fully comprehended M. Louis' project, and did not perceive the dependence of each part on the other. M. Louis' plan was adopted and laid before the Chamber of Deputies, supported by a sound statement of the motives that actuated its originator ; but the statement did not render justice to the proposed measure, for this able minister was more capable of conceiving than giving expression to his ideas, though on some occasions, when excited, he became eloquent, and expressed himself in terms at once energetic and picturesque.

M. Louis project was referred to the *bureaux* of the chamber, and from the *bureaux* to a select committee. The measure was expected with impatience, and produced a great effect. The real extent of the burdens of the state was now for the first time fully laid bare, and though considerable in the actual state of things, it was not more than France could bear. There was now shown the possibility of making the expenses of the budget tally with the resources of the state, and there was exhibited on the part of the government a frank and sincere

desire to pay the public debts, for which sufficient resources existed. And the public now saw a minister, energetic, able, and thoroughly competent to the task he had undertaken; a task from whose responsibilities he did not shrink, and which he felt convinced he could discharge.

The day M. Louis' project was laid before the royal council, the funds stood at 65 : within a few days they rose to 70, and soon after to 75. It was evident that the minister of finance understood perfectly well the temper of the money market, and how to inspire confidence there; and it can be confidently asserted, that underhand methods of influencing the funds, though often employed, had no share in their rapid rise on this occasion.

The committee examined M. Louis' project in all its bearings, without any feeling of complacency towards the government, and with the desire natural to committees that represent public assemblies, to make improvements in measures proposed for their consideration. But after an attentive examination both of the budget of 1815, and of the means proposed for liquidation of the arrears, the committee acknowledged that the proposed measure was the most certain and least expensive method of extricating the treasury from its embarrassments. With the exception of one or two amendments in the mode of drawing up the statement, the minister's budget and his financial plan were integrally adopted.

The report was laid before the chamber, and discussed in the latter days of August. The public could not be expected to testify the same interest in this as in the law concerning the press; for the subject was less likely to excite the passions, or call forth a brilliant display of eloquence. Besides, the matter was rather abstract. But the subject was deeply interesting to commercial men and to politicians, who fully appreciated the importance of the subject. The galleries of the Chamber of Deputies were less thronged with partizans; but there was a large number of serious-minded men amongst the auditory. M. de Montesquiou accompanied M. Louis to all the sittings where the question of finance was discussed, in order to afford him the aid of his personal influence, and if needs were, that of his eloquence. The discussion lasted twelve days, and was very animated, ably supported on both sides, though exhibiting the inexperience of men who were for the first time called on to discuss serious interests in a really free assembly. The members commenced by a demonstration of zeal for royalty, and passed the civil list, which amounted to 25 millions for the king and 8 for the princes. Afterwards, in a spontaneous outburst of feeling, they offered to pay the debts contracted by the royal family during the emigration, and granted 30



millions to defray an expense that was purely accidental. After this manifestation of loyalty, the members proceeded to business, and began to examine the budget in all its details.

The budget of 1815 was first taken into consideration, for that of 1814 was liable to all the chances of a laborious liquidation, whose result would yet remain unknown for some months. Besides the *arrears* being burdened with the expenditure of 1814, could alone be affected by it, and 50 millions more or less, in the 600 or 700 that were to be raised by credit, were not worth mentioning under the head of resources. The chamber consequently turned its entire attention to the budget of 1815, which represented the future, and about which alone any measures could be taken. According to the habit of public assemblies little accustomed to state affairs, the members exclaimed against the enormity of the expense. There were some deputies who, like M. de Flaugergues, a man of talent and a sincere and upright constitutionalist, complained that this budget of 618 millions was nearly as great as that of the Empire in time of peace, though in the time of the Empire France reckoned 130 departments. The complaint was groundless, for with the exception of military expenses, a few departments more or less could not make any sensible difference in the expenses of a great state. Had the members of the chamber been thoroughly versed in public business—a knowledge that can only be acquired in a free country—they would have criticised M. Louis' budget in a very different spirit; for the real error of the budget was the insufficiency of the sums allowed for some of the principal departments of the state. For example, the ministers of the war and the marine departments, whose expenditure had been so curtailed by the finance minister, had in the end persuaded themselves that they could defray their current expenses, the one with 51 the other with 200 millions, which was a complete illusion, attributable not to a wish to deceive, but to their inexperience. Expenses to the amount of at least 100 millions had been unintentionally dissembled in this budget. But that was of little importance at the time. The great point was to re-establish public credit by an open discussion of the state of the finances, and by a statement not wholly disheartening of the resources of the state. Succeeding years would bring forth calculations more correct, and more conformable with the real state of things. The budget was consequently criticised in a sense inverse to the truth; but the objections produced no effect, because they did not touch the essential question, one that would awaken the passions—that is to say, they were not brought to bear upon the proposed plan of raising credit. A few words were



said about the state revenue. Some deputies, who represented the wine-growing departments, remonstrated, but without being supported, against the indirect taxes. The chamber, though constituted several years before the Restoration, was essentially imbued, as we shall see presently, with the spirit of landed proprietorship, and was more concerned about the direct than the indirect taxes. The chamber silenced by not giving attention to the deputies from the south; and appeared to attach importance only to the additional centimes that had been levied by a simple decree within the last three months of the Empire, and converted into a law in the budget of M. Louis. The sum total of these centimes, whether for the expenses of the departments or for general expenses, amounted to sixty. The chamber seemed inclined to reduce them, but deferred a final determination until the day when the amendments should be debated.

A general feeling of impatience at length brought on the question of the arrears, and the means proposed to defray them. M. Louis' plan was opposed by two classes of adversaries; the deputies, who were certainly few in number, that participated in the sentiments of the emigration, and who wished to pay the State creditors with paper, and not with timber belonging to the clergy. And there were the ultra-liberals, such as M. Durbach, who with good intentions, but without discernment, looked upon the proposed means of raising credit as a system of stock-jobbing, not perceiving that nothing could be more opposed to stock-jobbing than paying one's debts punctually. Both parties uttered with much pomposity a vast number of puerilities.

Those who were well-disposed towards the emigration dared not propose a national bankruptcy. It must be said, for the honour of those times, that ideas of financial honesty had already made so much progress that no one would have ventured to deny the principle of the total liquidation of the State debts, whatsoever their origin. We must even add, for the honour of the members of the legislative corps, that they would not have suffered it. But indirect ways were adopted; it was asserted that it would be sufficient to pay the State creditors with stock at par; that it would be placing them in the same position as all the holders of government stock, and that they would have no right to complain. The supporters of this view insinuated besides that amongst the State creditors there was a number of government contractors who had largely defrauded the Treasury, and that paying them in the proposed manner, there could be no doubt but that they would receive more than their due. The alienation of three hundred thousand hectares of wood was next condemned. The speakers

repeated those arguments so often adduced against the destruction of timber, but they carefully abstained from alluding to the point which weighed most with them, which was that the wood in question had been the property of the clergy. They said that the proposers of this measure were about to injure forest property, by putting up for sale such a quantity of timber, and considerably diminish the quantity of timber belonging to the State, for the State possessed in all 1,400,000 hectares of forest; that of these, 400,000 would return to the former proprietors, should their unsold property be restored to the emigrants; that, consequently, there would not remain, at the utmost, more than a million; that if of these, 300,000 were sold, there would only remain 700,000; that the forest property of the State would be thus reduced to half, which would entail a serious injury on the country, as it was only the woods belonging to the State whose preservation was secured. All this was said in an irritated tone, and with a great want of candour. But the legislative corps saw very clearly the motives that inspired these speakers.

As to the ultra-liberals, they exclaimed against the creation of a fresh paper currency, and, above all, against an interest of 8 per cent., which, in their opinion, was excessive. They forgot that the minister had already created this paper money, that a large quantity had been already issued under the title of exchequer bills; that he had succeeded in getting them accepted, thanks to his recognized principles, and thanks to an interest of 7 per cent.; that an interest of 7 per cent. on bills of three or six months supposed at least 8 per cent. for bills payable in three years; that it was fortunate that such a plan had been devised and had succeeded, for the taxes had not brought 200 millions to the Treasury, and 350 millions had been paid away, thanks to the plan devised by the minister. Not being aware of these facts, or neglecting to inquire into them, not having a desire to learn them, nor possessing sufficient talent to seek them, the provincial deputies said what provincial deputies often say, that the government was seeking to increase the facilities for stock-jobbing, and sacrificing the property of the people to Paris speculators.

One opponent alone proposed something less futile, which was to give the State creditors bills at 5 per cent., redeemable at 8 per cent., which would render the liquidation more prompt, and keep these bills at a much higher value than the stock, which was only redeemable at 1 per cent. But this proposal, apparently favourable to the Treasury, as it seemed to show that at an equal expense the public debt could be much sooner liquidated, was, in reality, only an attempt to frustrate the financial plan of the minister. In fact, by making part of the

interest redeemable, it was reduced to 5 per cent., consequently lower than the commercial rate, which was 7 per cent. for bills of three and six months, as was shown in the case of the exchequer bills. It was, therefore, only a puerile effort to evade the common commercial law, which is to pay for things at their actual value. As to the rest, the project in question, though subtle in itself and supported by arguments still more subtle, was not favourably received, nor warmly supported.

The project of M. Louis was supported by the committee, and many well-informed deputies, who adduced excellent reasons for their opinions, but all these arguments were in writing, for the most part without order or connection, but they produced an effect, for sound reasoning will ultimately prevail, whatever be the form in which it is put forth. The best defender of the ministerial plan was the minister himself, who, in a written and sound discourse, discussed all the parts of his system, in a manner comprehensible to the humblest intelligence. But when details came to be examined, the discussion became warmer, and, consequently, more serious and more effective, and the written speeches being laid aside, the minister produced a still greater impression on the Chamber. M. Louis was not endowed with the gift of eloquence, and, besides, he spoke with a kind of stammer, the effect of his extreme vivacity; but there was an energy in his language, consequent on intense thought, and which produced a powerful effect on his hearers. He began by saying that he had never neglected any means of reducing the public expenses, and that he had carried economy to its extreme limits. As to the taxes, he treated with contempt those orators who affected to pity the tax-payers, and said that the first of all duties was to provide for the wants of the State, which represented the most imperious wants of every individual; for people could no more do without soldiers, judges, and roads, than without bread; that the direct and indirect taxes were indispensable; that they should be submitted to; and that besides, of all the countries of Europe, France was one of the least burdened by taxation; that, in short, France should pay the price of her errors, which was the most certain way to get rid of them. Passing afterwards to the question of the arrears and the proposed plan for raising credit, the minister maintained that, as a principle, the State ought to pay the public debts, and pay them fully; that such was in the first place the duty of honest men, and, in the next place, the policy of wise men; that instead of becoming poor, the people became rich by acting in this manner; for public credit would be thus re-established, and with public, private credit, and with private credit, the vitality of commerce; that, in fact, there was not a member of the govern-



ment who thought otherwise; that the king subscribed to the principle of paying the arrears, no matter what their amount, nor by whom contracted. The minister expressed these opinions with the energy of profound conviction; and added that not being able to pay the State debts by means of the taxes, and not wishing to increase them as they were already thought too heavy, no other way remained to him but credit; that he was sure of succeeding by this means, as he had found by recent experience, but that his success depended on two conditions: first, that the government should establish a claim to credit by the punctual discharge of existing engagements, and by paying according to the actual rate of the money market; that if the government pretended to pay the State creditors by giving them stock at par, they would defraud the creditors of 25, 30, and 40 per cent.; that if, on the contrary, the interest was to be rated at the current price of the day, the State would be exposed to pay more than the actual debts, and would be, moreover, bound to an interminable interest of 8 per cent.; and that, lastly, the money market would be inundated by the quantity of bills issued; that for all these reasons, bills at short date were preferable, which would certainly bear an interest of 8 and even 9 per cent.; but the burden would be only temporary, and would neither defraud the State nor the creditors, as by this means nothing more than the capital really due would be paid; that these bills were not a chimera, but a reality, for those already issued at three and six months' date continued to bear an interest of 7 and  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., which was equivalent to about 8 per cent. on securities payable in two or three years; that the woods in question were much more a guarantee than an actual alienation of forest property; that if a portion of this wood were sold, to the amount of a hundred million francs, for example, and that with this money, the bills issued should be redeemed, public credit would become so stable, that the government might then obtain a loan, with which the unpaid portion of the arrears could be paid off; and of the woods whose alienation was proposed, it was not probable that more than a third would be sold. Besides, as for what concerned forest property, the government proposed to sell only those woods of small extent, which could be better managed by private individuals than by the State; but the woods containing timber suited for ship-building or important from public considerations, should remain intact; and the fears conceived or expressed on this subject were perfectly chimerical; that the financial project devised for the accomplishment of all these objects, formed a whole, whose parts were intimately dependent on each other, and to withdraw one, involved the destruction of the entire. And the minister finally

declared that he knew no better means to adopt, nor did he wish to try any other, being certain, after five months' experience, of the efficacy of the means proposed.

M. Louis repeated these reasons several times in the course of the discussion, as circumstances called them forth, and with an emotion of voice and features that testified to the sincerity of his conviction. The members of the chamber were persuaded. Seeing that they had to do with a man of talent, who understood perfectly well what he was about, they closed the debate, notwithstanding the cries of a many-shaded opposition. The examination of the details was then commenced, and adjourned to the next sitting.

After having ascertained the real feelings of the Chamber, the two ministers recognised the necessity of making a concession, not upon the budget nor the financial plan, but in the matter of the additional centimes. The spirit of landed proprietorship that prevailed in the Chamber, demanded a sacrifice in favour of the direct taxes. The additional centimes were consequently reduced from 60 to 30, but no alteration was made in the sum total of the budget, which remained fixed at 618 million francs—a proceeding that implied a pledge on the part of the Chamber to make up this total the following year, by some means or other. The thing being agreed on, the amendment was proposed at the final sitting, and accepted by M. de Montesquiou. The minister of finance left the Chamber at this moment, not wishing to be responsible for a concession that was repugnant to the inflexibility of his principles; for he argued, that the Chamber having voted the expenses, ought at the same time to have voted the resources that were to meet these expenses. The amendment was put to the vote, and carried.

The last point of difference remained to be decided. The opposition had rallied all their forces for the discussion of an amendment that proposed to reduce the interest on the lately issued exchequer bills from 8 to 6 per cent. The amendment presented serious dangers. In the first place, medium measures suit public assemblies, that for the most part seek truth in a middle course. Besides, many honest men, but profoundly ignorant of financial affairs, believed that by this diminution of the interest they were protecting the public money; and there were many malicious opponents who saw in the proposed amendment the ruin of the minister's project, a prospect highly gratifying to the ultra-royalists, who did not wish to pay "Bonaparte's creditors;" and it was equally pleasing to the enemies of the Bourbons, as it would be a severe check to the restored dynasty. M. Louis made a vigorous opposition. He said that, in proposing 8 per cent., he had not made an arbi-



trary but a necessary proposition; that money had a commercial value independent of the will of governments; that he had already obtained money at 7 and  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on bills of short date; that possibly he would be obliged to pay 8 per cent. on bills of a longer date; that if possible he would make a better bargain, but it was indispensable that he should enjoy a discretionary power on this point, a refusal of which would be equivalent to a rejection of the entire financial project, and even of the budget, in which case he would leave to the authors of the amendment the task of meeting the difficulties of the position.

A courageous sincerity in a ministry visibly attached to the public welfare, never remains without response in a general assembly. The amendment, however popular, was only supported by 101 voices, and rejected by 122, which gave, it is true, only a majority of 21 for the government; but this majority did not represent the Chamber, for when the total of the ministerial proposition was put to the vote, 140 members voted for, and only 66 against it—giving a majority of 74, which was enormous considering the number of voters.

This triumph produced a great effect on the public, who saw on the one side a powerful and rational majority, decided to support the government; and on the other side, this government, steady, prudent, skilled in financial affairs, knowing what was desirable, and desiring it ardently. The following day the Five per Cents., which had risen from 65 to 75 francs on the presentation of the financial project, rose when it passed the Chamber to 78; and should the peace continue, it was not chimerical to believe that the funds would rise to 90, an extraordinary figure at that period. Under these circumstances, it would be easy for the government to effect a loan, and immediately pay off the entire of the arrears, alienating only part of the woods ordered to be sold.

But questions of finance were not the sole difficulties on which M. Louis was called to decide. The termination of the Continental blockade, which occurred at the same time as the fall of the Empire, necessitated an immediate consideration of the state of commerce and manufactures. Napoleon had not persevered sufficiently long in the Continental blockade to conquer England by commercial means; but he persevered long enough to lay the foundations of our manufactures, and it naturally followed that, when our country was invaded, and the barriers that opposed the influx of foreign manufactures fell, our commercial market should be powerfully disturbed, and add to the military, to the civil functionaries, and holders of national property, a new class of malcontents, disposed to regret the Empire.

We have already seen that, immediately after the return of the Bourbons, M. Louis had taken some provisional measures to accommodate our commercial legislation to the new state of things. For example, he had reduced the duty on raw cotton to a mere *droit de balance*, in order to enable our manufactures to work cheaper. He reduced the duties on sugars and coffee to a rate that enabled the French to compete with the British commerce. But these measures were only temporary, and many others were needed to secure the existence and development of our manufactures. But as always happens in such cases, each class demanded a prohibitory duty for its own advantage, refusing at the same time a merely protective one to others; and the Chambers, as the arbitrating power, were beset with pressing petitions from all our manufacturers. The minister had endeavoured to satisfy the greater number of these demands by the introduction of moderate measures, calculated to obtain the consent of the Chambers.

In the first place, he had re-established custom-houses along our frontiers, and had at the same time stopped a species of fraud resulting from the exceptional circumstances of the time. The districts added to our territorial possessions of 1790 by the treaty of Paris, though not of great extent, held at that time considerable quantities of merchandise. These additions, lying in the direction of Belgium, the Rhine, and Savoy, were filled with English manufactured goods, which became French property, as a matter of right, the day we took definite possession of the new territories. With regard to these goods, the minister ordered the re-exportation of those that were prohibited, and demanded duty for those whose entrance was authorised by the tariff. He prohibited goods made of thread or cotton. With respect to woollen cloths, it was only necessary to enforce the existing laws. Our cotton spinners and weavers being at length able to obtain the raw material, not at the price that prevailed during the Continental blockade, but at the rate current through Europe, were that year able to compete at the Leipzig fair with English manufactured goods. In fact, ours were found to be of a better quality. Our manufacturers had certainly sustained a considerable loss, immediately after the abolition of the duty on raw cotton; for they were obliged to sell their goods at the rate to which the suppression of this duty had reduced them. The loss thus sustained was stated at 30 million francs, and the manufacturers did not hesitate to demand the reimbursement of this sum from the Chambers, as the consequence of a tax unduly collected. M. Louis angrily rejected the claim, and the Chamber agreed in his opinion. The deputies looked on the loss thus sustained by the manufacturers as one of the inevi-

table evils of war, and which a government can no more avert from a certain branch of manufacture, injured by an alteration in the frontiers, than they could from a province occupied by an enemy.

Next to cotton, the most important of our modern manufactures was of iron. This metal, made to replace stone and wood in a thousand uses, was destined to become one of the most active instruments of modern civilisation. The manufacture of this metal had been greatly developed in France, in consequence of the Continental blockade, which prohibited the entrance of foreign iron brought by sea. The abolition of this interdict exposed our metallurgic manufactures to a formidable rivalry. A great revolution had been accomplished in England in this branch of trade by the substitution of sea coal for wood as a combustible, and by the use of the rolling mill instead of the hammer in working the metal. The consequence was that the English were able to sell iron at 350 francs the ton, which the French could not do at less than 500. It is true that the French iron, smelted by the action of wood and worked by the hammer, possessed incontestable advantages as to quality, but could not support the impending rivalry. Consequently, our metallurgic manufacturers were amongst the most restless and anxious. The great iron manufacturers declared, and with reason, that if they were not protected against foreign iron, they would be obliged to stop their works, which would deprive France of an article of the first necessity, and render her dependent on the English, who would soon make her pay a higher price than the French themselves. These were supported by the great timber proprietors, who could find no market for their goods if the manufacturers of iron ceased to purchase. These petitioners were opposed by the inhabitants of the seaports and the wine-growing provinces, who hoped to export their wines to those northern countries that might send iron to France. Not daring to avow their true motives, they asserted that France, deprived of Belgium and the Rhenish provinces, would not be able to furnish a quantity of iron sufficient for her wants, an assertion that experience has belied. The iron manufacturers demanded a prohibitory duty, whilst, on the contrary, the merchants and proprietors of vineyards clamoured for free trade. The minister proposed to put a duty of 150 francs per ton on foreign iron, which added to 350—the English market price—would bring it up to the rate of 500 francs. He thought this protective duty would be sufficient. There was a lively discussion in the Chambers, where both the opposing parties found warm defenders. An amendment proposing a duty of 250 francs was presented and largely supported, but the duty



of 150 francs was carried, and in this affair also the wishes of the Government prevailed in the Chambers.

After the iron manufacturers came the sugar refiners, who addressed strong remonstrances both to the government and the Chambers. Sugar refining was an ancient branch of French manufacture, and one of the most extensive and productive, especially when France, possessing St. Domingo, drew thence large quantities of raw sugar, which, being refined, found a sale in all the markets of Europe. War, which had favoured our national manufactures, had also served some rival productions, amongst which was the refining of sugar in other countries. The French refiners remonstrated. They appealed to the mighty memories of our colonial prosperity: they were listened to, and a prohibitory duty was passed.

The agriculturists also put in their claims, and found amongst the members of the legislative corps many inclined to hear them favourably. Our agriculturists wished to profit of the opening of the seas, to export their grain and wool. Grain of all kind had been retained in France during the late times of scarcity, and as to wool, Napoleon had prohibited not alone its exportation, but that of sheep, because he wished that the great importation of merino sheep should tend exclusively to the improvement of French woollen goods. The agriculturists, consequently, demanded free trade in corn, wool, and sheep; but they were opposed by the inhabitants of the sea coast—that is, by the people of Normandy, Brittany, and Vendée—who were violent royalists. They were also opposed by all those who worked in wool; in the first place, the manufacturers of woollen cloth; and next, the manufacturers of those various tissues, known as “merinos,” which have become a real blessing for the people by their extensive use and low price. But the agriculturists had sound arguments on their side; for if, for the protection of national manufactures, it is natural to prohibit the importation of foreign produce, it does not appear so reasonable to prohibit the exportation of home produce. The agriculturists appeared to be right. Their arguments were popular, and the Chamber of Deputies, adopting the views of the finance minister, sanctioned the exportation of grain, subject to a fluctuating duty that varied with the price of the commodity. The exportation of wool was also permitted, that of rams alone being subject to duty.

Such were the principal measures used to modify the transition from the Continental blockade to a free marine commerce. We have already said that the duty was suppressed on foreign raw materials, such as raw cotton, dyes, dyeing woods, which Napoleon had overtaxed, as articles connected with British

commerce. Cotton manufactured goods were still prohibited, in order to afford the home manufactures an absolute protection. A duty was put on iron equivalent to the difference between the price of that article in the English and French markets; and as to goods of large consumption—such as sugar and coffee—the duty imposed on them being exclusively for the benefit of the exchequer, was much diminished, and this was done with a view to lessen the incentives to smuggling, which had much increased since the return of peace. Lastly, foreign refined sugar was prohibited, and the exportation of our agricultural products was declared free, or nearly so.

These measures, conceived in a praiseworthy spirit of moderation, met with general approbation. The government was thus alternately supported and checked by the Chambers, that had become the tutelar authority, beneath whose shelter all the aggrieved classes of the community flocked. Still, some men, who entertained exaggerated ideas of liberty, often expressed regrets that the Chamber of Deputies did not act in a more decided manner. These men wished, for example, that the Chamber had unconditionally rejected the law concerning the press. But by making this law temporary, the Chamber of Deputies had preserved the principle of liberty, and for prudent men that was enough; for to go further would have been to give the crown a check which would have weakened the kingly power, and deeply irritated the Bourbons against the new order of things. Politically speaking, this mode of conduct was evidently the wisest.

The Chamber of Peers, on the other hand, had not acted less wisely than the Chamber of Deputies. The peers had thoroughly discussed the law of the press, and had passed it after retrenching the preamble, which seemed to imply that the censorship was a principle of the Charter. The peers addressed an excellent reply to the Minister of the Interior, on the occasion of a report presented to the Chambers on the state of France. Napoleon, we must remember, caused a statement to be every year laid before the legislative corps of the position of the empire, in order to ascertain the general state of progress. The new government thought it well to follow this example, and took advantage of the opportunity to dilate upon the state of desolation in which the Empire and the Revolution had left France. The statement of the Minister of the Interior, considering France from one point of view, was only true in the description made of the miseries resulting from war. The Chamber of Deputies replied to this document by a simple vote of thanks; but the Chamber of Peers, of whom two-thirds were members of the senate, would not allow the Revolution nor even the Empire to be so unjustly treated. The



peers made a thoughtful reply, in which were recounted the immense benefits that France owed to the application of the principles of 1789, to the abolition of wardenships, and all the shackles that formerly fettered manufactures in the interior of France; to the division of landed property; to the increase in the number of landed proprietors, the improvement of land, the establishment and advancement of manufactures; and after recapitulating these various benefits, the peers added that they saw in these things, as well as in the peace and liberty for which France was indebted to the Bourbons, motives for hoping a speedy return of public prosperity. The reply, though perfectly respectful, was dignified, veracious, and pointed.

It was evident that the two Chambers, though not so enthusiastic as the liberal party, deserved the confidence of enlightened men, and had begun to obtain it. They were also gradually acquiring the power of restraining and supporting the government, two conditions alike desirable. Unfortunately, the opposition that the government met, though it did not irritate the members against the constitutional *régime*, had not in any way ameliorated their feelings. The king was pretty much as usual—that is to say, tranquil, considering political questions quietly, and inclined to allow his ministers to do as they pleased when the principle of his authority, or any of the essential interests of the emigration, were not in question. To these interests he was deeply attached. Thus, with regard to the national property, he actually did himself violence: and had it been in his power, he would have restored it to the ancient proprietors. He had especially disapproved the arrest of MM. Dard and Falconnet, authors of the two pamphlets that condemned the irrevocability of the national sales. After a short imprisonment, these two lawyers had been set at liberty amid the loud applause of the high emigrant party, who had visited and offered them the most lavish attentions during their short captivity, and continued to throng their houses after their liberation. The king also took part with his body-guards in their quarrels with the national guards and the soldiers, and expressed his intention of supporting them at all hazards. His ministers, without contradicting him, contented themselves with trying to prevent new collisions, or to correct the effects when they had not been able to prevent the cause. With these exceptions, the king allowed his ministers to follow the bent of their inclinations. As to the Count d'Artois, who had returned from Saint Cloud to Paris, after an absence induced by ill health and bad humour, he as usual made himself very busy. He turned an attentive ear to those provincial petitioners, who came to beg places as a recompense for their

loyalty; made them promises that he could not fulfil, and sympathised in their exaggerated feelings, which made him more and more the object of the hopes and love of the ultra-royalists. Influenced by a spirit of curiosity, a fondness for meddling in government affairs, and the distrust that characterises weak minds, he had allowed a kind of police to gather round him, composed of the plotters of every régime—the worn-out remnants of former police forces, who sought at what was then called the *Pavillon Marsan*—the Prince's residence at the Tuileries—employment that they were refused in the government police. The Prince was delighted to receive through these channels, reports, either annoying or alarming, which he carried to the king, to prove to him that he was badly served, or that he had made a bad choice in his officials; and that whilst he was reading his classic authors, the monarchy was undermined and threatened with fresh calamities. Louis XVIII., being privately informed by M. Beugnot of the groundlessness of the information brought by Monsieur, had several times enjoined his brother to give up this gossiping, and allow him to live in peace. The Duke d'Angoulême, the eldest son of Monsieur, was not very talented, but he was prudent and modest, and did not pretend to play a more important part than that allotted him. He was then travelling in the west, endeavouring to recover for the royal authority that respect which in these provinces had declined very much. The other son, the Duke de Berry, who was not deficient in talent, but uncontrollably irritable, had at first succeeded with the troops, to whom he paid the most lavish attentions; but he ultimately offended them by the violence of his temper, which he had at first restrained, but could not entirely suppress, and which became more apparent as each succeeding day proved the difficulty of attaching the army to the Bourbons. Thus these three Princes, notwithstanding their difference of disposition, participated too largely in the prejudices of their friends to be able to resist their influence or avoid their errors. Scarcely a day passed that some manifestation on their part did not add to those incidents, of which party ill-will is only too glad to profit.

The 15th of August was the day on which under, the Empire, the feast of Saint-Napoleon was celebrated. It would have been better to take no notice of the day and allow it to pass unobserved. But the royal family wished, on the contrary, that the day should be still a fête, but a royalist fête. The 15th of August was the day on which Louis XIII. in gratitude for the pregnancy of Anne of Austria, had by a solemn vow placed France under the protection of the Blessed Virgin. However interesting this historical souvenir might be,

it would have been well to consider the actual circumstances of the time before enjoying the pleasure of recalling it. But the Bourbons did nothing of the kind, and ordered a solemn procession throughout France to revive and confirm the vow of Louis XIII. At Paris the princes walked in the procession, carrying tapers in their hands, and this spectacle did not produce a favourable effect on those whom the religious zeal of the Bourbons was calculated to offend. The half-pay officers were much amused by the devotion of the princes, and the soldiers bought candles to celebrate the feast of Saint-Napoleon by illuminating their barracks. It was not without considerable difficulty that this seditious illumination was extinguished in the evening.

A manifestation of a different character produced on the 29th of August a not less disagreeable effect. The king was invited by the city of Paris to a magnificent banquet, and went to dine at the *Hôtel de Ville*, which he had not done since his return to France. Scarcely was he arrived when it became necessary to appease a quarrel that arose between the body-guard and the national guards. The body-guard wanted to occupy the inner apartments and banish the national guard to the outer. This was a pretension that involved inconvenience, for the national guard was, in fact, the city of Paris itself that took up arms to do honour to the king, and at the *Hôtel de Ville* the members of the national guard were in their own home. To banish them to the gate of the palace, whilst the body-guards occupied the interior, would be a strange forgetfulness of the decencies of life. The quarrel became warm, the king took part in it, and it was agreed that the national guards and the body-guards should occupy in equal numbers the inner apartments of the *Hôtel de Ville*.

The fête commenced by a dinner to the king; a ball was to follow. The magnificence and taste displayed on this occasion were worthy of the great city that received its king, and of the august guest that she received. Louis XVIII. sat at the chief table with the princes of his family, and admitted to the same table, by an infraction of ancient customs, thirty-six ladies. In this number were comprised the most distinguished ladies of the ancient court, and only three or four of the modern nobility. But this was not the most remarkable circumstance of the entertainment. The prefect, standing behind the chair of the king, waited on the monarch, and the prefect's wife, in the same attitude, waited on the Duchess d'Angoulême. The members of the municipal council performed the same services for the princes. It is true that in earlier times, princes and even kings had waited upon emperors, but we may add, without adopting any vulgar democratic prejudice, that the time



for such exhibitions had passed away. Napoleon, with all the prestige of his glory and his power, had not been able to renew these customs, but he had never tried the experiment on so large a scale. The morrow of the fête at the *Hôtel de Ville*, the court flatterers were loud in their encomiums on the magnificence and moral beauty of the spectacle presented on the previous evening. They spoke of the fêtes of the Revolution and the Empire with profound contempt; they said that neither had ever presented anything like what they had just witnessed; that it was legitimate authority alone, recognized and accepted by all, that could command such a spectacle; and that those who had the happiness of witnessing it, would preserve during their lives ineffaceable recollections of the scene. Those sycophants dealt out in this way common-places that are uttered after every public fête, and which obtain favour only with those who have partaken of the banquet. It is true, and happily so, that even in our days crowned heads can still command respect, but it is when they exhibit much virtue, simplicity of manner, and correctness of taste, and testify for the rest of mankind a respect equivalent to what they demand for themselves.

The masses judge by their eyes, and, for the most part, form their opinion of the moral strength of a government by its external manifestations. The part played by the magistrates at the city feast, with regard to the king, was in their eyes only a counterpart of the task that certain men would wish to impose on France herself; and they connected the scene enacted at the *Hôtel de Ville* with the extravagant acts in which certain landed proprietors had lately indulged in Normandy, Brittany, Languedoc, and Provence. Some of these seigneurs required that in their village churches, the incense should be swung before them; others insisted that the consecrated bread should be offered to them before being presented to the municipal authorities; these pretensions had induced ridiculous contests, accounts of which had been eagerly propagated by the journals, and the acts themselves denounced in the Chambers. But these incidents would have been trifles under a staple and rigorously legal government, consistent with the institutions it had granted and animated by the spirit displayed in the Chambers. Unfortunately, such a spirit could not exist in a ministry that had neither unity, head, nor a steady principle of conduct, and was, consequently, without influence. M. de Montesquiou, minister of the interior, had more direct intercourse with the country than any of his colleagues. His manners were amiable, when he laid aside the self-sufficiency of which he was sometimes accused; he was moderate, considering his birth and the party to which he be-

longed; he spoke with fluency, and was listened to with attention in the Chambers, but he was, spite of these advantages, the most incompetent of the ministers, because he possessed neither firmness nor application to business. After recalling the special commissioners, he had left the imperial prefects in office, without entering into any explanation, without telling them whether they should be continued in office, or be dismissed. It was reasonable enough to retain special functionaries, such as clerks in the finance, the roads and bridges, the war and marine departments; nothing could be better, for it would have been difficult to find substitutes for the men who filled these places. But it was a dangerous experiment to retain in office the prefects who were exclusively political personages, and who were supposed to represent literally the spirit and sentiments of the new government. However, for want of suitable men, M. de Montesquiou had been obliged to continue in office a great number of the prefects of the Empire, for the royalists, long removed from the sphere of business, were unfit for these posts. It would have been wiser to have transferred these men to new departments, which would have given their appointment a sort of royal sanction, and spared them the annoyance of appearing self-contradictory in the eyes of their fellow-functionaries.

M. de Montesquiou had taken none of these precautions, he contented himself with appointing as prefects, and sub-prefects, in some departments, certain ancient nobles who were reputed fit for public business, and these he left to act according to their own inclinations, without entering into any explanation about the imperial prefects. The consequence was, that the royalist prefects indulged all the passions of partizans, and the imperial prefects who were retained in office exhibited extreme weakness of character, fearing to excite the anger of the royalists. So, one party boldly did the evil, and the other complacently allowed it to be done, and suffered it to be publicly said that the Charter was a temporary expedient; that the Bourbons once firmly fixed on the throne, would complete the Restoration by reviving the tithes, and restoring the property of the church and the emigrants. To obviate the commission of all these errors, the minister would have been obliged to read a voluminous correspondence, and reply immediately to all these letters, and give directions, in a word, he would have been obliged to act, and of this M. de Montesquiou was incapable. He scarcely seemed to perceive the most serious accidents, even when followed by a scandal like that connected with the Bishop of Rochelle; and when forced upon his attention, he interfered with a cold inefficacious letter. M. de Beugnot, a man of high intelligence, to whom the



direction of the police was confided, had foreseen this state of things, and had sent into the departments sensible enlightened agents, who had sent him a succession of well drawn up reports, describing the strange position of France at that period. It was a delicate task to communicate these reports to Louis XVIII., for it was in other words, to denounce as mad, and sometimes as very criminal, his most zealous friends. When M. Beugnot happened to receive a very piquant report, one capable of amusing a sarcastic monarch, he profited of the opportunity to lay the truth before his eyes. Louis XVIII. read the report, returned it to M. Beugnot, and contented himself with joining his minister in a laugh against persons whom he designated the friends of his brother. Things remained in this state, and such was the entire system of government. But the weakness of the administration was confessedly acknowledged, and the princes persuaded themselves that they ought to appear in person, that their presence would animate and subdue every heart, and kindle on every side the flame of loyalty. They were strangely mistaken, and did not perceive that instead of diminishing they were about to increase the evil. Good government on the part of the king under such circumstances would have consisted in restraining his friends, but sending the princes into the provinces was only exciting the popular feeling, whose sole fruit would be some few acclamations of loyalty, vain as the acclamations of the populace generally are, who applaud when their passions are roused, and forget on the morrow the shout of the previous evening, ready to utter a different cry on a new morrow should their passions be aroused in favour of an opposing cause.

It was thought prudent to send one of the princes immediately to the West, which was the most disturbed part of France. The Duke d'Angoulême was selected for this purpose, and a better choice could not be made. The prince consecrated the months of July and August to his tour. It was decided that in September and October the Count d'Artois should visit Champagne, Burgundy, Lyons, Provence, Dauphiné, and Franche-Comté, and that at the same time the Duke de Berry should visit the frontier provinces, where the soldiers were stationed in great numbers.

The western provinces, that is to say, Lower Normandy, Brittany, and Vendée, had greatly offended Louis XVIII., because they seemed to make little account of him, and spoke much more of M. de la Rochejacquelein and other royalist chiefs than of the king himself. The insurgents of these provinces, as we have already said, had assembled, and armed themselves at the expense of the blues, whose muskets they

seized; they recalled their ancient chiefs, and elected new ones in cases where the former had died, and obeyed these leaders much more strictly than they did the government. To the Duke d'Angoulême was confided the task of informing them that there was a king in France, that there was but one, and that it was his authority alone they ought to recognize and obey. To avoid fixing public attention on a journey into provinces formerly insurgent, the prince announced his intention of visiting the seaports of the English Channel, that is to say, Brest, Nantes, Rochelle, &c., &c. Conformably with this announcement, he left the country of the Chouans on the left, and proceeded directly through Lower Normandy to Rennes and Brest. He was received with a warmth of feeling and demonstrations of joy which might be naturally expected in provinces where his presence brought back the memory of many sufferings endured for the Bourbon cause, and where there were numbers of old men to whose eyes these memories brought tears. The Prince found that the royalists, both ancient and modern, spoke very lightly of the Charter, and looked upon the maintenance of the national sales as a merely temporary act of prudence; they considered the Concordat as another kind of Charter, that had lost its force on the abdication of Bonaparte. He found the people disposed to regard the taxes as a remnant of imperial tyranny that ought to be cast aside as soon as possible. They were, besides, determined not to suffer the exportation of corn, though decreed by a royalist government. The holders of national property were alarmed, and ready to combine for self-defence. The magistrates were distrustful, and expecting with anxiety the new investiture they had been promised; and, lastly, the army was dispirited, hostile in feeling, and scarcely respectful in manner. The prince had not sufficient penetration to appreciate the tendency of this state of things, but he possessed sufficient good sense and uprightness to perceive that it was opposed to order, and in direct opposition to the promises made by the king, which, in his opinion, ought to be honourably fulfilled; and he spoke admirably well on every point with the exception of religion, for on that subject the Bourbon family held most dangerous opinions. The prince took especial pains to persuade the people that there were not two kings, one residing at the *Pavillon de Flore*, called Louis XVIII., an ancient Jacobin, as the provincialists called him, very crafty, and making promises that he never intended to keep: the other, the Count Artois, residing at the *Pavillon Marsan*, whose heart was filled with the true sentiments of a good royalist; the former represented by the prefects, who ought not to be either obeyed or believed, the second by some



Chouan chiefs whose advice alone ought to be listened to and followed. The prince declared that there was but one king, that his orders ought to be obeyed, the taxes paid, and corn allowed to be exported, that the holders of national property ought not to be disturbed; in a word, that people ought to live peaceably and enjoy the restored public tranquillity, and allow it to be enjoyed by others. He spoke less prudently to the priests, in whose errors he seemed to participate, excepting in what concerned tithes and church property. He strengthened as much as he could the legal authorities, called forth the enthusiasm of the masses by the mere fact of his being a Bourbon, and satisfied honest men by his moderation and uprightness, but unfortunately did not fascinate anybody, and after having traversed Laval, Rennes, Brest, Lorient, he left the country as disturbed as he found it, because though he spoke rationally, his presence excited deep emotion, and at that moment emotion of all kind was an evil, because it awakened passions that ought to have been suppressed.

To visit Nantes was an important point. This city contained a rich commercial population, attached to the principles of the Revolution, but detesting its excesses, of which many cruel instances had occurred before their eyes, and hating as strongly the Vendean insurrection, and discontented with the arrogance of the nobility on both banks of the Loire. The people of Nantes entertained an exceeding dislike to Napoleon's government, because under that their commerce had been destroyed, and this aversion naturally inclined them to look favourably on the Bourbons, who brought with them peace and the Charter. But the extravagancies of the priests and the emigrants on the one hand, and on the other the difficulty they found in re-establishing their commerce, had rendered them discontented. They bitterly regretted the Mauritius, attributed to the English the worst designs, and entertained an ill-feeling against the Bourbon government on account of the partiality shown to England. Our colonies, on which the merchants of Nantes had reckoned so much, were now under the protection of the British flag, stocked with European produce, and under existing circumstances no great traffic could be expected in that quarter. Influenced by all these motives, the people of Nantes were sincere royalists, already somewhat disappointed in their hopes, but still perfectly constitutional. The Vendéans having announced their intention of erecting a post on the left bank of the Loire, bearing the inscription, "Here Vendée commences," the Nanteans declared they would erect a post at the gates of their city, with this inscription, "Here Vendée was foiled."

The Duke d'Angoulême was well received by the Nanteans;

he addressed them in a tone of moderation that produced an agreeable impression, and brought them back to an excellent frame of mind. On quitting Nantes, he journeyed through the centre of Vendée, stopping first at Beaupréau. He was now in the "Bocage," this wooded and almost inaccessible country, where nobles lived after a patriarchal fashion with their tenants, whom they had formerly led to battle against the armies of the Republic. In these rural districts, there abode much sincerity of feeling and simplicity of manners, and very little of the spirit of intrigue and brigandage that had characterized the progress of *Chouannerie*. The peasants of the Bocage were tolerably quiet under the direction of their seigneurs, who bade them have patience and obey the orders of the king. The only symptom of insubordination exhibited by these people was a reluctance to pay the taxes, which they hoped to see soon abolished. About five or six thousand of them arrived at Beaupréau, with their seigneurs and their white banners, deeply touched by the sight of the prince, as was natural when they recalled the many struggles, the many sorrows, and heavy losses they had endured in the royal cause. Their language was not unreasonable; besides, they remembered the concessions made since 1789, and had no wish to see tithes and feudal rights revived. Here, in the centre of the Bocage, many touching scenes had taken place, and scarcely one that could awaken regret. At Bourbon-Vendée, the prince found the public spirit less simple and less innocent amongst the people of the Marais. In this region, the people were less agricultural than commercial, they were fond of excitement, and assumed a certain importance; they smuggled and evaded the payment of taxes, and exhibited on the whole rather turbulent passions. The clergy, especially, displayed a total want of common sense. The prince repeated here to those who came to hear him what he had already said throughout his progress, and his discourse was not without effect. He afterwards repaired to Rochelle, where he might have done a great deal of good by receiving the titular bishop, against whom the clergy of the diocese had revolted, preferring the ancient bishop, who had not given in his resignation. Unfortunately, the Duke d'Angoulême, who was the most pious of the Bourbon princes, refused to receive the titular bishop, and by this conduct gave a most deplorable contradiction to M. de Montesquiou's letter. The "little church" was transported with joy, and became more arrogant than ever, for no act could be more significantly favourable to her than a refusal on the part of the prince to receive the prelate *en fonction*, to whom the government had but lately enjoined a complete obedience. This was declaring by the



mouth of the prince that the official government was a delusion, of which nobody ought to be the dupe.

At Bordeaux, the prince found himself, so to speak, in his capital. It was there that the Bourbons had first appeared on their return to France, and the Bourbon who represented the family on that occasion was himself. But at Bordeaux, as elsewhere, the first fervour of the people had passed away, as well as their alluring hopes. After having looked upon the English as liberators, and also as extensive consumers of their produce—for they had carried off and drunk a great deal of wine—they were exasperated against them, since they had learned the loss of the Mauritius and the state of our colonies, whose markets were filled with British merchandize. And the Bordelais were, besides, displeased at some imprudent outbursts on the part of the Guyenne nobility, and especially irritated by the obstinate maintenance of the *droits réunis*. Hatred of the English, dissatisfaction against the nobility, and irritation against the *droits réunis*, were the three prevailing sentiments of the Bordelais, and which the Duke d'Angoulême was called upon to remove or at least moderate. The prince did all in his power, and admitted which was true—that the English had not acted like generous conquerors, but maintained that they had not done anything to prevent the revival of French commerce, and that with a little time and industry trade would again flourish. He treated the rich citizens with distinction, and finally insisted on the absolute necessity of the indirect taxes, without which the expenses of the State could not be met. On this point, he succeeded in producing an effect on the minds of the more enlightened of the Bordelais merchants.

After leaving Bordeaux, the prince repaired to Mont-de-Marsan, Bayonne, Pau, Toulouse, and Limoges, making sensible speeches everywhere, giving here and there useless advice, and exciting, unintentionally, the passions of the royalists more than was beneficial either to the interests of France or his family. He returned to Paris by Angers and Mans.

Angers was one of the most disturbed and one of the most important cities of the West. The citizens and the nobility held opposite opinions on every subject which at that time occupied public attention. The infantry of the national guard was for the most part composed of the citizen class, and the cavalry of the nobility, because the latter being richer could provide for the maintenance of horses. The cavalry had adopted a special uniform, which they called the "Vendean uniform," and which, notwithstanding reiterated commands from Paris, they refused to lay aside. The cavalry had, moreover, declared their intention of exclusively surrounding the prince, and con-

stituting themselves his personal guard. These pretensions were exhibited in more than one place, and especially at Mans, in the centre of the ancient country of the Chouans. But the latter had announced a more serious project, which was no other than to assemble to the number of twenty thousand, with their chiefs and banners, and so accompany the Duke d'Angoulême during his stay in the province. During more than two months previously, the prefects of Angers and Mans had used every effort to prevent manifestations of this kind, but had not succeeded. However, as the Duke d'Angoulême drew nearer, thanks to several sage admonitions emanating from the prince, the prefects succeeded in making their silly fellow-citizens listen to reason; and at Angers, in particular, the cavalry guard promised to abstain from all pretentious display, and the infantry made a like promise. Notwithstanding these pacific assurances, when the prince arrived at the gates of Angers, and the authorities, accompanied by the troops, went out to meet him, a company of the infantry, national guards, who suspected the intentions of the cavalry, broke the line of the *cortège*, and suddenly surrounded the prince, whom they placed in a kind of square. Neither the prince nor the military authorities dared act with severity, for the innovators were supported by public opinion, and the prince was obliged to enter the city escorted in this fashion. Having arrived at Angers, he determined to make both parties feel his authority. He dissolved the company of infantry that had disturbed the tranquillity of the fête, but adjusted the balance by addressing a sharp remonstrance to one of the principal nobles. "It is you, Sir," he said, "who wish to be here more king than the king himself; it is you who wish that the soldiers should present arms to you and obey you, instead of obeying the legally constituted authorities; it is you whose pretensions disturb a country where you ought to give an example of peace and submission to the laws. Royalists such as you are more dangerous than the most formidable enemies. You may withdraw."

This scene, which soon became the subject of conversation throughout the city, delighted the citizens, and would have produced a highly beneficial effect had it been made known through the entire of France. But the journals were forbidden to allude to the circumstance. The prince afterwards pardoned the company of the national guards that had been dissolved, allowed it to be formed again, and left all the sensible people of Angers perfectly satisfied with him.

At Mans, the Chouan chiefs had been induced to listen to reason, an effect that was in a great measure attributable to the fact, that they were not able to enlist so many of their old soldiers as they had expected, and amongst the new, very few

could afford to make a journey of fifteen or twenty leagues at their own expense, to take part in a political demonstration. The prince was, consequently, spared some annoyance. But he saw many ardent royalists, numbers of old soldiers, remnants of the civil wars, who gave utterance to sentiments by no means moderate, without, however, proceeding to any vexatious demonstration. The prince returned to Paris about the middle of August. He had set out on his journey with the intention of doing good, but it had been his fate, in several instances, to do evil, by unintentionally exciting districts that most needed to be tranquillized.

Immediately after the return of the Duke d'Angoulême, the Count d'Artois proceeded to visit Champagne and Burgundy. He was authorised to make large promises of government favours, and not to refuse any merely honorary distinction, the measure in the latter case not depending either on the budget or the tyranny of custom. He could confer on the majority, the order of the lily, on military men and magistrates the cross of the Legion of Honour, on select royalists the cross of Saint Louis, and he was not a man to keep his hand closed when he had the king's permission to open it. He first visited the banks of the Seine and the Aube, and particularly the cities of Nogent, Méry, Arcis sur-Aube, Brienne, Bar-sur-Aube, and Troyes, where the war had made fearful ravages. He found part of the population sunk in wretchedness, and living in the midst of ruins. He was compassionate and demonstrative; he was touched by all the sorrows he beheld, he did not conceal his emotion, and won the affection of the sufferers by the sympathy he displayed. As he journeyed along, he melted in tenderness over those that were afflicted; he even wept with them, he called them his friends, his children, and promised to acquaint the king with their misfortunes, as if the king possessed the means of remedying these woes. The minister of finance had taken precautions against the prodigality of the prince, and laid it down as a principle that the State could do nothing for the districts ravaged by the war; that the utmost amelioration that could be afforded would be the reduction of the taxes, but that only in cases where the impossibility of payment was proved. Monsieur promised all the districts he visited to petition for exemption from taxes; he even promised them loans of money, and gave them permission, meanwhile, to cut down 120,000 trees in the State forest, to help in rebuilding their houses. To these aids, which were only just and of some importance, he added alms as large as the civil list permitted, which was already burdened by grants made to the emigrants. To these aids, he added the decoration of the lily, which he bestowed at the rate of five or six hundred



at a time, relieved occasionally by some crosses of the Legion of Honour or Saint Louis. He quitted the people of these districts, leaving as the chief consolation of their sorrows the emotion caused by a prince's visit; and hope, which whether groundless, or well-founded, always cheers the human heart.

After this visit to the provinces, suffering from the effects of war, the Count d'Artois went from Troyes to Dijon. Dijon was an ancient parliamentary city, inhabited by an old *noblesse de robe*, formerly well educated, still very pretentious, and unwilling to recognise any other liberty than that of the privilege of *remonstrating*. The inhabitants of Dijon were consequently imbued with a bad spirit, and encouraged in these dangerous sentiments by a prefect who shared in them. They treated the bishop, who owed his elevation to the Concordat, very badly, and accused him of favouring the priests who had taken the civil oath, because he had taken it himself. These people declared openly and with great self-sufficiency, that they could have arranged matters much better than Louis XVIII. had done; they pronounced the Charter to be a detestable production, but said that there was still time to repair the faults committed, by acting differently when the opportunity presented itself. Thus, whilst in Champagne, there prevailed a certain degree of calm, disturbed solely by the sufferings resulting from war, in Burgundy, on the contrary, the public mind was extremely agitated, one portion of the inhabitants ardently desiring a return of the ancient form of things, a feeling that excited in the minds of the others, a profound alarm. Monsieur, as might be expected, was received with transport by the royalists, in whose sentiments it was well known he shared; and with his usual facility of temper, he did not question anything they told him, believed all he heard, and recommended patience. As to the manifestation which ought to have been the most significant, he did not fail to render it the most vexatious; for he refused to receive the bishop, a circumstance that made a profound impression in the district, and tended to increase rapidly the dissensions that were already beginning to disturb the clergy.

Monsieur found affairs in a bad position at Dijon: he left them in a worse state, and repaired to Lyons. This great city, at that time the most important in the kingdom, next to Paris, did not present a less troubled aspect than the others. On one side was a host of ancient royalists, filled with recollections of the siege of 1793; detesting the Revolution and its results, and now united in a state of high enthusiasm under their former chief, M. de Pr  cy. On the other side was the rich class of merchants and manufacturers, too young to remember anything of 1793, but sensitively alive to the memory of all

Napoleon had done to repair the misfortunes of their city, and above all to protect their trade, which during his reign had increased prodigiously. The maritime war, that had ruined Nantes, Bordeaux, and Marseilles, had, on the contrary, enriched Lyons. This city, situate on the Saône and the Rhone, at the conflux of all the fluvial communications with Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Spain, had become the centre of a most active and extensive trade. The possession of Italy and the faculty of procuring thence raw silks at a low price, the facility of transporting rich stuffs to all parts of the Continent, together with large orders from the Imperial palace, were advantages that Lyons had fully appreciated, but which had visibly diminished since the opening of the seas; for the fluvial navigation lost what the maritime had gained, and the English having as much power in Italy as the Austrians, raised the price of raw silk by purchasing for their own consumption. If we add to these annoyances the exactions committed by the Austrians, and for which the Bourbons were unjustly blamed, we may comprehend the divers motives that rendered cold, if not hostile, to the royal cause the Lyonnaise merchants, as well as many of the richest and most influential persons of the country. The people, imitating these dissensions, were also divided. A small but enthusiastic number had joined the royalists; the remainder adhered to the opposite party. The royalists held their meetings in a café, since become remarkable by the violence of the speeches uttered there; and thence they sometimes issued in search of their adversaries, intending to provoke them to quarrel; but the latter, though far more numerous, were timid. The mayor, a quiet honourable-minded man, a royalist by birth and connection, allowed himself to be carried away by the current of Lyonnaise passion, and quarrelled with the prefect, M. Bondy, who endeavoured in vain to allay the disorder. The prefect, though actuated by the best motives, was left to struggle alone between the extreme parties, for neither M. de Précý, head of the National Guard, nor the Marshal Augereau, who commanded the troops, afforded him any assistance. The latter was despised by the troops and the bulk of the population for not having defended Lyons against the Austrians; he was also despised on account of his famous proclamation, and consequently possessed no influence, and could not unite the local authorities in a common line of conduct, at once firm and conciliatory.

It was into this blazing furnace that the Count d'Artois came to throw fresh fuel. His arrival excited violent commotion. The *precursor of legitimacy*, as he was at that time called, the brother of the king, and in the opinion of the extreme royalists, the real king, ought naturally to be received

with enthusiasm. M. de Précy, commander of the National Guard, and M. d'Albon, the mayor, accompanied by the most enthusiastic of the population, received him at the gates of Lyons, and in his presence took an oath, in the name of all the inhabitants, to remain ever faithful to the Bourbons. The by-standers confirmed by their acclamations this pledge, which was taken in all sincerity. The prince was afterwards conducted through the city, and the municipal authorities, pausing in the most public places, renewed on their knees the oath never to acknowledge any other dynasty than the Bourbon. It was after this fashion that the prince was conducted to the palace, where he was to take up his abode. During the following days he visited the public establishments, and inspected several manufactories, whose owners were very much flattered by this distinction, and became for the moment good royalists. He was next shown traces of the siege, of which Napoleon had not allowed a great number to remain; and, lastly, there were presented to him all that remained in the city of those that had assisted at that memorable siege, those who had been wounded, or had suffered in any way on that occasion. They were introduced by M. de Précy, than whom none could be found better fitted for the office. The prince embraced these brave men with his accustomed cordiality, gave the cross of St. Louis to several, and afterwards laid the first stone of a monument intended to perpetuate the memory of the resistance made by Lyons to the National Convention in 1793. No government had ever made more promises to forget than did the restored Bourbons, and no government had ever shown a more retentive memory! Monsieur was made to please, those especially who were of his own opinion; and after having passed some days at Lyons, he won the hearts of all his own party, and enkindled passions which it would have been wiser to extinguish. He had not been unfriendly either to the prefect or Marshal Augereau, for he was incapable of offending anybody; but he had not strengthened their position. But he had, on the contrary, poured forth his feelings to the mayor, to M. de Précy, and some of their friends; telling them all that, without doubt, many concessions had been made to the revolutionary party, but that it was better to be patient; that the king would in time repair all that was reparable, but that for the moment prudence should be observed, in order not to furnish pretexts to their adversaries. The prince was himself so imprudent, that the prefects of the environs having come to Lyons to visit him, he said to one, who had served under the Empire and was noble by birth, "Well, my dear prefect, what do you think with regard to the national property? Do you think it could be restored to the ancient proprietors?" The



prefect replied, that if the government wished to excite an immediate and violent revolution, nothing would effect that object more certainly than making such thoughts public. The prince, perceiving that he had ill chosen his confidant, hastened to retract his opinion, and explain what he had said as best he could. We may divine the tone of his conversation with his own adherents.

The Count d'Artois left the city of Lyons in a state of violent excitement, and the inhabitants more at variance than ever. At Valence, he permitted a manifestation of feeling that produced a very bad impression. He was invited to a public dinner, that was served on several tables, in order to accommodate the numerous guests, amongst whom were the members of the council of the department. One of these, a rich and influential man, was son of a citizen who in former times had had the weakness to sign one of the numerous addresses presented to the Convention after the death of Louis XVI. Local malevolence had taken the trouble to recall this circumstance, and communicate it to the retinue of Monsieur. Some of the officers who accompanied the prince were seated at the table where the obnoxious member was to dine; they rose when he made his appearance, and retired with an affectation of disgust. This circumstance gave occasion to some sharp observations, and was, within a few hours, talked of throughout the district.

The prince traversed Avignon, where he pursued the same line of conduct, and finally arrived at Marseilles, where he was expected with extreme impatience.

This great city, formerly the queen of the Mediterranean, and which has again become so, though by means very different to what she then contemplated, had many reasons to hate both the Revolution and the Empire, for through them she had not only ceased to be prosperous, but had been reduced to beggary. During five-and-twenty years she had seen more than three hundred merchant vessels fast anchored at her quays, and rotting there.\* From time to time, indeed, but very rarely, a vessel laden with corn or sugar entered the port, having by a miracle escaped the enemy. The English had seized several within the mouth of the harbour, and even

\* Born and brought up at Marseilles, this spectacle is still present to my eyes. I can fancy that I still see that vast number of motionless vessels, several lines deep, extending from what is called *la place de la Cannebière* to the foot of fort Saint Jean. A child at that time, I was often brought down to the quays, where I acquired the habit of remarking these vessels; I knew their names, and can still recall their forms, as one does the houses of a street one is accustomed to frequent, and I never saw a single vessel change place during the latter years of the Empire. Consequently, the fall of the Empire occasioned an outburst of joy at Marseilles, greater than I have ever witnessed at any time under any circumstances.

under the fire of the forts. This unfortunate city had fallen into fearful distress, and suffered so much, that the inhabitants would certainly have revolted, had not an energetic prefect, the Count Thibaudeau, restrained them with a hand of iron. The sole comfort afforded to their misery was, when from time to time they committed to the flames the English merchandize they had seized, and which was burned in one of the principal squares of the city, before the eyes of a starving people, who saw destroyed in a few hours wealth that would have relieved all their wants. Consequently, the day of Napoleon's downfall and the return of the Bourbons, was one of frantic joy; of a joy of which no description could give an idea. But joy is transient, for it frequently consists in picturing to ourselves unattainable happiness. And Marseilles soon witnessed the loss of the Mauritius, with which her merchants had kept up an extensive commerce. The Marseillaise conceived so great a hatred against the English, that they could scarcely endure to see them enter their harbour. The Marseillaise merchants found the colonies restored to us stocked with European, and wholly destitute of colonial produce; all the commercial relations were changed. Spain was in disorder—the Mediterranean was in the hands of the English and the Greeks—the harbour of Marseilles, formerly a free port, was now beset with imperial custom-houses; and, lastly, the *droits réunis*, to which they imputed a great part of their sufferings, were maintained and confirmed. Consequently, the joy of the Marseillaise cooled down rapidly, and they sought with bitterness the cause of their delusion. Marseilles was not aware that a vast manufactural industry would soon be developed around her walls, that a new empire acquired by France—Algeria—and a general *renaissance* of the Mediterranean countries, would render her the queen of the southern seas, and richer in her regal power than she had ever been; but, like many others, she sought for her lost crown in the past instead of the future. She fancied that her former prosperity resulted from her being a *free port*, a freedom that consisted in receiving without inspection, and without payment of duty, the merchandize of the entire world, which was exempt from dues within two leagues of the walls of Marseilles; as if removing a line of custom-houses to a distance of two miles could alter the fate of a city, or restore commercial relations once lost. A mart may facilitate commercial relations, but cannot create them. Hamburg, one of the most important trading cities in the world, owes its greatness not to being a free port, but to the Elbe, which renders it the thoroughfare of German commerce with the rest of the world. But Marseilles, poor emigrant, rendered frantic by thinking over the

past, longed to become again what she called a *free port*, and fancied that under these conditions, the restoration of the Bourbons would be for her the greatest of benefits, a benefit such as she had pictured in her fondest dreams.

The visit of Monsieur revived the former illusions of the Marseillaise. They received him with transport, and entertained him with discourses more extravagant than any he had heard during his journey. They said they had wished to see amongst them the king, the true king, the independent king, emancipated from every restraint, in a position to secure the welfare of his subjects, unfettered by the shackles with which revolutionists sought to fetter him. This was saying, in other words, that they wished to see the prince removed from the influence of any sensible people who might raise an objection against making Marseilles a free port. In addition to all this, the prince heard vehement declamations against the *droits réunis*, but he conducted himself at Marseille as he had done elsewhere. He told the Marseillaise that he was of their opinion; that they were certainly right; that he believed he could promise them speedy satisfaction, but that it was necessary to have a little patience, and give the king time to accomplish the contemplated good. The people were so happy to look upon him, to press his hands, that they seriously believed all he said, and under this impression prepared him magnificent fêtes. On such occasions, every city puts forth its best. Marseilles displayed her fine haven, which was far from being then what it has since become, and which on this occasion was made the scene of brilliant aquatic exercises. At the close of one of those days of amusement, as the shadows of night were closing in, a mountain that overlooks the harbour suddenly burst into flames, presenting the appearance of a volcano. This effect was produced by the use of a thousand casks, filled with inflammable materials. The mayor told the Count d'Artois that the picture presented to his eyes was only a feeble image of the ardent sentiments of the Marseillaise. After this exhibition, the prince was conducted to the principal theatre of the city. Here a scene occurred, in which the public joy bordered on delirium. Monsieur had written to the king, asking the freedom of the port. This request was strongly opposed in the royal council, but the king wrote to his brother that he hoped soon to obtain it by forcing the will of his ministers. The prince, regarding as done what was only promised, announced in the open theatre the freedom of the port as a *fait accompli*, whereupon the mayor, falling on his knees, kissed the prince's hand in the name of the entire population of Marseilles. The audience rose from their seats eight or ten times, uttering cries of joy and gratitude.



After having passed some days amongst people that were nearly wild with joy, the prince repeated to the Marseillaise what he had already said to Lyonnaise, to the Burgundians, and to the Champenaise—that the days passed with them had been the happiest of his life. He left Marseilles and went to Toulon; then, retracing his steps, he visited Nîmes, where he might have done a great deal of good by restraining the Catholics and giving confidence to the Protestants, neither of which he did. He journeyed on to Grenoble, where he was warmly received by the royalist party, small in number, but fervent in feeling, and at length reached Franche-Comté.

The state of parties at Besançon was such as required the most prudent and steady conduct. A haughty nobility, entertaining the strongest prejudices, and the prefect of the department one of the local nobility, who excited instead of restraining the violence of party feeling, all of which circumstances had strongly indisposed the mass of the population. One fact in particular aggravated this state of things. The Archbishop Lecoz was located at Besançon. This prelate, of whom we have already spoken, was an old constitutionalist, a very worthy but obstinate man. He had afforded protection to the priests, who had taken the civil oath; but in other matters, his nomination had not occasioned any regret either to the spiritual or temporal authorities. On the downfall of the Empire and the accession of the Bourbons, the “little church” had poured forth its anger on the archbishop, the nobility had joined their voices to the outcry, the prefect had added fuel to the fire, and the result was a species of religious war, which, however, went no further than evil speeches, the combatants never proceeding to the use of arms. The prefect and his partizans announced openly that the prince, in passing through Besançon, would not receive the archbishop; to which the archbishop, with his accustomed obstinacy, replied, that he would not fail to appear at the levée of the Count d’Artois. Piqued by such boldness, the prefect declared, that if the archbishop kept his word he would keep his, and have him arrested. Such were the remarks publicly exchanged at Besançon between the civil and religious authorities, and as no secret was made of these quarrels, all the inhabitants of the district heard and repeated these insulting speeches.

Monsieur might, on this occasion, have done what would have been both wise and salutary. He might, by his conduct, have contradicted the remarks of an imprudent prefect, by entering into at least official relations with the prelate; relations which were supposed to exist until the revocation of the Concordat, and which were besides an inevitable consequence of the letter written by the Abbé Montesquiou to the Bishop of

Rochelle. Unhappily, it could not be expected that Monsieur would adopt such a line of conduct. Having arrived at Besangon, where he was greeted by the warmest demonstrations on the part of the ultra-royalists, he would not go to the cathedral for fear of meeting the archbishop there; and fearing that the prelate might visit him, he caused it to be intimated that he would not receive him. The prefect had orders to transmit this communication, which he was only too willing to do. The bishop, as obstinate as his adversaries were imprudent, asked the prefect to put his communication in a written form, as he ought, in such a case, to assume all the responsibility of his acts. The prefect, quite as unreasonable as any of his party, wrote to the bishop; and not content with this exaggerated mode of proceeding, he completed the scandal by making the chief of the gendarmerie bearer of the document. This brave officer, who participated in the upright sentiments of his corps, whose members have at all times admirably discharged their duties, went to the archbishop, expressed his regret at what had occurred, and entreated him not to leave the episcopal palace during the prince's stay at Besangon, giving him at the same time to understand that he was empowered to enforce this advice. The prelate submitted for once, and remained within doors; but he wrote immediately to Paris, determined to denounce such scandalous proceedings to the two Chambers. The effect produced in the surrounding district was immense. The clergy presented the appearance of two opposing forces, behind whom the people ranged themselves; but the numbers of the latter were unequally divided, the greater portion taking part against the nobility and those of the clergy who had excited these stormy proceedings.

Monsieur, continually fêted by his partizans, proceeded on his way towards Paris, having by his graceful manners won the affection of those whom he had not offended by some act of imprudence; having lavished the Cross of the Lilly by thousands, and those of the Legion of Honour and Saint Louis by hundreds. He left the districts through which he passed more disturbed than he had found them, nor had he, like the Duke d'Angoulême, given any good advice along his route. Monsieur arrived at Paris about the end of October.

Meanwhile his second son, the Duke de Berry, had performed an exclusively military journey along the frontiers. He had visited Maubeuge, Givet, Metz, Nancy, Strasbourg, Colmar, Huningue, Belfort, and returned to Paris by Langres. He had given his entire attention to inspecting the troops, and putting them through their exercises. He gave them standards, distributed crosses amongst them, and neither found nor left them satisfied. This prince, who was short of

stature, endeavoured to imitate Napoleon in his bearing, and succeeded in gaining some degree of favour with the army during the first days of the Restoration. But whether attributable to the difficulty of winning the affections of the malecontent soldiers, or to the faults of the government, or to the prince's own faults, his success with the army was very short-lived. Instead of becoming more lavish of his attentions, in order to soothe those adverse spirits, he became angry when he encountered opposition, and especially during his last tour, he abandoned himself to outbursts of passion, which the tongues of the malevolent retailed, exaggerated and talked of in every direction, and which produced consequences as injurious as the acts of political and religious imprudence committed by his father.

The princes had not effected by their presence in the districts through which they passed, all the good they hoped, though they had been received in the different cities with great enthusiasm. To render their journeys really useful, there should have existed in France a government determined in its views, immovable in its resolutions, and animated by the spirit of the Chambers, a spirit at once liberal and moderate; and in addition to this, the princes should have declared on all occasions to their friends, a truth, of which the latter seemed wholly ignorant, which was, that the Charter was a solemn act, whose entire consequences they were resolved to abide by. With such a government at Paris, and princes acting as its organs in the provinces, the exaggerated feelings of friends might have been calmed down, and the alienated affections of the people won back; and with the people thus gained over, the army might have been restrained, whose discontent would not have been, under such circumstances, a hopeless evil. But such a government, as we have shown, did not exist in France. There was a moderate-minded but careless king, who certainly did not restrain the actions of his ministers; but neither did he restrain his brothers and nephews in the commission of errors. There were princes totally divergent in their modes of conduct. One—the Duke d'Angoulême—sensible, but not brilliant; another—the Count d'Artois—amiable, but possessed by a spirit of interference, and never interfering in a profitable manner; a third—the Duke de Berry—rather intellectual, rather military in his tastes, but inconsistent in his conduct, alternately flattering or offending the army, not knowing how to respect the feelings of the soldiers, nor to make himself respected by them. There were ministers without a leader, without system; alternately bold or timid in their conduct towards the Chambers, with the exception of one. This combination was not a government: it

was a party in power; and a party in power is a naughty child, wielding a thunderbolt.

The position of affairs had deteriorated considerably during the months of September and October, the months dedicated to the journeys of the princes. Various measures, the necessary consequence of the course public affairs had taken, had been very badly received, and met so determined a resistance in the Chambers, that they were of necessity withdrawn. For example, the War Minister, embarrassed by the unexpected expenses imposed on him, had endeavoured to economise as much as he could, and made an effort to save two millions out of the sum allotted for the support of the *Invalides*. Our protracted wars had greatly multiplied the number of wounded and indigent soldiers; and branch establishments had been erected for them at Arras and Avignon. The minister intended to lighten his expenses by giving those pensioners who, since the alteration in the frontiers, could no longer be considered Frenchmen, a small sum of money; and by sending to their homes a portion of those who were French, allowing them an annual pension of 250 francs. He fancied that this pension would be sufficient to support them in their villages, whilst that at Paris, in the *Hotel Royal des Invalides*, the support of one man cost 700 francs. Of the saving thus effected there could be no doubt, but the measure appeared very harsh; for 250 francs would be far from sufficient for men, who for the most part possessed no family ties; and it was said that soldiers wounded in the service of their country were expelled from their asylum, whilst money and promotion were lavished on men who had fought against France. And in fact, a commission had been appointed to pay the army of Condé, and distribute aid amongst the old Vendéan soldiers. Another measure, as ill-advised as that touching the pensioners, excited an equally great degree of discontent.

It became necessary to make an inquiry into the state of the funds appropriated to the maintenance of the Legion of Honour. The endowment had been converted into funded property, and was not sufficient to meet the expenses of the nominations made by Napoleon on account of the last war. It had been determined that no pensions should be attached to the appointments made since the last war, until the resources of the institution would warrant the expense. But it was necessary to furnish funds for the establishments appropriated to the education of the daughters of poor soldiers. The establishments of Saint-Denis and Ecouen were to be supported as well as several secondary institutions, of which two were known as *Des Barbeaux* and *des Loges*. These houses were filled with young girls, the greater number of whom had become orphans

in consequence of our long wars. It was proposed to suppress three of these institutions—those of Ecouen, *des Barbeaux*, and *des Loges*, and to treat the young girls thus expelled from their asylum in the same manner as the wounded soldiers, by giving them a pension of 250 francs each. There was a circumstance that tended to complicate the question still more. The chateau of Ecouen belonged to the princes of Condé. It was therefore natural to believe that in order to restore the chateau to its former masters, a number of young orphan girls were about to be thrown into the streets, whose fathers had fallen in the service of France. When this intelligence became bruited about the military, already discontented, became still more so, and the public caught up the same feeling of sympathy for these poor children, who could not live on 250 francs, and of whom some had neither father nor mother. The marshals took up the cause, and Marshal Macdonald remonstrated in the Chamber of Peers, of which he was a member, and even pleaded with the king, to whose presence he had access.

Lastly, an unfortunate project of the war minister with regard to the military schools completed this combination of ill-concerted measures. The minister wished to combine into one, the three military schools of Saint Cyr, Saint Germain, and la Flèche, to give them, as he said, more unity, and to allow the nobility of the kingdom to enjoy the advantages secured to them by the edict of January, 1751. A royal ordinance was accordingly issued decreeing the fusion of the three schools into one—that of Saint Cyr. The general tone of the ordinance seemed to imply an intention of excluding the citizens from the military schools in order to fill them exclusively with the nobility, by whom the profession of arms would, consequently, be alone exercised, as was formerly the case.

To describe the effect produced by these different measures would be indeed difficult. Though the opinions uttered by a discontented public, and the journals that acted as their interpreters, were of course exaggerated, still it was evident that in order to meet unreasonable expenses, such as the re-establishment of the king's household troops, or the pensions of emigrant officers, the misery of the army was increased; and it was no less evident that the project of introducing the ancient order of things was entertained, by which the nobility should enjoy all the high military grades. Remonstrances rose from every side. The importance of the right to petition is little felt in ordinary times, when there are no serious wrongs to be redressed, but if ever its utility was recognised it was on the present occasion. Numerous petitions were addressed to both Chambers. The Chamber of Deputies wished to hear the report immediately, and spite of the opposition of a minority de-

voted to the emigrants, and spite of the imprudence of another minority devoted to the opposite party, the Chamber of Deputies condemned the proceedings of the government by presenting the petitions in question, accompanied by a request couched in mild but positive terms, that the obnoxious acts should be revoked. The government was, consequently, obliged to undo its work. It was publicly declared that the allusion to the edict of 1751 did not imply a preference for the nobility in the admission to the military schools. It was decided that the branch establishments of the *Invalides* should be supported until the demise of the soldiers who occupied them; that none should be sent home with pensions except at their own express wish; that the same rules should be observed with regard to the female orphans of the Legion of Honour; and that the houses of *des Barbeaux* and *des Loges* should be re-opened for those young girls who either would not or could not return to their families.

The Chambers, though moderate in tone and sincerely loyal, were always prompt to check an undue assumption of power on the part of the Crown, and it would have been desirable that offended partizans had confided in the Chambers, instead of seeking satisfaction and security elsewhere. But irritated passions look for more than justice—they seek for vengeance, and are not scrupulous in the employment of means. The half-pay officers who thronged the capital, some frequenting the salons of Paris, and others the public places, held language which every day became more violent and more irritating. Their audacity provoked the government, and brought down upon themselves inevitable punishment; and provocation followed provocation until the result was a kind of open war, which, beginning in angry words, might unfortunately terminate in violent acts.

Murat had, up to this time, thanks to his defection, remained king of Naples. But his presence on the throne of Lower Italy disturbed not alone the Italians, but the Spanish and French Bourbons, who demanded his deposition at the Congress of Vienna. The rival police, one belonging to the government, the other to the Count d'Artois, indulged in all kinds of suspicions and inventions, and fancied that the agitation of the public mind resulted, not from the faults of the government, but from the action of hostile parties. Excited by the reports of these two police forces, the government sought elsewhere than in itself the cause of the evil, and fancied that Murat and Napoleon, who had been recently reconciled, and possessed considerable riches, made use of these to keep alive the hostile spirit of the military and unemployed functionaries.

Lord Oxford, a fantastic Englishman, of whom there are many such, had conceived an intense admiration for Bona-



parte, a sentiment so contrary to the general feeling of his compatriots. He passed through Paris on his way to Italy, and was believed to be the bearer of a secret correspondence between Naples, the isle of Elba, and the discontented French military. The French Government had a communication with the English embassy; Lord Oxford was arrested, not with the intention of depriving him of his liberty, but for the purpose of taking away his papers. The examination of these papers caused a degree of surprise which the members of the government would not have experienced were they endowed with more self-possession. The most culpable document amongst these papers, was one written by General Exelmans, and the guilty secret it contained amounted to very little, as we shall soon see. General Exelmans having heard that one of the allied armies was to be sent against Murat, wrote to this prince, under whom he had long served, and who had loaded him benefits, saying that there were many officers as well as himself, who would offer him their swords were the throne of Naples in danger. But there was not a word relative to the Bourbons of France, or to any project against their government.

This letter, though it did not contain a tittle of what had been suspected, irritated the king and princes exceedingly. They wished to avenge on General Exelmans all the imaginary conspiracies of which they had no proof, but in whose existence they persevered in believing. It was resolved to arraign him on a criminal charge of having kept up a correspondence with the external enemies of the state, a crime aggravated by the fact of his being an officer on active service. General Dupont, the war minister, though often weak, resisted on this occasion in the most prudent and honourable manner. He observed that the king of Naples had been hitherto recognized by all Europe; that France, though soliciting his deposition at Vienna, had not yet declared open war against him; that French subjects could consequently, without incurring the imputation of criminality, offer him their services; that no tribunal would think of attaching criminality to General Exelmans' letter; that the general being on service, and consequently aware of the sentiments entertained by the court of France towards the court of Naples, might be accused of indiscretion and want of zeal, and thereby subject himself to be reprimanded, but nothing more. Though the king was quite as much irritated as the princes against General Exelmans, he comprehended the reasons adduced by the war minister, and admitted that a reprimand was the severest punishment that ought to be inflicted. The war minister sent for General Exelmans and reproved him for his conduct, and for the

moment, this affair, destined at a later period to excite a terrible commotion, was suppressed, thanks to the wisdom displayed by General Dupont on the occasion.

The young officers who thronged Paris, and disturbed it by their remarks, quickly learned what had befallen General Exelmans, and though he had only suffered a slight punishment, they made a great noise about the matter. These gentlemen were soon furnished with another grievance of the same nature. General Vandamme was an officer of great merit, but of violent temper; he held extreme revolutionary principles, calculated, if not to justify, at least to provoke calumny, and was wrongfully reputed a most wicked man. He shared with Marshal Davout the hatred of the enemies of France. Returning from a Russian imprisonment, he had been shamefully insulted in passing through Germany, and this incident ought to have excited a universal interest in his favour throughout France. But the effect was quite different, and the king was advised, should General Vandamme appear at the Tuileries, to make him an exception to the flatteries lavished on the heads of the army. No sooner had the General arrived at Paris, than he repaired to the Tuileries on the day appointed for the reception of officers of his rank. He was refused admission to the palace, and the body-guards expelled him, so to speak, from the royal dwelling. This old soldier, who had passed his life fighting for his country, became indignant at receiving such treatment from young men who had never heard a musket fired; he filled Paris with his complaints, and found many-tongued echoes of his grievances.

Whilst one of the oldest soldiers of France was treated in this manner, a report was suddenly put into circulation that the family of Georges Cadoudal had received a patent of nobility. Nobody could deny the courage of Georges, nor his devotedness; but neither could anybody approve the means he had determined to employ against the First Consul, and which he had acknowledged before the bar of justice. We need not say what bitter thoughts and violent expressions such a circumstance was calculated to excite.

Whilst young unemployed officers hurried restlessly from one part of Paris to another, there was one who lived quietly and in solitude. This was Carnot, who after the defence of Antwerp, had retained the post of inspector of engineers, and was even presented to the king, but shunning the court and the revolutionists, he retired into one of the most remote quarters of Paris. He cared little about the insults to which the military were subjected, as he regarded them for the most part as giddy-headed men, but he was deeply moved at the manner in which the government treated the ancient patriots,

whilst Chouan chiefs were raised to the rank of nobles. Carnot was a man of vigorous mind, but not a correct reasoner; he was a proud honest man, led astray by the passions, and above all, by the logic of the Revolution; he was convinced that he exercised a legal authority, and was perfectly right in condemning Louis XVI. to death. Influenced by this belief, he came to the strange resolution of discussing the question of regicide, and discussing it in a memoir addressed to the king himself. He had not made up his mind as to the use he should make of this memoir, but writing it was a consolation to his feelings. In this memoir which was written with great vigour, bitterness, and irony, but which contained no insult against the royal authority, he discussed this fearful question of regicide, reproducing those arguments that prevailed in the days of the Convention.

Are kings inviolable? "This," he said, "is a serious question, decided in different ways at all times, in every country, and even in the Bible. In any case, this inviolability admitted many exceptions, for it could not be asserted that monsters like Nero and Caligula should be inviolable in the eyes of their people. Besides, the French nation, in nominating the Convention, had invested its members with a mission to judge Louis XVI. Had they judged well or ill? History would decide that question, but in any case, his judges were not called on to give an account to any earthly authority. They might have been mistaken, but they erred in good faith, and upon all occasions they had given proofs of an intrepid patriotism. Now, they were attacked, and called criminals, but in whose name? by what right? France had by numberless addresses confirmed the judgment they pronounced, and raised the judges of Louis XVI. to the highest offices of the state: should France be called a regicide, or the accomplice of regicides? But this was not all. Europe had lowered her uplifted sword before these men, and signed with them treaties such as that of Bâle. Should Europe, too, be designated a regicide? In short, who were these accusers, who now returned from foreign lands to insult those amongst their countrymen—who during five-and-twenty years had fought for France and for liberty? It was these very emigrants who, instead of making a rampart of their bodies for Louis XVI., had taken flight under pretext of making war on the Rhine; and who, in addition to the crime of bearing arms against their country, had committed the enormous error of exciting against Louis XVI. a storm of anger that entailed the destruction of the unfortunate king."

Such was the terrible logic of the old Conventionalist, from which only one conclusion could be drawn, which was, that

in these formidable times, whose events bore down the strongest minds, everybody had erred, and the wisest mode would have been to shelter everybody under the oblivion promised by the Charter. Unfortunately, the act of oblivion promised by one party, and asked by the other, was not in reality conformable to the wishes of either.

It appears probable that Carnot had not intended to print the memoir we have just analyzed; but, blinded by revolutionary prejudices, he believed he could get it presented to the king, and so discuss the question of regicide *tête-à-tête* with the brother of Louis XVI. Though living so retired, he frequented the society of certain regicides, such as MM. Gard, Fouché, and some others, and to these he showed his memoir, impelled by the necessity of giving vent to his feelings. To give it to be read was to run the risk of soon seeing it printed; and in any case, if he desired a prudent counselor, it was not such a man as M. Fouché whom he ought to have taken into his confidence. The memoir was scarcely shown to a few persons when it was copied, printed, and within a few days circulated as widely as M. Necker's famous financial report had been. It was printed by thousands, both in France and abroad. In fact, it chimed in with the prevailing passions of the hour, with the irritation of the revolutionists, who still formed a numerous party, and was equally gratifying to the holders of national property, who were still more numerous than the revolutionists; it accorded with the discontent of the military and the unemployed functionaries; it even pleased the liberal party, who certainly did not approve regicide, but who looked upon this memoir as a deserved retaliation for all the acts of indiscretion committed by the emigrants. Lastly, the emigrants themselves, in their anger, were eager to read a memoir universally talked of. All this was sufficient to render Carnot's memoir, within a few days, known—not alone throughout France, but throughout Europe.

As might be expected, this memoir produced a wonderful sensation amongst the emigrant party. This party replied, and the reply, as to justice and moderation of sentiment, was no ways inferior to the attack. Carnot was told that there were men, who if they possessed a gleam of common sense, would think themselves happy in being allowed to enjoy the impunity in which unprecedented goodness was willing to allow them to exist; that they ought to be satisfied, and seek an asylum in the most profound obscurity, and by such conduct win for themselves, if not indulgence, which would be impossible for such a crime as theirs, at least forgetfulness, which would be accorded them, on condition that they did not

continually recall their existence to the execration of contemporaries, and that to their abominable crimes they did not add apologies still more abominable—that, as to the rest, their writings corresponded with their acts. The authors of the reply added, that amongst these men there was one whom they had had the weakness to set apart from his fellows, in giving him credit for some honesty and good sense, but that the puerility of his reasoning equalled its wickedness; that the authors of the 24th January were decidedly superior to the present writers; but that, in short, these men ought only to think of avoiding the observation of the indignant world, and make up their minds, after having shed the blood of the fathers, to respect the repose of the sons.

But invectives were not the only reply. The government commenced a prosecution against Carnot's memoir. The author was summoned, and he proudly avowed what he had written, adding that he was not accessory to the publication, and his word was believed, for his adversaries esteemed his character more than they cared to acknowledge. Inquiries were made of several booksellers suspected of issuing clandestine publications, for the purpose of ascertaining what part they might have had in propagating the memoir in question. They were all brought up for examination—a circumstance which contributed not a little to increase the public agitation. The voters who assembled at the house of Fouché and Barras were very much excited, and made fresh advances towards the military, that is to say, towards the Bonapartists, who seemed every day more inclined to join them. Incidents soon multiplied, as if destiny had decreed that every person and every circumstance should in some way tend to hasten the approaching crisis.

It was with considerable reluctance, as we have seen, that the emigrants submitted to the article of the Charter that guaranteed the inviolability of the national sales. They never ceased complaining, and said that the Bourbons, having recovered the crown, believed they had recovered everything, and allowed those who had made great sacrifices for their cause to remain in distress. Private negotiations, from which much had been hoped, produced no great result, though supported by intimidation, violent sermons, and even the power of the confessional. The new proprietors expected to be paid if they gave back the property they held, and very few amongst them, particularly the peasants, would consent to give up possession, even on condition of receiving a reasonable price. Wishing to know what right they really possessed, they made inquiries, and found that the Charter and the Chambers would afford them all-powerful protection. Consequently,



all those that the clergy had not won over by disturbing their consciences, firmly upheld their rights, and would not listen to any compromise. The government, conscious of its weakness in this matter, but willing to give some satisfaction to the men who complained that the Restoration had been of no advantage to them, resolved to restore the unsold national property. The amount of this kind of property held by the State was very considerable, and consisted for the most part of timber. It comprised three or four hundred thousand hectares of forest land of great value. The Charter did not protect this property: it only protected the property already sold. There was one circumstance connected with this projected restitution of property, which rendered it particularly agreeable to the king and the princes, which was, that the property in question belonged for the most part to the old nobility, to families with whom they were personally acquainted, and with whom they were in daily intercourse; and to satisfy the wishes of these persons would be to silence the most troublesome grumblers. The restitution of this property was therefore determined on: it only remained to consider the arrangements.

Had this restitution been dictated by an unbiassed spirit of justice, it would have been carried out in a manner very different to what was designed. The high nobility were certainly not the most to be pitied, for they had by their imprudence contributed to aggravate the violence of the Revolution. It was the numerous emigrants of the lesser nobility and the *bourgeoisie*, who, involved almost without being aware of it in the common disaster, had paid the price of our dissensions sometimes with their lives, and almost always with their property. These certainly deserved consideration; but the government ought to have relieved them without disturbing the public tranquillity, and without committing, for the advantage of these persons, acts of injustice as great as those from which they suffered, and the assistance thus afforded ought to have been distributed so as to aid those that deserved most pity and least blame. The principle might have been laid down, and put into immediate operation, that an indemnity was to be granted by the State, not to a few individuals, but to all who had lost their property; and that this indemnity was to be furnished in a great part by the State property. This indemnity might have been so distributed that the poorest should be best treated; and with this might have been combined a financial operation, based on the three or four hundred thousand hectares of timber still in the possession of the State, and to which, when the state of the exchequer permitted, two or three hundred millions of francs might have been added.



By this means might have been accomplished a work, not alone of reparation, but of pacification. The ancient proprietors being indemnified, if not to the full extent of their wishes, at least as far as possible, would have been deprived of all pretext for quarrelling with the new holders, and the latter would have been left in peaceable possession. But no such idea was conceived.\* The princes thought only of satisfying the ancient nobility, whose misfortunes had certainly the fewest claims on compassion, and who were the most importunate in their clamour. The crown held the landed property of these families, and the Bourbons thought only of restoring this property to satisfy and silence the owners, without reflecting that they were depriving themselves of a valuable pledge that might have served as basis to a general operation for alleviating the misfortunes of the entire mass of sufferers.

The bill on this subject was drawn up by a committee, of which M. Ferrand was president, and laid before the Council for discussion. The principle laid down was the unconditional restoration of the property that the State had not alienated. But this principle, apparently so simple, presented serious difficulties in the application. For example, certain parishes possessed a considerable quantity of this unsold property, which was applied to the use of the hospitals. The sinking fund also possessed a portion, which served as security to the annuitants. To take back the lands possessed by the parishes would be to strip the poor and the sick. To take back the lands held by the sinking fund, would be to injure public credit. Spite of their inclinations, the authors of the bill were obliged to abandon their project, and content themselves with holding out vague hopes to the proprietors of the unsold property. There was also property of this nature applied to certain public services, such as mansions converted into State offices, and works of art transferred to the different museums. For example, a portion of the Artillery Museum might be claimed by the Condé family, who, as was well known, would not be slow to assert its claims. Many serious inconveniences would have resulted from the restitution of this property; the idea was therefore abandoned, and it was decided that the State should retain this species of property, whether landed or personal, paying the value to the former proprietors. It was agreed that a certain sum should be added to the budget for this purpose. These difficulties being removed another arose, whose importance became apparent after a few moments' reflection. The clause of the bill regarded the arrears due to the treasury by the new holders of property, as being in reality due to the

\* The records that remain of the debates in Council, prove that this question was never even suggested.

ancient proprietors. The principle laid down that the State ought to restore, as ill got, the property in question, was only saying in other words that the unpaid portions of the purchase money were really owed to the so-called legitimate proprietors. But as the institution of the laws about national property had kept pace with the depreciation of the assignats, and were consequently very complicated, there was scarcely a holder of national property whose possessions might not give rise to quarrels about pretended arrears, which would serve to re-instate the former proprietors. In fact, the passing of this law would put them in a position to commence law proceedings against all the holders of national property. It would be arming them with a formidable weapon, that might triumph over the protecting power of the Charter.

The clause in question would have passed without objection, thanks to the inattention of the members of the Council, who were for the most part ignorant of business, if the sagacity and vigilance of the Minister of Finance had not raised an obstacle. He pointed out the bearing of the proposed measure, and the Council, alarmed, immediately abandoned it. M. Ferrand did not persist. The bill was then submitted to the two Chambers, with the proposed modifications.

Unfortunately, a statement of the motives that dictated the measure, and which were quite as important as the bill itself, had not been laid before the Council. Even the king had not read it. The whole business was confided to the principles and talent of M. Ferrand, who was a man advanced in life, mild-tempered, well informed, and a good writer; but he was obstinate, devoid of tact, and an ultra-royalist.

He had condensed his statement of motives into a sentiment, which was shared by the court, that the government, in restoring the unsold property of the emigrants, scarcely fulfilled its duty; that it was painful not to be able to do more, but that, in default of additional satisfaction, the government would give hopes of future compensation; in a word, that the government would do all that was possible at the time, and promise to do more at a future period.

M. Ferrand entered the Chamber of Deputies accompanied by MM. de Montesquiou and Louis, and read his statement in a low, drawling voice, which at first weakened the effect. In this statement, which was particularly addressed to the emigrants, the king apologised for not doing more for them, and for being so tardy in doing what he did. But on the morrow of a great revolution, obstacles spring up so rapidly, that it is difficult to return to the ways of justice and truth. It was only slowly and with precaution that good could be effected. "Undoubtedly," said M. Ferrand, "*the king will*

rejoice in the happiness of those to whom he is about to restore their property; and he stood in need of this satisfaction to mollify the regret he felt at not being able to make this act of justice as complete as he could wish. But he hoped that, thanks to the prudence of his administration, and thanks to the order observed in the public expenditure, the day would come when the state of the finances would diminish successively the painful exceptions necessitated by existing circumstances."

The intensity of this regret proved what violence the king did himself in adhering to the conditions of the Charter, and these vague but ill-defined promises, giving so much ground of hope to some, and consequently causing so much alarm to others, could not fail to produce a bad impression. One passage in this statement produced a sensation of a different kind, resulting from an offence offered to the entire nation. Endeavouring, with a flagrant want of tact, to estimate the moral merit of those who had emigrated and those who remained in France, M. Ferrand added, "It is universally acknowledged at present, that so many good and faithful Frenchmen, in leaving their country, only contemplated a short separation. Wandering in foreign lands, they wept over the calamities of the country which, they still flattered themselves, they should again behold. It is well known that the fondest prayers of the French who remained at home, as well as of those who emigrated, were for a happy change in the state of their country; even when they dared not hope for it. The result of these misfortunes and convulsions was, that both parties found themselves in the same position: both had arrived at the same point; *the one party in following the right line, without ever deviating from it, and the other after having followed more or less the phases of the Revolution, amid which they had remained.*"

These words, though pronounced in a voice little calculated to excite the passions, produced a strong emotion, an emotion which gradually increased until it assumed the magnitude of an event. It was, then, a recognised fact in the eyes of the king that the emigrants alone had followed *the right line*, and that all other Frenchmen had, more or less, abandoned this line. And so the entire nation, with the exception of twenty or thirty thousand individuals, had deviated from the right path! And so, all those who had lost their lives endeavouring to snatch France from the hands of furious demagogues, had deviated from the right path! And so Malherbes, who had not followed the princes, but who died for having defended the king; and Boissy d'Anglas, who had nobly held his place in presence of the bleeding head of Ferrand, had deviated from the right path! The king, Louis XVI. himself,



was excusable, only because he had failed in the journey to Varennes! And so, all those who, during twenty years, had so ably governed France; all those who had died, by hundreds of thousands, to save her from the power of foreigners, or to exalt her to the summit of glory, all those had deviated from the right path! Desaix, Kleber, Marceau, Lannes, were all wrong-headed men, who had deviated from the *right line*! It was only those men who, during five-and-twenty years had plotted or prayed incessantly that France might be at length conquered or invaded—it was these alone who had followed the right path!

These reflections arose at first confusedly before the minds of the hearers, but the next day they became more distinct, and the following day still clearer, until the strong impression produced on the first day in the assembly became stronger on the succeeding days, and continued to increase. This feeling was transmitted by the members of the assembly to the minds of the general public, and passed from Paris to the provinces. Propagated by a press that was scarcely restrained by the censorship, the sentiment soon became as vivid as universal. In addition to this, M. Ferrand's unfortunate expressions were maliciously applied to every possible circumstance. *The right line* became all at once a proverb: everybody was on the *right line* or the *curved line*—that is to say, those who had emigrated possessed real merit. There were different degrees of merit, but those who had not emigrated were barely excusable. Though malevolence strangely exaggerated the sense in which these words ought to be taken, and attributed to them a significance that M. Ferrand never contemplated, it was unfortunately true that they did represent the opinions of the king, the princes, and the emigrants. When in the royal Council, the conditions that should determine the pensions of the emigrant officers were laid down, the princes drew a line of demarcation between the emigrants themselves. It was not sufficient to have followed the king or served under Condé to be entitled to a reward, for if these emigrants had returned to France without the sanction of the princes, their claim became less, and their pensions diminished proportionately. It was not, therefore, the mass of the nation alone that was excluded from the great merit of having emigrated; there were amongst the emigrants themselves some who, fatigued with ten years' exile, and thinking that their native land, pacified by the First Consul, was still a country worthy of being loved and inhabited, it was these, too, who had deviated in some degree, a degree that was quite appreciable, and which the committee appointed to award pensions was expected to determine exactly.

The universal belief of the country at this period was that

the government was composed of emigrants imbued with all the principles of that party, and ready to put those principles into action if the opportunity served. This opinion, without being a definite condemnation of the government, was the foundation of much disaffection. But there were the Chambers, upon whom the people could depend to check the government, and if they could not inspire its members with patriotic sentiments, which was not in their power, they could at least oblige them to listen to such. The Chambers responded to the hopes placed in them, and did not betray their mission.

All the *bureau* of the Chamber received the proposed law as an act of justice, for even the liberal party wished to defend the principles but not the excesses of the Revolution. But in accepting the measure as an act of justice, they expressed strong indignation against the avowed motives, demanded that they should be suppressed, and a vote of censure passed upon the minister who had drawn up and presented the bill, and that a public protestation should be made against his anti-national language.

The members of the committee appointed to examine the projected law, were imbued with the sentiments of indignation expressed by the *bureaux*, and acted under the impulse of the moment. They passed the law, with some changes insignificant as to its operation, but very important as to its moral tendency. Thus, for the word *restitution*, *resignation* was substituted, which ignored all right on the part of the emigrants to the restored property. This property being held by the State was given up to the emigrants, in order to put an immediate termination to their distress. As to the property that had been applied to public services, such as to hospitals and the sinking fund, and of whose restitution the law made an exception *for the present*, the words *for the present*, which made the exception provisional, were suppressed, and by this means all promises with regard to the future were cancelled. The members of the committee requested the chairman to make his report the antithesis of the minister's statement of motives.

M. Bedoch, who was chairman, read his report in the Chamber on the 17th of October, and condemned severely all that M. Ferrand had said. He announced that he was appointed to re-establish public confidence, which had been shaken by the imprudent expressions of the minister, who had attributed to Louis XVI., personally, sentiments which the king of France ought neither to entertain nor express. The balance of good and evil in our vast revolution could not be nicely discriminated, for it would be necessary to examine the conduct of those who by a misplaced zeal had accelerated the misfortunes of the king,

and of France. And even, could such a task be accomplished, it ought not to be attempted. The king had promised to look on France as one large family, composed of his children, and he ought not to attempt to establish invidious distinctions, nor ought others to do so for him. The king's profound regret was spoken of, but the king ought to entertain no other sentiment than a firm determination to keep his promises, and amongst these promises none was more sacred than that which implied a respect for property, no matter from what source derived. As to the future, it was not possible to anticipate a time when the emigrants should be better treated than at the actual period, for it was to be hoped that the taxes would be always applied to the wants of the State.

The report, as may be seen, was firm and severe, and contained a direct lesson addressed to those higher placed than the minister. Though the members of the Chamber approved the report, they hesitated when the question of printing it was put. It had been printed in the ordinary way, like all reports, but discourses highly approved by the Chamber were favoured by an order for a special reprint. The Chamber dared not grant the latter distinction.

M. Ferrand, taking advantage of this hesitation, thought it afforded him a favourable opportunity of replying to the chairman, and for that purpose, making use of the most accredited of the royalist journals, he asserted that the Chamber interpreted his speech in the same sense as himself, which was evident from the fact that M. Bedoch's statement was refused the honour of being printed.

No sooner was this assertion put into circulation than a sudden revulsion of feeling took place in the Chamber of Deputies. A member of the committee made a speech, in which he reminded the house that the *bureaux* had demanded either the refutation or the suppression of the minister's discourse; that the members of the committee had, therefore, only obeyed the formal mandate of those by whom they had been nominated, and that the chairman had been their faithful organ. But, in consequence of the doubts now raised, it was necessary that the Chamber should pronounce a decided opinion, and declare whether the report in question had been approved by the members. The opinion of the Chamber was now unmistakably expressed by a large majority. The report and the speeches made on the subject were ordered to be printed. The discussion on the bill still continued. It was long and stormy, and occupied the latter part of the month of October. The debate called forth a display of angry feeling on both sides. A member of the *right* (the fashion had already commenced of designating the different parties by their relative positions in the



Chamber)—M. de la Rigaudie—in a vehement speech, interrupted every moment by murmurs of disapprobation, arraigned the entire Revolution, and excited such a commotion that the police forbid the journals to publish a full account of the proceedings. A reply was made to this speaker, and, fortunately, not in the exaggerated style he had employed. M. Durbach made a very reasonable proposition to the Chamber, which was, to take possession of all the unsold national property and make it the basis of a financial operation, by which an indemnification could be made, not to a privileged class of emigrants, but to all, and particularly to the poorest. This proposition was rejected, and the bill passed with the amendments proposed by the committee. An almost unanimous vote of censure was passed on M. Ferrand's speech.

The prosecutions carried on against the memory of Carnot, the different events relative to the *Invalides*, to the female orphans of the Legion of Honour, to the military schools, and to the generals Vandamme and Exelmans, the journeys of the princes, the conduct pursued with regard to the Archbishop of Besançon, the law about the surrender of the unsold national property, and the expressions of M. Ferrand about the *right line*, had rendered the months of October and November a period of great agitation. The species of tranquillity that had prevailed after the first legislative discussions, and especially after the vote on the budget, which was a measure stamped with wisdom, had given place to violent agitation, not less violent amongst the partizans of the emigration than of the Revolution. The latter comprised at this period not alone those revolutionists who had seriously compromised themselves, such as the *voters*, but also the functionaries of the Empire, the military, the moderate liberals, and a great number of the citizen-class, who were offended by the pretensions of the nobility and clergy. The public journals, though restrained by the censorship, reflected clearly the irritation of both parties. Paris presented a highly-animated spectacle. It was the beginning of the winter season, and many persons of importance had returned to the capital. The police kept a strict watch on them. These were MM. de Bassano, de Vicence, de Montalivet, de Cadore, de Rovigo, Lavalette, and others, who did not enter into conspiracies, but who lived amongst revolutionists, and who could not be sorry for the errors of a government that they regarded as adverse to them. The government would have been glad to expel them from Paris, but dared not. These gentlemen were so cautious that Prince Cambacérès, who enjoyed the society of his friends only at his own table, forebore to invite the military for fear of exciting suspicion.

There was one circumstance which much perplexed the

police, and though of no importance in reality, kept them in continual agitation. This was the presence of some of the marshals, who ought to have been in their departments, but who had come to Paris, one after another, by mere chance, and without any political motive. The names of Soult, Suchet, Oudinot, Massena, and Ney were mentioned. Marshal Soult had come to prefer a petition, and, as we shall presently see, the Bourbons had nothing to fear from him. Marshal Suchet, who had commanded the two armies in Spain, was at Paris only because these two armies had been disbanded. He was of a peaceful disposition, and generally looked upon as the man best fitted to become war minister. Marshal Massena having obtained his letters of naturalization, had set out for Provence, whither his duties called him. Marshal Oudinot had only remained some days at Paris. Marshal Ney took up a permanent abode in the capital. More flattered by the princes than any of his brother marshals, he had in the commencement seemed very much pleased, but had suddenly become discontent. Having flattered himself that, by the intervention of Louis XVIII., and the favour of the Emperor Alexander, he could retain his emoluments, which were the produce of foreign possessions, he was disappointed in this hope, and reduced to his pay. Burthened with a large family, he found himself embarrassed. The war, which to him as to others had seemed protracted, was, however, a source of glory and profit, which was now closed; he already regretted warfare, and preferred it to an idleness mingled with many causes of annoyance. In fact, the false flatteries of which he had been the object, had gradually assumed their true character, and contempt peeped out from amid compliments. His beautiful and haughty wife had experienced at the Tuileries from the court ladies, who were less prudent than their husbands, annoyances which she felt deeply, and which had greatly offended her irritable husband.\* One circumstance had put the acmè to the Marshal's ill-humour. The Duke of Wellington had been appointed English ambassador at Paris, and displayed in the French capital considerable vanity, the only weakness of this simple and strong mind. He enjoyed with much self-complacency at the court of France the glory of his conquests, which the royalist party took pleasure in exalting. At this moment there was a universal outburst of angry feeling against England, for to her were attributed the severe condi-

\* A gentleman whose character and high position put his testimony beyond doubt, assured me that he saw in the hands of Madame Ney a letter from her husband, written at Lons-le-Saulnier, the very day he abandoned the cause of the Bourbons for that of Napoleon. In the letter were these words, "My love, you shall not again have cause to weep on leaving the Tuileries."

tions of the treaty of Paris. The destruction of Washington, recently burned by the English army (the war was still going on between England and America), had exasperated all parties to such a degree, that it became necessary to restrain even the royalist journals. Besides, the English army had passed from Bordeaux to Brussels overland. Lord Wellington, though at Paris, seemed to command this army, and the French people, as if they had foreseen the fast-coming future, were deeply irritated. This feeling rose to such a pitch, that the police were obliged to keep continual watch lest Lord Wellington should be publicly insulted.

When Marshal Ney compared the loneliness in which he and his wife found themselves at the Tuileries, with the eager flattery of which the British general was the object, his soul was filled with bitterness. "This man," he said, speaking of Lord Wellington, "has been successful in Spain owing to the errors of Napoleon, and not of our generals; but should we happen some day to meet him in a position where fortune has not prepared everything for his triumph, the world shall see what he is. And then to see him flattered in this way in the presence of French marshals, he, the bitterest enemy of France!"

The generous indignation that the Marshal experienced, became so strong, that he could no longer conceal his feelings; he even renewed his intimacy with Marshal Davout, with whom he had been at variance since the fatal day of Krasnot. Marshal Davout who, as we have said, had retired to his estate at Savigny, had drawn up a circumstantial statement of his conduct at Hamburg, in which he demonstrated beyond all possibility of doubt, the baseness of the calumnies of which he had been made the object. He asked the king's permission to publish the memoir. The king, instead of treating this faithful servant of his country with the distinction he deserved, contented himself with telling the war minister that the reasoning of the memoir was strong, so strong that it would be impossible to treat the production with severity (this silly idea had been entertained), and that the publication would be permitted. And notwithstanding this declaration on the part of the king, the Marshal was allowed to remain in the kind of real, though not avowed exile in which he lived at Savigny. But, it must be said, that it was the Marshal who had banished himself to Savigny; he seldom went to Paris, where he could not appear without being beset by spies.

The conduct pursued towards the glorious defender of Hamburg, was one of the principal causes of the exasperation of the military. They said, and with justice, that such conduct was shameful, and insulting to the entire army. Ney

repeated these expressions wherever he went, and declared that the marshals ought to unite, and lay their complaints at the foot of the throne.

The princes would have been glad to silence these indiscreet men whom they had uselessly flattered, but they dared not strike hard enough to effect that object. The audacity of the emigrant party, and their desire of vengeance, had not yet risen so high as to aim at the glorious head of Ney. To engender such an ambition, fresh disasters and a vast catastrophe must happen. No stronger measure was adopted than to send General Vandamme away from Paris, who since he had been denied the entrée of the Tuileries, had given utterance to the most imprudent expressions. But the evil was not remedied by these means, and during the month of November, the public disquietude increased daily. The funds went down, and the five per cents., which M. Louis' financial plan had raised from 65 to 78 francs, fell to 70, though the financial position of affairs was visibly improving, though the indirect taxes were coming in, and the *reconnaissance de liquidation* were negotiable on 'change at a very low premium. Public confidence was severely shaken, and the cause of this disturbance was political, not financial.

M. de Chateaubriand took up his pen on the occasion, and, unlike his wont, his style was steady, sober, and rational. He endeavoured to calm all parties by proving to them that extreme desires were irrational, and impossible to be realised; whilst, on the contrary, rational desires were either realised, or about to be so; that consequently all parties ought to be satisfied, and contribute to the triumph of a state of things, in which both had an equal interest: the Royalists, because it was the cause of the Bourbons, the Revolutionists and Bonapartists, because it was the cause of liberty, which was the sole possible guarantee for the rights and security of all. He thus gave all parties, and particularly his own, good and prudent lessons—lessons more prudent than his own conduct. He gave these lessons in articles inserted in the *Journal des Débats*, or contained in pamphlets which the king praised publicly. But nothing could allay the general disquietude and the fear with which each party inspired the other.

Both believed they were plotted against, and that the plots were ripe for execution. The Bonapartists—that is to say, the military men and the revolutionists—united in common hate against the royalists, were persuaded that twelve or fifteen hundred of the most daring Chouans had been brought to Paris with the intention of securing their assistance in removing the king to Compeigne, that the government would be afterwards changed, the Charter abolished, the most re-

marriage persons amongst the military and the revolutionists seized, the principal part to death, the others exiled, and then the unconditional re-establishment of the ancient régime proclaimed. On the other hand, the royalists, to whom these projects were antipathetic, were convinced that the young generals who flocked to Paris, and who had some thousands of unemployed officers under their command, and could reckon on the adhesion of some regiments, were about to execute a *coup de main*, carry off the royal family, murder or send them beyond the seas, treat the French nobility in the same manner, and proclaim Napoleon I. or Napoleon II., and commence a new imperial reign, by ravaging Europe for the advantage of a race of mamelukes, the offspring of war, and whom peace could not satisfy. This great conspiracy was, in the opinion of the royalists, concerted in conjunction with Napoleon and Murat, who had been lately reconciled, and who subsidised all the conspirators. The suppositions about Napoleon were boundless, as was the idea entertained of his ceaseless activity and his prodigious influence. Never had he occupied a larger place in the imagination of men than when banished to the wretched isle that served as his asylum, for whilst hate laboured to paint him as a vile wretch, devoid alike of genius and courage, fear converted him into an indefatigable giant, exhaustless in resource, always on the alert, and now on the eve of overturning the world. He had, it was said, carried off vast treasures to Porto Ferrajo, whence he guided the thread of all the European conspiracies, particularly those of Vienna, where the Powers were at this moment assembled in general congress. He fanned the flame of discord in that capital, and held his weak-minded father-in-law in subjection, as he was about to put himself at the head of the Austrian armies, and fall upon the French and Spanish Bourbons. At other times, the current report was that Napoleon had escaped and taken the command of the American armies against England, or of the Turkish armies against Europe, or of the Neapolitan against Austria, for contradictory reports cost nothing. In a word, Napoleon was believed to be everywhere, and the fear felt by his enemies compensated for the efforts their hate made to diminish his greatness. Of the thousand plots which each party attributed to the other, how much was true? All and none. All, if we consider as plots the empty remarks of partizans; nothing, if we only regard as plots projects maturely concerted between chiefs and agents who understand each other perfectly well, who have at their command means proportioned to the object in view, and who have appointed, or are ready to appoint, the day for executing their project. But nothing of this kind existed. It was cer-

tainly impossible to deny that, had they been able, the royalists would have annihilated the Charter, and had they been as wicked as their words, they would willingly have got rid of the heads of the army, and the chiefs of the revolutionist party. But they were more powerless than their adversaries, they possessed far less courage, and contented themselves with uttering extravagant expressions, which being repeated to the revolutionists and the Bonapartists, threw them into actual terror. But, on the other hand, it was equally true, that had the Bonapartists and the revolutionists possessed the power, they would have seized the royal family and their court, and done, no matter what with them, provided they could only get rid of them. It is equally true, that had they agreed amongst themselves, combined and pulled together, they would have been able to accomplish all they wished, for public opinion was entirely in their favour. It is also true, that perceiving what they might have been able to do, they foolishly declared that they were about to do it, and by the intemperance of their language they rendered themselves as formidable as they were really powerless. The public mind might have regained tranquillity, had the public been able to perceive the real state of parties; but according to custom, the public estimated the designs of parties by their words, and by their own fears. Consequently, both sides took precautions. Frequently did these agitated military men pass the night standing, with their swords and pistols in their belts, convinced that they were about to be attacked; whilst the terrified police, having given the alarm to the authorities, the national guard, the companies of the body guard, and all the disposable forces, were called out, excepting the garrison troops, who were held in suspicion; both parties continued in this state until day dawned, each causing the other daily alarm.\* On a night spent in this fashion, in the month of November, the patrols crossed each other in hundreds, without any other result than exciting a general panic, which destroyed all public confidence, and lowered the funds, to the great detriment of the finances.

The principal police—that is, the government force, commanded by M. Beugnot—did not indulge in these ridiculous alarms, or at least only in a very slight degree; and they, in their reports, endeavoured to tranquillize the king, which was no difficult task, for his majesty, through natural indolence and love of ease, was inclined to take pacific views of things.

\* Nothing can be more amusing than the succession of police reports, drawn up by M. Beugnot. It is evident from these reports that the month of November was one of groundless alarms, which induced the ministerial changes we are about to relate.



But Monsieur, who could not remain quiet, and his police, who were equally incapable of enjoying tranquillity, declared that France was on the brink of a volcano, which was ready to break forth, that the official police were incompetent, that they actually betrayed the trust reposed in them, and that the royal family ran the risk of being carried off some morning, in consequence of their blind credulity. Monsieur went to the king, told him he was badly served, and that he was on the eve of a catastrophe. The king rejected his advice, and told him that he was, as usual, the tool of intriguers, and yet the king was somewhat disturbed by these incessant alarms, and fell into a kind of perplexity.

His nephews, whose opinion the king valued much more than his brother's, joined the Count d'Artois, declaring that things were in a bad state, and ought to be remedied in some way. But this was the difficulty. Things were undoubtedly in a bad state, and the remedy was one which governments will never recognise, which is, to resist the promptings of their own passions, and still more, to reject the passion-prompted advice of their friends, to tranquillize the mass of the nation, who were not partizans, and desired only the general good. But they were far from reasoning in this fashion, and complained of those who governed—that is to say, of the ministry, who are generally held responsible for everything that occurs in a state that is free, or nearly so. The ministry, it was said, had no unity, which was perfectly true. But, in order that the ministry should possess unity, it ought to have been constitutionally organised—that is to say, the ministry ought to constitute the sole council of the crown, from which the princes should be excluded; and one, or at most two, principal men chosen, in whom implicit confidence should be placed. But the government was far from thinking of such means, and complained not of the council or its formation, but of each individual minister, and of the war minister in particular. He did not restrain the army, it was said; he possessed no influence over the soldiers, and knew neither how to govern nor content them. Such is the recompense reserved for weak-minded ministers! General Dupont was as unfortunate during this short ministry as he had been in Spain. He was a man of talent, and well-intentioned; he had done all in his power to satisfy his ancient companions-in-arms; he had concealed their follies, and, in short, endeavoured to satisfy them and the emigrants, but had only succeeded in rendering both parties discontented. It would have been impossible, in his position, not to commit faults, as it would have been impossible to content the army, that was obliged to undergo severe reductions, and submit to a

*régime* highly displeasing to the military of every grade. And he had committed faults, and serious ones, but who obliged him to commit them? Those very princes who accused him; it was they who had done so, by establishing the Military Household, and by lavishing commissions as rewards for services during emigration, &c., &c. When the anticipated and inevitable result of these faults became apparent, the princes blamed the too-complaisant minister, who had acted at their suggestion, and said that it would be dangerous to leave the army under his control. The king made no objection, for he did not understand the business, and seemed inclined to yield implicit credence to his nephews, who busied themselves very much in the affair.

There was another subject on which the king was disinclined to listen to the remarks made; in the first place, because these remarks originated with his brother, and in the next, because his judgment was sufficiently clear to let him see that they were made without sufficient foundation. He was told that the police were badly, deplorably constituted—that it was a matter of which M. Beugnot, intelligent as he was, understood nothing, that he was duped by the Bonapartists, and was unconsciously deceiving the king, and hurrying the destruction of the monarchy. Louis XVIII. was annoyed in the highest degree by these remarks, which he plainly saw originated with his brother, who was ever inclined to interfere, and was the constant dupe of the intriguers of every *régime*. The king regularly read M. Beugnot's witty and amusing reports, which were seasoned with a little skilful flattery, and presented a piquant picture of contemporary personages. The truth of these reports was evident to his good sense, and their piquancy amused him, whilst their flattery gratified his self-love. But Monsieur tried to persuade him that M. Beugnot only entertained him with gossip, and that there was but one man in France who, if his majesty would venture to confide in him, could properly fulfil the functions of minister of police, and save the kingdom. Will it be believed that this man was the regicide Fouché! Monsieur, even when he did not hate people, could never do them justice, through want of discernment and coolness of judgment, but he had suddenly become not only impartial, but indulgent, even friendly, towards M. Fouché. The latter, as we have already said, was not in Paris at the time the revolution of 1814 occurred, but since then he had sought to take up the part he would have played on that occasion, by interfering wherever his interference would be permitted. When Monsieur sought to be invested with the lieutenant-generalship of the kingdom by the senate, he had found the Duke of Otranto

officious, zealous, skilful, and although a regicide, free from hatred of the Bourbons, and at least as anxious to please them as to get the senate out of its embarrassing position. He had, consequently, conceived the most favourable opinion of the man, and entertained a friendly feeling towards him. These favourable dispositions had been confirmed by the reports of the agents of the *Pavillon Marsan*. There were, undoubtedly, many royalists amongst these agents, but the greater number was composed of men ready to assist any *régime*, men whom the police employ and fling aside when their services are no longer needed, and who, when rejected, offer their services to any one that will enable them to procure their daily subsistence. They are an abject race, whom an honest man never employs, only from necessity, when it is his duty to watch over the safety of the State; and whom he is only too happy to break with, once he is relieved of the cares of government. Far from avoiding the society of such men, M. Fouché eagerly sought their acquaintance, and often supported them at his own expense, when he could not dispose of the resources of the State. By these means, he collected information of all kinds, true and false, without however always distinguishing the one from the other, which, added to what he himself collected in his visits, alternately paid without offending any of them, to MM. Carnot, de la Fayette, de Blacas, de Bassano, and even the foreign ministers, whose doors opened to the talisman of news—he thus acquired the air of a magician, knowing all things, guiding everything; and possessing the secrets, the confidence, and guiding the will of all parties, whom he could restrain or set loose as he pleased. In a word, he seemed the king of this chaos, which he alone could organise and govern.

These agents, repelled by the official police and received at the *Pavillon Marsan*, were the assiduous panegyrists of M. Fouché to the Count d'Artois, and succeeded in inducing the prince to receive him. Yielding to his natural taste for intrigue, the Count d'Artois admitted M. Fouché, and was charmed by the conversation he had with him. M. Fouché, unlike Carnot, far from boasting of being a regicide, expressed on the contrary the humiliation and repentance that it caused him; and speaking with respect and submission, declared his ardent desire to repair his fault by supporting and saving the Bourbons. Then, making use of his knowledge of men and things, he dazzled the prince, to whom he appeared the saviour to whose care the destiny of the monarchy ought to be entrusted; and thus the Count d'Artois, the idol of the ultra-royalists, passed to the opposite extreme, even to the region of regicides, to associate with an unprincipled intriguer, and be-

stow on him the confidence that he refused to the most respectable friends of liberty.

It was under these circumstances he conceived the idea of getting the Duke d'Otranto appointed Minister of Police to Louis XVIII.—an appointment of which he not only gave him hope, but almost certainty. The Duke d'Otranto left the prince with the most sanguine expectations, and proclaimed to every one his desire and hope of re-entering the ministry. M. d'Artois had, however, promised too much. It was not in his power to bestow portfolios as he would; and his good opinion, far from winning that of Louis XVIII. for the same object, had a contrary effect. The promised portfolio not appearing, M. Fouché was offended, and went about Paris telling that he had been offered the Ministry of Police, but had refused. All this was very skilfully related to Louis by M. Beugnot, and the king laughed at his brother whenever he was not made too angry by these provoking accounts.

The Ministers of War and Police were both thus attacked at Court, the sole employment of the latter being Director-General, with the title of Minister of State. The king, fond of repose, averse to change, and seeing that there was more of danger than utility in the proposed remedies, told M. de Blacas of the annoyances with which he was beset. M. de Blacas agreed with the monarch; for though prejudiced, he was not devoid of good sense, and was besides willing to agree with his master. However, he was too sincere to conceal the truth from the king, or to hide from him that many complaints were made against the War Minister and the Chief of Police. The king was perplexed, and had it been possible, would have been very much agitated; but his cumbrous body weighed down his mind, and often oppressed it even to inertia.

The month of November had passed in domestic anxieties, which were seldom revealed to the gaze of the public, when, on Wednesday, the 30th of November, the king, being about to go with great pomp to a theatrical representation at Odeon, Monsieur's police took alarm and hastened to the Tuileries, where they announced a plot that was to be put into execution on that very day. The object of this plot, they said, was to seize the king and royal family, and either fling them into the Seine or carry them off to some other country, and then change the government. This bold stroke was to be accomplished by some hundreds of audacious and intrepid military men. These were in communication with the heads of the different parties, and all arrangements were made for what was to follow, once the deed was accomplished. The official police knew nothing of all this, which was an additional reason for the extreme royalists giving it explicit credence. Marshal Marmont and

his company of body guards came to attend the king. He was as credulous as thoughtless, and moreover detested General Dupont, because this minister occupied a place he thought due to himself, and which he had still a vague hope of obtaining. He was, consequently, one of those who most frequently asserted that the army was not properly guided, and was left a prey to conspirators. On the morning of the 30th, he was awakened by one of those official agents who usually disturb the repose of courts, and being informed of the plot that was to be executed that evening, he ran all breathless to the king, to whom he made the greatest display of devotion, without however exciting either gratitude or anxiety in that prince; for Louis had little faith in the danger that was announced to him. The Marshal commanded his guards to mount, sent a message to General Maison, commanding the First Military Division, and General Dessoles, commanding the National Guards, both of whom hastened to call out their soldiers; whilst Marmont took very good care not to give the least information to the Minister of War, who ought to have been the first informed. The principal persons of the court resumed their military dress, secreted arms of every kind about their persons, and proceeded to Odeon armed to the very teeth. The streets were filled with troops, the boxes of the theatre with uniforms, which gave the affair rather the air of a review than of a theatrical representation. In the midst of this display of uniforms, one man alone—the War Minister—arrived, dressed in a black coat, and with an air of indifference and ignorance that was most offensive to all those who were oppressed by zeal, terror, or prudence.

The king was applauded as usual, and retired without being attacked or offended. The next day, the newsmongers laughed loudly at this violent alarm; but those who pretended that they had saved the king—and Marshal Marmont was at the head of these—were indignant at the carelessness of the War Minister and the Director of Police. There was the most unheard-of excitement at court; and as some change was necessary to calm people's minds after all this agitation, a modification of the ministry was demanded. The king's nephews demanded the appointment of a new War Minister, and his brother begged that there should be a new Director of Police. The king, wearied, and believing in the end that he had been in danger, yielded, and consented to the desired changes.

He would not listen to the proposal of making the Duke d'Otranto Minister of Police, and confided the functions of this office to M. d'André, an old constituent, a well-informed functionary, industrious and sensible, and who had corre-

sponded with the Bourbons during their residence in England, for all which reasons he inspired the emigration party with sufficient confidence. But whilst he gratified his brother by removing M. Beugnot, Louis XVIII. did not mean to sacrifice him, but rather to elevate his position, which he did by appointing him Naval Minister, an office that had just become vacant by the death of the distinguished and lamented M. Malouet. M. Beugnot was thus doubly recompensed for his witty and sensible reports; for he was not only freed from the police, and was appointed minister, with a portfolio.

The War Minister was still to be appointed. The army at that time possessed two men—Marshals Davout and Suchet—who united in an eminent degree the rare qualities required in a War Minister, and in whom moral influence was joined to administrative talents. The appointment of Marshal Davout was impossible, for he was an object of hatred both to the Allies and the emigrants. He could not even be thought of. Marshal Suchet, whose natural disposition inclined him to that sagely liberal government which the Bourbons might have established in France, and besides being very well liked at court, had been more than once spoken of as suited to the office of War Minister. He had, indeed, without his knowledge, figured in all the ministerial combinations which the Duke d'Otranto had proposed to Monsieur. However, being a man of great reserve, he had not testified sufficient devotion to win the good opinion of the court. Marshal Soult, contrary to what might have been expected, had succeeded completely with the royalists, whose idol he had become, as M. Fouché was that of the Count d'Artois' coterie. We shall now see by what means he reached this high degree of favour.

He had been ill-treated at first, because of his having fought the battle of Toulouse, after peace had been declared, and ill-treated most unjustly, for he was ignorant of the state of affairs of Paris at the time, and consequently became a malcontent, and a daring malcontent, so unmeasured was the expression of his feelings. General Dupont, an excellent man, who was seeking to gain as many adherents as he could for the Bourbons, had received and listened to Marshal Soult, whom he inspired with some little hope, and succeeded, at the same time, in calming his feelings somewhat. This minister, pursuing his work, resolved to give an appointment to Marshal Soult, that he may attach him definitely to the Bourbons, and for that purpose determined to send him to Alsace, but upon reflection he preferred Brittany, a province that would test the fidelity of a doubtful functionary. The loyalty of this province was such as to call forth all sorts of danger, whilst, at the same time, it afforded an opportunity of ascertaining the sincerity of



the man's conversion who should be employed there. The war minister's calculations were crowned with success. Marshal Soult, surrounded by the most ardent royalists, had given them perfect satisfaction, and had shown himself their equal, at least in political sentiments, for he did not hesitate to declare that for twenty-five years past the Bourbons had been the "good cause;" that those who had served another had been deceived, but that they were ready to repair their error by an unbounded devotion. He did not confine himself to mere words, but went to visit the mournful battle-field of Quiberon, where he found some unburied bones, as often happens on a field of battle, and opened a subscription for the erection of a monument to the French officers who had fallen on that fatal day. Those brave men most undoubtedly deserved to be held in sad remembrance, who, employing their bravery so ill, had perished on the gloomy banks of the Quiberon; but this was not the time to renew such memories, and one may be indeed surprised to find them awakened by the new governor of Brittany.

The astonishment of the army was as great as the satisfaction of the Royalists. Marshal Soult was a valuable conquest that merited preservation. He had been excluded from the peerage, together with the Marshals Massena and Davout, and therefore when he completed the subscription for the monument at Quiberon, he returned to Paris to renew his solicitations for that distinction; he was very badly received by his old comrades, but very well by the Court. He was still occupied in this pursuit when the office of war minister became vacant. It was almost unanimously agreed to confer it upon him at once, notwithstanding the pretensions of Marshal Marmont, which nobody considered serious. As Marshal Soult combined with an unusual application to business the deportment of a determined man accustomed to command, he seemed the very personification of an accomplished minister of war. This choice filled the public with surprise, and the Court with joy and hope.

These different appointments were published on the 4th of December by royal ordinance. The king had rather consented to than desired them. A strange circumstance, but a natural one for the time, and which shows the idea entertained of a constitutional government at its commencement, was that the Royal Council learned these ministerial changes only a few hours before the general public. M. de Blacas informed his colleagues, in the name of the king, of what had occurred; they were much surprised, but did not apprehend that the harmony of the Cabinet would be disturbed by these events. M. de Blacas dispatched a courier with an account of the

ministerial changes to M. de Talleyrand, who had already set out for the Congress of Vienna, and he with whom these modifications ought to have originated, was scarcely made acquainted with them even after their accomplishment. As Louis the XVIII. disliked explanations, because that his repose and royal dignity suffered somewhat by them, he would not speak himself to Marshal Dupont. He had avoided receiving him since the scene at Odeon, sometimes alleging illness as a cause, and sometimes that he was about to take his customary exercise; but on the 3rd of December he sent M. de Blacas to demand his portfolio, and offer him a pension of 40,000 francs, together with a provincial appointment. M. de Blacas took care to inform General Dupont that he was not the author of this change, which was indeed true; he surprised him not a little by announcing the name of his successor, and attributed his dismissal to the king.

Thus ended the crisis, by the dismissal of the war minister, to whom were attributed the bad feelings of the army, and by the change of the minister of police, who was blamed for imaginary conspiracies, merely because he would not believe in their existence. As always happens in such cases, a short calm ensued until the inutility of the remedy had been felt, and the sinister prophecy of Napoleon had been realised—"The Bourbons will reconcile France with the rest of Europe, but set her at war with herself."



## BOOK LVI.

## CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

STATE of Europe since the peace of Paris—Discontent of the Belgian and Rhine Provinces, which were annexed to Protestant countries, and ill-treated by foreign armies—confusion that threatens—The Germans expect their promised liberty in vain, and the small states dread being swallowed up by the larger—Outbreak in Switzerland in consequence of the struggle between the old and new cantons—Sad state of Italy—Bad government of the King of Piedmont, and rigorous proceedings of the Pontifical Government at Rome—Revocation of the French Concordat which was on the point of being granted, but is deferred—Murat is surprised to find himself still on the throne of Naples, the Powers are displeased at it—State of Spain—Perfidious and cruel conduct of Ferdinand VII.—To please the English he abandons the family compact—Whilst Europe is in this state of excitement, the allied sovereigns are present at several brilliant fêtes in London—They renew their promise to remain united, without, however, entering on any explanation of disputed points—The Congress of Vienna put off till September—Dispositions with which they meet—Only two sovereigns, the Emperor Alexander and the King Frederick William, arrive there on good terms with each other—They consider that Europe owes them everything, the one wishes to get all Poland, the other Saxony—England sees nothing of this; Austria discovers it, but is silent, in the hope of disappointing them without disturbing the European union—This state of affairs would have been very profitable to France if she had come to Vienna free of engagements, and without having signed the treaty of the 30th of May—M. de Talleyrand is left at liberty to act as he thinks proper—The king imposes but one condition on him, that Murat should be expelled from Naples—Departure of M. de Talleyrand, accompanied by the Duke Dalberg—His desire to play an important part, and his determination to take legitimacy as the groundwork of his policy at Vienna—Solemn entry of the allied sovereigns into the Austrian capital—Magnificent and expensive hospitality with which the Emperor Francis receives them at the palace of Schoenbrunn—The pretensions of Prussia and Russia to Saxony and Poland are soon discovered, and become the universal subject of conversation—The German princes protest against these pretensions—Embarrassment of England and Austria, who are anxious about the maintenance of the Alliance of Chaumont—The more danger there is of disunion, the less they affect to believe it, and promise to remain united—Secret arrangement of Austria, England, Russia and Prussia to arrange everything themselves, and to allow the presence of the other sovereigns only as a matter of form—This agreement being soon discovered, is a new source of discontent to the powers of the second rank, who fear that their exclusion is only a means for their destruction—The members of the French legation do not confine themselves, in their irritation, to protesting against these projects of exclusion, but they immediately take the part of Saxony against Russia and Prussia—Prussia avenges herself by saying that France intends to resume the Rhine boundary—The members of the French

legation are reduced to make protestations of being disinterested in order to correct the effects of their hasty proceedings—Alexander's anger is principally directed against M. de Talleyrand—His interview with the French plenipotentiary—When some weeks have been passed in parleys and bitter remarks, a general cry is raised for the assembly of the Congress—The *four*, that is England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, feeling the danger of a general and immediate meeting, propose a delay of a month, which defers the Congress until the 1st November, under pretence of preparing the different questions—M. de Talleyrand places himself at the head of the opposition—He requires that the Congress take place immediately, and wishes to profit of the occasion for the coming to a decision concerning the admission of the representative of Saxony, and the rejection of the Neapolitan representative, which would be an indirect manner of deciding immediately the two most important questions of the moment—Resistance of the *four*—After some days discussion, the Congress is deferred until the 1st November, when all promise to meet, and some expressions are used which give some hope of their respecting what was called public justice—Having prevented the exclusion of the secondary powers, the members of the French legation, instead of refraining from engaging farther in the Saxony question, declare themselves even more decidedly—The Russians and Prussians, on their side, express themselves with the greatest haughtiness—Activity of the lesser states, particularly Bavaria—The latter unite with the French legation—Increasing embarrassment of England and Austria—Lord Castlereagh, dreading a quarrel with Prussia, whom he needs in his policy with regard to the Low Countries, will give her Saxony in order to save Poland—M. de Metternich, on the contrary, wishing rather to save Saxony than Poland, disapproves of this plan, and yet lets it go on in hopes that it will not succeed, for Frederick William will not be satisfied unless Alexander is so too—Lord Castlereagh speaks out boldly—Warm conversations with Alexander, followed by firm and bitter notes—Bavaria, always the most active, does not hesitate to speak of war, and tells Austria that it is better to think of an alliance with France—M. de Metternich, dreading disunion, says that France has not an army—Bavaria reports his expressions to the French legation to pique their honour—M. de Talleyrand advises Louis XVIII. to prepare his armaments—Deliberation on this subject in the Royal Council—The minister of finance agrees to give fifty million francs in order to equip the army—M. de Talleyrand is delighted, and is anxious to announce the preparations going on in France—Meanwhile, disputes are as warm as ever at Vienna—M. de Metternich is obliged to yield to the tactics of Lord Castlereagh, and advises Prussia for her own sake not to accept Saxony, but consents to give it to her on certain conditions that Prussia will not accept—Alexander, in his anger, seems determined to brave everything—He gives up Saxony, which he held, to Prussian troops, and concentrates all his forces on the Vistula—Irritation at Vienna, general desire that the Congress should assemble on the 1st November—Violent altercation between Alexander and M. de Metternich—Assembly of Congress at the appointed time—The eight who had signed the treaty of Paris, France, England, Austria, Russia, Prussia, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, take the initiative in the convocations and resolutions—Division of the Congress into committees—Committee for the verification of credentials—Committee of six, composed of France, Spain, Austria, England, Russia and Prussia for the great European affairs—Committee for German affairs, for Italian affairs, for Swiss affairs, for the liberty of the negroes, for the free navigation of rivers, &c., &c.—It is decided that, when the principal persons concerned in each question should confer in committee, the eight should come to assist in their decisions, and ratify their resolutions—Labours of each committee—Italian affairs—Questions concerning the annexation of Genoa to Piedmont, and the succession to the crown of Savoy—Questions of Parma and Naples—M. de Metternich's wise reasons for protracting the discussion on the affairs of Naples—Swiss affairs: continuation of the struggle between the old and new Cantons—Influence of France over the aristocratic canton of Berne, and over the democratic cantons of Uri, Glaris Unterwalden; she is employed to bring about an accommodation—Whilst the affairs of Switzerland and Italy approach an accommodation, those of Saxony and Poland become more complicated—Lord

Castlereagh's exertions to detach Prussia from Russia—Alexander perceives this and forces Frederick William to an explanation—After the explanation, the two sovereigns embrace, and promise to be more united than ever—Proclamation of Prince Reppin, temporary governor of Saxony, which announces that this kingdom is about to pass into the possession of the king of Prussia, with the consent of England and Austria—These two powers deny it vehemently—The entreaties the German princes make to the Prince Regent of England oblige Lord Castlereagh's instructions to be modified—The latter changes his tactics, and joins M. de Metternich for the determined defence of Saxony and Poland—War seems to threaten—Plan of the campaign decided on by Prince Schwarzenberg, who disposes of the troops of France without consulting her—Plan of introducing in the spring 200,000 Austrians and Germans into Poland, 150,000 into Silesia, and 100,000 into Franconia and Westphalia—On the 10th December, M. de Metternich presents a note, in which he withdraws the half consent that he had given to the sacrifice of Saxony, on the pretext that Prussia had not fulfilled any of the conditions required by Austria—The irritated Prussians wish to make an outbreak, but Alexander endeavours to restrain them—After several conversations with Prince Schwarzenberg, the Czar is convinced that the Powers are determined to resist his designs, and he thinks of making some sacrifices—He determines to keep all Poland, and abandon the duchy of Posen to Prussia that she may have less claim in Germany, and at the same time he endeavours to be on friendly terms with Austria, relative to the Prussian frontier in Galicia—By Alexander's advice, Prussia replies in moderate terms to Austria—Austria's reply, in which she proves that, in giving 3,000 or 4,000 souls to Prussia in Saxony, the engagement of restoring her position of 1805 will be fulfilled—Prussia enters into those calculations, and the question then becomes one of figures—Formation of a commission of valuation, into which France is admitted, although it was first intended to exclude her—The questions of quantity are warmly debated in this commission—The news of the peace concluded between England and America restores all his energy to Lord Castlereagh—A violent scene takes place between the English and Prussians—Lord Castlereagh goes in a passion to M. de Talleyrand—The latter profits of the opportunity, and proposes an alliance offensive and defensive to the British minister—Treaty of 3rd January, 1815, by which Austria, England, and France unite, and promise to furnish each 150,000 men to ensure the success of their projects—Hard condition imposed on M. de Talleyrand, that if war should be declared he should confine himself to the limits of the treaty of Paris—A French General is sent to discuss the plan of the campaign—The convention of the 3rd January, though secret, is communicated to Bavaria, Hanover, the Low Countries, Sardinia, in order to gain their alliance—Notwithstanding this secrecy, Russia and Prussia perceive that their adversaries have come to an agreement, and therefore they determine on deciding the different questions—Half its territory and one-third of its population is taken from Saxony to be given to Prussia—Last struggle for the city of Leipzig, which is left to Saxony—Frederick Augustus is summoned to Pesth, in order to extort his consent—The great question which divides Europe being decided, and Lord Castlereagh being summoned to the British parliament, the others hasten to conclude—Decision of the questions in debate—Definite constitution of the Low Countries—Re-establishment of Hesse Cassel and Hesse Darmstadt—These houses give up Westphalia to Prussia for a compensation—Exertions of Prussia to obtain a continuity of territory from the Meuse to the Niemen—Unjust conduct towards Denmark—Luxembourg falls to the Low Countries—Mayence becomes a federal fortress—Bavaria gets the Rhine palatinate, and the duchy of Wurzburg, and gives the Tyrol with the line of the Inn to Austria—Germanic constitution—Austria refuses the Imperial crown, and obtains the perpetual presidency of the Diet—Organization of the Federal Diet—The cessation of Swiss disputes chiefly due to France—The new cantons preserve their existence by paying a pecuniary indemnity—Berne gets a territorial indemnity in Porrentruy and the duchy of Basle—The Swiss constitution taken almost entirely from the act of mediation—Difficulties of the Italian question—M. de Talleyrand not having demanded anything as the reward of his assistance in the affairs of Saxony and Poland, is in danger of being totally abandoned in the affair of Naples—Happily for him, Murat



solves the difficulty by addressing an imprudent summons to the Congress—Austria replies by announcing that an army of 150,000 men will be sent into Italy—General determination to destroy Murat—Difficulties of the affair of Parma—At the demand of the two houses of Bourbon, the Congress is inclined to restore Parma to the Queen of Etruria, and to leave Maria Louisa only the duchy of Lucca—The latter is advised to resist, and succeeds in awakening the tenderness of her father and the generosity of Alexander—Lord Castlereagh, without M. de Talleyrand's knowledge, is commissioned to negotiate, at Paris, a direct arrangement with Louis XVIII., in order that Parma may be left to Maria Louisa for her life, and that in the mean time the Queen of Etruria should have only the duchy of Lucca—It is decided that the Legations should be restored to the Pope—Resolutions adopted as to the liberty of negroes and the opening of navigable rivers—All these questions being decided in February, the monarchs prepare for their departure, and leave to their ministers the charge of drawing them up—It is decided that there shall be a general instrument, signed by the eight Powers who took part in the treaty of Paris, containing all resolutions of general interest, and that there shall be particular treaties between the interested parties for what concerns them individually—When they are about to separate, the news of Napoleon's landing surprises all persons—It is determined to remain together until the termination of the new crisis—All European arrangements which had been adopted are maintained—True character of the Congress of Vienna, and what may be thought of its results, which, with a few changes, have lasted half a century.

## BOOK LVI.

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### CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

We have seen in what position the Bourbons had placed France, although they were bound by a written constitution, and watched over by public opinion of a most censorious character, and though they were actuated by the best motives, but they yielded to the reactionary influence which tended to re-establish the old *régime* on the ruins of the Revolution and the Empire. We should next consider Europe divided into a number of governments, unrestrained by law or public opinion, and consequently at liberty to seek the re-establishment of the old order of things, and determined to resume the territories they had lost, or to appropriate those to which they had no claim. This unhappy Europe was fearfully disturbed by its emigrants, as short-sighted as our's, as well as by its ambitious chiefs, who were tearing it to tatters. It thus presented a kind of chaos, where avidity struggled with madness. The man who was then called the "Genius of Evil"—Napoleon—might well from the watch-tower of his isle say, with all that bitterness of which he was accused, and which he indeed possessed, that his fall had not been the triumph of disinterestedness and moderation. We must consider this distracted Europe for a moment, in order to form a just idea of her state at the period which was called that of her deliverance.

The Belgian provinces, which had at first felt a real relief in escaping from our yoke, were surprised and annoyed to find themselves oppressed by another quite as heavy, and, at the same time, opposed to all their national feelings. It was the conscription, the *droits réunis*, the closing of the ports, and regulations in matters of religion, which had alienated these provinces from us. They were freed from the conscrip-

tion for the moment, but not from indirect imposts, which were still maintained. The ports, indeed, were open, but only to allow the English, those rivals of the Belgians, to bring in their goods, whilst they were debarred from intercourse with France, whose commerce had so much contributed to enrich them. The Pope was re-established at Rome, whilst the Belgians were placed under the rule of a Protestant nation for which they felt no affection. They were annoyed by the presence of the British army, which was constantly increasing in order to protect the new kingdom of the Low Countries, and they accused Austria, that had principally contributed to their separation from France, of having betrayed and sold them to England.

The Rhenish provinces were no better satisfied. If, like the Belgians, they were no longer subjected to conscription, and the Rhine, the chief source of their wealth, was allowed free communication with the sea, the French markets were no longer open for the products of their industry, which had greatly increased under the Empire, nor was the commerce of Prussia a compensation for that of France. In a word, it seemed as little natural to them to be fellow-citizens of the inhabitants of Koenigsberg as of the Parisians, and the liberty of the Pope was no more consolation to them than to the Belgians for being ruled by a Protestant sovereign. They also experienced the inconveniencies of foreign occupation, for the Prussian army was in their territory, and they were horribly ill-treated by Blucher's soldiers, who had not yet learned to consider the inhabitants of Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle as fellow-countrymen.

Beyond the Rhine, discontent resulted from other causes. The Prussians were satisfied, and justly, for they were conquerors, and expected great aggrandizement; but they hoped to receive as the reward of their patriotism, the liberty that had been promised them, but which, it seemed, there was no hurry to grant. Hanover, Brunswick, and Hesse, whilst anxiously awaiting the decision of their fate, were devastated by the passage of the allied armies. Saxony, that had abandoned the French on the field of battle, was thrown into despair by the prospect of falling under the power of Prussia, and losing her nationality as the reward of her defection. Meanwhile, she had the mortification to see her sovereign a prisoner at Berlin. The princes of the smaller German states were disturbed by the projects imputed to the more powerful sovereigns of the country, and the peoples were discontented by the little liberty that appeared in the principles avowed by their princes. Bavaria having considerable claims to indemnification for what Austria was about to deprive her of, she felt

little pleasure at the prospect of being compensated on the left bank of the Rhine, quite close to France, with which power it was thus intended to compromise her.

Switzerland had fallen into a state of confusion from which it was impossible to free her, and which put all her interests in opposition, all her populations in arms. The act of mediation, making a happy application in the Alps of the principles of 1789, by setting the old subjugated countries at liberty, and forming all into nineteen independent cantons instead of thirteen, had abolished the inequalities of condition, together with all kinds of oppression, and had created a perfectly well-balanced state of things, which had rendered Switzerland perfectly happy during ten years, and which would have left her nothing to desire had not war disturbed the happiness of the whole world.

It was this same act of mediation which the inhabitants of Berne had intended, and succeeded in destroying by introducing the Allies into Switzerland during the preceding December. Immediately all the old pretensions were renewed, Berne wanted to bring Pays de Vaud and Argovia under her yoke, and deprive them of their position of federal cantons. Uri wished to deprive Tessin of the vale of Levan, and actually took possession of it without an appeal to any authority. Schweitz and Glauris were preparing to snatch back the territories of Uznach and Gaster from the Canton of St. Gall, and for that purpose excited disturbances in these ancient districts. Zug claimed Argovia as her dependency, and Appenzell flattered herself with the hope of recovering the Rheinthal. On the other side, the threatened cantons put themselves on the defensive. The citizens of Vaud, Argovia, Thurgovia, Saint Gall, and Tessin, had taken up arms to the number of twenty thousand men. The interior policy of the cantons was in no less danger than their territorial possessions. The subjection of class to class was about to re-appear. It was at least intended to re-establish the system, and all the new and legitimate interests, which had been recognised by the act of mediation, seeing the threatened danger, were ready to revolt.

The diet having assembled at Zurich, wishing to put a stop to this state of anarchy, had tried to reconstitute Switzerland. But the five cantons, which were meditating these territorial changes, viz., Berne, Uri, Schweitz, Glaris, and Zug, having induced the cantons of Fribourg, Soleure, Lucerne, and Unterwalden, which shared in their sentiments, to join them, formed a counter diet, which would neither yield to that held at Zurich or recognised its acts. The diet at Zurich was composed of the cantons whose liberties were in danger—viz., Vaud, Argovia, Thurgovia, Saint Gall, and Tessin, together with the so-called

impartial cantons of Zurich, Basle, Schaffhausen, Appenzell, and the Grisons. The latter diet represented ten cantons; its opponents nine.

Fortunately for the cause of justice and good sense, Alexander, liberal both from feeling and education, besides being influenced by M. de Laharpe and General Jomini, had no idea of lending his aid to such a work of destruction. Under his influence the allied sovereigns declared that they would recognise no other diet than that of Zurich, nor would they consent to the suppression of a single one of the existing cantons; and that as Berne had lost much they would endeavour to compensate her with some portion of the territory recovered from France.

The Diet of Zurich, strengthened by this support, conquered and even absorbed the dissenting cantons. This Diet had drawn up the plan of a federal union, recognising the existence of the nineteen cantons, and which, leaving to the Congress of Vienna the care of deciding territorial questions, had preserved all that was good in the act of mediation with regard to civil equality and legislative power. But this plan being rejected by the dissenting cantons, those cantons whose existence was threatened refused to lay down their arms. Pays de Vaud was transformed into a sort of camp, and instead of being, as once, the seat of wealth and repose, presented nothing but a scene of anxiety and agitation. This was all that Switzerland had gained, at least for the present, by the deliverance of Europe. It depended on the Congress of Vienna to restore order and justice, if possible.

As we pass the Alps the prospect becomes sadder and drearier. The French, in retiring, had left the wrecks of their Italian army at Milan, and the Austrians had left the remnant of their army in the fortresses of Lombardy. Notwithstanding his noble fidelity to Napoleon, Prince Eugene flattered himself that he would be able to retain a part, at least, of his vice-royalty. For this he had counted on the influence of his father-in-law, the King of Bavaria, and the personal consideration enjoyed by himself in Europe. The wisest amongst the Italians would have desired him for their prince, and the Lombard Senate was considering how the object might be effected, when the Milanese populace, weary of the abode of the French amongst them for eighteen years, and also excited by some members of the nobility and clergy, revolted, attacked the Senate, and massacred Prina, the finance minister. They were about to murder the war minister, when their violence was checked. General Pino, having placed himself at the head of the public forces, a kind of regency was formed of intelligent patriots, who demanded a sovereign from the Congress of

Vienna. The reply to this demand was, as may be expected, the occupation of the country by Austrian troops. Marshal Bellegarde, at the head of fifty thousand Austrians, invaded Lombardy as far as the Po, dissolved the provisional regency, and took possession of the country, in the name of the imperial Court of Austria. Although it was not yet announced to what power these countries were to be subjected, it was easy to foresee that they were about to become Austrian provinces.

The Austrian rule was harsh, but conducted with legal forms, in Lombardy, whilst, from the very first day, it was exercised with disorderly severity in Piedmont. The old King of Sardinia, having passed the period of his exile at Rome, and assisted at the Pope's return, at whose feet he had prostrated himself, returned to Turin and took possession of his dominions, which the English proposed increasing by the addition of Genoa. He governed after the fashion of the most short-sighted of emigrants. He not only re-established absolute power, but he employed it in punishing all who had served under France, and persecuting those who did not abstain from flesh meat on Fridays and Saturdays, and in all things acted with the most violent intolerance, in a country which, during twenty years, had been imbued with the French spirit. A great number of Piedmontese officers fled to Murat, who received them with delight, and those who remained, either refusing to serve, or detesting the new government, were very little suited to support it. A general insurrection would certainly have broken out but for the neighbourhood of the Austrians on the Tessino and the Po.

Genoa thoughtlessly yielded to the English, and was promised her independence by the complaisant and liberal Lord Bentinck, but she was thrown into despair when she saw the fate that was being prepared for her. It was remarkable that at first all the seaport towns of Europe stretched forth their arms towards England, that is to the sea, but now drew them back in anger. Genoa acted like Marseilles, Bordeaux, Nantes, Antwerp, &c., &c.

The Legations, which under the Empire had been included in the viceroyalty of Lombardy, were occupied by Murat, who had invaded them in the name of the Coalition. In conformity with the opinions of the day, that each prince should recover what he had formerly possessed, the Legations ought to be restored to the Pope, and he was justified in expecting that they would. But the Pope at his return having refused to recognize Murat's title, the latter avenged himself by continuing to occupy these provinces, not indeed ill-treating the inhabitants, but leaving them in a painful state of uncertainty as to their future destiny.



At this period—September and October, 1814—Tuscany was the only country in Italy, and perhaps in Europe, that was at rest. Under the Empire, Tuscany had been restored to the Archduke Ferdinand, Duke of Wurabourg, and after being tossed about for twenty years from one sovereignty to another, found herself at last under the government of a wise and moderate prince, who did not seek to deprive her of the privileges she had obtained from the French, nor persecute those who had served under Napoleon, but, on the contrary, placed MM. Fossombroni and Corsini, the most distinguished members of the French administration, at the head of his government. Thus Tuscany, fully aware of the advantages of her position, was the only Italian state that neither regretted nor desired anything. The turbulent Leghorn, having obtained the freedom of the sea, and, unlike Genoa, not being threatened with a foreign ruler, was as contented and peaceful as the rest of Tuscany.

The Romans had got back the Pope, whom they received on their knees on the *Place du Peuple*. Amongst those prostrated before him might be seen poor Charles IV., his wife, and the Prince de la Paix, sad remains of the Spanish family, collected at Rome like the waifs of some great shipwreck. Pius VII., generally so mild and moderate, seemed to have flung aside these qualities the moment he was restored to his own sacred domain, and put into practice the most unwise and least humane rigours of the church. He immediately annulled all the improvements that the French had introduced into the administration, he persecuted most pitilessly all those priests or laymen who had served under them, he annulled the sales of church property, and proclaimed the re-establishment of the Jesuits, which caused no little inquietude to all enlightened men. These imprudent resolutions were not suggested by Cardinal Consalvi, who was gone to solicit the support of the European courts in the affair of the Legations, but by his temporary substitute, Cardinal Pacca. Cardinal Maury had been banished to his diocese of Montefiascone, and was forbidden to appear before the Holy Father. Why? Because he was a bishop appointed by Napoleon, who had been crowned by Pius VII. All the Cardinal's relations had been deprived of their appointments. Things were carried so far that Pius VII. began to be ashamed of proceedings so contrary to the usual generosity of his disposition.

We have already explained the relations existing between the Pope and the Bourbon government concerning the revocation of the Concordat. At the same time that Pius VII. asked the support of the Bourbons in the question of the Marshes and the Legations, he demanded the restoration of

Avignon and Benevento. He requested Louis XVIII. not to accept the Charter because of the liberty of worship therein guaranteed ; he also demanded the abolition of divorce—a change in the law of marriage which would restore to the religious ceremony its superiority over the civil ; he also demanded a dotation in land for the church. In return, the old bishop of Saint-Malo, ambassador of Louis XVIII., had presented the demands of his court, which consisted in the unconditional abolition of the Concordat, and the restoration of the French clergy to the same position they held before 1802. Whilst the Bishop of Saint-Malo presented this demand with all the respect due to the Holy See, he yet gave Pius VII. to understand that the Bourbons were far from approving of his reign, and would even blame its weakness, had they dared to utter a reproach against the representative of God on earth.

On his side, the Pope, who saw nothing strange in his demanding the restitution of Avignon or opposing freedom of worship, thought it both astonishing and offensive that he should be asked to undo his own work by the re-establishment of the ancient French church ; or that it should be insinuated that he had done wrong in signing the Concordat. The doctrine held by him and his negotiators was, that the Holy See could not err. Had the Bourbons been consistent, they would not have disputed this ; but as in this case everybody was inconsistent, the minister of Louis XVIII., to obtain the abolition of the Concordat, asserted that the Pope could err ; and thus declared himself a Gallican ; whilst the Pope asserted ultramontane principles in order to defend the Concordat, the least ultramontane of his acts.

However, as both parties needed each other's assistance, they endeavoured to come to an understanding, and Pius VII. appointed a congregation of cardinals to examine the important question of the revocation of the Concordat, and resolve the numerous difficulties dependent thereon. Amongst the demands of the court of France, there was one very agreeable to the court of Rome, which was an increase in the number of episcopal sees. This measure was therefore admitted, not as a revocation of the Concordat, but as a simple increase of the number of bishoprics—a demand which the church has not refused to grant at any time. As far as individuals were concerned, the Pope was equally ready to yield, and made no objection to reinstate all the ancient titulars that were still in existence, numbering about twelve or thirteen, notwithstanding the self-contradiction of re-appointing prelates whom he had deposed. But at the same time, he demanded and obtained well-secured pensions for the prelates he was about to depose,

after having appointed them himself. However, these negotiations, as often happens at Rome, proceeded very slowly, which on this occasion was very fortunate both for Pius VII. and the Bourbons, neither of whom suspected the benefit conferred by this delay in the accomplishment of their wishes.

Naples still remained with what wrecks of the imperial dynasty still existed in that kingdom. Murat's astonishment at finding himself on the throne of Naples, could only be equalled by that which Europe felt at seeing him there. In the first days of 1814, whilst the Allies were still doubtful of their victory, Austria, in order to detach Murat from Napoleon, had guaranteed him the throne of Naples, and England confirmed the act. Now that the Allies were completely victorious, they repented of having bound themselves so early and so formally. The powers that had not taken part in the negotiation, blamed the precipitancy of England and Austria, who, indeed, were ashamed of what they had done; and though they could not venture to undo their work themselves, were very well disposed to allow it to be undone by others.

All the princes of Italy, and the Pope in particular, had refused to recognise Murat, who avenged himself on the latter, as we have seen, by occupying the Legations and the Marches. Whilst this neighbour, so morally powerful, refused to recognise Murat, another, Ferdinand IV., king of Sicily and Palermo, regarded him as an adventurer, whom the confusion of European affairs had allowed to continue on an usurped throne. As might be expected, the legitimate heir of the Neapolitan Bourbons made every exertion to recover his patrimony. Murat could now estimate at Naples, as Marmont at Paris, what one gains by abandoning a course to which he is naturally allied, whatever excuse unjust treatment might furnish for such conduct. Regret is the commencement of remorse; and Murat already regretted deeply having abandoned his true interest when he abandoned Napoleon. His sister-in-law, the Princess Pauline, aided by the queen, did all she could to make him feel what he only felt too deeply already. She then left for Porto Ferrajo, to bring about a reconciliation between the brothers-in-law.

But Murat was determined not to give the powers assembled at Vienna a pretext for dethroning him, by appearing unfaithful to his engagements; and whilst he sent messages of repentance to the island of Elba, he avoided any act that might compromise him, and always addressed the Allies as a member of the Coalition, who rejoiced at having aided in conquering the tyrant of Europe. But he gave a most friendly reception to the Piedmontese and Lombard officers who sought refuge in his dominions. He acted in the same manner towards the

French officers who came to offer him their services, although an order of Louis XVIII. recalled the latter to France: and he paid them all well, for his finances were in excellent condition. He made every exertion to increase his army, which already amounted to 80,000 men; for he knew that a large military force would constitute his very best title with the negotiators of Vienna. He had many partizans amongst the nobility and citizens of Naples, who dreaded all that the return of Ferdinand IV. would entail. If the better educated classes, whom he did not offend, were on his side, it was not the same with the *lazzaroni*, who had a lively remembrance of their ancient masters, although they often applauded him because of his noble person, which he frequently displayed by riding through the streets of Naples. He was not altogether unpopular; but he was no longer the hero of Italy, as he had been for a few months. No; the real hero of Italy was elsewhere: he was in the isle of Elba. Having at first wished to free themselves from the conscription and the *droits réunis*, the affections of the Italians soon returned to Napoleon, and they saw in him the ideal representative of their cause conquered, and Prometheus-like, chained to a rock. With the exception of Tuscany, the dominant wish, from the Alps to the Straits of Messina, was that the sovereign of Elba might quit his isle, put himself at the head of the Neapolitan army, and march on Milan. There was very little probability of such an event; for Napoleon would not leave his island, in order to attempt, with the assistance of the Italians, what he had failed in when aided by the French; or in other words, to undertake a desperate struggle against victorious Europe, to do battle for the unity of Italy, a cause in which he had never taken any great interest. However, it is certain that, had he appeared, all who were disgusted with the military *régime* of Austria, with the pious tyranny of Piedmont, and the domination of the Sacred College, would certainly have risen at his voice, and repeated one of those attempts so often made by the Italians, but in which they have not yet succeeded.

Italy, like the rest of Europe, after having desired and invoked what was called their common deliverance, was now very little satisfied with it. But there was one country more dissatisfied than any other—a country justly indignant at the deceptions that had repaid her efforts: this country was Spain. Spain had shed torrents of blood and supported a heroic struggle for the restoration of her king, and for all this blood and all these efforts, she had only obtained a stupid and sanguinary tyranny.

Ferdinand VII., who, as we have seen, had by Napoleon's orders been conducted to the frontiers of Spain and restored

to the Spanish troops, had entered Gironne on the 24th of March. From Gironne he proceeded to Saragossa, where he found deputies from the regency and the Cortes, who, before restoring him the royal authority, required that he should swear to observe the constitution of Cadiz, a proceeding similar to that adopted by the senate with regard to Louis XVIII. Let us imagine how the Bourbons would have acted at Paris, had they been unrestrained by public opinion and by the presence of the imperial army at Fontainebleau; and instead of depending exclusively on the support of foreign armies, obedient to the will of Alexander, had they rested on a Verdian army, we shall easily understand the conduct of Ferdinand VII. in Spain. This prince refused at first to enter into any explanation with the deputies from the regency and the Cortes, and proceeded from Saragossa to Valencia, greeted as he passed by the homage of the people, who were delighted at his return and the restoration of peace. At Valencia he was received with transports of delight. The army even came voluntarily to take the oath of allegiance, and this general good feeling, which his presence inspired, continuing to increase, he considered himself sufficiently strong to enter into explanations with the authorities at Madrid. Enlightened men were indeed of opinion that he could not, without some modifications, accept the constitution of Cadiz—a constitution still more defective than ours of 1791. General Castanos, the conqueror of Baylen, and the most distinguished man at that time in Spain, together with M. de Cevallos, the most enlightened of the ministers, advised him to negotiate, and confine himself to demanding modifications of the constitution, and not to break off with men who had defended his throne with their blood. Nothing would induce him to adopt conciliatory measures; for he felt more indignant against men who sought to limit his royal authority after having conserved it for him, than against those who had sought to deprive him of it for ever by shutting him up at Valency. Unfortunately, the heads of the Cortes, unwise as he, were quite as unwilling to make concessions, and the unity, whose result might have been the establishment of rational institutions in Spain, was become an impossibility.

The Cortes having commissioned the Archbishop of Toledo to go to the king, and request him to declare his decision concerning the constitution, his Majesty said he would not accept it, and sent back the archbishop to Madrid, resumed the plenitude of his authority, annulled all the acts of the Cortes, and ordered the troops to march upon the capital. The people and the army, who only saw in him the king for whom they had fought so long, and understanding nothing, or almost

nothing, of the theoretic dispute between the sovereign and the Cortes, and even feeling astonished that the royal authority could be refused to him for whom it had been preserved at the expense of such exertions, had encouraged him by their enthusiastic submission to dare everything, and he entered Madrid as an absolute monarch, that is to say, free to pursue those measures that might lead to his ruin. Scarcely was he settled in his palace, when he exiled or imprisoned those who had struggled hardest to preserve his crown; sent to his diocese the Archbishop of Toledo—the head of the regency, the man who had supported the royal prerogative with all his might; he re-established the Inquisition with all its consequences, and thus added to what was ridiculous in an impossible restoration, the odium of the blackest and basest ingratitude. There were, however, men in Spain who, without entirely participating in the liberal opinions of the Cortes, were yet impressed by them; and who, considering the present re-action absurd, were determined to oppose it. These men abode chiefly in Catalonia. They were joined by several members of the Cortes, and it looked as if an organised resistance were about to commence in that quarter. When these men saw in what manner the son of Charles IV. behaved, they thought of recalling the old king, whose want of intellectual power was compensated by the gentleness of his temper.

The difficulties of the position increased visibly, and Ferdinand VII., attributing the present movement to the intrigues of the Prince de la Paix, who was staying at Rome with Charles IV., preferred a request to the Holy See that this old minister of his father should be exiled to Pesaro. Charles IV., whose affection for his favourite had never wavered, was indignant at hearing this, and seemed inclined to go to Barcelona or to Vienna, and appeal to Spain or to Europe to restore his throne, and avenge him on an unnatural son. It was with difficulty that he was pacified, and it needed all the Pope's sacred authority to restrain him.

Such was the spectacle that Spain presented, and in contemplating it we cannot but feel inclined to thank the senate for having drawn up a rational constitution for us; nor can we refuse our gratitude to the foreign sovereigns who supported it, and Louis XVIII. who accepted it, and thus spared us the disgraceful re-action which recompensed the devotion of the Spaniards. Although the Bourbons who reigned over us did not imitate the odious conduct of Ferdinand VII., they still committed faults that sufficed to open a new career of adventures to Napoleon, and a fresh source of misfortunes to France.

We shall complete this picture of Spain by a short explana-

tion of its relations with the cabinet of the Tuileries. The treaty of peace was signed in July, the bulwark of the Pyrenees being no unimportant argument in its favour; and nothing now remained to be done but to make a reciprocal exchange of prisoners. But France had secretly promised to assist Spain in getting a double restitution from Vienna, that of Parma for the Queen of Etruria and Naples for Ferdinand IV., who during the past eight years had no territory but Sicily. It did not require much entreaty to induce France to support these demands, as indeed she would have made them herself. At this very time, Spain contracted a secret engagement with England, by which she bound herself not to renew the family compact with the Bourbons, and abruptly broke off her engagements with us, for a very strange reason. The guerilla chief Mina, from whose enterprises we had suffered so much, and to whom Ferdinand VII. was so much indebted, was one of those whom the restored monarch persecuted for opposing his assumption of absolute power. This celebrated man had taken refuge at Bayonne, where he was arrested by the Spanish consul, with the concurrence of the French authorities, who had the weakness to consent to his arrest on French ground. Louis XVIII. and the Duke de Berry were indignant at such an insult to the French crown, and demanded that Mina should be set free; that the French agent who had assisted in this illegal act should be deprived of his place; and that reparation should be demanded from the Spanish court. Ferdinand VII., instead of granting satisfaction, demanded that reparation should be made to him, and consequently all diplomatic relations ceased between the two courts. Thus Ferdinand VII. first quarrelled with the Spaniards who had saved his crown, and then with the Bourbons of France, his only relatives, his only allies in the whole world, and sacrificed the family compact to England without being assured of her support—for she blamed him loudly for the injurious reaction, of which indeed he was as much the instrument as the author.

Such was the state of Europe, freed from Napoleon's power, but exposed to a species of universal counter-revolution; nor were these the sole evils with which Europe was threatened! After fifteen years of suffering caused by the exorbitant ambition of Napoleon, the fall of this insatiable conqueror might have served as a lesson, and taught moderation to all. But it had no such effect, and the victorious powers seemed, from their boundless avidity, more inclined to justify Napoleon than to cause the world to bless his fall. This was the painful spectacle they presented at Vienna, where they had appointed to meet on the 1st of August.



The allied sovereigns, on leaving Paris, had all, with the exception of the Emperor Francis, who was no lover of tumult, gone to pay a visit to the Prince Regent of England, and received in London such an ovation as the English know well how to bestow when their passions are inflamed, and their interests satisfied. Rome, Madrid, Vienna, Berlin, had echoed to loud acclamations, but all were surpassed by the enthusiastic delight exhibited in London when the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia appeared. Their reception verged on folly. Not wishing to disturb these magnificent fêtes by discussions on business which might have marred the universal joy, it was decided that they should remain good friends, and if necessary, even make reciprocal sacrifices, and maintain, at any cost, the alliance of Chaumont, by which they had rid themselves of the tyrant of Europe. France, it was said, though restored to the Bourbons, was not resigned to her fate, nor was Napoleon forgotten, though banished to the isle of Elba, and unforeseen events might arise which could only be overcome while the Allies remained united. Without entering, therefore, into any explanation concerning European arrangements, the monarchs swore an eternal friendship, and promised to meet at Vienna with the same sentiments.

According to the 32nd article of the treaty of Paris, which fixed the meeting of the approaching Congress within the next two months, the representatives ought to meet on the 1st of August. But as this date would not allow sufficient time for all that was to be done, the meeting was therefore deferred to the month of September.

After the fêtes in London, the King of Prussia, notwithstanding his modesty, went to receive the congratulations of his subjects. On the other hand, the Emperor Alexander had gone to Warsaw to excite the foolish imagination of the Poles in favour of a pretended reconstitution of Poland which he meditated, and, consequently, the two monarchs could not meet at Vienna before the 25th of September. They made a brilliant entry into the Austrian capital, worthy of their joy and their success. The Emperor Francis, who took part in these displays rather for the sake of his allies than from any feeling of personal gratification, went to meet the two monarchs, embraced them in the presence of his people, and then returned with them into his capital amidst the enthusiastic applause of the inhabitants. The Kings of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Denmark arrived successively, and after them all the German, Italian, and Dutch princes who had their interests to defend in the approaching negotiations. Princesses were as abundant as princes at Vienna, and amongst the

former, none was more conspicuous than Alexander's sister, the Grand Duchess Catherine, widow of the Duke of Oldenburg, an active-minded and intellectual woman, who possessed a certain amount of influence. To these crowned heads were joined the generals and diplomatists of the Coalition, anxious to compliment each other on their military and political successes. Some came merely to receive felicitations, and rejoice in the common triumph, whilst others came to represent their governments, but all alike greedy of rewards, fêtes, pleasures, news, and forming, with the sovereigns, the most dazzling and tumultuous assembly that ever was seen. But from this brilliant meeting of monarchs, two personages were absent—the unfortunate King of Saxony, imprisoned at Berlin, for having been the last to break his alliance with the French, and Maria Louise, buried in the palace of Schoenbrunn, whence she heard with a sort of envy the noise of the festivities, and where she was occupied, not in preparing to join her husband in Elba, but in disputing her duchy of Parma with the two houses of Bourbon, under the guidance of M. de Neipperg, who was appointed her adviser. He was an experienced officer, acquainted with war and diplomacy, and capable of informing her of all that was necessary for her to know, and in the profound isolation into which she had fallen, the Count was becoming daily more her counsellor, advocate, and friend.

After some days devoted to amusement of every kind, it was time to think of matters of more serious import; a change of occupation unwelcome to all. Whilst the sovereigns always declared that unanimity ought to be maintained, they had not entered into explanations on any subject, with the exception of some points already decided in the treaty of Paris. Written documents had already been drawn up, by which England was to get Belgium and Holland, and therewith form the kingdom of the Low Countries, as a protection against France; Austria was to have Italy as far as the Tessino and the Po; Prussia was to be reconstituted, and put in the same position with regard to territory as she had been in 1805; whilst Russia, freed from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (Napoleon's attempt at a French Poland), should share its wrecks with the neighbouring states. But there was so little desire to disturb the general happiness, that no arrangement had been made as to the disposition of the vacant territories, all debates on this difficult and doubtful point being referred to the autumnal meeting.

There could be no dispute as to Italy, which, as far as the Po and the Tessino, was given to Austria, nor the Low Countries, where the French frontier of 1790 was accepted as a

definite boundary; but ample subject, not only of debate but of contention, would be found in the centre of Europe, in the territories touching on Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia were each secretly determined to have entire possession, the one of Poland, the other of Saxony.

These two princes, equals in age and rank, though very different in disposition, had in the commencement of their reigns been firm friends. But their friendship was destroyed by the events of 1807, when, both being conquered, they experienced such very different treatment. Provinces were bestowed on Alexander, whilst Frederick William was deprived of half his dominions; in 1813 they renewed their alliance under the harsh oppression of Napoleon, and on the battle-fields of Lutzen and Leipzig their ancient friendship revived, and they vowed that nothing thenceforward should disunite them. They had, consequently, no secrets from one another; each felt perfect confidence in his friend; they were of the same opinion on every subject, and whenever Alexander spoke it was pretty certain that Frederick William would echo his sentiments. As Alexander not only spoke but thought first, he guided the opinions of his friend, though not to the disadvantage of Prussia, for they were as closely united by political interest as by personal affection. These two princes esteemed each other highly, looking upon themselves as the honestest men of their age, whilst they considered England the most egotistical of all powers, and Austria the most astute. If they were to be believed, the whole civilized world would be still in a state of bondage, if Alexander had not given the signal of resistance in 1812, and if Frederick William had not joined him in 1813, or if, when they had reached the Oder, they had not pressed forward, carrying all Europe in their train, until they reached the Elbe, the Rhine, and even the Seine. They esteemed nobody so highly as themselves, and this esteem was not altogether ill-founded, for though Frederick William sometimes exhibited a duplicity not uncommon in weak-minded men; and though Alexander's fickleness made him sometimes appear false, still the former was upright and modest, and the latter generous in disposition and fascinating in manner. But, as often happens to honest people who pique themselves on their honesty, these two monarchs believed they were impeccable, and even looked upon their ambition as a virtue. If the one desired to obtain possession of Poland, and the other of Saxony, it was, according to them, from the purest and noblest motives. Alexander desired to get Poland that he might re-organize the country. And, indeed, in his youth he had often thought and said that the division of

Poland by Catherine, Frederick the Great, and Maria Theresa—was an odious crime, and ought by all means to be repaired. But he was very much annoyed at Napoleon's attempts at this reparation from 1807 to 1812, and did all he could to prevent him. But, thinking the moment was now come when he could undertake the task himself, he commenced his preparations with the ardour that characterized all his movements. He possessed many facilities for carrying out his project, for he was master of the greater number of the Polish provinces. By joining to these the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, comprising Warsaw, Thorn, Posen, and Kalisch, he might compose a magnificent kingdom, extending from the Niemen to the Crapach range. On this kingdom he intended to bestow free institutions, and assume the crown himself, remaining at the same time Emperor of all the Russias. He would thus assume the double title of emperor and king—the very summit of human power—and would be in the eyes of Russia the equal or even the superior of Catherine and Peter the Great, since in the course of a single reign he should have added to Russia, Finland, Bessarabia, and Poland. These dreams of ambition seemed to him but schemes for the benefit of humanity. Many Poles, who considered France too distant to befriend Poland, which they believed could only be efficaciously done by Russia, together with many others who had adopted the same views since our misfortunes, now collected round Alexander, and contributed not a little to excite his ambitious views. He determined to become the restorer, the liberal restorer of Poland; for though he meant to place his new kingdom under the Russian sceptre, he did not mean to subject it to Russian despotism; the government should somewhat resemble the English. By acting in this manner, Alexander did not look upon himself at all as a conqueror; on the contrary, he said that he would deprive himself of Lithuania and Volhynia in order to create this new kingdom, of which, if it would give less offence to European jealousy, he would make his brother Constantine king, and be himself only suzerain. In his opinion, the Congress of Vienna by assisting in this plan, would put the acmé to the glory of victorious Europe, and would be in a position to say it had reconstituted the world on the bases of justice, liberty, and true political wisdom. We must pardon such illusions, for it is something gained when ambition thinks it necessary to assume the appearance of honesty, a point on which so many are indifferent, satisfied if they can obtain what they desire, without seeking to give their conduct even the semblance of justice.

There was, however, one objection to this fair vision, to which Alexander did not blind himself, but for which his

reply was prepared. The territories of which the Grand Duchy of Warsaw had been composed had been formerly divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The principal part had belonged to Prussia, whose rule extended as far as the Vistula, including Warsaw. This large portion, then, was to be taken from Prussia, who would certainly demand compensation somewhere; and this extension of the Russian frontier from the Vistula to the Oder should be sanctioned by Europe—an extension which would be a real subject of alarm to the entire continent, and would be also contrary to the treaty of Kalisch (28th February, 1813), to the treaty of Reichenbach (15th June, 1813), and to the treaty of Tœplitz (9th September, 1813), treaties which had successively formed the bonds of the Coalition. By the conditions of these treaties the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was to be distributed between the co-sharers of Poland, agreeable, or very nearly so, to the old partition that had been made of it; besides, Prussia should get ten thousand additional subjects, and Illyria was to be restored to Austria. This was what they had promised each other when they formed the European coalition against France in 1813; but the unexpected success of this coalition had permitted them to extend the sphere of these restitutions, for Austria, instead of getting Illyria alone, was to get back the Tyrol and the north of Italy, with the addition of Venice, that she had never possessed before. England, that would have been very well satisfied to deprive France of the seaports of Hamburg and Bremen, and still happier if she could deprive her of Holland, was now, in addition to these, about to rob her of Belgium, which she intended for the house of Orange. If all these Powers had in this manner enlarged their original demands, was Russia alone, asked Alexander, to confine herself within the narrow views she had formed at a time when the utmost the Allies hoped was to reach the Elbe, but had no expectation of touching the Rhine? Certainly not; and Russia's share should, as well as that of the others, be proportioned to the unhoped-for success of the Coalition.

Saxony, Prussia's compensation, was ready; the possession of this kingdom would be the realization of all her wishes. This power, since Frederick the Great, by the united genius of policy and arms, had put it together in bits and scraps, had always presented a kind of geographical deformity. On the map of Europe it appeared as a state of disproportioned length, extending from the Niemen to the Rhine, with many long intervals, and, above all, wanting solidity in the centre. If Dresden were added to Berlin, this awkward configuration would be partly remedied, and Prussia would obtain possession of that field for military operations, whose import-

ance had been proved by Napoleon in the nineteenth and by Frederick in the eighteenth century. And by this arrangement, Prussia, instead of disaffected Poles, would have honest German subjects, and, still better, she would thus become one of the chief German powers, and be placed in a position to bring about that Germanic unity, the bare mention of which is sufficient to excite the Prussian mind, whilst Alexander believed that he was performing a duty to the human race in remodelling Poland. Frederick William believed it was a duty he owed Germany to make this first great step towards her unity, and flattered himself that he would thus pay for all the blood she had shed in the common cause, never permitting himself to perceive that it was more for Prussia than for German unity he was working; that the lesser German States would be seriously alarmed by such a move; that Austria would be offended, and that all Europe would be terrified at the prospect of paying for German unity by abandoning Poland to Russia. Like Alexander, he had answers for all the objections that could be made to his projects, for the prism of desire always shows objects as we wish to see them. Prussia had been promised, he said, ten thousand subjects, without mentioning the locality, and she would not exceed this number in taking possession of Saxony; she would merely choose what suited her best. The King of Saxony's interests could not be alleged against this measure, for he was a traitor who had deserted the cause of Europe. Besides, when Russia and Prussia were united they need fear no opposition. Austria and England were so much occupied in satisfying their avidity—the one in Italy, the other in the two hemispheres—that neither would take notice of what was going on. France deserved no consideration. In short, Europe was under so many obligations to both Russia and Prussia that she could not refuse them the gratification of such honest and legitimate desires. So did Frederick William argue with himself, and he thought his reasoning excellent. Alexander and Frederick William had pledged their word to each other, and they came to Vienna persuaded that they should have Poland and Saxony.

Was it possible that England and Austria entertained no suspicion of these projects, and, if they suspected that, they made no opposition? This certainly looks very strange, when we reflect on the violent opposition that soon burst forth. But, as we have said, the fear of disturbing the general harmony had prevented all explanations. The re-constitution of Poland had been often spoken of, as well as the deserved punishment of the King of Saxony; and the partition of the Duchy of Warsaw was provided for by the treaties. The re-constitution

[ Poland had even been mentioned as one of the questions that might be submitted to the Congress. But so many places had been parts of Poland for the last fifty years, that in speaking of the country no precise boundaries were understood. This threw a vagueness over the subject, which was very agreeable to all parties; besides, the all-absorbing interests of the present excluded all thought of the future. England could not yet forget how the continental ports had been shut against her, and it was to prevent the recurrence of such an event that she formed the kingdom of the Low Countries; that she sought to give Hanover more importance, and endeavoured to make Prussia the ally of both, for which reason she was ready to make every concession to Frederick William to induce him to adopt her views. Austria, more clear-sighted than England, had more quickly detected the views of Russia and Prussia, for it was a serious consideration for her that Prussia should take possession of Saxony, and that the Slavonic race should extend to the foot of the Crapach mountains. But these were not her only cares, and in the midst of her present prosperity she was oppressed by greater and more serious anxieties than she had ever known before. In the west and north she had to apprehend Prussia and Russia; she had to watch over the re-constitution of Germany, and fix her own position amongst the Germanic powers; she had to organise Italy, to restrain Murat, to watch over the prisoner of Elba, to keep an observant eye on France, and at the same time be cautious that in treating these different interests she did not allow one to mar the other. Austria was, therefore, determined to employ all the means at her disposal—patience, tact, vigilance, and, if necessary, force. Of the three hundred thousand soldiers at her disposal, she had assembled two hundred and fifty thousand in Bohemia and Hungary, and left but fifty thousand in Italy, where she was exposed to be attacked by Murat, the Italians, and perhaps the prisoner of Elba. Austria had, consequently, silently made her preparations in the direction of Poland and Saxony, but the more her difficulties increased, the more she desired to overcome them by the union, by the good understanding of the Four—that is, of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia; for, in her opinion, were France and the lesser German States allowed to interfere, all would be plunged into a real chaos, whence would spring the modern Lucifer—that is to say, Napoleon, who was not yet forgotten, and who certainly was determined not to allow himself to pass from men's minds, although he affected to slumber in that profound sleep that might naturally be supposed consequent on his long fatigues. Under the influence of these impressions, the first words spoken at Vienna were the last that had been pro-



pronounced at London—that the Allies should remain united in opinion, at any sacrifice: and this was the oftener repeated, as they felt that the day of disunion was approaching.

Such were the dispositions of those that formed the Congress: all were extremely anxious to maintain unity, and all were filled with a boundless avidity, little compatible with such union. If ever the fault that France had committed in signing the Treaty of Paris with so much precipitation, was evident, it was at this moment, when destiny decreed that Europe should be disunited, for it was impossible that Austria would consent that Prussia should take possession of Dresden, or Russia of Cracow; or that the lesser German powers would allow Saxony, the most respectable amongst them, to be suppressed because of her alliance with France—a fault that was common to them all—or that England would sanction the execution of these ambitious projects in the face of the British Parliament. If, amid these divided interests, France had come to Vienna, unrestricted by a treaty which marked out her frontiers, there can be no doubt but that her position would be better than it was in Paris in the month of May. Whilst, on the one hand, Russia and Prussia were determined to have Poland and Saxony, at any price, and on the other hand, England and Austria were determined that they should not get them, France would have been able to give so decided a preponderance to whichever party she joined, that certainly no concessions would be spared to gain her support. Russia and Prussia were the two powers most inclined to make concessions to France, for their interests were connected with the Elbe and the Vistula, and not with the Rhine and the Scheldt. It is evident that, had we joined these powers, we should have got very different frontiers to those assigned us by the Treaty of Paris. Had we only gained the line of fortresses demanded by our negotiators, it would have been a great advantage; and being gained by diplomacy alone, would have obtained for the Bourbons that popularity of which they stood so much in need. It was indeed a misfortune that we came to Vienna clogged by the Treaty of Paris. However, the evil was not altogether irremediable, and it was still possible to profit of the new state of things. It was evident that the discussion would be warm, for both Russia and Prussia seemed prepared to proceed to every extremity in order to obtain Poland and Saxony. If it went so far as the forming of new alliances, or preparing for war, it is not likely that the Treaty of Paris would prove a greater restraint than that of Chaumont had been. Of course, we could not ourselves proclaim an intention of not abiding by the Treaty of Paris, but by prudence in our expressions, and giving hope of our support,

whilst we lingered in according it, Russia and Prussia were both so ardent, that they would probably pronounce the words we dare not utter, and offer us what we could not venture to demand. We cannot say how much our condition may have been improved, but undoubtedly it would have been ameliorated, and that in proportion to the seriousness of the conflict. We may add that, united with Russia and Prussia, we should have nothing to fear from the dispute, however violent it may be. It is even probable that England and Austria, not daring to venture on war, would have yielded, and we should have become the arbitrators, the well recompensed arbitrators of the contention. Consequently, the treaty of Paris was not an insurmountable difficulty, but only an obstacle that may be overcome by a little address; and it must be allowed that address was quite permissible against adversaries who had both used and abused force in dealing with us.

This line of conduct supposes our consent to the wishes of Russia and Prussia; and what loss would be incurred by these concessions? Had Russia obtained Poland, of which she already possessed the greater part, she would have advanced from her long-established position on the Vistula as far as the Wartha. Prussia, in getting Saxony, would have come nearer to Austria. By these movements, Russia would occasion more uneasiness to Germany, and Prussia more jealousy to Austria. Ought France to become uncomfortable at such results? Was it our duty to guard the union of the three Continental powers that had helped to conquer us, and after our defeat had imposed on us the treaty of the 30th of May; and that for forty years has held our policy under the yoke of a permanent coalition? If the Prussians were to be an inconvenience to any one, was it not better that they should be so to Austria by getting possession of Dresden, than to us by getting Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle? It is true, that had the house of Saxony been removed from the banks of the Elbe to the left of the Rhine, as Alexander and Frederick William proposed, the Germanic equilibrium—a component part of the European balance of power—would have been shaken. But what was the use of this Germanic equilibrium, which had been so largely encroached on during our century? What was its use either to us or the rest of Europe? It was only interposing small states between greater, in order to break the shock of their collision. Would it not be more to our interest that German states should be interposed between us and Prussia, in order to prevent collision between us, than that they should be placed between her and Austria to spare the latter a shock? And Saxony having abandoned us on the field of battle, and Europe having lost all sense of moderation

in her dealings with us, were we not justified now more than at any other time, or under any other circumstances, in thinking of ourselves, and of ourselves alone?

These questions contain their own reply; and now, at the end of half a century, one is surprised at the strange view that was taken of them at the period of which we are relating the history. Unfortunately, at that time our foreign was as defective as our home policy, and these questions were not even raised in the royal council. In the same manner, as it was not even asked whether it would not be better to defer for two months that convention of the 23rd of April, by which we surrendered such important pledges, without hastening the departure of the Allied armies by a single day, so it was not asked whether it were not better to put off the treaty of Paris for six months—that is, to a time when the powers assembled for our spoliation should quarrel over the division of the spoil—nor was it even decided what line of policy should be adopted at Vienna. The defective organisation of the royal council was the cause of this, and not a want of intelligence in the men who composed it. This council consisted, as we have already seen, of a confused mixture of princes and of ministers, with and without portfolios, acting under a literary king, who was both inattentive and idle, quite willing to allow himself to be governed, but not to allow a head to his cabinet whose active vigilance would extend to every subject—such a council could only produce results as disconnected as itself. In any department provided with a special minister, gifted with a real capacity for business, everything went on well. The finance department, which enjoyed this advantage, was admirably well administered. In the other departments, and particularly that of the interior, everything was left to chance, and was governed by the passions of the dominant party. As to foreign affairs, they were given up to the King, as king, and to M. de Talleyrand, who enjoyed the reputation of being more conversant in such matters than any man in France. We shall soon see what was the result of this state of things.

The views of Louis XVIII. with regard to foreign policy were, as in all things else, moderate, and tolerably wise, but as limited as his wishes.\* Happy at finding himself again in

\* There does not, perhaps, exist any subject within the history of our times on which both French and foreign historians are worse informed than the Congress of Vienna, nor is there one more important, since it was in this Congress that modern Europe took its present proportions, and that state of things was established which has now lasted nearly fifty years. Whilst I write, I have before me the most authentic documents, both French and foreign, together with the private correspondence of Louis XVIII. and M. de Talleyrand. The letters of the minister contain the personal anecdotes of this great scene, with every detail that could interest an intellectual, sarcastic king, who was fond of scandal, and free from every prejudice but what regarded his own descent, which he

the kingdom of his fathers, which he got back not alone entire, but increased by the addition of two or three fortresses, and a magnificent museum, in which he took little interest, he felt no desire to increase his dominions, and did not make the very simple reflection that if France remained the same as she had been in 1792, whilst the other States extended their possessions, she became relatively less, and that if she succeeded in recovering her superiority, she would be indebted for it to the Revolution, the benefits of which he was far from appreciating. Louis XVIII. possessed a certain dignified self-respect, but no ambition, and would not lightly risk the public peace, which his age, infirmities, and misfortunes, added to the exhausted state of France, made him value dearly. Besides, the desire of interfering in foreign affairs being an imperial tradition, was not agreeable to him, and he desired that the attitude of France at Vienna should be dignified and pacific. There was only one point about which he felt anxious, it was that Murat should be removed from the throne of Naples. To allow a lesser usurper to hold possession of an European throne, after the greater had fallen, was, in his eyes, an inconsistency, a disgrace to all the powers, and a real danger for France. *Flagitio addit damnum*, said he, in his usual fashion of expressing himself in Latin adages. He considered Naples as a stepping-stone on which Napoleon might descend at any moment, and march to the Alps with eighty thousand Italians, and thence excite all those elements that still fermented in France. As he attributed the difficulties he met in the internal government of his kingdom to Napoleon's intrigues and money, he refused to pay him the income of two million francs which had been stipulated by the treaty of the 11th of April, and even demanded that Napoleon should be transported to the Azores. Besides this removal of Napoleon, and dethronement of Murat, he wished that the Duchy of Parma should be taken from Maria Louisa, as he considered her holding it another source of danger, and another inconsistency of the

considered superior to any other upon earth. The materials for this correspondence were furnished by M. de Talleyrand to M. de la Besnardière, who put them into proper form, and M. de Talleyrand then copied them. The king generally wrote his own replies, though he sometimes employed M. de Blacas. Business, properly so called, was transacted by the Duke Dalberg, who corresponded with the cabinet, and this correspondence was directed by M. de Jancourt during M. de Talleyrand's absence. The latter correspondence, less piquante but more serious than the other, leaves nothing to be desired with respect to matters of business, which are set forth with clearness, precision, and a remarkable knowledge of things, all regarded, be it understood, from that point of view in which the French legation was placed. I cannot quote all the foreign documents from which I have drawn information, but they are equally authentic, and justify me fully in considering the following recital as true and complete.

European policy. He wished that the duchy should be given to the house of Parma, an ally of the Bourbons. As the son of a Saxon princess, he considered it becoming his crown to save the King of Saxony. But this last consideration yielded precedence to all the others. He would not venture on a war, nor even incur a disquietude, for the accomplishment of any of these objects, but he desired that everything should be done that diplomacy could effect. He thought alliances admissible for political reasons, but he would not ally himself too closely with any power, for he considered that close alliances often entailed war. Amongst the four great European powers with whom he could seek an alliance he preferred England, for he found in each of the others something that displeased him. In Russia, he disliked the imprudence of the sovereign; in Prussia, the too-liberal opinions of the nation, and in Austria, her relationship with Napoleon. He carried this prejudice so far as to refuse an alliance with Russia, which might have had the most beneficial results. As he had no heirs but his nephews, and one of these, the Duke d'Angoulême, being married and having no children, it was necessary that the Duke de Berry should marry, in order to keep the crown in the elder branch of the family. Count Pozzo di Borgo proposed that the Duke de Berry should espouse the Grand Duchess Anne, the same whom Napoleon was once about to marry, and entering into this project with all his wonted ardour, he extolled the services that Russia had already rendered, and could still render to France, and dilated upon all the advantages that would result from such a union. But Louis XVIII. considered an alliance with the Romanoffs a degradation to the house of Bourbon, and would not bind himself either to Russia or Alexander; he therefore made some objections on the score of religion, about which he cared little, required that the princess should abjure her faith before coming to France, and, in fact, put a thousand obstacles in the way. He would have preferred an alliance, as we have said, with England, but even with that power he would not form an unreserved alliance. His whole policy was limited to being on good terms with England, without being too closely united to her, and by her help to get rid of Murat and the prisoner of Elba, to obtain Parma for the house of Etruria, and ameliorate in some sort the King of Saxony's fate. But for the accomplishment of none of these projects, except, perhaps, for the dethronement of Murat and the removal of Napoleon, would he have consented to brave any serious difficulties. Having explained his moderate wishes to his negotiator, he left him free to do as best he could, and hardly bestowed a glance on a voluminous memoir drawn up at the Foreign Office, entitled

"Instructions," in which the political position of Europe was minutely detailed. He signed almost without reading it.

It was M. de Besnardière who drew up this memoir, and being intimately acquainted with all the details of European affairs, he had added to the wishes of Louis XVIII. the desires of France on a few points. As the fortresses of Luxembourg and Mayence had passed from our possession, it was necessary to take care that they should not become the property of Prussia or Austria. They could only be left, with safety, in the hands of Holland or Bavaria. With regard to Italy, there was a more important question to be resolved than dispossessing Murat in favour of Ferdinand IV., or Maria Louisa for the ancient Queen of Etruria; and this question was the regal succession in the house of Savoy. The old King of Sardinia had no children, neither had his heir. It was therefore necessary that the succession should be secured to the Carignan branch, lest by marriage Piedmont should fall under the yoke of Austria. In fine, it was necessary to see that the French donees, the principal of whom were Marshals, should not lose their emoluments in the general wreck. These were the secondary but very important points added by the framer of the instructions to the task of our negotiator.

This negotiator, so fashioned by circumstances that no other could possibly be chosen, was M. de Talleyrand. Associated with him was the Duke de Dalberg, who, from his vast connections in Germany and great sagacity, was very well suited for the office. Indeed, the moderate wishes of Louis XVIII. made the task of his two representatives at Vienna very simple. If, abiding by the treaty of 30th of May, they only demanded Murat's deposition, the concession of some lands to the house of Parma, and that the King of Saxony should retain some part of his dominions, everything was in their favour, and they were almost certain to succeed. It was evident that Murat, —whose position was a monstrous anomaly in the actual state of Europe,—unsupported except by Austria, whose protection he forfeited on the commission of a single fault, would soon free her from her engagements with him, and he would consequently sink beneath the combined influence of the two houses of Bourbon. In a congress in which Francis II. held a preponderating influence, it would indeed be more difficult to dispossess Maria Louisa in favour of the house of Parma. But it was not impossible that Italy, in its vast extent, would offer some compensation to her; and as for Saxony, it was certain that Austria would never consent that the Prussians should take possession of Dresden, or that the Russians should establish themselves at the foot of the Bohemian mountains. It was equally certain that the secondary powers of Germany

would rise at the mere suggestion of suppressing a State like Saxony; that England would not be deaf to their complaints; and that, above all, the British Parliament would become indignant at the idea of seeing Russia take possession of all Poland. And if to all this opposition France should join hers, Russia and Prussia would certainly be obliged to yield. It was therefore only needed to let things take their own course, and the moderate wishes of Louis XVIII. would be fulfilled. On the other hand, if France wished to annul the treaty of Paris by joining Russia and Prussia, the task would be more laborious and difficult, though not very dangerous, and almost certain of success; for, in truth, Austria and England would never venture on war, if in addition to Russia and Prussia they had France to contend with. In adopting either course, that of tranquil resignation to the treaty of Paris, or seeking a change of frontier through the disunion of the other powers, there was every prospect of success. Still, whichever line of policy we adopted, a difficulty would be found in Europe's repugnance to reveal her internal disunion to us, or to allow us to interfere in her affairs; for it would be unwise to acknowledge her divisions, and allow us to assume the important part of arbitrator. So long as this feeling lasted, there was but one course to be pursued at Vienna: to wait patiently, without putting ourselves forward, until the other powers, becoming disunited, should have recourse to us; in fact, to let our intervention be sought, not offered. Should we offer to interfere, we should only awaken distrust, and obtain less remuneration afterwards. Patience mingled with pride was the attitude best suited to us, and that most likely to produce a good result; for two things were certain, the division of interests, and the necessity the three powers would feel of France's aid; and considering these two inevitable results, our expectant policy would inevitably succeed.

If ever man was eminently fitted for this task, it was M. de Talleyrand. Noble by birth, and eminent by the position he had held for thirty years; distinguished by his style of living, and by the imposing and disdainful grace of his demeanour, he had almost transformed inertia into a virtue, and even an epigram, under a prince who seemed to consider activity a vice; and if an error should ever result from over-eagerness in action, that error would certainly not be committed by M. de Talleyrand at Vienna. But, however, temperament will yield to passion; and he who appears the most phlegmatic of men, becomes the most impetuous, when goaded by self-love or ambition. Of this truth, M. de Talleyrand was about to give an extraordinary proof.

During the last fifteen years, M. de Talleyrand had played



the principal part in all European assemblies ; and those very men who were now to appear before him as the ministers of the victorious powers of Europe, had always held a rank inferior to his, and yielded to his opinion. Under the Empire, M. de Metternich had come to Paris as the modest minister of a vanquished and oppressed court ; M. de Nesselrode was a simple secretary to the embassy. It must have been painful to M. Talleyrand not to find himself at least on a level with these men, formerly so submissive and so deferential ; and the result of this consciousness was an uncomfortable feeling, which could not fail to produce an injurious effect upon his deportment at Vienna. Averse to the trouble of reflecting or anticipating events, he had not paused to consider whether the divisions amongst the European powers might not afford an opportunity of ameliorating the condition of France. He only thought what attitude that long dominant country would assume at Vienna, now that she was herself conquered ; and in what position he would appear as her representative. He said to himself that, to represent justice—which he defined by a happily chosen word, “legitimacy,” and which was universally adopted—would be a very dignified and becoming part, and by no means inferior to that he had already acted as the representative of all-powerful genius.

He set out for Vienna, determined to assure himself a suitable position by means of the talisman of legitimacy, which, though powerful for many purposes, was not equal to all. It would be very efficacious in the dethronement of Murat, or in exciting sympathy for the King of Saxony, but could not be made universally applicable ; for were legitimacy adopted as a principle, it would not be possible to treat with Bernadotte, whom the Allies were anxious to flatter : negotiations should be entered into with Gustavus IV., who was wandering through Europe as a fugitive. Nor, were legitimacy admitted as a principle, could the representative of Ferdinand VII. be received at the Congress of Vienna, for he was king only in prejudice of his father, Charles IV., who, far from renouncing his rights, was quite ready to assert them. The admission of this principle would also necessitate a summons to the representatives of Genoa, Venice, Malta, to the ancient electors of Cologne, Treves, and Mayence, and many other victims, whose spoils were about being divided. The Congress would, under such circumstances, be filled with phantoms, to the exclusion of actual and powerful existences. This word, “legitimacy,” therefore, however true and respectable, was not at this moment sufficiently powerful to defend the more serious interests of France ; it awakened a smile on the lips of the practical men who were about to assemble at Vienna, and who used or rejected the word as suited

their purpose. But this assertion of legitimacy entailed on inconvenience—it placed us in the same category with England and Austria, and bound us to their policy, and in presence of the two great parties that were about to divide Europe, deprived us of our principle strength—freedom of choice.

With incontestable superiority as a negotiator, M. de Talleyrand arrived at Vienna in a frame of mind not the best suited to profit of the circumstances arising from our new position. That he would assume a dignified position, there could be no doubt; that he would act prudently was not quite so certain. In any case, France was certain, when represented by M. de Talleyrand, not to play the part of a conquered, and, far less, of a humiliated power.

Be this as it may, M. de Talleyrand left Paris on the 15th of September, and arrived at Vienna on the 23rd. It was two days before the arrival of the sovereigns, but their chancellors and staffs had arrived some days before, and from the time of their arrival their tongues had been very busy. Many points that had hitherto been left in doubt now began to be cleared up. The Russians and Prussians, who were informed of their masters' designs, were by no means anxious to conceal them. The Russians boastfully declared that they would have all Poland; and the Prussians, with equal lack of modesty and prudence, said that they should have Saxony. Both seemed to think that these concessions could not be refused in return for their important services.

These desires, announced with so much confidence, had from the very first day excited the greatest commotion in the Congress. The lesser princes of Germany, and other countries, were offended that a State of their own rank should be suppressed to gratify an ambitious neighbour, and for a fault that was common to them all—an alliance with imperial France. The representatives of the other States were alarmed at seeing Russia, with the connivance of Prussia, boldly advancing from the Vistula—her boundary at the commencement of the century—to the Wartha and the Oder. They spoke openly on the subject, and said that it was not worth the trouble of overturning the power of Napoleon, if it were to be replaced so quickly and so completely by another equally dangerous tyranny. This ambitious design, so boldly announced, was not less offensive than the avowed design of leaving the entire management of affairs between the four legations of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England, to the exclusion of all others. The French legation was, consequently, expected with the greatest impatience; and although no love was felt for France, especially in a place abounding with Germans, all were ready to place themselves under her direction, provided

that, putting forth no pretensions for herself, she lent her aid to the oppressed, the excluded, and the offended. The aggrieved were, in short, willing to be defended, saved, and avenged, gratuitously, by France.

The exercise of a little of M. de Talleyrand's habitual phlegm would have allowed these desires time to ferment until they became converted into passion; but from the moment of his arrival at Vienna he yielded to the influence of the scene of which he was witness. The ministers of each court received him with all the attention due to one of the most illustrious personages of Europe—the representative of legitimacy, as he had once been of victory; and, besides, the last type of the elegant dignity of the past, so much admired at that time. His house was frequented by diplomatists of every grade, by whom he was treated with profound respect; but when business came to be discussed, a different line of conduct was pursued towards him. The *Four*—that is, the representatives of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia—whilst they treated him with the greatest deference, conversed very little on business, and showed only too plainly that his influence was not as welcome as himself, and that they intended to arrange everything themselves, though there was less unity in their interests than in their intentions. The representatives of the lesser courts, generally restless, well-informed of passing events, and accustomed to excite the ministers of the greater courts against one another, because they derived advantage from such disunion,—all these assembled round M. de Talleyrand, and either directly or through M. de Dalberg, revealed to him the project which the *Four* had formed of retaining the direction of affairs in their own hands, and of giving Saxony to Prussia, who would deliver Poland to Russia. These revelations were accompanied by malicious commentaries on the good understanding subsisting between the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia; the incompetency of Lord Castlereagh, and the want of firmness of M. de Metternich, both of whom were ready to allow the most violent outrages on public justice—the one because he had not the ability, and the other because he had not the courage to prevent them.

M. de Talleyrand need only to have waited a few days, and he would have seen the project of the *Four* disappear before the general disapprobation. But the resolution, which the greater powers had formed, of excluding him from their councils, and which had been revealed to him by the lesser States, piqued him to the quick. He immediately declared, that as France was now under the rule of true equity, she would at Vienna, if necessary, be its disinterested and only represen-

tative; that there were improprieties she would not suffer and iniquities which she would not sanction. These resolutions being publicly proclaimed, produced a great sensation, delighted the lesser German powers, irritated Russia and Prussia, and very much embarrassed England and Austria, who, though they were undoubtedly dissatisfied at the eagerness shown to seize on Poland and Saxony, still were alarmed at the prospect of the storm, which France, at the head of the inferior German States, seemed about to raise.

The diplomatists, especially the Prussians, who were offended by the position we had so suddenly taken, began to say, that France had already thrown off the mask; that, at first, she seemed resigned to her new condition, though she was not so in reality; that she still wished her frontier to extend along the Rhine—a boundary which she sought to recover by exciting disunion amongst the Allies, and that if a strong combination were not formed against her, that she would still do great harm. These calumnies were answered by our legation, and by its most active member, M. de Dalberg, who was on the best terms with the Germans, by saying, that France desired nothing for herself; she was no longer ambitious; that she was not thinking of her own aggrandizement, but of checking the excessive ambition which threatened the safety of all Europe. It was very annoying to be obliged to make such protestations thus early at Vienna, and be forced to declare ourselves satisfied, after the manner in which we had been treated in the negotiations at Paris. If, on the contrary, we had waited a little, and not revealed our plans so soon, each power, in order to gain our support, would rather have fomented our ambition than blamed it, and offers would have been made us, instead of our being obliged to make protestations of disinterestedness, which bound us to our existing condition even more than did the Treaty of Paris.

Be this as it may, before the lapse of a week, the secret project of each power was bruited about Vienna. It was well-known that Russia wished to get the whole of Poland, that Prussia demanded Saxony, that the second-rate States of Germany were indignant, and eagerly sought the support which France as eagerly offered, and that Austria and England embarrassed by this tumult, were still determined, although suspecting the designs of Russia and Prussia, to transact all business with these latter, to the exclusion of all the other powers. The splendour of public fêtes only threw a veil over agitation the most intense, and anxiety the most profound.

It would be impossible to describe the Emperor of Russia's irritation and astonishment. He was so convinced of Europe's



great obligations to him, that he could hardly understand his wishes being opposed. In his anger he considered every one ungrateful; the Germans, because they would not allow him to advance as far as the Oder; the Bourbons, because they refused to give him up their cousin, the King of Saxony; and even England and Austria, because by their silence they seemed to approve the clamour that was raised against him. All this had such an effect on Alexander, that he, who was usually so mild and affectionate, became all at once cold, haughty, and severe. His anger was strongest against us. He had, he said, saved France as far as he could from the hands of the conquerors, he had placed the Bourbons on the throne, and M. de Talleyrand at the head of affairs. He had bestowed innumerable favours upon the country, king, and prime minister, and had met with ingratitude from all. Louis XVIII. had shown as little personal respect for him as consideration for his advice; he had not followed his councils: he had not even thought of offering him the "Cordon bleu," which he had so eagerly offered to the Prince Regent of England; had even refused him to raise M. de Caulaincourt to the peerage, and had put almost offensive obstacles to the marriage of the Duke de Berry with the Grand Duchess Anne. The Emperor Alexander recounted these offences with great anger and very little discretion, and he considered them even exceeded by the attitude which M. de Talleyrand had so suddenly assumed at Vienna. The prudent Count Nesselrode, constantly occupied in extinguishing the flames that others kindled, sought to calm the Emperor's feelings towards everybody, but more especially towards France, for whose alliance he was extremely desirous. He advised M. de Talleyrand to ask an audience of the Emperor. This was almost a duty incumbent on M. de Talleyrand on his arrival at Vienna, and one by no means disagreeable to him, for he was more anxious to extend than limit his sphere of action. He did ask this audience, but Alexander made him wait several days for an answer. At last the Czar replied, and received the representative of France at the imperial palace of Schoenbrunn, where he was staying. Instead of receiving M. de Talleyrand in his usual affectionate and familiar manner, he treated him with the greatest haughtiness, which, however, did not at all embarrass the illustrious diplomatist, an accomplished master in the art of preserving his self-possession in the presence of the highest earthly potentates. The Czar questioned him rudely and rapidly about the state of France, like one who did not expect to hear a good account of what was doing there, and who almost doubted whether Europe had acted wisely in recalling the Bourbons. M. de Talleyrand

replied respectfully, but firmly, to all the Emperor's questions, and the following sententious conversation took place between them:—"In what state is your country?" "Very good, Sire; as good as your Majesty could desire, and better than could be hoped." "And the public mind?" "Becomes calmer every day." "And the progress of liberal opinions?" "These opinions do not make a more regular or truer progress anywhere." "And the press?" "Is free, with the exception of a few restrictions which are necessary at first." "And the army?" "Excellent; we have thirty thousand men under arms, and can raise our numbers to three hundred thousand within a month." "And the marshals?" "Which, Sire?" "Oudinot." "He is most loyal." "Soult?" "At first he was a little out of humour, but he got Brittany, and is satisfied, and expresses the greatest loyalty." "Ney?" "He is depressed from the loss of his emoluments, but he depends on your Majesty to redress his grievances." "Your Chambers?" "It is said that they are not on good terms with the government." "Who could have said such a thing to your Majesty?" "As in every commencement, we have met some difficulties, but after twenty-five years of revolution, it is miraculous to have attained such a state of calmness as we enjoy at present." "Are you content with your position?" "Sire, the king's confidence and goodness exceed my hopes." As Alexander heard each of these replies, which he scarcely allowed M. de Talleyrand time to finish, an expression of ironical incredulity played over his features. But he soon discontinued these inquiries as to the state of France, inquiries that might have become offensive, had not M. de Talleyrand's respectful haughtiness sustained him in the difficult part he had to play. The Emperor then said quickly, "Let us speak of our affairs. Shall we finish them?" "It depends on your Majesty to terminate them to your own glory and the advantage of Europe." The Czar could scarcely restrain himself, and expressed as much surprise as displeasure at the resistance he met from France; he said to M. de Talleyrand, "I think the Bourbons owe me something." Without disputing his master's obligations to Alexander, M. de Talleyrand spoke of the rights of Europe, which ought to be respected, especially after the fall of a man who was accused of trampling them under foot. "These European rights," said Alexander, "that you raise up to oppose me, I know them not; between sovereigns, right means that which suits each, and I recognize no other." M. de Talleyrand turned away his face, and raising his hands above his head, cried, "Hapless Europe! hapless Europe! what will become of you?" The Emperor was more irritated than restrained by this significant exclamation, and said in a



tone that M. de Talleyrand had never before heard him use, "If that be the case, war! war! I have two hundred thousand men in Poland, come and expel me from it. Every power has consented to my holding it, you alone oppose, and break an agreement that was nearly universal." M. de Talleyrand had, under the Empire, sustained the attacks of a more formidable lion than Alexander. He appeared more afflicted than disturbed by the Emperor's violence, and replied that France neither desired nor dreaded war, but if unfortunately she should be forced to it, she would support the rights of all, aided by the sympathy of all, and the assistance of many allies, for he was certain that the universal agreement, the thought of which was so flattering to the Emperor, did not exist. At the termination of this painful conversation, M. de Talleyrand bowed coldly, but respectfully, and proceeded towards the door of the imperial cabinet. Alexander then advanced towards him, took his hand, and pressed it with a convulsive movement, which revealed both his excitement and irritation. It was in such situations, as the representative of one great power before another, that M. de Talleyrand was unrivalled. And had the true interests of France lain at that time in the direction of the Elbe and the Vistula instead of the Rhine and the Alps, never could they have been more proudly asserted, or more thoroughly served.

The end of September was devoted to *fêtes* and desultory discussions. But it was time that the Congress should assemble officially, under some form or another, either fully or in part. The representatives of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England—that is, MM. de Nesselrode, de Hardenberg, de Metternich, and Lord Castlereagh, the *Four*, as they were called—arrived first. The more complicated matters became, the more anxious were they to keep the management in their own hands. They proceeded to debate the conditions that should regulate the proceedings of the Congress, whilst they secretly agreed upon what they considered the best mode of proceeding.

The most celebrated Congresses of past times offered contradictory precedents, none of which was wholly applicable to actual circumstances. Never before had representatives from every nation assembled to decide the fate of almost the entire civilised world, not alone with regard to its territorial, but its legislative interests. The plenipotentiaries who composed the Congress of Westphalia had only to decide on the affairs of Germany, whilst those assembled at Vienna were called upon to arrange not alone the affairs of Germany, but of Europe, and even of the two hemispheres. It would seem that nothing could be easier and simpler than that the minis-



ters of the several states should assemble and deliberate in common. But how could they deliberate together on subjects that concerned some directly, and others indirectly? How, for example, could Berné decide on the affairs of Portugal or Portugal on those of Norway, or both on the constitution of Germany and Italy? How attach the same value to the vote of those who represented fifty millions of men, or to the vote of those who represented but a million or less? If these difficulties were taken into consideration, how could they be calculated with sufficient precision? It was evidently impossible to define such distinctions, and the plenipotentiaries of the different powers could not be assembled in a kind of *constituent* European assembly; for if there were some like Austria, Prussia, France, England, and Prussia, who were interested in all the questions, great and small, the greater number represented interests, either too exclusively local, or too trifling, to give their votes either the disinterestedness or weight that could influence the assembly. Besides, there were plenipotentiaries whom some would admit and others reject. Prussia and Russia refused to admit the minister of the King of Saxony, having already declared that this monarch ought to be deprived of his crown; the two houses of Bourbon rejected the envoy of the actual King of Naples, as the representative of an usurper; and none would admit the representative of the ancient republic of Genoa, whose existence was not recognised. A general assembly was therefore impossible, and it was more natural that those who had signed the Treaty of Paris, and who had adjourned their meeting to Vienna, should now assume the part of the mediating powers of former Congresses, and constitute themselves mediators, or, if necessary, arbitrators between the interested parties. Therefore the eight powers that had signed the Treaty of Paris could open the Congress, examine credentials, form committees of the interested parties to discuss individual questions, reserving to themselves the right to decide all difficult points, and thus establish a kind of unity. Special treaties being drawn up on each point, all should be afterwards combined into one general treaty, which should be signed by all the states, without exception, to render it binding upon all Europe. It is true, that amongst the eight states that had signed, two—Portugal and Sweden—found themselves called upon to play the part of first-rate powers, a part by no means due to their real influence, but which arose from the accidental circumstance of their being authorised as belligerents to sign the Treaty of the 30th of May with France. But this was a very trifling inconsistency, and was compensated by the advantage arising from the apparent legality of

the mediation of the eight who had signed the Treaty, and convoked the Congress.

This was the only good and practicable form of holding the Congress, provided, however, that certain powers did not take advantage of it to arrogate all authority to themselves; and this mode was adopted by the plenipotentiaries of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, who were secretly occupied in arranging the mode of proceeding. They therefore agreed to do all they could to make this arrangement acceptable to the numerous representatives of Europe actually assembled at Vienna. The question of formalities being decided, there still remained two important questions unsettled—the partition of the immense territories lately vacated, and the definite constitution of Germany. Italy and Switzerland gave rise of course to important considerations, but of restricted interest, as concerning only France, Austria, and Spain. It was agreed that this question could be decided later, when the two more important had been arranged. It was then agreed by the *Four*, that the eight states that had signed the treaty of Paris should take the initiative in opening the congress, and that two committees should be afterwards formed, the one to regulate the division of territory and the general affairs of Europe, and the other to fix the condition of Germany. The first, which was to be the great European committee, was to include the *Four*; but it would be impossible to exclude France, the representative of the elder branch of the Bourbons, and with her Spain, the representative of the younger—Spain, on whose support the Allies reckoned, because that she was Spain; because that she was under the sway of Ferdinand VII.; and because that they knew that the two houses of Bourbon were disunited. It was agreed at last, that whilst, for form sake, these six powers were to constitute the great European committee, all important questions should be secretly decided beforehand by the *Four*; by which means, whilst apparently dividing authority, they should retain it all to themselves.

The affairs of Germany were to be entrusted to Austria and Prussia, who would play the same part in this question that the *Four* did in European matters: that is, they would, after deciding all the points between themselves, submit them as a matter of form to the inferior German states, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover. (The latter had been formed into a kingdom for the advantage of the reigning house of England.) Saxony, being more or less condemned by the *Four*, and lightly esteemed by all, was to have no part in this German Committee; nor the two Hesses, which were not yet re-established; nor Baden, considered too unimportant to be taken into account.

Such was the result of the first Conferences, at the opening of the Congress, between the ministers of the four great countries, as to the mode of dividing the authority. It was strange, and even ridiculous, to see these Four arrogate to themselves universal sovereignty, in virtue of a union which their rapacity made impossible, and which was sure to be violently dissolved at the bare announcement of their reciprocal pretensions. There was, therefore, no reason for serious alarm at their intrigues. However, a general commotion was excited in a few days by the first glimpse of their projects. All those excluded from the deliberations, and who considered their exclusion only as preparatory to their ruin, complained loudly; and asked why every question should be decided by four, by six, or even by eight powers; and why the congress was not formally assembled? The French legation, highly offended at being excluded from these preliminary and secret arrangements, propagated the idea of a general assembling of the congress—an idea very acceptable to all the excluded, that is, to almost every one. This idea was warmly supported by the Spanish representative, M. de Labrador, a very sensible man, who, notwithstanding the bad feeling existing between the courts of Paris and Madrid—which he did not consider right to announce at Vienna—was most anxious that, as the two houses of Bourbon had the same interests to support, they should adopt the same attitude, conduct, and language. He followed M. de Talleyrand in everything, adopted his ideas, and repeated his words. Thus, under the influence of the French legation, but more especially under the influence of self-interest, but one question was heard in the saloons of Vienna—"When will the Congress assemble? when will it be summoned?"

The Four were alarmed at the idea of assembling the entire Congress in the present state of the public mind. However, they must show some symptom of life, and communicate with the many diplomatists assembled for some weeks past at Vienna, and who waited vainly for some communication. The Four, therefore, conformably to their private arrangement, resolved that the eight who had signed the treaty of Paris should, at least apparently, take the initiative in the operations of the Congress, and publish a declaration announcing that, conformable to the 32nd article of this treaty, which convoked the assembly of the representatives of Europe at Vienna, they had now assembled there, and were occupied in a preliminary examination of the important questions that were to be decided, but had not yet come to perfect understanding; that, consequently, they would adjourn for a month, and employ that time in endeavouring to assimilate the general interests, and recon-

cile contending opinions; that, afterwards, the congress should be assembled after whatever fashion was judged most suitable, in order to give an authentic and official form to the resolutions previously decided on.

Pursuant to this arrangement, M. de Metternich determined to assemble at his house, not the eight who had signed the treaty of Paris, but the six principal plenipotentiaries—that is to say, the representatives of Austria, England, Russia, Prussia, France, and Spain, who, according to the plan previously arranged in secret, were to form the European committee, and to these he resolved to submit the proposed declarations. This *réunion*—for the invitations having been sent in confidential notes, the character of the assembly was strictly private—seemed to imply no other desire than that the invited guests should come to a private understanding about a manifestation that had become indispensable. The invitations were issued on the 29th for the 30th of September, in order that the declaration may be dated the 1st of October, and the meeting be adjourned to the 1st of November.

M. de Talleyrand, having previously come to an understanding with M. de Labrador, repaired to this meeting, which instead of eight, only comprised six of those who had signed the treaty of Paris. He was the last that arrived, and entered with his wonted air of haughtiness and indifference; on his habitually inexpressive countenance, a slight shade of irony was discernible. Around M. de Metternich's table were assembled, M. de Nesselrode, the representative of Russia; Lord Castlereagh, of England; M. de Metternich, of Austria; MM. Hardenberg and Humbolt, of Prussia; M. de Labrador, of Spain, and De Gentz, the celebrated pamphleteer, who was to draw up the resolutions. M. de Talleyrand took his place between Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich, as though he were at home, and then, with a careless air, demanded what was the object of the meeting, and in what character the persons present were summoned. M. de Metternich undertook to reply to the French plenipotentiary, and said that he wished to assemble the members of the cabinet in order that they might come to an understanding concerning a declaration that was not only necessary, but indispensable. "The heads of the cabinet," said M. de Talleyrand, as he looked at those present, "M. de Labrador is not one, nor is M. de Humbolt." M. de Metternich, a little embarrassed, replied that as Spain had no other representative than M. de Labrador at Vienna, they had been obliged to summon him, and that M. de Humbolt was there to assist M. de Hardenberg, who was very deaf. "If infirmities confer a right," said M. de Talleyrand, "I, too, might have brought some one to aid me." He

then asked why their number was but six and not eight; if it were those who had signed the treaty of Paris that were to meet, why he did not see assembled around this table all those interested in the questions that were to be decided at the Congress; and, in a word, why were six to decide upon the interests of all? He was told that the point about to be considered was merely a preliminary declaration, which especially concerned those who had signed the treaty of Paris, because they were the originators of the Congress, and that to judge of the merits of the declaration it should be read. The declaration was then read.

In this document the word allies was repeated several times, and employed so that it evidently referred to the belligerent powers that had concluded the treaty of Chaumont against France. When this word was pronounced, M. de Talleyrand interrupted the reader, and said, "I know of no allies here, for allies imply war, and the war ended on the 30th of May, 1814." He listened to the remainder like one who did not comprehend what he heard, and yet could not be accused of want of intelligence. He disconcerted all present by his expressions of surprise, by his numerous questions, and at last succeeded in throwing them into indescribable confusion. "I do not know," he repeated, "in what character we are here, or by what right we represent all the European powers. I do not know who these are that call themselves 'allies,' who take upon them to adjourn the Congress for a month, instead of assembling it immediately, in order at least to examine credentials, and afterwards decide on matters of form and the time for commencing deliberations." M. de Metternich replied that a word was of no consequence, and that "*allies*" had merely been used from custom. "It is a custom that must be changed," interrupted M. de Talleyrand. M. de Metternich resumed, and said that a deliberative assembly could not be convoked without first deciding who were to be summoned, by what title members were to be admitted, and the amount of influence that was to be allowed to each; that the power of deciding on the interests of Russia, which possessed fifty millions inhabitants, could not be confided to a prince who had but as many thousand subjects; and besides, that this declaration was merely to announce the opening of the Congress, and to ask a month's delay, in order to make amicable arrangements between the interested parties, by means of friendly and confidential communications.

These reasons, which were extremely good, if they did cover the intention of restricting all power to four, did not seem to make the least impression on M. de Talleyrand, whom no argument could move. "But we cannot," said M. de Har-

denberg, "allow the affairs of Europe to be decided by the princes of Lippe and Liechtenstein." "Nor can we," replied M. de Talleyrand, "allow them to be decided by the representatives of Russia and Prussia." Somebody happening to mention Murat as a proof of the difficulty of deciding who should be admitted to the Congress, "We do not know that man," replied M. de Talleyrand, with a peculiar expression of contempt, and the air of one who was not much inconvenienced by the remembrance of his past career. In fact, he threw all present into the greatest embarrassment, and the conference broke up without coming to any decision.

It was undeniably a success to prevent the chariot of the four great allied powers from rolling unimpeded over the soil of Vienna. But this success ought not to be carried too far, for whatever policy France might adopt, whether she joined Russia and Prussia in the hope of ameliorating her own condition, or sided with Austria and England to save Saxony, there were two powers of the four whom it was important to separate from the others, and whom it would not be prudent to irritate, or even embarrass too much. There would have been sufficient publicity given to this scene by the eagerness of those who feared being excluded from the Congress, and who were delighted at seeing the project of the exclusives defeated. They told everywhere of the attempt that had been made to defer the assembling of the Congress, and to restrict the entire direction of affairs to four powers, and the resistance which had defeated these designs. The Four, Prussia especially, were most active in repeating what they had already said, that it was useless for France to try to conceal her secret wishes, that she only affected to be satisfied with the treaty of Paris, that she regretted the Rhine frontier, and sought to regain it by causing general disunion; a most unmerited calumny, which necessitated fresh declarations of disinterestedness, which were a new engagement neither to desire or demand anything beyond the terms of the treaty of Paris.

This state of excitement was increased by a note drawn up by M. de Talleyrand, of which the reasoning was most logical, and such as could not easily be answered. In this note he proved that six powers were no better qualified than eight to decide for all, that of course as these powers had, by the treaty of Paris, appointed Vienna as the place where the Congress was to be held, it was only natural that they should take the initiative in the first declaration, but that this declaration should be conformable to the claims and rights of all the States; that to fulfil this condition the plenipotentiaries of all the States ought to be summoned, were it only that their

credentials might be examined, and the Congress constituted according to the proper formalities. The different members might afterwards be divided into committees to examine questions individually interesting to the different powers, or the Congress might be adjourned were confidential communications needed to bring about a better understanding; that this first meeting would not present the difficulties that were apprehended, for the lesser States did not pretend to decide on the affairs of the greater, and were only anxious to protect their own interests; that even did these alleged inconveniences exist, they would present as great obstacles at the close as at the commencement of the Congress; that, consequently, all the plenipotentiaries ought to be assembled, were it but once, in order that their credentials might be examined, if even the Congress should be adjourned next day; that the prerogative of the eight who had signed the treaty of Paris, consisted exclusively in the right, 1st., to convoke this first meeting; and, 2nd., to determine by what title members should be admitted.

The entire aim of this logically irrefutable declaration was contained in the last proposition. M. de Talleyrand's object was, that the right of admission should be determined in such a manner that the King of Saxony's representative should be admitted, and Murat's rejected. England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia made a terrible outcry upon reading the French note. In the first place, they desired that everything should be done in a friendly quiet manner, for fear of warning or exciting the interested parties. Secondly, the very idea of assembling the Congress terrified Prussia, who expected a storm, should only two Germans be present, at the proposal to suppress Saxony. But this was doing more than speaking on the subject, it was solving the question by admitting to the Congress the representative of King Frederick Augustus, as it would be solving the Neapolitan question to reject Murat's representative.

Though nobody felt an interest in the last-named sovereign, his interests were carefully considered by M. de Metternich, on account, it was maliciously said, of this statesman's great friendship for the Queen of Naples; but that was a mistake; his real motives were very different. M. de Metternich had used his personal influence at the Court of Naples to induce Murat to join the Coalition, and he considered himself morally bound to protect him, unless Murat compromised himself by some crime against the general interest of Europe. It was not difficult to foresee that Murat would commit some error, and M. de Metternich waited the event, to avoid doing what might seem an act of treachery. Besides, having assembled two hundred and fifty thousand men in Bohemia, Galicia, and Moravia, in



order to support his policy against the pretensions of Russia and Prussia, and having but fifty thousand in Italy, where the public mind was in a state of ferment, and where Murat had eighty thousand men, principally commanded by French officers, M. de Metternich did not wish, as he very sensibly said, *to set fire to both ends of the house*. However anxious the members of the French Legation might be to gratify the wishes of Louis XVIII. with regard to Naples, they might have adopted the policy of the Austrian minister; for it was not because his views were so different from ours that he sought to gain time, but because he knew better than we how to attain his object.

Though M. de Gentz was very violent when he wielded his pen, he was very moderate in action. In his efforts to bring about a conciliatory state of feeling, he hurried from one embassy to another—to the French especially, for he was convinced, as was everybody else, that it was necessary to soothe the discontented parties, if an outbreak was to be avoided. Another meeting was agreed to, and the six plenipotentiaries assembled at M. de Metternich's. The first thing asked of M. de Talleyrand was to withdraw his note, as it would be difficult to avoid answering it, and still more difficult to answer it without touching on very delicate questions. Whilst M. de Talleyrand was alleging reasons for not complying with this demand, M. de Labrador said that the suppression of the note was no longer possible, as he had sent a copy of it to his court. In a momentary burst of ill-humour, M. de Metternich, turning to M. de Nesselrode, said, "I think we should have done better by arranging our affairs amongst ourselves."—"As you please," said M. de Talleyrand; and when M. de Metternich pressed for a further explanation, he added, "I shall not again attend any of your meetings, but, as a member of the Congress, I shall await the convocation of that assembly." This was announcing that France, heading the dissenting party, would demand the general assembling of the Congress, by refusing to recognise all that should be decided without its precincts. This was a serious threat. Therefore, all present, anxious to avoid coming to extremities, endeavoured to restrain themselves and conduct the deliberations with more moderation. M. de Metternich remarked to M. de Talleyrand, as was very true, that nothing was yet prepared; that not a single question had as yet been touched on; and that it would be very embarrassing to meet the Congress in such a state. M. de Talleyrand replied that he was quite willing to yield as to the time for assembling the Congress, and concede the three or four weeks that were thought necessary for preparation, but on condition that this general assembly should be decided on, and that the terms of admission should be pretty nearly the following:—

*That the representative of every prince should be admitted whose territories had been involved in the late war—territories of which he had been anteriorly and universally recognized as sovereign, and which he had not abandoned either by cession or abdication."*

This was coming back to the old difficulty, for this principle excluded Murat, who had not been universally recognized as sovereign, and admitted the King of Saxony, who had not yielded his territories either by *cession* or *abdication*. This was deciding by a question of form, a fundamental principle, with regard to the two most difficult questions that were to be brought before the Congress. The plenipotentiaries could not agree, and the meeting consequently broke up. As the members were retiring, Lord Castlereagh endeavoured to bring M. de Talleyrand to reason, by insinuating that his obstinacy was unwittingly injuring those interests that he had most at heart. Unfortunately, not wishing to avow that England and Austria were ready to abandon Russia and Prussia, and unskilled in that art which expresses much in half a word, he did not succeed in making himself understood. On the other hand, M. de Talleyrand had committed himself too far to draw back easily.

However, all parties felt the necessity of coming to an understanding, for the Four saw how impossible it was to realise their project of transacting all the business themselves, even though, for form's sake, they should increase their number to six or eight, whilst so many interests were arrayed against them; and M. de Talleyrand, although more excited than usual, felt that by constantly piquing Lord Castlereagh, and more particularly, M. de Metternich, whom he did not like, he would end by uniting the Four more closely, who, driven to extremities, would, perhaps, end by sacrificing all those interests which the French Legation was commissioned to defend. All were, therefore, disposed to make concessions, and after three or four days' negotiations, they finally came to terms, making use of the skilful pen of M. de Gentz, and deducting something from the declaration of each party. A document was drawn up, couched in very general and evasive terms, which conceded one important point to M. de Talleyrand—the assembling the Congress within a month; and yielded one equally important to MM. de Metternich and Hardenberg—that the principle of admission should be passed over in silence. This document declared that the representatives of the eight powers, that had signed the Treaty of Paris having promised to meet again at Vienna, had kept this promise and were come there; that they had already conferred with the representatives of the different courts interest

their proceedings, but that to come to an amicable understanding, longer confidential communications were needed; that they, therefore, deferred the opening of Congress for a month, when they would be in a position to accomplish their task in a manner more suitable to the interests of Europe, the expectation of contemporaries, and the esteem of posterity.

This declaration being drawn up, it was agreed that the plenipotentiaries should again assemble on the 8th of October, at M. de Metternich's house, their number increased from six to eight by the addition of the representatives of Sweden and Portugal to those of Russia, France, Prussia, Austria, England, and Spain. M. de Metternich invited M. de Talleyrand to come an hour before the others, in order to decide about the final form of the declaration. M. de Talleyrand kept the appointment, and M. de Metternich told him that he had desired this *tête-à-tête*, in order to concert with him concerning the declaration that was about being proposed, and which he was certain would satisfy him. M. de Metternich looked for the document, but not finding it, M. de Talleyrand said, with the ironic smile that sometimes enlivened his hueless countenance: "Probably the declaration is being discussed by *the allies*." "Let us make no further mention of allies," replied M. de Metternich. He then exhorted his interlocutor to act with confidence, and putting all bickerings aside, seek by their common efforts to secure the common interests. M. de Talleyrand replied by asking how it happened that M. de Metternich left to him the task of defending Dresden from Prussian, and Cracow from Russian cupidity. M. de Metternich might have replied, that it was quite as strange to see M. de Talleyrand so anxious to espouse the interests of Austria, and not leave her to take care of herself. But his purpose was to come to terms, and not to offend. M. de Metternich endeavoured to persuade M. de Talleyrand that were he allowed to act, he would defend those interests that seemed most in danger. M. de Talleyrand sought, by being more explicit himself, to induce M. de Metternich to explain himself further; he declared that France desired nothing for herself, that she was quite ready to sign the declaration, but that there were some things to which, considering the common interest, she could never consent. For example, she would never consent that Prussia should have Luxembourg and Mayence, that she should get Dresden, or that Russia should extend her frontier beyond the Vistula. He added, that the King of Saxony should be satisfied to make some sacrifices, but that France would never consent to his being deprived of all his dominions. Here M. de Metternich interrupted him, and taking his hand, said, "We are nearer to coming to an

understanding than you think. Prussia shall have neither Luxembourg nor Mayence; we shall do our best to preserve the greater part of his dominions for the King of Saxony, and to keep Russia as far as possible from the Oder; but have patience, and do not raise useless obstacles." He then spoke of that which M. de Talleyrand had not mentioned, although it was his essential interest. "I know," he said, "your principal aim" (he alluded to Naples); "everything is in your favour, but do not be in a hurry; you would only involve consequences that neither you nor I, nor indeed any of us, could control.

M. de Talleyrand affected a perfect indifference about Neapolitan affairs; it was a question of principle, and not of family interest; and he felt assured that Europe, for her own honour, would no longer support a state of things in Italy, that was at once a scandal and a danger.

This short explanation had a very mollifying effect on M. de Talleyrand, who from that time showed a greater inclination to negotiate. The other plenipotentiaries having arrived, MM. de Talleyrand and de Metternich joined them. M. de Nesselrode represented Russia, M. de Talleyrand France, M. de Metternich Austria, MM. de Hardenberg and Humboldt Prussia, Lord Castlereagh England, M. de Labrador Spain, M. de Palmella Portugal, and M. de Loewenhiehm Sweden. M. de Gentz acted as amanuensis. The two declarations were read, that first proposed by M. de Talleyrand, and that drawn up by M. de Metternich, in which he adopted part of the French note. The latter was generally preferred, because, whilst it announced the general assembling of the Congress at the expiration of a month, it did not decide as to the right of admission. M. de Talleyrand felt that he must yield, since he had gained the most important point—the promise of assembling the Congress; but wishing to gain another advantage before giving up, he declared that he was ready to adopt the proposed project, if to the phrase, which declared that by the delay of a month the proceedings of the Congress would be more conformable to the *expectation of contemporaries*, these words should be added, *and to European international law*, a phrase which he believed to possess a most useful signification, without particularising anything.

These words raised a storm. The Prussians saw in them an allusion to Saxony and its preservation, and were filled with fear and anger. It is true that international law was invoked as a shield for Saxony. Evident as the allusion was to some, others were quite unconscious of it, and, indeed, in any case the question could not be decided by allusions. M. de Hardenberg rose, and in that excitement usual to

persons who do not comprehend clearly either their own meaning or that of others, he exclaimed, "What need is there to speak of international law? Nothing, of course, will be done contrary to it. There can be no doubt of that." "If there is no doubt of it," replied M. de Talleyrand; "it will be still better to declare it." "But what influence has international law here?" persisted M. de Humboldt. "It is owing to international law that you are here," replied M. de Talleyrand; "you and the other plenipotentiaries." This tumult lasted some minutes, and these ten grave diplomatists made as much noise as the most numerous assembly. Lord Castlereagh, anxious to put an end to this scene, took M. de Talleyrand aside, and said to him, "Will you be more compliant, if this point is ceded to you?" "I will," replied M. de Talleyrand; "but you must do me one service. You have influence with M. de Metternich—promise me to use it against Murat." "I promise you," replied Lord Castlereagh. "Give me your word." "I give it." After this short dialogue, the British minister returned to his colleagues, and said that it would be difficult to refuse the insertion of so inoffensive and respectable a phrase as international law. M. de Gentz and M. de Metternich said the same to the others, and the phrase was accepted. The following form of declaration was then adopted, dated October 8.

#### DECLARATION.

The plenipotentiaries of the different courts that signed the Treaty of Paris on the 30th of May, 1814, have taken into consideration the 32nd article of that Treaty, which says that the powers engaged on both sides in the late war should send plenipotentiaries to Vienna, in order to regulate, in a general Congress, the arrangements for carrying out the designs of the said Treaty; and after mature deliberation on their position and duties, they find that they cannot better fulfil their obligations than by establishing in the first instance free and confidential communications between the plenipotentiaries of the several powers. They are also convinced that it will be to the advantage of all parties concerned, to defer the general meeting until the questions to be decided on shall be so matured as that the result shall correspond with the principles of national law, with the stipulations of the treaty of Paris, and the just expectation of contemporaries. The formal opening of the Congress is, therefore, deferred until the 1st of November; and the aforesaid plenipotentiaries flatter themselves that the labours to which the intermediate time will

be devoted, by determining views and conciliating opinion, will essentially advance the great work which is the object of their common mission.

Vienna, 8th October, 1814.

Nobody at Vienna misunderstood the import of the words *principles of international law*, which were looked upon by all as a first step gained in the cause of Saxony. It was a source of great joy to the Germans, who all, perhaps with the single exception of Prussia, were most anxious for the conservation of this State. And even among the Prussians, there were many who considered that Saxony would be dearly bought should the acquisition be paid by abandoning Poland to Russia. Great gratitude was felt to the French legation, for having checked the ambition of certain powers, and having established the principle that each State had a right to be heard at the congress. France ought to have rested satisfied with a success which had only been obtained at the expense of very great inconvenience, especially the being obliged to repeat to absolute weariness that we were satisfied—that we had nothing further to desire, and we besides ran the risk of embarrassing and offending England and Austria, of whom we were in absolute need in the limited policy we were forced to adopt.

Undoubtedly, had we boldly joined Russia and Prussia—a measure that policy suggested, and which, as far as we were concerned, was not forbidden by justice either towards Saxony or Europe—we should not have been forced to take so many precautions; for both Russia and Prussia were so eager and unreserved, that we needed not to be more cautious than they; and, besides, prudence might have been thrown aside, were the swords of France, Prussia, and Russia united. But by taking the other side, and merely seeking to save Saxony, or at the utmost to dispossess Murat and Maria Louisa, we were obliged to accommodate ourselves to all the susceptibilities and weaknesses of the over-fastidious party we had joined, and even to avoid causing embarrassments by showing too great a disposition to be of use. Both Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich feared to compromise themselves by uniting their interests to ours. M. de Metternich especially, dreading that we should advance too rapidly, and having, as we have said, left but 50,000 men in Italy that he may be able to keep 250,000 in Moravia, Bohemia, and Galicia, he would not allow the question concerning Murat to come on until the fate of Saxony had been decided. And even the Germans, spite of their gratitude, had to be treated with great precaution; for owing to their old mistrust of France, they soon took the alarm if they saw us very much interested or very busy. The

fear of co-operating with us was such, that both Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich reproached M. de Labrador severely for having modelled his policy on ours, and told him that such conduct on the part of Spain was the blackest ingratitude to Europe. Now that M. de Talleyrand had so skilfully succeeded in outwitting those who wished to make such offensive exclusions, he ought to have proceeded cautiously, for fear of anticipating persons who dreaded almost as much being saved by us as being swallowed up by Russia and Prussia. It is often in politics as in commerce, where an offer lowers the price of an article which a demand will cause to rise, if the owner has patience to wait. Had we delayed giving our assistance in the affair of Saxony, in which we were but slightly interested, we should have been more certain of carrying our point in the concerns of Naples and Parma, which were of essential importance to us, at least according to the views of the French cabinet. The most dignified and most profitable policy for us would have been to follow, instead of anticipating, the interests of the German policy.

These German interests had not, however, slumbered. The German States of the second rank opposed with great animation what they called the avidity of Prussia, the tyranny of Russia, the incapacity of England, and the weakness of Austria. These States were headed by Bavaria, the most excited of them all. This latter State had many reasons for opposing the sacrifice of Saxony, whose existence was necessary to preserve the equilibrium of Germany, and whose only crime was having suffered the alliance of France, which Bavaria, instead of suffering, had actually sought. It is quite certain that, were Saxony suppressed, Bavaria and the other States would be too weak to resist the influence of Austria and Prussia, that were always ready to unite when an opportunity arose of bringing the Germanic body under their domination. Bavaria had not only good reasons for defending Saxony, but she also possessed the means of doing so. She was well represented at Vienna. Besides that the king had come there in person, she had as minister at Congress the Prince de Wrède, who, spite of more than one military fault, was one of the most esteemed generals of the coalition, and possessed considerable influence.

The Prince de Wrède did not hesitate to say—and he was not contradicted by his king—that Saxony should be saved even at the expense of a war; nor ought any objection be made to accepting aid from France, in order to keep Prussia within the limits of Brandenburg, and Russia on the other side of the Vistula. He offered 50,000 Bavarians to support his views, and visited M. de Talleyrand and the Duke Dalberg constantly, urging them to bestir themselves more than they did. But whilst the



King of Bavaria sent the most affectionate and pressing messages concerning their common interest to M. de Talleyrand, he did not dare to meet him personally, lest it might give offence on account of his old intimacy with the French.

This policy was also supported by another German State—Hanover—which had become independent again in 1813. The King of England, with universal consent, had assumed the title of king, instead of Elector of Hanover, because he did not wish to bear in Germany a title inferior to that of the sovereign of Wurtemberg, who had been created king by Napoleon. Hanover was represented at the Congress by M. de Munster, who formally declared himself on the side of Saxony. But, though the two countries had been united for more than a century, the Hanoverian minister did not find that his views always coincided with those of the representative of England, who was guided exclusively by the interest of his own country, and that of his Cabinet with the Parliament. Still, Hanover could be of great service to Germany by inducing the Prince Regent of England to use his influence with the British ministers, and induce them to adopt views more favorable to Saxony; and this influence, as we shall presently see, was of great utility. Hesse, Baden, and almost all the lesser German States, were ready to join Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, and only waited for a signal from the more important ones to make a decisive manifestation in favour of Saxony. In order to occupy the German princes during the suspension of the Congress and the adjournment of public business, a committee was formed of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, for the purpose of drawing up the plan of a German constitution. Bavaria presided in this committee, a privilege accorded to her as a compensation for her exclusion from the great European committee. This German committee, in which the lesser princes had a preponderating influence, manifested on every occasion a strong determination to defend the existence and independence of German States against the cupidity of their too powerful and too ambitious confederates.

To all this Germanic fervour was added Austrian zeal, which, dissimulated for reasons we have already mentioned in the Cabinet of Vienna, was openly declared by the nation, the court, and the army. The Austrian staff, especially, felt and expressed the greatest indignation at the two-fold project of Russia and Prussia, each of which was equally alarming to the country. The military men of Austria asserted that the cause of Europe had at least been as much advanced by them as by the other allied armies; for they said that but for them the Russian and Prussian armies, after the defeats of Lutzen and Bautzen, would have been driven back upon the Vistula;

and they now demanded whether all the blood they had shed was to be repaid by placing them in a worse position than they had been in under the rule of Napoleon; and whether it as really intended to surround the Bohemian mountains with Russians and Prussians—the one on the left, the other on the right, and thus abandon to the common enemy those defiles, whose importance had been proved both by Napoleon and Frederick the Great. Little inclined as they were to recommence the war, they declared that as they were prepared for it, it was better to have it now than later, and thus prevent a disastrous and two-fold usurpation. Austria had two hundred and fifty thousand men ready for action, in Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia; the other German States could add one hundred thousand; and though England, on account of the American difficulties, could furnish no assistance, still they were sure of one hundred and fifty thousand from France, making altogether five hundred thousand men, and with this force, they said, there could be no doubt of success.

By leaving all these feelings to ferment, and by not interfering too much ourselves, we should have been certainly soon called on to play an important and decisive part, according to the policy adopted by France. The two men to whom were committed the task of unravelling the tangled skein of European politics—Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich—the one simple-minded, sensible, and firm, though sometimes deficient in tact; the other profound and deeply versed in German politics—though anxious to untie the Gordian knot, did not wish to employ the sword of Alexander, for this sword would be that of France; such a line of conduct would be to conduct the French armies again into Germany—a proceeding that seemed to them to present a singular contradiction, and be fraught with serious peril. But, though agreed as to their ultimate object, they were not agreed as to the means to be employed in attaining it. M. de Metternich would not yield either to Russia or Prussia, but wished to avoid a rupture by employing the greatest patience in his opposition. Lord Castlereagh, on the other hand, was willing to gratify Prussia, win her over to his views, and make use of her against Russia, which would be to save Poland at the expense of Saxony. These opinions of Lord Castlereagh arose from a mode of viewing British interests, peculiar to the ministers of that time, and which must be explained to be understood.

The Continental blockade had caused so much terror to the English, that they were in constant fear of seeing it renewed by the Bourbons, if not by Napoleon; an apprehension as irrational as the suggestions of terror generally are. It was this apprehension that induced them to give Holland and

Belgium to the house of Orange; and lest the new kingdom should not be sufficiently strong, the English secured it allies—Hanover, which they intended to strengthen, and even Prussia, whom they had in some measure forced to accept the Rhenish provinces, in order to render her of necessity our enemy. And still fearing that Prussia was not thoroughly won, they were anxious to give her Saxony, and hoped to justify the abandonment of this country to their parliament by pleading the usual system of Britannic alliances. But as they saw that there was no possibility of inducing the parliament to agree to abandoning Poland, they resolved to oppose Russia, and on that account wished to alienate Prussia from her by the cession of Saxony. They hoped by these means to isolate Russia so completely, that she would be obliged to abandon her prey.

This intricate policy was very displeasing to M. de Metternich, who was equally anxious to save Poland and Saxony. But as it is not easy to change the English when they once see their interests in a certain light, M. de Metternich, seeing that nothing but experience would convince Lord Castlereagh, let him go on, convinced within himself that defending one of the threatened States would be sufficient to save both. In fact, Alexander and Frederick William had promised each other Saxony and Poland, and the King of Prussia would be a traitor both to honour and friendship, if he occupied Saxony when Poland was not given to Russia. Add to this, that Frederick William being allowed to retain Posen, if all Poland were not given to Russia, he would lose the only specious argument he could adduce for demanding Saxony. Therefore, refusing to abandon Poland was refusing to abandon Saxony, and the safety of the one was the safety of the other. Perfectly conscious of all this, M. de Metternich offered no opposition to Lord Castlereagh, but let him act as he thought fit, knowing that he could not oppose a more formidable rival to Alexander. Independent of his own obstinacy of temper, Lord Castlereagh had the advantage of representing the power that had least interest in the disposal of Continental States, and the one besides that paid all the others. The superiority which the giver has over the receiver was always evident in the intercourse of England with her allies. Lord Castlereagh, in pursuance of his policy, demanded an interview of Alexander, and immediately obtained it.

The Czar had, at that time, overcome his first feeling of surprise and anger. He was impressionable, though wily as an Asiatic, and at the same time amiable and good, and so influenced by his desire to please that he could not possibly long sustain the part of an irritated man. Yielding as much to his

natural inclination as to circumstances, he was most affectionate in his manner to every one at Vienna, but more especially to military men. He visited the scenes of all the battles that had been fought during the campaign of Wagram; and though conversing with the conquered, he paid them many a compliment. He was to be seen almost constantly on foot, leaning sometimes on the arm of a diplomatist, sometimes on the arm of an officer. He appeared as a private individual in all the saloons of Vienna; made himself acquainted with persons of every grade, and by every means sought to avoid obtruding his rank upon the numerous princes who thronged to the Congress. In a word, he sought in every way to please, and succeeded; for nobody possessed the power of doing so in an equal degree. Every one noticed his intimacy with Prince Eugene, whose mother and sister he had protected at Paris, and who was come to solicit the principality that had been promised him by the treaty of the 11th of April. Alexander presented him everywhere, praising his fidelity to Napoleon—which, indeed, he did not find so great an obstacle, as the difficulty of obtaining a small portion from the universal cupidity. Alexander exerted all his powers to make himself agreeable, and these exertions were needed to counterbalance the bad effects of his policy.

He replied to Lord Castlereagh's demand of an audience by immediately repairing to the British minister's residence. The latter was touched by this, and testified all the gratitude and respect that such a proceeding was calculated to inspire; but at the same time, he remained an Englishman—that is to say, fixed in his determination; and though he wished to conciliate all parties, he did not conciliate any.

He endeavoured, in the first instance, to prove to the Czar that England had always sought to please him. In 1812, she had assisted him to conclude the peace of Bucharest with the Turks, and to obtain Bessarabia; that she had induced Persia to yield him a better frontier in the direction of the Caspian sea; that, in short, notwithstanding her repugnance to abandon Norway to Sweden, she had consented to the measure, in order to secure the conquest of Finland to Russia. Having thus proved his claim to the gratitude of Russia, he cited, one by one, the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Tœplitz, which had been concluded in the February, June, and September of 1813, and showed how they formally prescribed the partition of the duchy of Warsaw by the three Continental powers, which certainly did not imply that one should have it all. He then passed on to general considerations; showed what anxiety Russia caused all Europe; spoke strongly of the fears she had already excited amongst the Allies; and did not



hesitate to say that the Congress of Vienna, from which it had been hoped to date the reign of justice and moderation amongst civilised nations, would soon, if care were not taken, present a scene of ambition sufficient in itself to make Napoleon regretted. Lord Castlereagh said all this in that simple and positive manner which neither exaggerates nor softens anything, and which, by representing things as they really are, makes their importance more evident.

Unfortunately, not one of the four powers, who were disputing the remnants of the European continent, could read the others a lesson of morality without running the risk of retaliation; and Alexander might have seriously embarrassed the British minister by tracing the chart of English ambition from the occupation of Malta to that of the Cape and the Mauritius. He restrained himself, although very much excited. However, he did not wish to lie under the weight of England's pretended services; and with much tact and raillery, showed Lord Castlereagh that, if the peace between Persia and Russia, and between Russia and Turkey, had been facilitated by England, it was that the Russian may be free to turn their arms against France; and that if Norway was ceded to Bernadotte, it was to win him from his engagements to Napoleon; and that, consequently, in considering the motives of her benefactor, Russia might feel herself justified in lessening the amount of her gratitude. Then, passing to the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Tœplitz, he showed how they were drawn up under conditions that no longer existed; that at the time these treaties were formed, the utmost that had been hoped was to offer some opposition to Napoleon's then almost unlimited power, but that no expectation was entertained of driving him back to the Rhine, much less of hurling him from his throne; that by the unexpected success of the common efforts, Austria had gained the Inn, the Tyrol, and Italy; England, Holland and Belgium; and that it was not just that Russia and Prussia, that had encountered greater dangers than England, should have no part in this unexpected increase of good fortune; and besides, that as to what concerned Saxony, he was pledged to his friend the King of Prussia, and for Poland to the Poles themselves. Alexander declared that, in his opinion, the partition of Poland was a crime, whose moral effects were still felt in Europe—a crime, for which it was both honest and politic to make atonement. Russia alone, he said, possessed the means of making this reparation, for she possessed the greater portion of the Polish provinces, which was not the case with France, that had vainly sought to reconstitute Poland, nor of Prussia nor Austria, neither of which powers had ever conceived such a project.

Russia, by stripping herself of the provinces she possessed, could, by a slight sacrifice on the part of Prussia—a sacrifice for which the compensation was already provided—establish a separate kingdom, endow it with liberal institutions, whose operations she could moderate, and accomplish a work which would be the glory both of Europe and of the Congress of Vienna. This was the noble aim he had proposed to himself; he was on the eve of attaining it, and he did not intend to turn aside from his purpose. Besides, on entering Poland, he had made promises to the Poles in order to detach them from Napoleon, and these promises he was determined to keep. He was not one of those sovereigns ready to make promises in time of need, and retract them when the emergency had passed. He had made a promise, and would keep it: and he considered that he had rendered sufficiently important services to Europe, to expect some concession on her part.

The Emperor Alexander possessed both subtlety of understanding and romantic exaltation of feeling, a combination which prevented his pursuing at once the paths of ambition and sincerity. It is true, that his nobler feelings were flattered by the glory of re-establishing the kingdom of Poland, and he almost persuaded himself that he was making a sacrifice in giving up Lithuania and Volhynia for its formation, as though the new kingdom were not to belong to him but to another. The indignation he expressed at the resistance offered to his project was not altogether insincere.

His indignation had very little effect upon Lord Castlereagh, who returned to the charge, armed with all the reasons good and bad that his position afforded. He could make no valid reply with respect to the three treaties of 1813, for they had been concluded when but a small success was expected, and Russia had as good a right as the others to a share of the un-hoped-for spoils. Lord Castlereagh could only meet Alexander on this point by adducing motives of moderation and justice, most excellent reasons, indeed, but which could have but little weight coming from him, unless Austria should resign Italy, and England give up her claim to Belgium. But many reasons could be adduced in favour of the reconstitution of Poland, and on these he expatiated with all imaginable emphasis.

The partition of Poland, he told the Czar, was a crime, and it was not England, who had always opposed it, that would now assert the contrary. She was therefore prepared to consent to the restoration of Poland, if it were done completely, honestly, and with suitable conditions. If, for example, Austria, Russia and Prussia gave up the Polish provinces they held, and that an independent kingdom was formed, with a

Polish king, and if not a Pole, at least somebody not under the control of either of the three sovereigns who now shared the country between them, and if, in addition, the new kingdom should be endowed with liberal monarchical institutions, England was ready to approve, and even to assist in the work, at any expense to herself. But would the three co-divisionists consent to such sacrifices? Would a suitable king be found? And, finally, would the reunited Poles live together in amity, and comport themselves like a rational people, worthy of the liberty conferred on them. This was not only doubtful, but almost impossible, and the much talked-of reconstitution of Poland was a nullity—a mere dream. And if instead of this truly moral and European reparation, a false and incomplete kingdom was to be formed, called Poland for the sake of increasing its extent as much as possible, whilst in reality it belonged to Russia; this would be a mere illusion, to which Europe would never submit.

Lord Castlereagh then spoke to Alexander of the alarm his project had excited; he told him that but for his well-known principles of honour, these alarms would have already dissolved the Congress, and he implored him for the sake of his own fame, as well as for the general tranquility, to give up a project that could never be permitted to succeed. It was with great difficulty that Alexander restrained himself during this conversation, for with all his power of pleasing he could not produce the least impression on the solid English minister, who, on his side, with his personal awkwardness, was as incapable of influencing the plastic and mobile disposition of the Czar. They parted, with no other result arising from their interview than mutual dissatisfaction.

Lord Castlereagh, fearing that he had not said all that he had to say, and desirous to impress the memory of his august interlocutor, at the same time that he was anxious to take every precaution for his own justification before Parliament, drew up a long note on the following day, and sent it to the Czar, together with a confidential letter, making a formal declaration of his opposition to the pretensions of Russia. He was not satisfied with this, and, notwithstanding the system of secrecy that had been resolved on with regard to France, he sought to obtain her approbation for his firmness, and informed M. de Talleyrand both of the conversation and note. The latter was delighted to see Lord Castlereagh, although he was very little pleased by England's indifference in the cause of Saxony. The singular tactics of England inspired him with the idea of adopting a similar policy, though in an opposite sense. Desiring to restore as far as possible the balance in favour of Saxony, which had been disturbed by Lord



Castlereagh's desertion. He profited of the frequent visits of Prince Czartoryski to the French legation, to inform Alexander, through him, that France would never yield Saxony, but was quite willing to give up Poland. This was a skilful manœuvre, for while one party refused what the other was willing to concede, the unity of opinion which would be needed to satisfy both Russia and Prussia was impossible.

All this time, the lesser German princes continued their opposition. In the committee, where they were assembled to decide on a constitution for Germany, they opposed all Prussia and Austria's efforts to assume the domination in the Confederation. It would be impossible to revive the ancient title of Emperor of Germany, which the house of Austria had so long borne, and which Francis II. had abdicated in 1806, when Napoleon instituted the Confederation of the Rhine. Austria would certainly have accepted the title, were it made hereditary in the house of Hapsburg, but she would never consent to make it elective, for that would subject her to a disagreeable dependence on the electors, and perhaps expose her to the possibility of one day seeing a Prussian prince styled Emperor of Germany. The last consideration would be sufficient to make her reject such an offer. As the title of emperor, to which the direction of the Confederation naturally belonged, was to be given up, it was necessary that there should be directing states, as in Switzerland, and to this Prussia was quite willing to agree, provided that the authority alternated between herself and Austria. Austria did not approve this arrangement, and Bavaria, Hanover, and Wurtemberg declared that they would not agree to it unless the directing authority was limited to the two great German powers. It was thus that the condition of German affairs was commenced which continues still,—a simple presidency of the Diet given in perpetuity to Austria, as an emblem of the old imperial authority resident in her house, lessened, however, by the suppression of the title, but enhanced by the condition of perpetuity. But this arrangement still left undecided the serious question of the military command.

A no less important question than that of the direction of the Germanic body, was the condition of the confederate States, and the nature of their relations with the European powers. Up to the present time, the confederate States, although united by a federal bond, had enjoyed an independent sovereignty, that is, they possessed the power of sending ambassadors to foreign courts, and of raising armies and employing them as they pleased. This two-fold privilege had often led to the formation of alliances contrary to the interests of the two predominating German powers, if not to the Confederation itself; and if this

had sometimes induced foreign intervention, it also secured the safety of their common independence. Prussia would have the confederate States deprived of these advantages. But she was alone in her opinion, and met with the greatest opposition in the committee. On almost every occasion, the three kingdoms of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover declared that they would give no opinion on the points in dispute until Saxony's fate should be decided. They even threatened to draw up a protestation, signed by all the German States, against the projects attributed to certain powers with regard to Saxony. The committee broke up, resolved not to meet again unless this great question should be decided.

As the adjournment had been signed on the 8th of October, the 1st of November was not very distant. It was to be feared that the appointed day would arrive before the different powers should come to an understanding. Bavaria, the most important and the most active of the lesser German States, had declared her intention of taking up arms in defence of Saxony. Her army had been recruited, and now amounted to 75,000 men; she urged on M. de Metternich, whom she denounced for what she called his weakness, and offered to furnish twenty-five thousand men for every hundred thousand furnished by Austria. From M. de Metternich, her emissaries hastened to M. de Talleyrand, who certainly needed no urging, and begged him not to confine himself to mere words, but to use threats, and effective threats, by declaring, for example, that the King of France was determined to use force, if necessary. They declared that if M. de Talleyrand acted according to this advice, that neither England nor Austria could have an excuse or motive for subterfuge, and would formally declare themselves, and save the independence of Germany and Europe. M. de Talleyrand replied that France was ready, but that it did not become her to undertake alone what should be done by powers more interested in the question, and who should, at least, explain their intentions, and express some desire on the subject: that then France would answer their first cry for assistance, but that, hitherto, scarce a word was addressed to the French legation, that was excluded from all negotiations, and that, in fact, France could not force her assistance on persons who did not seem to desire it.

Bavaria was not slow to repeat these remarks to M. de Metternich, who did not refuse to act, but would not come forward immediately, alleging, as an excuse for his dilatoriness, the strange policy of England, who wished to save Poland by sacrificing Saxony, together with the intentions of France, whose ambition, in his opinion, ought always to be distrusted. This was strange reasoning, when France was the only one amongst the powers assembled at Vienna that did not show

any symptoms of ambition! M. de Metternich added, that it would be assuming a most serious responsibility to introduce a French army into Germany, especially as Frenchmen had been so recently despotic and detested there; and he added that a French army did not exist, at least for the Bourbons, who were incapable of assembling or conducting one; that France spoke a great deal, but neither could nor would act; that she only wished to cause disunion and dissension, and recover her position by promoting a misunderstanding between the Allies, who had conquered her. These replies were made to the Prince de Wiede, who immediately communicated them to us; and these remarks had not only been made by the minister but by the Emperor and several of the Archdukes, with the evident intention that they should be transmitted to us, and provoke us to come to an explanation. This tone, which was unwillingly assumed by the Austrians in their own defence, took the form of raillery and boasting when uttered by the Prussians, who wished to impress every one with the idea of the impotency of France; nor was it less offensive in the Russians, who were no less anxious to propagate a belief in the weakness of the Bourbons.

Such language could not be heard with indifference, and it was become necessary to put an end to it by some decided and convincing manifestation. M. de Talleyrand declared that France was both able and willing to act, which she would prove when occasion required, but that, in any case, she would soon show both her determination and her resources. He wrote immediately to the king, and desired the Duke Dalberg to write to the Cabinet, and proposed to both the double resolution of taking arms, and publicly announcing why. Knowing that neither Louis XVIII. nor the council had any wish for war, though the Duke de Berry was well inclined thereto, he told them that there was no probability of war, (which was true,) but that the terror of war was such, that whichever power would make a demonstration, would be sure to rule the others; that at Vienna, things would not go beyond a simple declaration, but that it was necessary to be in a position to make these demonstrations, and to make them after a serious fashion; that the consideration in which France would be held depended on this, as also her influence and the accomplishment of her wishes; that, for example, what she desired in Italy depended on what would happen in Germany, and that she would possess no power on one side, if she did not strengthen herself on the other.

To speak of Italy—that is, of Naples and Parma—was attacking the king on his weak side, and the surest way to gain his attention. The council was sensible and sincere, although

BY A STRANGE CHANCE, AS WE SHALL PRESENTLY SEE, these qualifications did not render it profitable to the Bourbons.

When these despatches, written about the middle of October, reached Louis XVIII. they did not fail to excite him greatly. As we have said, he was very anxious for peace, of which France was in great need, because it was his family's principal title to popularity, and because it was the condition best suited to his age, his infirmities, and his turn of mind. He was grateful to his representative at Vienna for so loudly asserting the principle of legitimacy, and for having defeated the project of excluding France from the common deliberations; he saw, with delight, that there was a possibility of Murat's downfall, and felt a certain pleasure at the prospect of saving his cousin of Saxony; but he thought the French Legation had been too busy, and feared it would lead him further than he wished to go. He deliberated on what was proposed him, first in his family circle and afterwards in full council. There could be no doubt as to the resolution to be taken—a resolution in favour of which were combined so many reasons, great and small, good and mediocre. In the first place, France's position at Vienna was in question, and it would not be wise, either for her sake or that of the Bourbons, to allow the opinion to gain ground that she had become powerless since the restoration of the old dynasty. Such an opinion would be as injurious to the country as to the reigning family. Secondly, on our influence at Vienna, the favourable solution of the Italian question depended—a solution to which Louis XVIII. attached so much importance, and which ought to be as dear to his ministers as to him; for the security of France depended on that of the Bourbons. Thirdly, the safety of the Saxon monarchy had a certain importance for France; once she had renounced the pursuit of territorial possessions at Vienna. The King of Saxony was considered, whether justly or unjustly, as the victim of his attachment to us, and saving him would, doubtless, do us honour in the eyes of all those who piqued themselves on their patriotism. Success would, therefore, secure popularity, without taking into account the rights of legitimacy. Finally, it was absolutely necessary to increase the army, which had been allowed to fall below the contemplated proportions, in consequence of the financial restraints imposed on the war minister, and the accessory expenses unwisely added to the budget. The different regiments were no more than skeletons, incapable of effective service. How this happened will be better understood if we consider that the army of two hundred thousand men, which had been expected to be supported with a budget of two hundred million francs, had been first

reduced to one hundred and fifty thousand, and afterwards, from want of resources, to one hundred and thirty thousand men. Limiting France to such an effective force in the existing state of European armies, was consenting to her annihilation. These reductions had also caused great discontent amongst military men, and it would be advantageous both to the home and foreign policy to put the army on a better footing. For all these reasons, the proposals of the French Legation were taken into serious consideration, and presented, with strong recommendations, to the king's council.

The difficulties of this question had never been other than financial. When the council was assembled, the king appealed to the patriotism of the minister of finance. The latter, though most rigorous in the expenditure of money, and perhaps, in consequence of it, had always declared that, in case of necessity, he could place a hundred millions of francs at the king's disposal. He had, indeed, secured a vast resource by the restoration of public credit, and by the firmness of his financial policy. His *reconnaisances de liquidation* had had immense success on the exchange, bearing an interest of seven or eight per cent. Besides, thanks to his perseverance, the indirect taxes began to come in, and he was, consequently, not embarrassed by having to meet an unexpected demand of fifty millions.

M. Louis, however, was astonished at being so quickly taken at his word, and called on to prove the extent of his resources. But he was no less skilled in diplomacy than finance; and the war minister having declared that forty millions would suffice, he said that he was prepared, and would give them as needed. Here was an immediate recompense for the good sense shown by the government in following the advice of the upright and vigorous mind that directed the financial department.

The funds for military expenses being secured, it only remained to consider how they should be employed. General Dupont, who was still war minister, wished that this money should be spent on the two hundred thousand old soldiers who had returned from abroad and been dismissed on leave of absence, pursuant to the system of forming a reserve, by allowing the soldiers to remain at their own homes and exercising them from time to time. The introduction of this system would be facilitated by the existence of thirty thousand officers on half-pay, who thus obtained a means of employing their energies, whilst they received additional pay. This system had not yet been well tried, nor was its nature understood even in Prussia, where it was an administrative *ruse*, employed to exceed the limits appointed by Napoleon for the Prussian army. Still, the Bourbon government dreaded to employ so many



men—officers and soldiers—of suspected opinions, and whose operations would be slow, when immediate and certain results were required. Influenced by all these reasons, and by the wise advice of the Duke de Berry, it was thought better to recall seventy thousand soldiers, a measure that would increase the army from one hundred and thirty to two hundred thousand men, and put the regiments on a better footing. To raise this number, it was not necessary to employ conscription, which was nominally suppressed, but merely to call out some of the men considered on leave of absence, which had either been given them, or had been taken by themselves in deserting.

In addition to the official despatches in which M. de Talleyrand was informed of the resolutions of the government, the ministers of war and finance were to send him private letters, that he might show in confidence, and in which they informed him of the flourishing state of the finances and army. The war minister was commissioned to tell him that he was about raising two hundred thousand men, and, if necessary, could raise three hundred thousand, all old soldiers, and well inclined to fight, which was true, provided it was against a foreign enemy. The king wrote to M. de Talleyrand to express his personal feelings. He said, that notwithstanding his desire for peace, he would not have France sink below her natural position, or appear unable to support the cause of legitimacy, but he recommended him expressly not to enter into any coalition in which he would have but Austria and the lesser German States as allies. He was desirous that England should be included in the alliance, for he wished to continue on good terms with that country, as with such an ally the result of a war would be more certain, should so disagreeable a necessity arise. He again directed his attention to the two essential objects of his mission—the expulsion of Murat from the throne of Naples, and the translation of the prisoner of the Isle of Elba to one of the Azores.

Whilst these replies were coming from Paris to M. de Talleyrand, the excitement continued at Vienna, as did also the debate between the Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh, the latter persisting in his efforts to save Poland at the expense of Saxony. It was well known that the Prince Regent of England, as future king of Hanover, did not approve of this sacrifice, and was even very much opposed to it; and great exertions were made to induce him to demand a modification of Lord Castlereagh's instructions. Meanwhile, Lord Castlereagh pursued his plan, in the hope of detaching Prussia from Russia, and by this isolation inducing the latter to yield. Although it was so difficult to detach Frederick William from Alexander, the Prussian ministers were not as inflexible as

their king, and some of them were disturbed by the idea of Russia's advancing into the centre of Europe, and by the bad effect produced in Germany by the annexation of Saxony to Prussia. In a word, they did not admire the Russian alliance as much as their master did. Lord Castlereagh perceived the difference of opinion that existed between Frederick William and his ministers, and flattered himself that he could induce an alliance between Prussia and Austria, and make use of these two powers to force Russia to remain at the other side of the Vistula, without having recourse to France, that would be thus still excluded from participation in all the great European affairs. He hoped that, with England, Austria, Prussia, and all the German States, he could form a central power in Europe which would restrain Russia, be independent of France, and become the supreme arbitrator in European questions.

M. de Metternich, compelled by the cries of Germany and the Austrian army, declared his intentions sooner than he wished; but abandoned by England on the Saxony question, he had been compelled, in a certain degree, to yield to Lord Castlereagh's policy, and send a despatch to Prussia, in which he announced the intentions of the Emperor Francis and his cabinet. In this despatch, dated the 22nd of October, some days before the official opening of the Congress, M. de Metternich, addressing Prussia with the greatest cordiality, recalled how, in the commencement of 1813, even before Frederick William had broken with Napoleon, Austria had advanced the principle of the complete reconstitution of Prussia, and made it an essential condition of her policy; and that, consequently, she could not be considered as affected by the old jealousy which had formerly divided the cabinets of Berlin and Vienna. He then requested Prussia to consider whether it would not be for her own interest to give up the idea of adding Saxony to her dominions, since it should be purchased at the expense of allowing Russia to establish herself on the Oder—a project that was blamed by every German, and so hateful that Austria, by merely consenting to the measure, would perhaps become as unpopular as Prussia, who would effect the deed. M. de Metternich asked whether it would not be better, by punishing King Frederick Augustus by depriving him of some of his territories and allowing the nucleus of the kingdom of Saxony to exist, to get rid of the unwise promises that had been made to Russia concerning Poland, and thus gratify the wishes of all Germany, and at the same time act in conformity with the spirit of political reparation, which had been so boastingly promised to Europe, but which had not as yet been put in practice. Having thus expressed his opinion in the form of



an advice, M. de Metternich added, that if, contrary to his inclinations, he should be induced to sacrifice Saxony, it would be only on conditions from which Austria would not recede. First, Prussia should promise to break her engagement with Russia concerning Poland, and join Austria and England when this question was to be decided on. Secondly, That notwithstanding the desire to preserve the most perfect cordiality between the courts of Berlin and Vienna, it would be necessary to maintain a certain equilibrium between them, by establishing a just proportion between the mass of States in the North and in the South, which constituted their dependencies. Austria desired that the Mein on the right of the Rhine, and the Moselle on the left, should constitute the territorial boundaries of the northern and southern States, in order that Mayence should not belong to the north, that is, to Prussia.

M. de Metternich could not have extricated himself more skilfully from the embarrassing position in which Lord Castlereag's strange policy had placed him than by this note; though the conditions proposed to Prussia relative to the boundaries of the northern and southern States might be accepted, Frederick William could scarcely agree to that which required his abandoning Russia on the Polish question; and so whilst M. de Metternich pursued the path traced out for him by England, he was not the less likely to gain his own ends, and save both Poland and Saxony.

The Emperor Alexander was greatly irritated by the position Austria had taken, for he saw that everybody was turning against him, and endeavouring to separate him from Prussia. With the intention of striking his opponents with awe, he determined on a decisive step that would prove that his and Prussia's determination was irrevocable. Saxony was still occupied by Russian troops, and he advised the King of Prussia to replace them by Prussians, and immediately commence the administrative and political organization of the country. On his side, he sent the Russian troops which had evacuated Saxony into Poland, so as concentrate all his forces on the Vistula, and present an iron barrier to all who should seek to deprive him of his prey. At the same time he sent into Warsaw his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, who, report said, was to be made king of Poland, in order to commence the organization of the new kingdom. He could not more boldly defy the opinions and dignity of the powers assembled at Vienna, for, without waiting for their decision, he had taken possession of States of which they alone could confer the sovereignty.

There was a universal outcry against such daring and arrogant conduct. All the Germans blamed the weakness of M. de Met-

ternich, but he replied, that instead of annoyance, it ought to be a subject of rejoicing to see the Russians return to the north, and free Germany from their presence. This excuse was not well received in the diplomatic circle, and it was said that France was right in demanding the assembling of the Congress, for had it been assembled, such audacious conduct would not have been attempted. Even Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich almost admitted the same. Many persons who were discouraged by this state of affairs, asserted that there was but one way of acting with the two usurpers, which was to abandon them to the public opinion of Europe, and convoke a new Congress, which, authorized by a special mandate, would become the organ of the universal feeling. More determined spirits declared that there was no occasion to retract, that the only course that remained was to fulfil the declaration of the 8th of October, and assemble the Congress on the 1st of November, when it would be seen whether these two august monarchs would retain their hardihood before the assembled Congress. The latter was the prevailing opinion: the 1st of November was at hand, and the efficacy of this plan would soon be tested.

The Emperor of Russia, who, though very simple in his own person, always kept up great state, which added not a little to the expense that Austria incurred for her guests, determined to go to Ofen, in Hungary, to assist at the funeral solemnities of his sister, the deceased wife of the Archduke Palatine of Hungary. He wished to appear in Hungarian costume, and for this purpose summoned many Greeks, both lay and clerical, from the adjoining provinces, for at this time his attention was as much directed to the East as to the West. The Emperor of Austria and several princes promised to accompany him, and as the journey would take up four or five days, they would be thus brought to the end of October. Before he left, he had two conversations with M. de Talleyrand and M. de Metternich, which caused a great deal of excitement, and contributed not a little to fixing definitely the opening of the Congress for the 1st of November.

We have already seen how M. de Talleyrand, in order to counterbalance Lord Castlereagh's policy of saving Poland at the expense of Saxony, had insinuated to Alexander, through Prince Czartoryski, that France attached more importance to Saxony than to Poland, and was willing to sacrifice the latter to him, provided the former could be saved. In fact, this was not yielding anything to Russia, for the destinies of Saxony and Poland were indissolubly united. However, it was a new point of view that had struck M. de Nesselrode, and which became the subject of a conference between Alexander and M. de Talleyrand. It was only for mere form's sake that M. de Talleyrand consented to

demand an interview, for, in truth, it was made at M. de Nesselrode's evident insinuation. This was the second interview that the French plenipotentiary had with the Czar during the month and a-half they were at Vienna; he had, of course, met him in public, but had not had a private audience since the interview we spoke of before.

The Emperor Alexander was more complaisant on this occasion to the representative of France. He regretted that he did not see M. de Talleyrand oftener, to which the latter replied with gratitude and dignity, and then, without loss of time, entered on the important subject that occupied all minds. The Czar wished to discover what the French really thought, and why they were so indifferent to the fate of Poland. "At Paris," he said to M. de Talleyrand, "you expressed yourself favourable to the restoration of Poland." "Certainly, Sire," replied M. de Talleyrand, in a firm and respectful tone, "both I and every Frenchman would rejoice at the restoration of Poland, but it should be really Poland. But the restoration now contemplated interests us very little. It is now only a frontier question between you and Germany, and it is for Prussia and Austria to consider whether it suits them that you should advance as far as the Oder. In this state of things we, the constant defenders of public justice in Europe, can only espouse the cause of Saxony." Alexander, who had restrained himself at first, replied in bitter terms, quite unworthy of him, that justice and treaties were mere words that every one used as suited him; that he was not deceived by them, and the question was not one concerning principles or justice, but of different interests, which each State interpreted in its own fashion. Alexander added, that he had promised Saxony to Frederick William, and would not break that promise, for he esteemed his word more than treaties, which were mere falsehoods; that the King of Saxony was a traitor to the cause of Europe, and would end his days a prisoner in Russia, nor would he be the first Saxon prince who had thus expiated his pretensions to Poland. M. de Talleyrand expressed as much horror at the announcement of such principles as respect would allow. "The epithet of traitor," he said, "should never be applied to a king (for in any case he could only be a vanquished enemy), nor should such an expression ever be uttered by lips so august as your Majesty's. Justice is something very definite and very sacred, and is what preserves us from a state of barbarism, and I hope that your Majesty will reflect more before you thus offend the unanimous opinion of Europe." Then Alexander replied abruptly, that both England and Austria gave up Saxony to him, and that his friend the King of Prussia should be King of Prussia and Saxony, and himself Emperor of Russia and King of Poland. M. de Talleyrand bowed respect-

fully, and said that he doubted it, for nothing could be more uncertain than the consent of Austria and England. Then Alexander interrupting the conversation said, "You have come here to advocate interests that you hold very dear (he meant Murat) and my complaisance towards France shall depend on her complaisance to Russia." "France," replied M. de Talleyrand, "does not need complaisance, she only asserts principles at Vienna." This was equivalent to saying that he would not seek the assistance of the Czar.

Alexander met with so much opposition on every side, that his resentment towards us abated. He spoke with less asperity to the French plenipotentiary, but he expressed himself in a more decided tone than on the former occasion, and affected in his manner the curtness and harshness of an unchangeable will. This inflexible will was met by M. de Talleyrand in his usual skilful manner, by mingling with his respectful tone a slightly ironical doubt, which seemed to imply that Alexander did not speak seriously.

The interview with M. de Metternich was also very violent, though in another fashion. The Prussians had informed Alexander of M. de Metternich's despatch containing the intentions of Austria, and which plainly showed the efforts of the Anglo-Austrian diplomacy to isolate Russia by gratifying Prussia. The Czar, though he had determined to be calm, could not control his excitement. As his conversation with M. de Metternich could only refer to Poland, Saxony being conceded for the time, he expressed himself at great length, repeated his former remarks upon the shamefulness of the original partition of Poland, and the utility and morality of restoring this kingdom, as if the reconstitution of a Poland, subject to the most dangerous of her co-partitionists, could be considered a reparation made to Europe. When Alexander repeated that Russia, by the extent of her Polish possessions, was called upon to make this reparation, M. de Metternich very simply remarked that Austria also possessed a great many Polish provinces, and would undertake as well as any one to make a reparation that would cost so little. At these words, Alexander could contain himself no longer, and did not hesitate to apply the terms false and unbecoming to the minister's remarks. He forgot himself so far as to tell M. de Metternich that he was the only man in Austria who would dare to assume so *rebellious* a tone in addressing Russia. Excepting the absence of genius, M. de Metternich might have thought himself in the presence of Napoleon, when at Dresden he threatened him during several hours with the exercise of all his power, after having sought to overwhelm him by the force of his intellect. M. de Metter-

nich was not to be moved, but deeply offended by the language of the Czar, he said that if such were the terms which in future were to exist between the cabinets, he would request his Emperor to appoint another representative for Austria at the Congress. He parted from Alexander in a state of excitement such as he had never before exhibited.

When this strange scene became known it caused loud murmurs. "Why," it was said, "did we cast off the yoke of Napoleon if we are to submit to another as harsh as his, and far more humiliating, for Alexander does not possess that prodigious ascendancy which had been Europe's excuse for her ten years' subjection." On the same day, the Emperor Francis set out to join Alexander at Ofen. He felt himself in a very strange position with regard to him. The Czar, as well as the other sovereigns that had come to Vienna, had been the Austrian Emperor's guest for more than a month. He was, consequently, bound to him by all the duties of a host, and had often obliged to meet him with a smiling countenance, that was far from expressing his real feelings. However, the Emperor Francis, with great tact, gave the Czar a well-deserved lesson, with all the appearance of the greatest simplicity. "After long experience," said he to him, "I think it better to leave the management of business to my ministers. I consider it a good plan, for our ministers can act with more freedom, perseverance, calmness, and possess more knowledge of business than we ourselves. Mine act under my orders, according to their own fashion, of course, but always according to my intentions, and at all times you may consider their will as mine." He could not have chosen a better mode of confirming what had been done by M. Metternich, or reproach the Czar in a more delicate manner for the impropriety of his conduct. In general terms, but with the greatest tact, he then spoke to him of the state of affairs. He was bound, he said, to his people. He had sacrificed everything to them, even his very daughter, and whenever he found them disturbed, he was obliged to attend to their anxieties, and endeavour to remove the cause. Alexander remarked that the known and tried sincerity of his character ought to be sufficient security for the Austrian people. "Yes," replied the Emperor Francis, "the sincerity of a prince is an excellent guarantee, but a good frontier is still better."

Whilst these monarchs continued their travels in Hungary, mingling worldly festivities with funeral solemnities, and whilst Alexander lavished not altogether disinterested cares on the Hungarians and Greeks who thronged to meet him, the diplomatists at Vienna were occupied in fulfilling the engagements they had made for the 1st of November. Each



day public opinion declared itself more decidedly in favour of the assembling of the Congress, though great disunion prevailed on the most important questions. But the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia had exhibited so much audacity in their actions, as well as in their words, that it was absolutely necessary to make them feel the authority of Europe, which could not be done in a better, more natural, or more regular manner than by assembling this same Europe in the persons of her representatives. It certainly would not be possible, as we already remarked, to summon them to a kind of European *constituent* assembly, for they did not possess an equal right to inquire into and decide on each other's affairs, but there were some questions on which the advice of all should be taken, whilst there were other special questions on which it was necessary to hear, and, if possible, to conciliate those interested in them. In short, since an assembly had been appointed at Vienna to regulate the affairs of Europe, it was necessary, in whatever manner the conference was to be carried on, that the representatives of Europe should be assembled, their credentials examined, and the mode of proceeding arranged, and this was, in fact, to assemble the Congress, and proclaim the existence at Vienna of a legitimate, incontestable, and European authority, whose moral influence might, under certain circumstances, avert dangerous disturbances.

On the 30th of October M. de Metternich assembled at his house the eight representatives who had signed the treaty of Paris, in order to consult as to the execution of the engagement contained in the declaration of the 8th of October. He said that the important questions which divided certain cabinets had not yet been solved, though their solution had been an object of incessant consideration, but that they would yet be arranged, that the important question of the Germanic constitution was already far advanced, and that it was hoped that a Germanic equilibrium would be established, which would contribute not a little to fix the balance of power in Europe, but that, meanwhile, there was no reason why the representatives assembled at Vienna should not be convoked, their credentials examined, and committees formed, to whom might be submitted the questions on which they were to decide.

This opinion was universally adopted. But as M. de Metternich took, perhaps, a little too much pains to impress on those present that it was not intended to form a single assembly, where all, on the mere authority of being present, as in the British parliament, should deliberate in common on the universal interests, and that the committees were only intermediate powers, meant to conciliate the interested parties, M.



de Talleyrand, who felt no affection for the Austrian minister, and thought him too desirous of restraining the sovereignty of the Congress, replied with asperity, and some harsh words passed between them, which was to the advantage of Russia and Prussia, and by no means to ours, for having adopted a policy opposed to that of these two countries, it was our interest to conciliate Austria. Fortunately, these personal misunderstandings went no further. It was agreed to call successively the plenipotentiaries of the several powers, demand their credentials, and submit these to a committee of three powers, chosen by lot. Chance favoured England, Russia, and Prussia. Should any doubt arise about the credentials of a plenipotentiary, the matter was to be referred to the eight powers that had signed the treaty of Paris, and who, having convoked the congress at Vienna, would naturally consider themselves the directing authority, and accept the responsibility of such a position.

M. de Talleyrand did not again refer to his principle of admission, which was no longer of importance, as the preservation of Saxony and the expulsion of Murat had become subjects of serious negotiation, and could no longer be resolved incidentally by the decision on a mere question of form. It was then agreed that those plenipotentiaries whose credentials would not be admitted, should, however, attend the conferences, and be summoned on committees, to give information, or express the wishes of their sovereigns, but should not be permitted to vote.

As the question of precedence amongst the different courts might give rise to embarrassing difficulties, it was agreed that every question of this nature should be deferred to the end of the Congress, and that during the sittings there should be no distinction, except that Prince Metternich, as representative of the monarch, in whose capital the Congress was held, should exercise the functions and prerogatives of president.

The succeeding day's meetings were held, to decide the manner of proceeding on each subject. In all that concerned convocations, the distribution of labour, the arrangement of committees, and their mode of deliberation, it was evident that the eight, who had signed the Treaty of Paris, as they had taken the initiative in assembling the Congress, would be the directing authority; but on fundamental questions, where the decisions might become the subject of public or private treaties, the unrestrained agreement of the interested parties should be the only deciding power. As the eight, who had signed the Treaty of Paris were universally accepted as an authority in all that referred to matters of form, it only remained to appoint committees for fundamental questions, and which were to be

composed not only of those immediately interested, but of mediators, who might reconcile the adverse parties.

The questions relative to the future constitution of Germany were still confined to the committee that represented Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, with the proviso, that the representatives of the other sovereigns of Germany should be admitted when their presence became necessary.

The great territorial questions of Europe were of two kinds—those that referred to the North, and those that related to the South. Those of the North, concerning Holland, Germany, Saxony, and Poland, were the most important and the most complicated. The consideration of these questions could only be confided to the principal of European powers, some having a direct territorial interest in them; the others being interested in the preservation of the balance of power, were, consequently, in a position to exercise a conciliatory authority. These questions were, therefore, laid before the five greatest European powers—Russia, Prussia, Austria, England, and France. These were to decide on the questions of Saxony and Poland, besides many referring to the Low Countries, Hanover, Denmark, Bavaria, &c., &c. Theirs was, consequently, the most difficult task; and, should they agree amongst themselves, nobody possessed the right or power to dispute their decisions.

The affairs of the South referred almost exclusively to Italy. The two powers most interested in Italian affairs were Austria and Spain. The latter demanded the patrimony of the house of Parma from Maria Louisa, and Naples from Murat. France also felt an interest in Italy, principally on account of Naples; nor were the other great European powers altogether indifferent. It was, therefore, thought better to join France, England, and Russia, to Austria and Spain; the three former being free from all territorial pretensions, were less inclined to dispute, and better suited to act as mediators.

All Europe felt the greatest interest in Switzerland. A committee that represented Austria, France, Russia, and England, was appointed to hear the cantons, and endeavour to reconcile them. Another committee that represented Prussia, France, Austria, and England, was appointed to consider the free navigation of rivers; and, finally, one exclusively composed of maritime States, to decide upon the slave trade.

This division of labour once effected, the negotiations concerning Saxony and Poland, which had been commenced with so much warmth, were still continued; and negotiations commenced about the affairs of Italy and Switzerland, which had been already talked of incidentally, but not formally debated.

The affairs of Italy presented difficulties of every kind.

There was Genoa to be re-united to Piedmont, as had been promised to the King of Sardinia; there was the house of Parma, supported by Spain, to be reconciled with Maria Louisa, who was supported by her father and the Emperor Alexander; there were the Legations that had been occupied by Murat, and which were to be restored to the Pope; and lastly, there were the two houses of Bourbon to be satisfied concerning Naples—France, especially, who almost considered her safety depended on the downfall of Napoleon's brother-in-law.

This last subject was very important; M. de Talleyrand felt an extraordinary interest in it, as he had received a special mission on that subject from Louis XVIII., and was every day further stimulated by that monarch's pressing letters. Every State wished the fall of Murat, and Austria no less than the others, for she saw clearly that he would never remain quiet, and would in his constant excitement seek the support of the liberal party in Italy, and thus become a perpetual source of disquietude. However, as M. de Metternich was personally pledged to the court of Naples, he wished to be freed from his promises by the errors of this court, and besides, as he had thought proper to assemble two hundred and fifty thousand men in Bohemia and Gallicia, he did not wish to be obliged to keep one hundred and fifty thousand more in Italy. He, therefore, constantly repeated to the representative of Louis XVIII., who was become the most impatient amongst the diplomatists, "Wait a little, many months will not pass before your wishes are accomplished. You support the cause of Saxony even more warmly than we, let us decide that question, and do not oblige us to solve too many at once." This advice was certainly very wise, for in the existing state of Italy, and the discontent that reigned there, from the Julian Alps to Calabria (Tuscany excepted), and having to do with so rash a man as Murat, who had been lately reconciled with Napoleon, and had 80,000 soldiers at his disposal, 50,000 Austrian troops were not sufficient in Italy, and yet that was all she could send at the moment. M. de Talleyrand took no heed of these reasons, and declared that a few thousand Frenchmen would suffice to terminate the affair. M. de Metternich replied that French soldiers would be faithful to their standards beyond the Rhine, against Russia and Prussia, but that their fidelity could not be relied on when fighting against Murat, and perhaps against Napoleon. M. de Talleyrand only replied by complaining of M. de Metternich's weakness, and by filling Vienna with unpleasant remarks upon that minister himself, and the motives of his leniency to the court of Naples, remarks which were very offensive to the Austrian premier, and

very injurious to the interests of the French legation, and even to the success of her fondest wishes.

M. de Talleyrand's zeal was greatly excited on another point, because of the importance attached to it by Louis XVIII., and this was, the translation of Napoleon to the Azores. M. de Metternich, bound by no engagement here, agreed as fully with M. de Talleyrand's opinions and wishes on this question as he did on that of Naples. He had always considered it highly imprudent to send Napoleon to the Isle of Elba, where he was within four hours' journey of Italy, and but forty-eight hours distant from France. But, if uncontrolled by any engagements, he was shackled by the essential difficulties of the affair itself. The Emperor Francis had not allowed his policy to be restricted by any ties of relationship, but he was not altogether insensible to family affections; and, although he did not love his son-in-law, he would not consent to become his executioner by sending him to a climate acknowledged to be fatal to human life. He might not, perhaps, have resisted a prudential measure resolved on by his Allies, but he would not take the initiative. England also considered that Napoleon could not be safely left so near the coasts of Europe, and Lord Castlereagh had unhesitatingly said so; but he considered the treaty of the 11th of April an obstacle, because of the British Parliament, an assembly that could not be easily brought to approve a breach of faith. He, therefore, wished to wait some act of Napoleon, or of those who were supposed to be his accomplices, which would justify the precautions that might be taken against him. He frequently demanded from France the payment of the two millions stipulated by the treaty of the 11th of April, in order that the European Powers may not be the first to infringe this treaty. His colleagues at Vienna addressed the same entreaties to M. de Talleyrand, who transmitted them to Louis XVIII., but without effect. Prussia had no objection to any personal violence that may be offered to Napoleon. The true obstacle was elsewhere: it lay in the generosity, honour, and, if the truth must be told, in the calculations of Alexander. This prince was the real author of the treaty of the 11th of April, with which he was too often reproached to be able to forget it. Regardless of reproaches, he considered it a point of honour to insist on the execution of this treaty, and daily urged its observance, sometimes by demanding a princely allowance for Prince Eugene; sometimes by supporting Maria Louisa in Parma, and sometimes by bitterly blaming the French exchequer for not paying the subsidy of two millions. Besides, he was not so well pleased with Austria as to be desirous of freeing her from the redoubtable neighbour he had given her, when he placed Napoleon in the Isle of Elba.

His language, even on this subject, had been most imprudent since his late irritation against M. de Metternich. "If it is necessary," he said, "we must only unchain this monster, who terrifies Austria and the others so much." This expression was soon repeated, and with bad effects, through all Vienna. But it would be calumniating one of the noblest characters of modern times to suppose this Alexander's sole motive in opposing any violence offered to the prisoner of Elba. It was so well known that both his honour and generosity would prevent his ever consenting to such a proceeding, that nobody ever ventured to address him on the subject. It was a measure of prudence that was contemplated but not spoken of, lest its publication should prevent its accomplishment, but to which all the Allies, with the exception of Alexander, were very much inclined, though they had not yet come to a decided resolution. It was one of those numerous points which M. de Metternich said should be left to time.

Murat's deposition, and the removal of Napoleon to the Azores, were the most delicate of the Italian questions. M. de Metternich was very much embarrassed when the representatives charged with the consideration of Italian affairs first introduced this subject. He alluded to the complications that he dreaded in Italy, and which great prudence alone could avert, a remark that elicited more than one disagreeable observation from M. de Talleyrand. In following a geographical order, Naples would be the last Italian question to be decided; and the only concession that could be obtained from the French plenipotentiary was, that this classification should be made. By following this order, the question of Genoa and Piedmont took precedence of all the others. It was, consequently, the first taken into consideration.

It was generally agreed to carry out the Treaty of Paris, and abandon Genoa to the King of Sardinia as a compensation for Chambery. But the Genoese did not approve of this. Their representative at Vienna was the Marquis de Brignole, a person distinguished both by birth and by his personal qualities, to whom the greatest respect was paid at Vienna, but whose credentials had not been recognised, because such a recognition would be admitting the political existence of the republic of Genoa, which the other powers had determined to ignore. This ancient republic was told, "You gave yourself up to France in 1805; France accepted you, and became your sovereign, and in right of the power thus obtained she bestowed you on Piedmont in 1814. You could only claim existence as a French province—a province which France resigned—an act which we both approve and confirm." Genoa objected to this mode of reasoning; said that she had given



herself to France and not to Piedmont; and added, what was perfectly true, that she had admitted the English only on Lord Bentinck's express promise that her independence should be restored. Lord Castlereagh took great pains to bring the Genoese to reason, but the committee, caring little whether the inhabitants were satisfied or not, decided that Genoa should be united to Sardinia, with a promise that her liberty and commerce should be guaranteed. As the Treaty of Paris spoke only of the city and not of the territory of Genoa, new difficulties arose, but these were soon settled in virtue of the authority which had been assumed over all European States; and the committee charged with the consideration of Italian affairs, finished the Genoese question in two or three sittings.

Next came on the question of the order of succession in the house of Savoy. It was evident that this throne would become vacant unless the succession were secured to the branch of Savoy-Carignan, as all the princes of the elder branch were childless. Austria alone, influenced by the hope of gaining this crown by marriage, could be expected to raise objections to the proposed arrangement. But she would not dare to put forth such pretensions at a moment when she was taking possession of the greater part of Italy. As no objection was made France carried her point, and the succession was fixed in the Savoy-Carignan-branch.

The third question in the adopted order was that of Parma. Spain, supported by France, demanded, as a consequence of the universal restoration going on in Europe, that the house of Parma should get back its ancient duchy of Tuscany, which, under the title of the kingdom of Etruria, it had obtained from the First Consul, at the request of Charles IV., whose daughter married the Prince of Parma. No objection could be made to so well-founded a demand. As Etruria, in virtue of the principle of universal restoration, had been given back to the Grand-duke of Tuscany, it would only be just to restore Parma and Placentia to the Queen of Etruria. In that case, what would become of the Treaty of 11th of April, or of Maria Louisa, whose revenue depended on it?

This princess, as we have already mentioned in the commencement of this book, was residing in the palace of Shoenbrunn, where, from the apartments she occupied, she could hear the noise of the *fêtes* that celebrated her downfall; and can it be believed, she almost felt annoyed, that she could not participate in these festivities, so completely was her weak and frivolous mind already a prey to *ennui*.

Flung, without her own consent, into the chasm of revolution, in the expectation that her marriage with Napoleon would close the gulf; in this fearful trial, her memory, consciousness,



and strength gave way. The poor creature was exhausted; she retained but two sentiments—her affection for her son, and the desire to obtain the duchy of Parma, whither she wished to retire, and fulfil her maternal duties in peace.

For a moment she thought of going to Elba, but she quickly abandoned the intention on being told that her son should not accompany her. It would have been too great a risk to leave that child in the hands of Napoleon. Compelled to choose between her duties as a mother and a wife, she unhesitatingly preferred the former, and whatever regret she may have felt, decreased daily, beneath the influence of M. de Neipperg, who, as we have said, was become the recipient of her entire confidence. As the reward of her submission to the wishes of her father and the allied sovereigns, she only asked the patrimony promised to her son, where she begged to be allowed to live in peace, forgetful of the brilliant dream that for a moment had dazzled her youth. We might certainly wish that Napoleon's wife had exhibited more energy of character, but if the consort he chose from political motives, abandoned him through weakness, he had little right to complain, and we ought to deal mercifully with this victim whom kings and peoples immolated to their repose, at one time elevating her to the noblest of thrones, and then flinging her from it, to secure themselves momentary advantages, without caring to inquire what she thought or suffered; like the worm on whom man heedlessly tramples, and on which he does not even bestow a glance. She was at Vienna, interceding with her father, who demanded, in her name, the execution of the promises contained in the treaty of the 11th of April.

Who would not experience an emotion of pity for this unfortunate creature? And when M. de Metternich told Russia, England, France and Spain that Francis II., who had already sacrificed so much to the common interest, could not be expected to rob his own daughter, all present, even the representatives of France and Spain were embarrassed. Russia, that is, Alexander, wished that the promises which had been made should be fulfilled. England thought it would be difficult to annul them altogether. As to France, Louis XVIII. would have yielded everything provided he was promised the expulsion of Murat, and it was rather from a feeling of family respectability that Ferdinand VII. of Spain, demanded a portion of the Italian States, however insignificant, than from attachment to a sister for whom he had never felt any affection. In this state of feeling an accommodation was proposed, which consisted in giving Parma and Placentia to the Infanta, the former queen of Etruria, and one of the Legations to Maria Louisa, reversible to the Pope, who would

thus be obliged to wait the death of the Archduchess to obtain the sovereignty of a territory, that legally belonged to him. However, the Catholic feeling of the time, and the desire of securing the prosperity of the Holy See, to whose financial prosperity the Legations were indispensable, prevented the adoption of this plan. Still everything tended towards an arrangement of almost all the Italian questions, even that of Murat, who had always been suspected, and now began to appear guilty, and was about to become a political criminal in the eyes of Europe.

The committee charged with the consideration of the affairs of Switzerland found them in the state we have already described. Ten cantons, of which some were modern, and formed from what had been once independent territories, and others of ancient date, but influenced by a spirit of equity, demanded the maintenance of the nineteen cantons, and the confirmation of the liberal principles contained in the act of mediation. These were opposed by the nine other cantons, partizans of the old regime; amongst which were found the aristocratic canton of Berne, and the democratic cantons of Schweitz, Uri, and Glaris, for democracy does not always imply justice and is often as conservative as aristocracy itself. These nine cantons, at first, refused to acknowledge the Diet of Zurich, but afterwards admitted its authority, and demanded that the territories they had formerly possessed should be restored to them, by which the cantons of Vaud, Argovia, and Tessin, would become dependent. Both parties had continued in arms, Berne as well as Vaud, Argovia, and Thurgovia.

At first, the other powers wished to exclude France from this complicated negotiation, as well as from every other, because they wished to annihilate her influence in Switzerland as well as in Germany and Italy. But by a strange peculiarity of the existing state of affairs, Berne, an essentially aristocratic canton, together with Fribourg and Lucerne, where the spirit of reaction was strongest, were, at the same time, those that felt most attachment to France, that is, to the Bourbons. This was principally owing to the great number of Swiss that had formerly served in France, and who felt sincere gratitude for the rank, honour, and emoluments, they had gained there. They had consequently demanded most decidedly, that a French plenipotentiary should take part in the consideration of Helvetic affairs, and this it was found impossible to refuse. The Duke de Dalberg was appointed to represent the French Legation in this Committee.

This French intervention produced most excellent results. When Berne, Uri, Schweitz, Lucerne, and Fribourg saw that however warmly MM. de Talleyrand and de Dalberg

might espouse their cause, they still dared not demand that Vaud, Argovia, and Tessin should be flung back into a state of dependence, and that distinctions of class should be revived in a republican state, these cantons, the most desirous of the restoration of the old system, lost all hope of gaining what they sought. The Emperor Alexander, faithful to his liberal sentiments also insisted that the nineteen cantons and the act of mediation should be maintained, with the exception of some slight alteration, and as France did not contest the justice of this resolution, Berne and her associate cantons began to yield, and a pacific arrangement of the affair was almost certain. It was decided, that the nineteen cantons should be preserved, that the principles of civil equality should be maintained in the confederacy, that four or five of the principal cantons should be alternately invested with the federal authority, and that Berne should be compensated either in Porentruy or the bishoprick of Basle (both of which had been taken from France) for the sacrifices required from her. Pecuniary compensation was to be made to the other cantons, for the territories which they demanded, but which it was impossible to reduce again to a state of dependence.

The Italian and Swiss questions were in a fair way of being arranged, the greater number was even decided, except that of Naples, which, it was expected, Murat himself would solve. In this state of things, Saxony and Poland were the only subjects of abiding anxiety; but the interests involved were so serious that a universal commotion was dreaded.

Lord Castlereagh had not relaxed in his endeavours to detach the Prussian Ministers from their King and the Emperor of Russia. He was unwillingly assisted by M. de Metternich, who, obliged to adopt Lord Castlereagh's tactics, regretted the sacrifice of Saxony, although conditional on his part, for it was extremely displeasing to the Austrians, who considered the sacrifice of Saxony as even more dangerous than that of Poland. However, Lord Castlereagh's warm entreaties and M. de Metternich's cold counsel had a certain degree of success. The Prussians were told that the abandonment of Poland would be a misfortune for all Germany, and a serious risk for Prussia, lying so near Russia; that the last partition of Poland had not been so dangerous, as it had, at least, left the Vistula as a barrier between Germany and Russia; that to allow Russia to pass the Vistula, and, above all, allow her to take possession of Warsaw, the head and heart of Poland, would be to furnish her with the means of reconstituting that country; not, indeed, as an independent, but as a subject, Poland, that would be in the hands of the Czars a valiant slave, fighting bravely for her masters, who would not fail to restore her



scattered members by taking Galicia from Austria, and Dantzic, Graudentz, and Thorn from Prussia. They were told that if Frederick the Great had eagerly taken possession of a portion of the Polish provinces at the time of the first partition, it was with the intention of uniting Old Prussia with Silesia, which would, otherwise, remain separated, and resemble the two sides of a right angle, only joined at the apex; that Russia once established on the Netz and Wartha, between Thorn, Bromberg, Posen, and Kalisch, she needed to take but one step and divide Prussia in two, leaving Old Prussia and Pomerania on one side and Silesia on the other, like two branches of a tree separated from the parent stem; that all that Prussia could gain on the Elbe from Wittenberg to Dresden would not compensate for the danger of having the Russians at Posen; and that the Prussians ought, for their own sakes, to oppose the Czar's designs on Poland. The Prussians were moreover told that the territories they desired on the Elbe would not be refused; that England and even Austria would abandon Saxony to them, but, on condition that they should join the European cause, and separate from the ambitious ally to whom they were so unfortunately bound. They were lastly reminded that this bond consisted only in their king's friendship for the Czar, but that the destiny of States ought not to depend upon the affection of princes, and that it was the duty of the Prussian Ministers to enlighten Frederick William as to the interests of his kingdom, and to oppose if they did not convince him.

These considerations had great weight, particularly with military men, who considered the establishment of Russia on the lower Wartha as extremely dangerous, and also produced a certain impression on the Prussian Ministers, who, in their turn, did not fail to influence their king a little. At least Alexander thought so, and was very much affected by it; for if Prussia abandoned him, he would be left alone in opposition to all Europe, without being able to count on the assistance of France, who had adopted the German policy, and whom there was no longer time to gain over. Thus reduced to the limits of the old partition, he would be humbled in the eyes of Poland, and obliged to hear his own subjects say that he had gained nothing by the late wars, although he had run such risk in undertaking them. It is true that he had gained Finland and Bessarabia, but as these conquests were due to his alliance with France, they would only be a condemnation of his policy in joining the allies, and would afford no greater satisfaction to the national ambition than what a hungry man feels in the recollection of a dinner eaten in bye-gone days.

In this disagreeable position of affairs, Alexander brought about an explanation with the King of Prussia, by means of a *tête-à-tête* dinner, on which occasion he gave vent to his feelings with the greatest vehemence. He reminded Frederick William of the mutual vows of friendship they had made in 1813, at the time of their meeting on the Oder, when, after some years of coolness, again united by a common danger they had promised to fall together, or, united, save, at the same time, their own dominions and Europe. He reminded him of the devotedness with which he (Alexander) had held out his hand to free the Germans, at a time when his most faithful subjects advised him to remain on the Vistula and treat with Napoleon. He told him that but for this devotedness on his part, Germany would be still enslaved, and Prussia reduced to five million subjects; that to their union alone so favourable a change was due; that the Allied Powers wished to profit of their improved position, to exclude Russia, to whom they were indebted for the advantages they enjoyed; that confining the Russians to the Vistula, would be to leave them unrecompensed for all the blood they had shed from the Oder to the Seine; for Napoleon, after the disaster of Moscow, had offered them the frontier of the Vistula, and they might have returned to their homes without exposing themselves to new dangers, without sacrificing two or three hundred thousand soldiers to continue the war of 1813, having rid themselves of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and possessed themselves of Bessarabia and Finland; but now, nobody seemed to remember the heroism of their determination in passing the Vistula, in opposition to the prudent Kutusoff; that some of the Allies, Austria, in particular, who had been compelled to join this European crusade, and who had not shed one quarter of the blood lost by the Russians, wished to enjoy the fruits of victory alone; they who had not had a single village burned, refused compensation to Russia for the ruins of Moscow; that it was very well for diplomatists to act in this way—it was their trade—but that princes, like Alexander and Frederick William, actuated by principles of honour, united by similarity of age, and the vicissitudes of their lives, by their common reverses and successes, should not allow themselves to be disunited by the ingratitude of others; that they, who were always fortunate when united, and unfortunate when separated, might be allowed to entertain a superstitious belief in the necessity of being allied, and for their own happiness as well as for that of their peoples, ought to live and die united.

There was a great deal of truth in all this, at least, when seen from the Russian or Prussian, but not from the European point of view; for it is certain that if Prussia separated from

him, Alexander would be forced to remain on the other side of the Vistula, and would have good reason to regret having passed it at the end of the year 1812, and not treated with Napoleon in the beginning of 1813, except that he had the glory of having entered Paris, and behaved there as a generous and courteous conqueror.

Frederick William was sensitively alive to the duties of honour and friendship, besides that he was perfectly conscious of all the obligations that Germany was under to Alexander; for very different would have been the course of events if the latter, after the passage of the Beresina, had followed Kutusoff's advice and treated with Napoleon. He was also moved by Alexander's vehemence, which (according to M. de Hardenberg's account) was extraordinary. Touched to the very heart, and entertaining a kind of superstitious belief in the potency of the Czar's friendship, he flung himself into his arms, and swore to be faithful to him. But Alexander told him that the king's fidelity was of little value without that of the ministers, of which he had every reason to doubt. To make sure of this, M. de Hardenberg was called, and the explanation that was commenced with the king was concluded with his prime minister. The Czar exhibited as much vehemence of manner with the latter as he had done with the sovereign himself. When the minister alluded to the reasons adduced by the English and Austrians for opposing the approach of the Russians to the Prussian frontier, he was fiercely contradicted; and, after a vain attempt at resistance, was compelled to yield, and promise to support the policy to which Alexander and Frederick William had again most solemnly engaged themselves.

The project which both agreed to defend was, that the greater part of the Polish provinces should be delivered to Russia, on condition that Prussia should get all Saxony. In pursuance of his ambitious and romantic plan of re-constituting Poland, Alexander was most desirous of getting possession of Warsaw, which in the last partition had been allotted to Prussia, in order that the head may be severed from the body, and that this hapless country may for ever remain deprived of existence.

In fact, the three partitions of Poland, which had taken place in 1772, 1793, and 1795, had successively disjointed that country in such a manner that a re-combination of the parts was impossible. In the first partition (that of 1772, devised and carried out by Frederick the Great), each of the co-partitionists took the part that suited him best. Prussia took the mouths of the Vistula, and both banks of that river as far as Thorn (exclusively), in order to unite Old Prussia and Pomerania by the suppression of the intervening Polish territories.



Austria took Galicia, lying at the foot of the Crapach mountains; Russia seized the territory so warmly disputed in the middle ages by the Muscovites, and the Poles—that is, the country opening between Smolensko and Vitebsk, between the sources of the Dwina and the Dnieper, and a territory further on between Jacobstadt and Rogaczew, forming the eastern part of Lithuania.

In 1793 and 1795, the entire country was portioned away, each spoiler in seizing what suited himself, taking especial care so to dismember hapless Poland that a re-union of the scattered parts would be impossible. Thus, Prussia took the Grand Duchy of Posen in order to unite Silesia to Old Prussia, to which latter she also added all that part of Lithuania, which extends to the Niemen from Drogitchin to Kowno; and, lastly, Warsaw itself, which was refused to Prussia, because as she was to have the greater part of the body, it was not thought advisable that she should also have the head. Austria had descended the left bank of the Vistula, as far as the Pilica, and the right as far as the Bug. Russia had all the rest—that is, all Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, &c. When, in 1807 and 1809, Napoleon thought of re-constituting Poland under the name of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, being under the necessity of conciliating Austria and Russia, but not Prussia, he deprived the latter of the mouths of the Vistula, of Dantzic, which he erected into a so-called free city, of the Duchy of Posen, the territory to the left of the Niemen, and, above all, of Warsaw. He next deprived Austria of both banks of the Upper Vistula, as far as the Pilica and the Bug, leaving her only Galicia; but he took nothing from Russia, because having made her the pivot of his policy, he was still more anxious to conciliate her than Austria. From these different acquisitions he formed the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which comprised the basin of the Vistula from its source, near the Carpathian mountains, to its embouchure in the Baltic, and almost touched the Oder on one side, and extended to the Niemen on the other, but it did not comprise Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, and Galicia, that is, more than two-thirds of the Polish territory.

When Russia, in 1814, thought, in her turn, of re-constituting Poland, she had a great advantage over Napoleon, inasmuch as she possessed a far larger portion of the Polish territory; but should Alexander be compelled to pause in his progress at the Vistula, he could have but one shore of this river; nor could he have Warsaw if the partition made by the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Tœplitz was rigorously adhered to. But Alexander was desirous of having both banks of the Vistula; in the first place, that he might get possession

of Warsaw, which was the head and heart of the body he sought to resuscitate; and next, that on the left bank he may have sufficient territory to prevent the capital of his new State from being a frontier town.

On this account he wished to obtain possession of the Duchy of Posen, by which he would become master of both banks of the Wartha. He also wished to be master of both shores of the Vistula, as far as Cracow inclusively. But this would be asking Germany, and especially Prussia, to allow Russia to advance to the Oder, which would bring her very near Dresden and Berlin; and it would be asking Austria to let her approach the Carpathians, a movement by which Austria would entirely lose her portion of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which it had been agreed to divide as formerly. It is true, as Alexander said, that when the partition of this duchy was agreed on, neither the Tyrol, Italy, Holland, or Belgium had been re-conquered; and as Austria had gained so much by these acquisitions, she may very well leave him her share of the Grand Duchy.

As Russia had now renewed her alliance with Prussia, it was again decided that she should cross the Vistula, and get possession of the left bank as far up as possible. Her progress towards the Wartha should be regulated by what Prussia should obtain in Central Germany—that is to say, in Saxony. This was a point to be decided after the settlement of the Saxony question, and would be dependent on the success of that negotiation. With regard to Austria, Alexander meant to leave her Galicia, which she had possessed since the first partition, but he intended to take those portions of Poland which fell to Austria in the second and third partitions—that is, the left bank of the Vistula as far as the Pilica, and the right as far as the Bug; and in this he was right, for without these territories Warsaw would be on the east a mere frontier town. But this was, in plain terms, asking Austria for her entire portion of the Grand Duchy, which, according to agreement, was to be restored to the ancient co-partitionists. It was possible, indeed, by insisting on the acquisition of the Tyrol and Italy, which had not been anticipated in 1813, to mollify the sacrifice required from Austria, and by giving her the salt mines of Wieliczka, upon which she set great value. If Cracow could be made a free city, as was intended to do with Thorn and other disputed towns, to Austria might also be given the rich and populous district of Tarnopol, constituting eastern Galicia, and which had been given to Russia by Napoleon in 1809. Besides, necessity might be adduced as a reason for the contemplated changes, as Warsaw would have no suburbs without the annexation of the territory situated between the Pilica and the Bug.

In the negotiations between Austria and Russia, Prussia was to act as intermediary in the concessions offered by Russia to Austria, in exchange for the Upper Vistula, and would thus fulfil, as far as possible, one of the conditions which M. de Metternich attached to the sacrifice of Saxony—that of joining the Western Powers in the question of Poland. We have already said that M. de Metternich, forced to co-operate in Lord Castlereagh's policy, had consented to give up Saxony to Prussia, but on certain conditions, which he hoped would not be complied with. These were, that Mayence should belong to the Confederation; that the Mein and Moselle should separate the northern from the southern states of Germany; and, lastly, that Prussia should join England and Austria in the Polish question. As Prussia was determined to yield the points concerning Germany, by affecting to assist Austria in tracing the Polish frontier in the direction of Galicia, she might say that she had fulfilled the conditions required for obtaining Saxony, and consider the Cabinet of Vienna pledged to her. The success of this comedy was of great importance to Alexander, for Russia's progress into Posen would be measured by Prussia's acquisitions in Saxony.

Alexander and Frederick William having renewed their friendship, were become more fixed in their ambitious views, and more determined in their language. However, Prince de Hardenberg, whom Lord Castlereagh had hoped to win over by yielding Saxony to Prussia, on the above-mentioned conditions, could not conceal from the English representative the new bonds that bound Russia and Prussia. He related the scene that had taken place between Alexander and Frederick William, declaring that he had never witnessed the like, and that it would be impossible to withstand its influence. Lord Castlereagh saw all his calculations disappointed, and M. de Metternich saw his hopes realized, for he had only affected to consent to the sacrifice of Saxony under the conviction that Prussia would never fulfil the proposed conditions. Lord Castlereagh reproached Prince de Hardenberg most bitterly, and told him that he ought rather to have resigned office than yielded, but he did not induce him to take this step, and Prussia continued more closely bound to Russia than ever.

Meanwhile, an unexpected event contributed to show the fallacy of the English policy, and even brought about a crisis. We have already seen how Russia and Prussia had ventured to take possession of the disputed provinces; Russia by evacuating Saxony in favour of Prussia, and concentrating her forces on the Vistula, and by sending the Grand Duke Constantine to Warsaw to organize the new kingdom of Poland; Prussia, by ostensibly occupying all Saxony, and sending

thither civil officers empowered to establish the Prussian rule. This double occupation had given great offence, and had not a little contributed, as we have already said, to the immediate assembling of the Congress. An accidental announcement, the inevitable consequence of Russia and Prussia's imprudence, completed this ill-feeling, and excited their adversaries to the highest degree of exasperation.

When Prince Repnin, the Russian governor of Saxony, and who had fulfilled the duties of his office with great prudence, was about to leave, he thought he ought to take a formal leave of the Saxons, and in a declaration that was afterwards published, told them that, in consequence of an arrangement with England and Austria, they were about to pass under the rule of Prussia. He added that their country would not be divided, but should remain entire, as had been promised, under one sovereign, and this sovereign, Frederick William, well-known for his virtues, would ensure their rights and happiness as he had done that of his other numerous subjects. He said that, undoubtedly, the Saxons ought to regret their old king, who during forty years had secured their happiness, but now the fiat of a superior destiny had gone forth, and after having paid a just tribute of regret to Frederick Augustus, they would be faithful to Frederick William, and prove themselves worthy of his benefits by their submission and loyalty.

The sincerity of this declaration, and the excellent sentiments it contained, heightened the effect it produced, because they showed how far things had advanced. It produced an extraordinary effect on all the Germans assembled at Vienna. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich were assailed with questions. They were asked whether it was with their consent that Saxony was become a Prussian province, and whether the Congress so solemnly assembled at Vienna had only been summoned to consummate an usurpation no less odious than those for which Napoleon was so much blamed. The general excitement was fearful, and Lord Castlereagh feared that a policy which had been willing to sacrifice Saxony to save Poland would not be understood in England, whilst M. de Metternich was quite certain of the bad impression it would produce upon the Austrians; consequently both hastened to contradict Prince Repnin's assertions. They denied the truth of what he said, both verbally in private, and in public through the medium of the press, asserting that the Russian governor had announced as done what had not even been resolved on, and which depended on very difficult negotiations that were far from being completed. The Russians and Prussians replied with much asperity that this was only playing on

words, that certainly no document had been signed, but that in a formal note Austria had approved of the annexation of Saxony to Prussia, and that England had made no opposition. In reply to these assertions, the Austrians said that they were only calculated to mislead the legations assembled at Vienna, that Austria had always considered the sacrifice of Saxony a misfortune for Germany, and consequently for Europe, and had constantly advised Prussia to renounce her designs on Saxony as eventually inimical to her own interests, and that, in any case, Austria's consent to this sacrifice had been fettered with conditions, the chief of which was yet unfulfilled, namely, that the Prussian cabinet should abandon Russia on the Polish question. The public mind was still more exasperated by a new event that occurred in the midst of these contradictions and denials. This was a proclamation which the Grand Duke Constantine addressed to the Poles, and in his brother Alexander's name called on them to rally round the old standard of Poland to defend their existence and threatened rights.

This last manifestation completed the general indignation. Those who were opposed to the views of Russia and Prussia considered that such effrontery ought to be met by something else than newspaper articles, and remarks made in the drawing-rooms of Vienna, and they did not hesitate to say that it was imperatively necessary to summon a military force and prepare to restrain those ambitious men, who sought to parcel out Europe as they pleased. The Bavarians and Austrians were the most excited of all, the former, because that the suppression of so important a state as Saxony was a terrifying example for all the princes of the Confederation: the latter, because that the intimate union of Russia and Prussia, and their establishment at the foot of the Bohemian and Carpathian mountains, were calculated to endanger the security of Austria. The Austrians, in particular, were most indignant at the arrogance of Russia and Prussia, and asked what would have become both of the one and the other if the Austrian army had not come to their assistance after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen? or if the Austrians had not borne the principal burthen of the war at Dresden and Leipzig? "If," they said, and with perfect truth, "if the safety of Europe, as some insolently assert, was exclusively the work of one portion of the Allies, would it not be more just to attribute the good work to those who in 1813 had, at the risk of their existence, declared themselves, and who, breaking the bonds of family affection, had decided everything, than to those who, when left to themselves, were not able to defend either the Saal, the Elbe, or the Oder?"

Prince Schwarzenberg was generally esteemed, and though not in the habit of arrogating to himself the exercise of authority, he was rough, and even harsh, when urged too far. He had several conversations with Alexander, by whom he was always treated with consideration and courtesy. He did not spare the Emperor, and was so excited by the general complaints as to say that he almost repented the blind confidence he had felt in the Emperor's personal sincerity. He added, that had he foreseen what had occurred, he would neither have advised his sovereign to unite the Austrian forces with those of Russia or Prussia, nor would he have accepted the command of these armies, nor have so freely shed his blood, borne so many affronts, or assumed so much responsibility to secure the success of the common cause. He recalled the entreaties and supplications employed by the Allies to win the support of Austria, and the ingratitude with which she had been afterwards treated; he pointed out the bad effects of these audacious pretensions, pretensions that fully justified Napoleon's conduct; he also pointed out the danger of letting Europe see that she had only made an exchange of masters. "Napoleon," continued Prince Schwarzenberg, "though secluded in his island is still all-powerful in his influence over the public mind, and what would be the consequence if, whilst the European courts present so scandalous a spectacle of disunion and cupidity, he suddenly appeared in either camp?"

The Austrian generalissimo was violently excited, and embarrassed the Czar by the vehemence of his language. Alexander endeavoured to exculpate himself, denied the ambitious designs of which he was accused, again appealed to his well-known sincerity and generosity, said that he was bound both to the Poles and Prussians, and expressed his surprise at the indignation exhibited against an arrangement that he considered quite natural. He expressed some regret that things had proceeded to such extremities, or that he had gone so far. Still, notwithstanding his apologetic tone, it was evident that he had not renounced his plans.

However much the allies might desire to avoid war, or have recourse to the interference of France, which would be inevitable in case of a rupture, they began to think of such a necessity. Lord Castlereagh found his position changed by instructions he had just received from England, and which modified his conduct not a little. Hitherto he had acted like all British ministers, and made little account of Hanoverian interests, which were dearer to the reigning family than to the English nation. He had taken little heed of the wrongs of German princes, and in the question of Saxony seemed to forget that he was minister of the King of Hanover as well as



of the King of England. The true motive of his conduct was, that he believed a stronger sympathy existed in the English Parliament for Poland than for Saxony. However, it was not possible, that he would be long allowed to follow such a policy. A number of letters, principally by the Coburg princes, had been addressed to the Prince Regent of England from Vienna. Although these princes had, during the late wars, espoused the cause of Russia, and served in her armies, they had not forgotten their duty to the King of Saxony, the head of their house, who had always protected them against Napoleon, and they now pleaded his cause, with a most honourable fidelity. One of these princes was at Vienna, daily braving the rage and threats of Alexander; the other was at London, making preparations, it was said, for his marriage with the Princess Charlotte of England. Both, aided by the Austrian ministers, had impressed on the Prince Regent, the future monarch of Hanover and of England, the danger of sacrificing Saxony, and the prince, in his turn, had insisted that the British Cabinet should formally command Lord Castlereagh to defend the interests of Saxony. The order was issued, and arrived at Vienna in the beginning of December.

This order could not have come more *à propos*. It obliged Lord Castlereagh to change his policy, and, at the same time, furnished him with a most natural excuse for this change. Had these instructions arrived a few days earlier, he might, perhaps, have been annoyed; but now that he saw himself the dupe of his complaisance to the Prussians, he was very well pleased to receive them. He consequently agreed perfectly with M. de Metternich in his absolute refusal to sacrifice either Saxony or Poland, and showed the two allied sovereigns that he was determined to oppose them by every means. Prince de Wrède, the ever-active and useful representative of Bavaria, was constantly advising the adoption of energetic resolutions. He offered, in the name of his court, twenty-five thousand men, for every hundred thousand furnished by Austria, and also advised a good understanding with France, for without her aid the balance of strength would be uncertain. Austria had three hundred thousand men, of whom she could employ two hundred thousand against Russia and Prussia; Bavaria could furnish about sixty thousand, though she promised to raise more; and the other German princes, who were removed from Prussian and Russian influence, could furnish about forty thousand, and the Low Countries, perhaps, as many more; but a greater number could not be reckoned on, as all England's forces were still engaged in the American war. The whole, thus collected, would not

amount to more than three hundred and fifty thousand men, a number not exceeding the combined armies of Russia and Prussia, as the one could easily assemble two hundred thousand, and the other one hundred and fifty thousand men. The numbers being equal, and their valour and resources assumed to be so, the event would be most uncertain, and they might continue slaughtering each other for years, without any result, whilst France would be a mere spectator of a conflict so beneficial to her. To secure a certain result France should be engaged in the quarrel, and furnish one hundred thousand men, who would attack Prussia either in the Rhenish Provinces or in Franconia. Certainly the price of this assistance might be something alarming, were it solicited, but here it was freely offered by the French Legation, and not only offered, but urgently pressed upon those who needed it.

These reasons adduced principally by Bavaria, were decisive, and had risen spontaneously in everybody's mind. It would have been folly to refuse the proffered aid of France, which would be most valuable, though some had affected to doubt it. Intelligence of our warlike preparations, instigated by M. de Talleyrand, was now noised in every direction, and Vienna was filled with letters from Paris, relating all that was going on there. These letters spoke of the internal state of France, and the discontent felt at the proceedings of the Bourbons, but whilst mentioning the discontent that prevailed amongst the military, the writers added that the army was increasing daily, that it had never been composed of better soldiers, and that employed on foreign service, the French soldiers would sustain the glory they had already acquired. The letters received by the Russians and Prussians were less flattering to France, and still less to the Bourbons, but those written by the Duke of Wellington and M. de Vincent, the English and Austrian Ambassadors at Paris, though they admitted the political errors of the restored dynasty, agreed in admiring the French army, and admitted the advantages that such a force could offer. These letters also mentioned the flourishing state of our finances, whose prompt reestablishment appeared inexplicable, though from the ease with which each department was carried on there could be no doubt of their good condition.

There was no longer any reason to doubt, as Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich had appeared to do, of the efficacious assistance that France could offer. Nor could there be any doubt of her willingness to furnish aid, since M. de Talleyrand's entreaties to be allowed to take part in this European crusade in favour of Saxony, and the constant communications exchanged between the French and Bavarian

legations left no doubt on this point. However, no anxiety was felt to take France into confidence, or let her know that the Allies were making warlike preparations against each other. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich were restrained by a certain party feeling, and did not wish to make advances to M. de Talleyrand, who they knew, would come forward on the slightest hint. Besides, they knew, that he would learn sufficient from Bavaria to hold himself in readiness. A plan was drawn up, to be put in execution in the month of March 1815, in which the French forces were disposed of as though their aid was certain. In virtue of this plan, proposed by Prince Schwarzenberg and Marshal de Wrede, three hundred and twenty thousand Austrians, Bavarians, Wurtembergers, Badeners, Saxons, &c., were to be divided into two armies, and sent into Moravia and Bohemia. One of these armies, consisting of two hundred thousand men under the command of Prince Schwarzenberg, was to proceed through Moravia to the Upper Vistula; and the other, consisting of one hundred and twenty thousand, under Marshal de Wrede, was to pass through Bohemia to the Oder, whilst fifty thousand French, entering Franconia, would prevent the Bohemian army from being outflanked; and another force of fifty thousand men was to proceed to the Rhenish Provinces, to act in concert with the Hollando-Belgians. There was no doubt but that Prussia would be overwhelmed by such a mass, and Russia forced to retreat beyond the Vistula. No soldiers were to be required from England until the end of the American war, but she was to subsidize the new Allies, with the exception of France, that no longer needed either the purse or sword of strangers. These plans, which were to be further matured before being put into execution, were to remain a secret between England, Bavaria, and Austria, and not communicated to the French, except through the officious indiscretion of Bavaria. As a preliminary precaution, Austria sent a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men into Galicia, where she already had forty thousand.

On the strength of these arrangements, M. de Metternich entered into a categorical explanation with the Russians and Prussians, and in a note dated 10th December, declared that, in consequence of the unanimous opinion of Germany, and the definite resolutions of England, announced in Lord Castlereagh's late instructions, and the opinion of all the great European powers, France in particular, and in consequence of the non-compliance with the conditions imposed on Prussia at a time when her wishes were about being complied with, Saxony was to be maintained in her actual state, with the exception of some territorial sacrifices deemed necessary for de-

fining more accurately the Prussian frontier, and which, in any case, would be the punishment of the faults committed by King Frederick Augustus.

This positive declaration of Austria produced a great effect at Vienna. She would never have used such language without having taken a decided determination to proceed to extremities, without having calculated her resources, prepared the means of executing her plans, and formed new alliances. Besides, even a superficial glance seemed to show that Austria, England and France were united, and determined to act in common. The union of all the other European powers had scarcely sufficed to conquer France, and what was now to become of Russia and Prussia alone against united England, Austria, and France? The two northern powers would not be able to hold their ground. The Prussians, against whom this manifestation was principally directed, were violently indignant. King Frederick William, then at Vienna, was surrounded by the principal Prussian generals, amongst whom Marshal Blucher was conspicuous, and who besieged him with their haughty demands, asserting in the loftiest terms that they were the sole conquerors of Napoleon, the sole saviours of Europe. If they were to be believed, nothing ought to be refused them, and whoever opposed their pretensions should be prepared to feel the temper of their swords. Influenced by the same sentiments, the Prussian ministers prepared to reply immediately, and in the same tone, to the Austrian despatch. They were about to embody in their reply all the vehemence of the Prussian staff, and intended to retort upon Austria the charge of faithlessness, when the Emperor Alexander, who, although much excited, was not inclined to urge things so far, prevented them from yielding to their first emotions of anger, or using such violent language in their reply. He restrained them, and proceeded to act with all that tact that was natural to him when not thrown off his guard. He first visited the Austrians, commencing with Prince Schwarzenberg and the Emperor Francis. He found the former, not indeed excited like the Prussians, but severe and determined, and was so dissatisfied with him, that he complained to M. de Metternich, whom he accused of inspiring the commander-in-chief of the Austrian army with false ideas. He next visited the Emperor Francis, who treated him with all the urbanity due from a host to his guest, but with a calm determination that often produces a greater effect than anger. His next interview was with M. de Talleyrand. This was their third meeting, for since Alexander had come to Vienna he was chary of his interviews with the illustrious diplomatist, at whose house he had not hesitated to take up

his abode at Paris. He now almost solicited an interview, for meeting M. de Talleyrand in a drawing-room of the Austrian capital, he took his arm, and made an appointment with him. When M. de Talleyrand appeared on the appointed day, the Czar received him, if not with the seductive charm of former times, at least with a gracious friendliness which invited intimacy; the Emperor now spoke with the greatest moderation on subjects whose discussion a little before deprived him of all self-command. He asked M. de Talleyrand how it happened, that he, who at Paris had expressed himself in favour of the restoration of Poland, was now so much opposed to it. M. de Talleyrand replied that he was still favourable to the project, but it should be the restoration of a free and independent Poland—a European, and not a Russian Poland. The French diplomatist, in conformity with the policy already employed, added, that Poland no longer interested France, that since it was not Poland that was to be restored, but a frontier to be decided on between Russia and Germany, he left the business to those interested in it, and that as far as this question was concerned, Russia would meet with no opposition from France. This was certainly a concession, but it was no advantage to the Czar to gain Poland unless he got Saxony at the same time. M. de Talleyrand appeared inflexible on this latter point, and no longer adducing arguments based on the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, he endeavoured to prove to Alexander that the peace of the world, and the glory of Europe, depended on the recognition of the principle of legitimacy under all circumstances, and in every place. Such opinions had little influence with the Czar, especially coming from the lips of M. de Talleyrand. He did not seem to attach much importance to these professions of faith uttered by the ancient minister of the usurper, and repeated to him that he was bound to the Prussians, that his policy was to be faithful to his word, but that if M. de Talleyrand could induce the Prussians to release him from his promise, he would yield. M. de Talleyrand replied that some other than he should be employed to influence the Prussians, and that Alexander himself possessed the means of doing so, by restoring them their portion of Poland. “You wish, then,” replied Alexander, “that I should despoil myself to satisfy you. That would not suit me. But,” he added, “let us make a bargain. I know your secret; I know your principal object here; you are seeking to dethrone Murat! Well,” he said, extending his hand to M. de Talleyrand, “let us form a contract; I will take your side on that question, and it will be soon decided according to your wishes, provided that you yield Saxony to me.” At this moment the expression of Alexander’s countenance was animated and insinuating,

showing how anxious he was to gain his end, and it is quite evident that had France pursued a different policy at Vienna, and not confined herself to seeking the safety of Saxony, she could have obtained every concession from Russia. But as M. de Talleyrand's course was marked out for him, he remained unmoved by Alexander's seductive proposal, and said he could not entertain such a proposition, which was no other than to tolerate usurpation in one quarter of Europe, in order to secure the triumph of legitimacy in another; that for his part, he desired to see the rights of legitimacy universally maintained. M. de Talleyrand delivered these sentiments with a pontifical air, which unfortunately made Alexander smile.

This proposal not having succeeded, the Czar, wishing to derive some advantage from the interview, sought to learn from M. de Talleyrand what were those warlike preparations going on in France so much spoken of at Vienna, and for what they were intended. Without seeming to attach much importance to these questions, though he turned his good ear to M. de Talleyrand (he heard badly in one), he asked him in what condition was the French army, and whether it had been considered necessary to reorganise it, as was reported at Vienna. Then with all that art which he possessed in so high a degree, and with an expression of the greatest indifference, M. de Talleyrand related what had been, and what was still being done to reform the French army, to attach the soldiers to the new government, and, above all, to render the army as fit as ever for foreign service. He said, quite carelessly, that at present France had 200,000 soldiers, and would have 300,000 in March, all veterans who had returned from abroad, and taken the place of the conscripts drawn for 1815. He gave those details like one who was neither desirous nor conscious of producing an effect. Alexander could not conceal his feelings as well as M. de Talleyrand, and they parted with formal politeness, the Czar deeply impressed by what he had heard, for he had no doubt but that these newly-raised French troops would be at the service of England and Austria should a war arise on the Polish and Saxon question.

However, in order to be still more certain, Alexander sent Prince Czartoryski to M. de Talleyrand. This prince was deeply interested in the fate of Poland, for whose sake he was most anxious to bring about a union between France and Russia. The motive of this visit was a phrase in M. de Metternich's despatch, in which he alleged that all the European States, and France in particular, were opposed to the sacrifice of Saxony. Prince Czartoryski was commissioned to discover the true meaning of this phrase, which seemed to indicate a



formal compact between France and Austria. As M. de Talleyrand divined this motive, he persisted in his tactics of making a greater show than the reality justified, and of intimidating Alexander by the idea of a coalition existing between France, England, and Austria, but took care, at the same time, that of the three powers France should appear the least opposed to Russia. He expressed a decided preference for the latter power, and an extreme desire to be on good terms with her, but, at the same time, he did not deny that, with regard to Saxony, France would join those who defended her, even to the shedding of blood. He boasted, indeed, a little; for Prince Czartoryski was led, by this conversation, to believe that M. de Talleyrand enjoyed more of England and Austria's confidence than was really the case. But the desired effect was produced, and this was the essential point considering the policy that was adopted.

Every species of opposition now rose against the projects of Alexander and Frederick William. The German princes of the North and South, most of whom were assembled at Vienna, were desirous of making a protestation in common against the annexation of Saxony to Prussia. One prince alone dissented—the son of the King of Wurtemberg, who had served with the French in Russia, and who, whether fighting with or against us, always distinguished himself by his bravery and brilliant daring, and who, now captivated by the charms of his affianced bride, the Grand Duchess Catherine, was entirely devoted to the Russian policy. This prince, who seldom agreed in opinion with his father, used all his influence to prevent the intended declaration. He succeeded in restraining the lesser princes, by threatening them with the anger of Prussia, if they signed the declaration. However, the result was the same; and the members of the committee entrusted with the consideration of German affairs, declared that they would suspend their labours until the fate of Saxony should be decided, which meant, that their resolutions would entirely depend on the decisions made with regard to this kingdom, in whose fate the German States felt as much interest as in their own.

Opposed by so many difficulties, both moral and physical, Alexander felt that he should make some concessions, and he reluctantly yielded to necessity. In the first exaltation of his feelings, he had intended to demand the entire territory of ancient Poland. But these pretensions he was obliged to renounce in consequence of the resistance he met on every side. Still, he was determined to demand, and obtain at any price, all the territory that essentially constituted Poland—that is, the basin of the Vistula from Sandomir to Thorn.

He would thus have Warsaw, surrounded on every side with

sufficient extent of territory. And, in possessing Warsaw, he might boast of having re-constituted Poland, and in such a position he would have, so to speak, won the wager he had laid against all Europe, as much through self-love as from ambition or chivalrous feeling. He was ready to make some concession, the fundamental point of his project being gained.

The principal concession was to be made on the Prussian side in the Grand Duchy of Posen. Had Alexander taken all the territory of ancient Poland on this side, he would touch the Oder, as these possessions extended nearly to the confluence of the Wartha and Oder, and terminated not far from Custrin, Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and Glogau. There remained, consequently, but a very narrow strip of territory on the right of the Oder to constitute the country of Silesia. Alexander would have thus penetrated through the junction of the angle formed by Old Prussia and Pomerania with Silesia, and would have made an angular advance into the heart of the Prussian monarchy, which would be most alarming to the Germans and even to the Prussians; for amongst the latter, those who were more influenced by rational geographical considerations than by self-love, considered that their country was in more need of being strengthened from Thorn to Breslau, than extended from Wittenberg to Dresden. By leaving the actual Duchy of Posen—that is, the greater part of the basin of the Wartha, to the Prussians, they would get a fine territory more populous than that nearer to Warsaw; nor would it be impossible to trace a good frontier between Poland and Prussia. By following the Prosna to its confluence with the Wartha, a little below Konin, and by drawing a line from this point to the neighbourhood of Thorn, Prosna would form a first point of separation; and then from Konin to Inowracław the succession of lakes whence the Netze takes its rise, would present a line of obstacles of real importance as a frontier. This formidable point being directed towards Prussia would not injure the Polish frontier, for the country around Warsaw would be still sufficiently extensive. Of the two millions and a half of Poles, that Prussia might claim as her portion of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, if this Grand Duchy were restored to its ancient co-partitionists, she would get one million, and as many more in the centre of Germany. Therefore, if an arrangement could be made in Germany, as in Poland, by detaching a portion of territory from Saxony, Prussia might be restored to the position she held in 1805, which was what had been promised her.

The arrangements with Austria would not be so easy, as more was to be demanded than conceded. But here the demands of Russia were really well-founded, at least, if the principle of re-constituting Poland as a separate kingdom were

admitted. Austria had always held Galicia since the time of the first partition, nor had even Napoleon thought of depriving her of it, except, indeed, in 1812, when he flattered himself for an instant to be able to overpower Russia and create a French Poland. This enterprise failed; Galicia still belonged to Austria, and not the most impassioned Pole, not even Alexander himself, would have thought of demanding it from the Cabinet of Vienna. But there were provinces on both banks of the Vistula, extending to the Pilica on one side and to the Bug on the other, which Austria had acquired in the last partition, and of which Napoleon had taken possession, when about to create the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Were these territories restored to Austria, she would possess the country on each side of the Vistula, even to the very gates of Warsaw, in which case it would be impossible to say that Poland was re-constituted. Austria saw this; and, besides, she might be told, that if the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Tœplitz, which were concluded when but a limited success was hoped for by the Allies; if these treaties required that the different portions of the Grand Duchy should be restored to their old possessors, still, Austria had benefited so much in the Tyrol, in Italy, and in Bavaria, by the unexpected success of the Allies, that she could not deny the justice of Russia's claims to an equal advantage. Now, this latter State could only pretend to acquisitions gained on the banks of the Vistula; therefore, no very serious opposition was to be dreaded on the part of Austria. Besides, other concessions, of a certain value, were to be offered to Austria: she would be allowed to retain the salt mines of Wieliczka, by erecting Cracow into an independent city (as Alexander thought to do with Thorn); and Galicia would get back the beautiful district of Tarnopol, of which Napoleon had deprived her in 1809, to punish Austria for having declared war against us at that time.

Russia, therefore, resolved to yield the important Duchy of Posen to Prussia, a concession which would render the latter power less exacting in Germany, and induce her to come to an amicable arrangement with Austria relative to the Polish frontier. M. de Hardenberg was, consequently, desired to address a very moderate reply to Austria, and endeavour to attain the principal objects of the Prussian policy without coming to a rupture which might be fatal to Russia and Prussia, and would certainly entail general disgrace.

Whilst Alexander, in consequence of these conciliatory resolutions, sought to come to an understanding with Austria concerning the frontier that was to separate them, M. de Hardenberg, pursuant to the instructions he had received, replied on the 20th of December to the note of the 10th, by a

note whose tone was exceedingly conciliatory, and the arguments, ably supported, considered from the Prussian point of view. In this document the Prussian minister expressed his surprise that after the formal consent of England, and the conditional approbation of Austria to the incorporation of Saxony with Prussia, that a discussion should now be resumed on a subject that had been in some sort decided. The excuse, founded on the non-fulfilment of the conditions imposed by Austria was not valid, he said; for Prussia agreed to all that she required concerning the limits of the northern and southern German States, to the destiny contemplated for Mayence and to everything connected with the balance of power in Germany. As to the Polish question, Prussia had interfered, and would continue to do so, in order that everything might be arranged, as far as possible, according to the desires of the Austrian cabinet. M. de Hardenberg asserted that there was as little foundation for the principle of sovereignty, which was brought forward in favour of the King of Saxony. Saxony had been conquered in nine pitched battles, especially at Leipzig, where he did not hesitate to say that Prussia had borne the entire burden of the days of the 16th, 17th, and 18th of October, and that, consequently, the right of conquest, recognised by all publicists might be confidently appealed to. The application of this right to the King of Saxony was founded on incontestable principles, and no less so on equity. Frederick Augustus, though pledged to the cause of Europe by the intervention of the Austrian cabinet, and received at Prague by the Emperor Francis, had left that retreat where he was in safety, abandoned the cause which he had promised to serve, and embraced that of the common oppressor, to whom he gave up Torgau, the Saxon army, and the Upper Elbe. He might, therefore, be punished without any scruple of conscience, and his punishment would serve as a good example. Besides, his chastisement would not be very severe; he would not be dethroned, but merely transferred from one country to another. A new State could be given him on the left bank of the Rhine, a State peopled with Catholics, an arrangement which would terminate the disagreeable disunion existing in Saxony between a Catholic government and a Protestant people. Prussia herself would furnish the materials for this new kingdom, by yielding a part or even the whole of the provinces destined for her on the left of the Rhine, for she attached little importance to possessions that brought her into such close contact with France, and had accepted them only *for the public good*, and in conformity to the wishes of Great Britain. This renunciation on the part of Prussia would put the King of Saxony in a position equal, if not superior, to that of the princes of Baden, Nassau, and Hesse.

He should also have a voice in the Diet, and all these arrangements would tend to the maintenance of the Germanic equilibrium. Such transfers of sovereignty were not rare in history. Charles V. furnished an example in his dealings with this very house of Saxony, by transferring the actual reigning branch from a simple duchy to the throne of Saxony. Austria and France afforded an example in the last century, when the house of Lorraine was transferred to Tuscany. The arrangement now proposed with regard to Saxony would be much better than cutting up that kingdom, which would be done were the design put into operation of only punishing Frederick Augustus by a diminution of territory. In the first place, this dismemberment would afflict the Saxons, who had been promised that they should not be separated; besides that, Saxony, reduced to the third or the half of her proportions, would not be in a position to support royal state, or her beautiful capital, the centre of art in Germany. A nest of malcontents would remain in the country, who, discontented with the new order of things, would be ever plotting the re-constitution of a revolutionary Poland governed by a Saxon prince. Considered in any light the worst possible arrangement would be to partition Saxony, instead of giving it entire to Prussia, and transferring Frederick Augustus to the left of the Rhine. Nor would there be any reason why Austria should take offence at Prussia's closer neighbourhood, for Saxony in her actual state would form but a feeble barrier between the two great German powers. This had been proved by Frederick the Great, for in his different wars one step was sufficient to bring him to Dresden, and enable him to establish himself at Koenigstein, and also more recently by Napoleon; and it was thus that the Prussian government would always act, should it unfortunately happen that war broke out between Austria and Prussia. In order that Austria may feel less anxiety on this point, her wish that Dresden should remain unfortified should be gratified. Finally, M. de Hardenberg recapitulated all that Europe owed to Prussia for contributing so-much to the common welfare, and the promise made to her of re-construction, which, in securing her the same amount of population she possessed in 1805, would afford her a better geographical configuration. This latter point had been formally stipulated, for every one admitted her defective configuration, which would be only increased were she compelled for interests not her own to stretch from Koenigsberg to Aix-la-Chapelle, unless she were permitted, at the same time, to strengthen her centre by extending her possessions as far as Dresden. Acting otherwise would be treating Prussia with ingratitude, besides breaking a solemn promise, and neglecting the interests of Europe, which wer

involved in the well-being of Prussia. It should also be admitted, that the ambition of which she was accused was the result of a desire to correct her defective geographical conformation; and were her present demands gratified, she might be tranquillized for a long time, if not for ever.

Doubtless, more than one reply might be made to these assertions, some well-founded, others specious, and they were put forth in a tone of moderation that showed more inclination to conciliate than to quarrel.

The question having assumed this form, a pacific arrangement was to be hoped for. Austria, on her side, determined to make some concessions. Having recovered the Tyrol and Italy, of which she had no expectation when the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Tœplitz were concluded, it would ill become her to dispute any advantage that Russia might obtain, and where could Russia gain territorial advantages except in Poland. Had Austria been less apprehensive of war, or were she better supported on this point by France, she might have disputed the reconstitution of a Poland which would necessarily be only a Russian Poland. But as Prussia had promised to support Russia on this point, and France had only shown a disposition in favour of Saxony, Austria was not in a position to dispute a proposal which Alexander made an absolute condition, and, in some sort, a point of honour. The principle being conceded that Poland should be reconstituted as a vassal of Russia, Austria could not pretend to retain the country on each side of the Vistula as far as the Pilica and the Bug, which would be extending her dominions to the very gates of Warsaw. She consequently consented to negotiate on this subject, only claiming the Vistula as far as Sandomir. At Sandomir, the San should become the boundary of Galicia, which would be restoring the old Gallician frontier. Disputes arose touching Cracow, Tarnopol, and the salt mines of Wieliczka, but Russia, delighted at becoming mistress of the basin of the Vistula as far as the Pilica and the Bug, was most accommodating on these points. She yielded a portion of territory lying round Cracow, and still more, recognized the independence of this city, so famous in Polish annals. Russia looked upon Cracow as a floating remnant of Poland, which might be at a later period absorbed into the new Russian Poland. Russia also gave up the salt mines of Wieliczka, and, lastly, she voluntarily surrendered the district of Tarnopol to Austria, as a compensation for provinces which she had been promised, but did not obtain.

The more yielding Austria was in the direction of Poland, where, however, by the annexation of Galicia to her dominions, she secured a long strip of territory along the Carpa-



thian mountains, the more firm she could and would be with regard to Saxony.

She persisted in asserting that the principal condition imposed on Prussia, that of joining England and Austria on the Polish question, had not been fulfilled, that she had not been bound concerning any particular frontier, but on the fundamental question, and that, consequently, Austria was freed from her engagements. She reminded Prussia that it was against her will she had ever consented to the sacrifice of Saxony, and had only yielded through complaisance, and a desire for concord, and had always advised Prussia not to take advantage of this sacrifice, for the suppression of Saxony would be a severe shock to the political equilibrium of Germany, and be a grave offence to the moral sentiments of her people. She added, that England having maturely reflected, had retracted her consent to the suppression of Saxony, and that, consequently, the idea of incorporating that country with Prussia could no longer be entertained. Austria declared herself formally on this point, and said that she would only consent to some slight dismemberment of Saxony, which in punishing Frederick Augustus for the faults he had committed, would serve to define the Prussian frontier, and, at the same time, fulfil the promise made to Prussia to restore her the position she held in 1805.

Details being entered into, Austria took great pains to show that, in order to restore Prussia to the position she held in 1805, it would not be necessary to sacrifice Saxony. Out of less than ten million subjects, Prussia had lost, through Napoleon, 4,800,000, that is, nearly half of what she possessed. Since the Allies had victoriously crossed the Elbe and the Rhine, she had, by the recovery of Dantzic, Magdeburg, Westphalia, &c., got back about 1,500,000. She still required 3,300,000 in order to be fully indemnified. She might claim as her share of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 2,500,000 subjects; 500,000 for the principalities of Anspach and Bayreuth, which had been given to Bavaria in 1806, and were still held by that state; 300,000 for an addition that was promised to Hanover at the expense of Prussia; 50,000 for a recompense promised to the house of Saxe Weimar, making altogether 3,350,000, which added to the 1,500,000 she had already recovered, would amount to 4,850,000, being a little more than she had lost. By getting the duchy of Posen from Russia, she would gain one million souls; the provinces on the left of the Rhine, and the Grand Duchy of Baden on the right contained at least 1,600,000, and it was only necessary to find 750,000 more. These might by management be procured from the lesser princes, and the deficient 200,000 made up in this way:

Hanover was willing to give up the 300,000 that had been promised to her. There were, therefore, but 200,000 or 300,000 more to be found in order to satisfy Prussian ambition, and by demanding these from Saxony, whose population amounted to 2,100,000, she would still retain her position, for she would not influence the Germanic balance less with 1,800,000 subjects than with 2,100,000.

These calculations, which were certainly true, excited great indignation amongst the Prussians, and gave rise to the reproach, so often repeated since, that the Congress of Vienna portioned out human beings as though they were flocks of sheep. The Prussians denied the correctness of these calculations, and adduced others, as difficult to admit as to contest. Without a competent authority, invested with the power of giving a final decision on these estimates of men and territory, it was not possible to come to an agreement, for differences arose not alone as to the quantity, but the quality, of these human beings. It was said that a Pole from the neighbourhood of Posen, given by Russia to Prussia, was of greater value than one from Klodawa or Sempolno, which were still under her sway; and that an old Frenchman from Aix-la-Chapelle or Cologne, was infinitely superior to a Pole from Kalisch or Thorn, for whom he was to be given in exchange. Consequently, the quality as well as the number of the subjects apportioned to each power was to be taken into consideration.

It was determined, that besides the great Committee of Five empowered to deliberate upon the most important questions, a special committee should be formed to examine and pronounce upon the estimates brought forward on each side.

Towards the close of December, Lord Castlereagh called on M. de Talleyrand to speak with him on the subject, and suggested this committee as an excellent means of setting aside the difficulties resulting from these contradictory calculations, and saving Saxony by reducing the question to one of arithmetic. M. de Talleyrand made no objection to this committee of valuation, but he told the British plenipotentiary, that it would be degrading the subject to treat it so; that it was better to discuss principles than figures, and then introducing his favourite theme of legitimacy, he proposed that England, Austria, and France should conclude a short but precise convention, by which these powers would bind themselves to maintain the existence of Saxony on principle, though yielding some of her territory to Prussia. Lord Castlereagh recoiled some steps, like one taken by surprise. "You propose an alliance," he said, "and an alliance implies either certain or possible warfare. We do not desire war, and would

only have recourse to it at the last extremity. Should we be compelled to make war, we shall then think of the means of carrying it on, and of the best alliances to form."

M. de Talleyrand, thus repelled, did not persist. It was agreed to form a committee of valuation, where France should be represented. The suggestion of this committee was well received by the parties most interested; but the proposal of admitting a French commissioner met with great opposition. This was considered an infraction of the promise made by the allies to each other, that France should have no voice in the disposal of the territories taken from her, a promise renewed at Paris, on the 30th of May, and again at Vienna during the first days of the Congress. It is true, that since then they had been compelled to act conjointly with France, for the idea of deciding definitely on European questions without her participation was soon perceived to be as ridiculous as impracticable. But though she had been consulted on all important territorial questions, still the secret and formal engagement subsisting between the Four, of settling everything themselves, had not been revoked.

M. de Metternich and Lord Castlereagh ought to have acknowledged that in their great anxiety, they had initiated France into the Saxony question, and could not decently reject her further interference. This avowal they had not the courage to make; and as Prussia showed an extreme repugnance to admit a power, avowedly inimical to her, to form one of a tribunal empowered to decide definitely on her claims, the others did not insist, and France was excluded from the committee of valuation.

Lord Castlereagh did not dare to carry this intelligence to M. de Talleyrand; he sent to M. de Talleyrand his brother, Lord Stewart, the English Ambassador at Berlin, who presented himself at the French embassy with many excuses and embarrassed explanations. As M. de Talleyrand was not to be trifled with, when the interests of the French legation at Vienna were at stake, he asked Lord Castlereagh's brother very drily, who those were that opposed the admission of France to the committee, and added with bitter irony, that doubtless, it was the *Allies* who did not desire her presence. Lord Stewart ingenuously admitted it was, and M. de Talleyrand, transported with rage, exclaimed; "Since you are still the *Allies of Chaumont*, settle your affairs amongst yourselves. This very day the French Embassy shall leave Vienna, and your future acts shall be invalid in her eyes, as in those of the kingdoms whose interests are sacrificed. Europe shall learn what has occurred. France shall be informed of the part she was expected to play, and England shall be told of the

weak and inconsistent conduct of her representative. She shall be told, that after abandoning Saxony and Poland, he rejected the aid by which he might have saved them." These words contained serious threats against Lord Castlereagh, and implied that his position with regard to the British Parliament would be rendered very embarrassing. Lord Stewart was very much alarmed, and lost no time in informing his brother of the storm that was gathering. Though M. de Talleyrand's menaces were not taken literally, still the dread of their consequences not only on the tranquility of Europe, but still more on the British Parliament, when it should become known, that Saxony and Poland might have been saved, and were not, because of adhesion to a ridiculous system of exclusion carried out against France, influenced Lord Castlereagh so powerfully, that he spoke to the *Allies* in a tone he had never before assumed. He assembled them immediately and pointed out the danger of provoking an explosion that might set Europe in flames, and declared that, for his part, he would not assume such a responsibility in the eyes of England. He was warmly supported by M. de Metternich, and in spite of the Prussians, it was decided that France should be represented in the committee. This intelligence was communicated to M. de Talleyrand, the same evening, in a polite note from Lord Castlereagh.

The Duke de Dalberg was chosen to represent France in the committee of valuation. The members met on the 31st of December. The Russian representative was appointed to state the Russian and Prussian pretensions, and he was in a position to do so with propriety, as Russia, by her arrangements concerning the frontiers of Galicia with Austria, and her abandonment of Posen to Prussia, appeared as a disinterested party in the question. He consequently spoke in the names of both countries, and made the following proposals: that Prussia, besides the duchy of Posen, which Russia had resigned, in order to smooth away the newly-arisen difficulties, should also get the entire of Saxony as a compensation for the losses she had sustained. According to the Russian commissioner, less could not be done to restore Prussia to the position she held in 1805, or to fulfil the promise made to her that her geographical configuration should be improved. The King of Saxony was to be transported to the banks of the Rhine, where Prussia would give him a territory containing seven hundred thousand inhabitants, and with the pretty town of Bonn as a capital. He should also have a voice in the Diet. This Prince, surrounded by a Catholic population, placed on the frontiers of France, would prevent all contact between that country and Prussia. As to Poland,

the Russian Government would bestow on her a separate existence and government, and would ultimately enlarge her dominions by the addition of the ancient Polish provinces in the actual possession of Russia, subject, however, to the will of the Emperor, who would organise the kingdom of which he was the head, according to his own views. The Emperor would henceforth bear the title of Czar of Russia and King of Poland. The other powers, co-partitionists of Poland, who in virtue of the present peace would retain certain Polish provinces, should pledge themselves to give these provinces local governments calculated to secure them a certain civil independence, a *régime* conformable to their national customs and favourable to the development of their commercial and agricultural interests.

This project supported by the most specious reasoning was a last effort attempted by Alexander to gain Saxony for his ally, the King of Prussia. But it was very evident that his own wishes being gratified, he would not proceed to extremities to support his proposition.

The further consideration of these propositions was adjourned to the second of January.

On the first of January, Lord Castlereagh received important intelligence, which produced a very great change in his position. England had just signed articles of peace with the United States, and was henceforth at liberty to employ all her forces on the European continent. She had been very much occupied by this American war, in which she had employed all the troops that the protection of the kingdom of the Low Countries left at her disposal. Being freed from this anxiety, she was now in a position to assemble eighty-four thousand men in Holland, in the spring of 1815, and thus furnish a large contingent, should it be necessary to form a new coalition against Prussia and Russia.

The committee of valuation reassembled on the second of January to discuss the propositions presented in the Emperor Alexander's name. The Prussians had left the exposition of the common project to the Russians, but now undertook its defence themselves. This was an important juncture for them. It was their last attempt to get possession of Saxony; and should the verdict of a diplomatic tribunal decide against them, no resource was left but an appeal to arms. Their agents assembled in great numbers at Vienna, united great zeal to all the wonted animation of the military men of their nation, and were constantly boasting that it was they alone who had saved Europe, and that, consequently, they could not expect a refusal; that Saxony was their special conquest, won at Leipsic, on the fearful days of the

16th, 17th, and 18th of October, 1813, that refusing to give them possession of it, was depriving them of their own property, but that supported by their companions in arms, the Russians, they would not allow the price of their blood to be wrested from them; that, besides, they were not alone working for Prussia, but for Germany, as every territorial aggrandizement of the latter was a step towards German unity, which could only be accomplished by Prussia. It was, M. de Stein, especially, seconded by many German patriots, who repeated these assertions, and constantly recapitulated what he and those who shared his opinions had suffered in the cause of Germany.

Under the influence of this excitement, the Prussian legation exhibited in the committee all the ardour of the national feeling. Perfectly conscious of the opposition that these bold assertions and pretensions would meet, they became angry instead of calm, and even went so far as to say, that should what they asked be refused, they would, if necessary, obtain it by force. Lord Castlereagh, who possessed all the pride of an Englishman, and who was surprised at meeting such treatment from persons to whom he had shown so much favour, proudly met the declaration and threats of Prince de Hardenberg, and told both Russians and Prussians that England was not of a temper to submit to dictation, nor would she do it, but would meet force by force. He left the assembly in a state of excitement very unusual to him, and immediately hastened to the French embassy, where he was sure to find a response to his resentment. Forgetting now the *Allies* of Chaumont, he told M. de Talleyrand all that had passed, and again declared that England would not suffer such insolence. Freed from the incubus of the American war, Lord Castlereagh had recovered his firm bearing, and showed a determination to brave the worst rather than submit to the arrogance of the Russians and Prussians. His adroit interlocutor skillfully flattered all his opinions, and reminded him of what he had said a few days before, that a few written words binding England, Austria, and France, would put an end to the boasting of Russia and Prussia. "Put your ideas on paper," replied Lord Castlereagh, and M. de Talleyrand, without waiting for a second invitation, took up his pen. Between them, they drew up a project, by which Austria, France, and England bound themselves to furnish 150,000 men each, to act in common should the defence of the balance of power in Europe expose them to the attacks of enemies. These enemies were not named, but very plainly indicated. Lord Castlereagh took this plan with him, promising to return the following day, when he should have seen and consulted with M. de Metternich.

M. de Talleyrand had attained the great object of his wishes.



He came to Vienna apprehensive that the existence of the French embassy might be ignored, instead of which, the French legation was called upon to play an important part in the dissolution of the alliance of Chaumont, and by the formation of a new alliance, was destined to support the principle of legitimacy. An important point was certainly gained by placing France in such a position, and it was no less a gain to dissolve the coalition of Chaumont, and substitute another in its stead; but it would have been well to consider what was the object of this new alliance, for if it were to support equivocal or inimical interests, there would be less reason for congratulation, and the advantages gained might have been waited for a little longer, if by patience they could have been made more profitable to France.

Lord Castlereagh lost no time, for he seemed to hear already the cries of the British Parliament, reproaching him with having passed under the Russian and Prussian yoke. He sought M. de Metternich, whom he found quite as ready as himself to throw aside his ancient alliance prejudices, and accept the assistance of France against ungrateful and exacting allies. Having arranged all these points with the Austrian minister, he returned to M. de Talleyrand on the morrow—3rd of January—and brought with him the plan of the previous day, now skilfully elaborated. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich had taken great pains to give the project a pacific, and, above all, a defensive character. In fact, no attack was to be made. But should one of the contracting powers, in all sincerity, and without any interested views, support a plan in conformity with the balance of power in Europe, and thereby incur the displeasure of other powers, in that case, France, England, and Austria bound themselves to furnish 150,000 men each in defence of the party attacked. Lord Castlereagh wished to add to these stipulations, which were drawn up at great length, another, which, in his opinion, was indispensable, and not to be disputed by any one. It was as follows:—

“As it was not now a question of ambitious projects, but rather of plans of conservation, and the maintenance of a sacred principle—the preservation of legitimate princes on their thrones—there could be no objection to announcing beforehand that in case of war, *which God forbid, each power should consider itself bound by the Treaty of Paris, according to whose principles and text all States and frontiers were to be portioned out.*”

Now, was M. de Talleyrand taken in a terrible snare. If in the commencement he had been less forward, and less decided in declaring himself for Saxony, if, instead of eagerly

offering his aid, he had waited to be asked, he would not have been obliged to submit to these conditions, and, probably, they would not have been proposed. A profound silence would have been observed, and war should have borne its own expenses according to the issue, and the services rendered by each power. But having so hastily declared his opinion in the case of Saxony, and blamed the different cabinets for their indifference, it was not possible for him to draw back, now that he was taken at his word, nor avow that France could, in certain cases, seek her own interests, having previously asserted that she only sought the maintenance of a principle. Had he sought any advantage for France, his proffered assistance would have been rejected, and England and Austria would have come to an understanding with Russia and Prussia, by yielding to their demands. In truth, this would have been no great evil, for the policy supported by these two powers was the most disadvantageous for us; the house of Saxony might have been transferred to the Rhine, and she would be our neighbour instead of Prussia.

And we might have done as well by striving to attain such a result in conjunction with the Russians and Prussians, who would have paid us in some way, and not asked us to make war for the sole honour of being their allies. But having so long supported the English and the Austrians, whom we were constantly urging and imploring to act, we could not now raise an objection, and reject the proposed condition; and yet this condition was very hard! Now, at the end of twenty years of desolating warfare, when we had hardly entered upon the enjoyment of peace,—a peace that constituted the Bourbons' best title to popularity,—to compromise that peace, and run the risk of again pouring forth French blood in torrents; merely that Germany might have less cause of uneasiness from Russia, or that Prussia might give less umbrage to Austria; and to act thus whilst those very powers for whom we were about to combat, retained our spoils the more securely because of our aid, and we, recovering nothing of what we had lost, should be reduced to the honour of fighting gratuitously for the very conquerors who had contributed most to bring us back to our frontier of 1790! This was, indeed, a sad fate! But, we repeat, it was now too late to draw back, for after all that we had said and done, we could not refuse the Convention of the 3d of January, nor the condition which, in case of war, bound us to make the treaty of Paris the basis of a future peace. M. de Talleyrand signed without making a remark, and he was right, for it was only in silence that such a condition could be accepted. It should either be rejected with indignation and flung back to those who proposed it, or signed without a word of observation. So

it was M. de Talleyrand acted. He did not even think of asking, in return, a promise of Murat's dethronement, an event that interested Louis XVIII. much more than the fate of Saxony. He feared to retard for one moment the accomplishment of a result he had laboured so hard to bring about; and this treaty so much desired by M. de Talleyrand, because of the importance it added to the French legation, was signed on the night of the 3d—4th of January, and dated the 3d. It must be confessed this treaty was of little advantage to the reigning French dynasty, whose prejudices at most it could be said to flatter. The contracting parties pledged themselves to profound silence to avoid furnishing the Russians and Prussians with an excuse for a quarrel, and, perhaps, for war. Nor did they wish that the enemies of the coalition should enjoy the triumph of seeing it so scandalously divided. An exception, however, was made in favour of Bavaria, Hanover, the Low Countries, and Sardinia, whose adhesion was worth seeking, and was indeed almost certain. The Prince de Wrède, on the part of Bavaria, and the Count of Munster as the representative of Saxony, immediately gave their sanction to what had been done. The Low Countries and Sardinia joined a few days later. The secret was still preserved intact. A plan of military operations was to be concerted between Austria, Bavaria, and France, as the powers most likely to take an active part in the war; and a wish was expressed that a skilful and friendly-disposed French general should come to Vienna to take part in the arrangement of this plan. M. de Talleyrand thought of General Ricard, who had fallen into disgrace under the Empire at the time of the unsuccessful attempt to obtain the sovereignty of Portugal for Marshal Soult. He was a man of talent as well as a distinguished officer, and very well calculated to figure at a Congress composed of the highest personages of Europe. M. de Talleyrand immediately informed Louis XVIII. of the treaty he had concluded, and requested that General Ricard should be sent to Vienna.

Though the secret of the new coalition was scrupulously kept, still from the similarity of sentiments expressed by the Courts of England, France, and Austria, it was evident that they had come to an understanding, and were resolved to support their views to the last extremity. The attitude assumed by Bavaria was a no less significant symptom. Though all the German States, including those of the north, shared in her opinions, she alone—thanks to the strength she had acquired during the last fifteen years, and to her geographical position, which removed her from Prussian interference—dared to speak as she felt, or hint the possibility of war. It was all in vain that the Prussians, both publicly and in the committee, exclaimed and threatened; they

were allowed to talk, but nobody swerved from the essential point,—the preservation of Saxony,—always excepting the loss of some territory, to be applied to improving the configuration of Prussia; and meant, as was said, to punish King Frederick Augustus. It was a mere concession to the passions of the moment to say that this unfortunate prince should be punished, for everybody knew that the fact of joining Napoleon for self-aggrandisement was a very general crime, which had been committed by the greater as well as the lesser German princes; and it was equally well known that the unfortunate King of Saxony, had only acted on compulsion; that the duplicity of his conduct in his dealings between Europe and Napoleon, was the result of weakness of character, and could his conduct be compensated by defection from France, the Saxon army had seceded with sufficient éclat to obtain the pardon of its sovereign.

But though it was agreed that the King of Saxony should lose a certain portion of his States, nobody would consent that all the confiscated territory should be given to Prussia, and it was evident that on this subject a determination was come to that could not easily be shaken. The imprudent chiefs of the Prussian army were disposed to make the attempt, but their king did not wish it, nor would Alexander have sanctioned such temerity, which would be nothing less than a pursuit of the impossible. When Alexander asserted in the Committee of Evaluation that all Saxony ought to be given to Prussia, and consented at the same time to resign the Duchy of Posen, he did all that his friend Frederick William could expect, nor would this friend have dared to ask him to engage in a war against France, England, and Austria, and almost all the German states. The state of opinion was soon evident in the committee itself, from the attitude assumed by the different Legations. Although Russia and Prussia still persisted in demanding Saxony, they did not hesitate to discuss arithmetical calculations when introduced by Austria. The latter power undertook to prove that, considering what Prussia had already obtained in Poland, Westphalia, and the Rhine provinces, she could not claim more than three or four hundred thousand inhabitants from Saxony to recover the position she held in 1805, and to which it had been promised she should be restored.

The Prussian diplomatists took part in this controversy, and opposing valuation to valuation, asserted that they ought to get more than half Saxony in territory as well as in population. Taking up this position was equivalent to admitting they were defeated, for they accepted the principle of their adversaries—the conservation of Saxony—with the excep-

tion of some sacrifices of greater or less extent. The Treaty of the 3rd January, though kept secret, had by combining the antagonists of Russia and Prussia, contributed not a little to solve the fundamental question. And, in fact, once the discussion was reduced to an arithmetical calculation, there could be no doubt of a good understanding being come to.

The month of January was devoted to discussions of this kind. One circumstance in particular contributed to bring about a definite result. The British Parliament was to assemble, as usual, in February. Lord Castlereagh had been recalled by his colleagues, in order to justify his conduct which was not understood by the general public, and was in the opinion of the better-informed, subject to the charge of inconsistency, for though, at the close, he defended the cause of Saxony, he had at the commencement consented to sacrifice her. The Duke of Wellington was to leave Paris, and replace Lord Castlereagh at Vienna. The illustrious British Secretary of State, now certain of making Prussia submit on the fundamental question, was anxious to compensate her by smaller concessions, and so win her back by his favourite system of alliance, and at the same time, facilitate the termination of the Congress, by his compliance in ancillary points. He did not wish to leave Vienna until the principal questions should be decided, and until he had something positive to communicate to Parliament. The desire to return to home was universal. The Sovereigns, both those who received and he who gave hospitality (it had already cost the latter twenty-five million francs), were weary of this *mélange* of frivolous festivals and bitter discussions. They had passed two entire years—1813 and 1814—in all the anxieties of a fearful war and of an armed and agitated diplomacy. They were impatient to return home, to look after their own affairs, and enjoy the peace with their subjects. It is weariness rather than reason that terminates long disputes. Now, every thing tended to concord, when for two months past every thing seemed to threaten a serious rupture, and a new war to determine the partition of the fruits of victory.

M. de Talleyrand, who was as anxious about appearances as essentials, even whilst he despised the former, had in order to flatter the imprudent party that preponderated in France, persuaded the assembled sovereigns to mingle a funeral ceremony for Louis XVI., in the almost uninterrupted course of their festivities. This would naturally take place on the 21st January. M. de Talleyrand attached great importance to this on account of the double effect it would produce at Vienna and at Paris. At Vienna it would be an act of marked deference to the French legation, whilst it would please the royalists at Paris, and prove

how much influence M. de Talleyrand exercised over crowned heads. Such a proposition, whether opportune or not, could not be rejected, for none could refuse a tribute of homage to the angust victim of the 21st January, nor could it be unwelcome to the sovereigns as it was a new malediction pronounced upon the French Revolution. The Emperor Alexander, though he offered no opposition, made a simple observation. He said, that nobody could doubt the sentiments that all Europe entertained for the unfortunate Louis XVI., but that this was a display of party feeling which, impolitic at Paris, could only obtain a bad and unworthy imitation at Vienna. He added, that should the ceremony be performed, he would of course attend as the members of the French Legation must best understand the feelings of their government.

This assemblage of crowned heads, that had a little before incurred such ridicule by the excess of their amusements and luxury, now suddenly donned habiliments of woe, and repaired in a body to the beautiful cathedral of St. Stephen, on the 21st January, to assist at a solemn service in honour of Louis XVI. Nothing was wanting to the pomp of this ceremony. All the sovereigns came accompanied by their courts, a French priest pronounced the funeral oration of Louis XVI., and Maria Antoinette, and after a few hours of political mourning, they returned to the festivities and business of the Congress, of which, indeed, the former are as celebrated as the latter.

M M. de Metternich, de Talleyrand, and Lord Castlereagh, seeing Prussia nearly conquered, concerted, under the direction of Prince de Schwarzenberg, the representative of Austrian military interests, how they could best divide Saxony, and satisfy the cupidity of her neighbour without entirely destroying her existence. It was at first agreed to deprive her of her territories, on the right of the Elbe, particularly of Upper and Lower Lusatia. Saxony proper was more on the left of the Elbe, the possessions on the right being only annexed provinces. However, though deprived of Upper and Lower Lusatia, she would retain the territories that bordered on Bohemia, that is, Bautzen and Zittau.

It was next decided to diminish the Saxon territories on the left of the Elbe, in the direction of Misnia and Thuringia—that is, towards the extensive and level but least populous portions of the country, leaving her the mountainous districts inhabited by an industrious race, and interesting to Austria, whose frontier they touched. It was at first intended to take but four or five hundred thousand souls from the hapless monarchy, thus exposed to the spatula of the geographers of the Congress; but, in compliance with Lord Castlereagh's en-



treaties, who was anxious to recover the friendship of the Prussians, and, above all, to bring things to a speedy termination, it was decided to take seven thousand inhabitants out of the two millions one hundred thousand that the old Saxon territory contained. She was thus deprived of a third of her population, and of very nearly the half of her territory. The places she held on the Elbe possessed a value far greater in proportion than the extent of territory. One—Torgau—was very warmly disputed. Having given up Wittenberg, it would be serious loss to abandon Torgau, which, in Napoleon's opinion—an opinion supported by his acts—was become the principal fortress on the Upper Elbe. Prince de Schwarzenberg and M. de Talleyrand resisted this demand, but, being abandoned by Lord Castlereagh, they were obliged to yield. A plan was finally arranged by which Prussia, in addition to the important fortresses of Torgau and Wittenberg, obtained one-half of the Saxon territory and a third of her population. It is true, that Frederick Augustus retained the principal cities and the richest territories of Saxony.

This plan, decided on by Austria, France, and England, whilst the members of the committee were disputing, and often disputing violently, was presented to the committee of valuation in the beginning of February. This was evidently a concerted plan, and it was plain that the Russians and Prussians would not obtain much more, even if they proceeded to an open rupture. The promises made to Prussia were more than fulfilled, for she was restored to the position she held in 1805, and a better configuration was given to some of her frontiers. From a second, Saxony was become a third-rate German State. Russia, having resigned Posen and run the risk of war for Prussia, could not be expected to do more. Prussia saw this, and determined to yield. But there was one point which touched her nearly, because it involved the self-love of her army and the commercial interests of her merchants, and this was the possession of the celebrated city of Leipzig. The acquisition of Leipzig would be an indemnification to the pride of the Prussians for the humiliation of being obliged to evacuate Saxony, which, they said, they had been allowed to occupy, which was equivalent to a promise of permitting them to keep the country for ever.

Consequently, on the 8th of February, Prussia presented a note in which she, for the first time, consented to the proposed arrangement, but demanded the city of Leipzig, in consideration of having received the poorest and least populous portion of Saxony—a portion that did not contain a single important city. She insinuated, though in very moderate terms, that whilst she was restored to the position she held in 1805

Austria gained, in addition to what she possessed at that period, fifteen hundred thousand souls directly, and at least two millions, indirectly, in her collateral branches at Florence, Modena, Parma, &c.

As it generally happens, the last day of discussion was one of the most stormy. King Frederick William had an interview with Lord Castlereagh, and told him that there was a combination to dishonour him, and render his return to Berlin impossible by depriving him of Saxony after having been allowed to occupy it; and that the possession of Leipzig could alone mollify the bitterness of such a sacrifice. It was easy to reply, that it was his own fault if evacuating Saxony was so disagreeable, for he had taken possession of it by a kind of *coup de tête*, which it was impossible to support, and he had only to blame himself for the consequences. Lord Castlereagh communicated Frederick William's entreaties to his allies; but besides that England, for commercial reasons, would prefer that Leipzig should belong to a small, rather than a large state, the British Minister met with so much resistance that he yielded the point. But it was agreed that some further concession should be made to Prussia, who disputed obstinately, thousand by thousand, the souls in the contested territory. England, on Hanover's part, gave up 70 thousand souls out of the 300 thousand she was to get from Prussia, and 50 thousand in the Low Countries, whilst Alexander, in his desire to satisfy all parties, made a still greater sacrifice. He had wished that Cracow, from its moral, and Thorn, from its military importance, should remain free and neutral cities. He abandoned this idea, and consented that Thorn should be given to Prussia, who would thus be put in possession of all the fortresses on the Lower Vistula, Thorn, Graudenz, and Dantzic, after having already obtained all the fortresses on the Elbe, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdebourg, &c., &c. It was at this price that Leipzig was preserved to Saxony, and that Prussia agreed, at last, to the proposed arrangements. She certainly had no cause to complain; and yet the irascible Blücher, giving way to an exaggeration of expression unworthy his well-known bravery, exclaimed that no soldier could wear the Prussian uniform with honour. He had proved, and was fated to prove again, that it could be worn with honour.

The principal difficulties of the Congress were thus removed, and if the questions still to be solved called for exertion and even sacrifices, still none were of a nature to excite apprehensions of war, of which the sovereigns were so convinced, that they showed a disposition to return to their homes, and leave their ministers to settle the remaining business.

Still there was a final difficulty to be overcome with regard to Saxony, and one not to be despised even by the allies, powerful as they were; this was to obtain the consent of King Frederick Augustus. This gentle and affable prince, a prisoner at Berlin, had resolved never to give his sanction to any act inimical to his authority, and especially to any attempt to remove the seat of his power from Saxony. Now, according to the principle laid down then and at all other times, no territorial possession could be justly and irrevocably acquired without the free and voluntary consent of the lawful sovereign. This principle, which had been constantly asserted by M. de Talleyrand with the intention of employing it afterwards against Murat, gave great moral strength to the King of Saxony at an epoch when the *definite* was the passion of the moment, and when the common desire was to exchange the instability of the revolution for the stability of monarchy, all acquirers of new states were most anxious to obtain the consent of the old possessors. To obtain the King of Saxony's consent, it was determined to set him at liberty, and bring him to Austria; not, indeed, to Vienna, where he would find his despoilers as well as defenders, but to Presbourg, whither the three principal ministers of the courts that had espoused his cause, M. de Talleyrand, M. de Metternich, and the Duke of Wellington (he had replaced Lord Castlereagh), should repair, and use all their influence to induce him to resign.

With the exception of Italy, almost all the European questions were solved. The formation of the kingdom of the Low Countries, which had been stipulated by England at Chaumont and Paris was definitely agreed on at Vienna. It was decided that the Prince of Orange, the representative of this house should receive the united sceptres of Holland and Belgium, with the title of King of the Low Countries. Some other territorial arrangements were added to this. It would not be allowed that Luxembourg and Mentz should become Prussian fortresses. The duchy of Luxembourg was given to the future King of the Low Countries, together with the fortress of that name, which was to remain federal, and Prussia, who was already mistress of all we had possessed on that side, was to be compensated by the hereditary states of the Prince of Orange, which she could exchange with the house of Nassau. By these arrangements France would touch but a very small part of the Prussian frontier, that is from Sarreguemines to Thionville, instead of from Sarreguemine to Mezières.

Many changes were made to give a better configuration to the Prussian territory. Under the title of the Rhenish province she got the old ecclesiastical electorates of Cologne and Trier together with the duchy of Juliers, all which, since 1803, composed a large part of the French territory on the left of

Rhine. There still remained of our possessions on this shore, the old Palatinate, called the Palatinate of the Rhine, comprising the country between the Rhine and the Moselle, from Lanterberg to Worms, and from Bohrbach to Kreuznach. There was no great difficulty on this subject, as Austria and Prussia had agreed that the Moselle should be the line of demarcation between their dependencies. The Rhine Palatinate was given to Bavaria, and what remained of the territories of the Elector of Mayence was given to Hesse Darmstadt, which had been restored together with Hesse Cassel. Mayence, which had been given to Hesse Darmstadt, was to be a federal fortress, in which the German States were to keep a common garrison. In return for these acquisitions Hesse Darmstadt gave Prussia the ancient duchy of Westphalia, by which Prussia, that was already in possession of the grand duchy of Berg, which we had held on the right of the Rhine, acquired a continuation of territory from the Rhine to the Elbe, and only interrupted by the territories of minor German princes dependent on her. Besides the principality of Hildesheim, Prussia gave Hanover Ostfriesland, which England ambitioned, because it lay contiguous to the sea, and Hanover gave her the duchy of Lauenbourg on the right of the Elbe, of which Prussia intended to make a very important use by giving it to Denmark in exchange for Swedish Pomerania.

The unfortunate King of Denmark was little better treated than the King of Saxony. He had been faithful to France, because his maritime principles united him to her against England. He had acted honourably throughout, and when our defeat obliged him to abandon us, he did so without any duplicity. But badly recompensed in these days of violence, for his honourable conduct, he was deprived of Norway, which was given to Bernadotte and Finland, both as an indemnity for Finland, in order to procure him a degree of popularity that might compensate for his want of birth. When these territories were taken from Denmark she was promised Swedish Pomerania, containing the fortress of Stralsund and the island of Rugen, trifling remnants of the old Swedish possessions on the German continent; she was also promised further indemnities. The King had come to Vienna to demand the fulfilment of this promise, but though he conducted himself with the greatest discretion and dignity, and defended his incontestable rights with the greatest moderation, and though his claim was fully allowed, still, no notice was taken of him, nor were his ministers admitted to the Congress. The celebrated phrase, *Væ victis* was never more completely verified, and out of the thirty-two million inhabitants, taken from the French Empire, a small number could not be found to compensate this prince for what had been taken from him; and this for the sake of the general good, as was said, which good consisted in giving Norway to

Bernadotte. Besides, it was not even certain that he should get the miserable indemnity of Swedish Pomerania, as Bernadotte refused to give it up under the pretence that the allies had not fulfilled their engagement to give him Norway, as the Norwegians had resisted by force of arms.

The measure of iniquity would, in all probability, have been filled, but that Prussia wished to get Swedish Pomerania. In fact, the Prussian territory, which had not been formed by nature, but by the ambition of its princes, who had put it together by scraps and morsels, was now undergoing a general remodelling, and the time was well chosen, for after the short opposition that had been made to the Prussians, they were now allowed to do as they pleased; by England, because she wished to recover their alliance for the sake of the Low Countries, by Russia through complaisance, and by Austria that she may not be disturbed in Italy. Prussia was, consequently, seeking exchanges that would secure her a continuity of territory from the Rhine to the Niemen. It was for this reason that she gave Luxembourg, as we have said, to the house of Orange, in exchange for its hereditary possessions, in order that she might exchange these with Nassau for different places in Hesse. For the same reason, she had demanded a portion of the old electorate of Mentz, which she meant to give Hesse Darmstadt for the duchy of Westphalia. Lastly, she wished to get Swedish Pomerania, that she may have all the mouths of the Oder, and the shores of the Baltic, from Mecklenburg to Memel. In return, she offered Denmark the duchy of Lauenbourg, which she had just got from Hanover, and which was contiguous to Holstein. But Denmark did not consider this as an equivalent for Swedish Pomerania, and anything but a fulfilment of the solemn promise made her of a full indemnification for Norway. Prussia thought to supply the deficiency by some millions of crowns, for territory she would have by purchase, if she could not succeed by force. The King of Denmark, seeing the hopelessness of his case, and considering that a territory contiguous to his states in Holstein was better than one so distant as Pomerania, which, besides, he was not certain of getting, as Sweden refused to give it up, yielded at last to the wishes of Prussia. Denmark deserved better treatment, as well in consideration of the personal qualities of her sovereign and people, and the honourable manner in which she had acted, as for the guardianship of the Sound, which made her of more importance to the balance of power in Europe, than many others. But she was conquered; and if, when the victor is one man, like Napoleon, the conquered have some chance of touching his generosity, they have none when subdued by many, as was now the case, for all, occupied with their individual interests, and seizing what they could, had neither

feeling nor shame, because that, in a corporation, each member casts upon the entire body the responsibility of acts for which the individual would blush.

In order to complete her projects of exchange, Prussia was obliged to submit to the recognition of Bavaria's claim to the principalities of Anspach and Bayreuth, in Franconia, and which had formerly belonged to Prussia, that she may in return obtain the Grand Duchy of Berg, which had formerly belonged to Bavaria.

Thanks to all these arrangements, Prussia was now as well circumstanced as she could expect. Her territories extended without interruption from the Meuse to the Niemen, and expanded a little, though not as much as she desired, in the direction of Saxony, and by the restitution of Posen she was better enclosed by the provinces of Silesia and Old Prussia, at the same time that she got possession of the different fortresses on the rivers that watered it—Thorn, Graudenz, and Dantzic, on the Vistula; Breslau, Glogau, and Stettin, on the Oder; Coblenz and Cologne, on the Rhine. She had but one thing to regret, which was being placed on the left of the Rhine, not because of the neighbourhood, which, fortunately, is not an infallible cause of hostility, but of the distrust she must feel in the possession of a territory that had belonged to France for twenty years. To the honour of her good sense, it must be admitted, that she had never wished and had only accepted it, through complaisance to England, who wished to keep her at enmity with France as long as possible. Had Saxony been ceded to Prussia, she would willingly have abandoned the left bank of the Rhine, even though France should get the better part of what she left.

Now that the re-constitution of Prussia and the re-establishment of the two houses of Hesse were effected, and the account with Denmark so unjustly closed, the most important business of the Congress was the arrangement of the Bavarian territory. This had been commenced even in Paris. It was understood, that Bavaria should restore the line of the Inn, the Tyrol, and Vorarlberg to Austria, who would give her in return, the Grand Duchy of Wurzburg, which was become vacant by the return of the Archduke Ferdinand to Tuscany, the principality of Aschaffembourg, which had been taken from the Prince Primate, the deposed head of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the greater part of the ancient Rhine Palatinate, which had formerly belonged to Bavaria. This, under the pretext of restoring each State to its old position, was a new plan of the Allies of Chaumont for keeping Bavaria as well as Prussia at enmity with France. Once that the question of Saxony and Poland, by which a new war had been threatened, was decided, it would



seem that a spirit of compliance had taken possession of all, and through the mediation of France, the courts of Austria and Bavaria, with both of whom she was allied since the 3rd of January, were on the eve of coming to an understanding. The sole remaining cause of disagreement was the old Bishopric of Salzburg, which was necessarily to be divided as the line of the Inn and La Salza was taken as a frontier. Bavaria was desirous of retaining at least Berchtesgaden, which had been formerly so contested on account of its salt mines. To avoid giving a decision in this case, France urged the disputants to come to an arrangement, and they were about to do so.

Every question relating to the north of Europe was now settled. The principles of the new Germanic constitution were decided on. Austria, who had acted with great prudence throughout, had refused the revival of the Germanic crown, which would have been willingly conceded, nor would she accept the Belgian provinces, where her sovereignty was preferred to that of Holland, and which England would have willingly accorded, in order to bring her, as well as Prussia and Bavaria, into contact with France. Though Austria was very well satisfied that others should commit themselves, she had no desire to compromise herself by taking possession of the Belgian provinces, which, though rich, beautiful, and well situated, were remote from her capital and too near France. The Venetian and Milanese provinces, less industrial, but equally fertile, and better situated with regard to her, suited her better. She had already felt the weight of the Germanic crown, and did not desire to possess it again, should it be elective. But, as Prussia, in hope of obtaining it one day herself, insisted on this condition, Austria had the good sense to refuse a cumbersome crown, which each successive emperor could only obtain by flattering the electors at the commencement of his reign, and which might possibly be transferred to Prussia. She preferred having this crown abolished, and converted into what was more useful to her, the perpetual presidency of the German Diet. It is true, that by this arrangement, a most important question—the military command of the Confederation—was left undecided, and would become a future difficulty. At this moment peace was the absorbing thought, for it seems that the public mind is capable of entertaining but one idea at a time.

The ancient Diet, simplified with Austria as perpetual president, was the system generally preferred. Instead of the divisions into different orders, and a large number of voters, it was determined to yield to the spirit of the time, and concentrate the votes as well as the sovereignty. An ordinary assembly of seventeen members was established, of which each had but one vote, however extensive his possessions, be

it Austria or Baden, Prussia or Mecklenburg; whilst the inferior princes were to be united in different groups, with a vote to each group. The free cities—which were reduced to Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfort, and Lubeck—were to have but one vote between them. Besides this ordinary assembly, established in perpetuity at Frankfort, for the arrangement of current business and for the decision of cases of competency, another assembly was established, called the General Assembly, consisting of sixty-nine voters, in which each member should have votes proportioned to his possessions, when fundamental laws on the great interests of the Confederation were in question.

It must be admitted that this new constitution of the Germanic Confederation was in conformity with the annihilation of social distinctions, and with the decreased number of petty princes; and, in a word, with the simplification of modern society. The confederates preserved their independent sovereignties, could have their separate armies, and send representatives to the different courts of Europe; but they could not contract any alliance inimical to the federal compact or the safety of the Confederation, and were bound to furnish, each according to his possessions, a contingent in defence of the general interest.

These were healthy ideas, and though capable of misapplication under certain circumstances, may be considered as some of the best decisions of the Congress. When the month of February arrived, these different resolutions were either reduced to writing or agreed on; for all these minor questions had been under consideration during the discussion of the important interests which seemed to threaten a universal conflagration. When the results obtained by the particular treaties contracted between the interested parties had been approved, it was determined to draw up a general treaty, composed of all that these minor treaties contained of a general and permanent interest, and which was to be signed as arbiters and guarantees by the eight powers who had subscribed the treaty of Paris, and which the other States represented at Vienna were also to sign, as interested and personally engaged parties. This is what was afterwards published under the title of "Final Act of Vienna."

The drawing up of these different acts was commenced in February, 1815, but could not be finished for several weeks. Meanwhile, the last doubtful questions were taken into consideration. That of Switzerland was of the number. This question had been a subject of serious consideration to the special committee intrusted with its arrangement, and also to the three powers who interfered privately, Russia,

Austria, and France. The Emperor Alexander, influenced by liberal principles, did not wish to appear in Switzerland as the author of an extravagant counter-revolution; Austria, who cared little about liberal sentiments, sought only what was practicable and reasonable; whilst France, who had adherents both in Berne and in the small democratic cantons, was anxious to bring about a decision that would not offend either. From this general spirit of moderation nothing could result but what was rational and conformable to the spirit of the times. We have already seen that the three principal powers were opposed to the new cantons being again reduced to a state of dependence, and had laid it down as a principle that the nineteen cantons, constituted by the act of mediation, should be maintained. France, whose aid against this decision was implored by the inhabitants of Berne, Uri, Lucerne, Schwitz, and Unterwalden, was happily represented by an enlightened man, the Duke Dalberg, who succeeded in making those cantons understand that no other principle was admissible; for it would be impossible to reduce Vaud, Argovia, Saint Gall, &c., to their ancient state of dependence, without a civil war—an idea revolting to Europe. The principle of the nineteen cantons was, consequently, definitely admitted. However, as Berne had been formerly so extensive and rich a canton, and was now become so small, it was only just and prudent to make her some compensation. Imperial France, whose spoils were used to satisfy every demand, had left some fragments of territory (Porentruy and the ancient bishopric of Basle) vacant on this side of the Jura. These were offered as an indemnification to Berne, and were finally accepted. It was also decided that the new cantons should make a pecuniary compensation to the old that had been injured by their separation. The new cantons, happy to secure their existence at this price, consented to make this compensation, and thus all difficulties were smoothed away. It was also required in the federal compact, that the principle of civil equality, both between the cantons and the different classes of citizens, should be proclaimed and approved. Finally, Switzerland was presented with some gems that had fallen from the imperial crown of France; for Neuchâtel, which had been given to Prince Berthier; Geneva, which had been lately restored to its primitive state of a free city; together with Valais, which was vibrating between France and Italy, were formed into three new cantons, and added to the nineteen.

The plan of transferring the federal government alternately to the different cantons, which had been suggested by the Act of Mediation, was continued in operation. Alexander, still

under M. de la Harpe's influence, wished to exclude Berne. But France, from a sense of justice and in consideration of her Swiss adherents, objected to this; as did also Austria through sympathy with the aristocratic party, therefore Berne, Zurich, and Lucerne, continued to be the three cantons, between which the Government of the Swiss Confederation was to alternate.

By these arrangements, the act of mediation was almost renewed, whilst some reparation was made to the interested parties, and three cantons were added, that had been taken from France. These resolutions being communicated to Switzerland, and having received the approbation of the different cantons, were about to receive the sanction of Europe with the usual guarantee of perpetual neutrality.

Italy still remained, and here were two questions of great importance, those of Naples and Parma, which had been deferred, hoping that time would bring about a solution. As we have already said, the Sardinian question had been decided by giving Genoa to Piedmont, and by securing the succession to the Carignan branch. Austria did not allow any one to decide in her affairs, but having adjudged Lombardy so far as the Po and Tessin to herself, she had put the collateral branches of the imperial family into immediate possession of the Duchies of Tuscany and Modena. There remained to be decided only Parma and Naples, which the two houses of Bourbon demanded for the Queen of Etruria and Ferdinand IV. M. de Talleyrand, who in the commencement had been so anxious about the Neapolitan affairs, had allowed himself to become so involved in the Saxon question, that he had hardly spoken of Italy to M. de Metternich, and had not stipulated that Austria should support France on the Naples question, as a reward for the assistance he had given in the affairs of the North. He had contented himself with the unimportant reservation, that all votes on Italian affairs should be provisional, until the question of the Two Sicilies should be decided. This precaution was of no great use, for the only question that could have been decided, was that relating to Sardinia, and we were more interested than any other power in rendering these decisions definite.

M. de Talleyrand left all to the good feeling of the Congress, until the very last day, and in the desire that every one felt to leave, it was very much to be feared that the Congress would break up without coming to a decision, which would save Murat, who being in possession, needed only silence to gain his cause.

However, Louis XVIII. did not cease to urge his plenipotentiary on this subject, which interested him much more

than Saxony. This monarch, whose views in foreign policy were narrow though sensible, had no desire that his legation should play an active part at Vienna. He was proud, as we have said, of being a Bourbon, he was happy at being placed on the throne of France, and thought himself sufficiently great, if he could only hold his position. He only wished to get rid of Murat, whom he regarded as the secret accomplice of Napoleon, ready to provide him with the means of coming again into action, either in France or Italy, in which views it must be admitted that he showed more foresight than M. de Talleyrand, who concentrated all his energies on Saxony. However, now that the Saxon question was decided, M. de Talleyrand urged on by Louis XVIII. began to speak of Italy to all the members of the Congress; but he was now powerless, in consequence of not having taken his precautions beforehand with England and Austria. That he should have given time to M. de Metternich for the Neapolitan question, which required time for its full solution, was very proper, but that he should ally himself gratuitously to England and Austria for the sole pleasure of signing a treaty, without making any stipulation with regard to Murat, was a mode of proceeding for which he might have paid dearly and which did eventually cost him dear. The Emperor of Russia, to whom he spoke on the subject, listened as though he had fulfilled all his obligations towards France, Lord Castlereagh listened like an ally who wished to make himself agreeable, but who took no interest in questions of legitimacy, and was besides embarrassed by the promises made to Murat. M. de Metternich listened to the French ambassador like a wily diplomatist, who having made use of France, did not trouble himself about being grateful, and was constantly apprehensive of exciting a commotion in Italy.

Happily for M. de Talleyrand, he found a support in the Duke of Wellington, who had lately arrived at Vienna. Louis XVIII. had, during his residence in England, acquired much of the English habits and manners, and had adroitly flattered the British generalissimo, and won him over to his interests. When Lord Wellington arrived at Vienna, he rendered important service to Louis XVIII. by the manner in which he spoke of him and his government. "Many faults are committed at Paris," he said, "but the king, who has more sense than any of his family, is generally esteemed. The army is more formidable than ever. It might be dangerous to employ the soldiers at home, but abroad they would be both faithful and terrible. The finances are re-established, and even flourishing. A government alone is wanting; there are ministers, but no ministry; but that can be provided for. Of

all the European powers, France is the best prepared for war, and would be the least embarrassed were warfare renewed. She must not be neglected." These words were of more service to us than all the exertions of the French legation; and being uttered when the Russians and Prussians were called upon to come to a decision, had a very marked influence upon them.

Lord Wellington had fully adopted M. de Talleyrand's ideas with regard to Naples. And this for more practical reasons than the principle of legitimacy, for, as M. de Talleyrand wittily said in one of his letters to Louis XVIII., the English *had formed their moral notions on this subject in India*. The Duke of Wellington believed that the Bourbons reigning at Paris, at Madrid, and at Palermo, whilst Murat remained unsupported at Naples, it would soon become impossible to remain at peace with him, and that within six months all Europe would be thrown into confusion, which would give Napoleon an opportunity of again coming into action. This he explained to the Emperor Alexander, to the King of Prussia, the Emperor Francis, and more especially to M. de Metternich, who was the least inclined of all to interfere. These observations were met by an objection quite as true, that the execution of the project would be most hazardous, as it would certainly involve all Italy in war. M. de Talleyrand replied, that France and Spain would become responsible for the risk, and provided that a simple declaration were made, importing that the powers assembled at Vienna would only recognise Ferdinand IV. as King of the Two Sicilies, France would promise to bring the affair to a conclusion. To this was objected the engagements that had been made with Murat, and also some doubts as to the means of execution, not that any one supposed it would be difficult for the French troops to beat the Neapolitans, but it was doubted whether the French army, when led on against Murat, and probably against Napoleon, would remain faithful to the Bourbons.

Nobody at Vienna felt any interest in Murat. On the contrary, all wished his dethronement. But now that the Saxon-Polish question was decided, and the wishes of the different Powers gratified, they were only anxious to leave, and scarcely listened to what was said about Naples; in fact, all were resolved to subscribe on the last day to whatever determination France and Austria should arrive at. In the midst of this universal indifference, an accidental circumstance came to M. de Talleyrand's assistance. Lord Castlereagh wanted his help on the question of the slave trade, in which the English people took the greatest interest, but about which the continental cabinets cared little, who only took part in that as in the Neapolitan question through complaisance. Lord Castlereagh was returning to England to



announce the conclusion of peace, and the long-wished-for humiliation of France, with the establishment of the kingdom of the Low Countries, the definite possession of Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, the Isle of France, and many other magnificent gifts; but still he needed something else to gratify the popular feeling, which, though most noble in its object, for it was the abolition of slavery, exhibited the characteristics of most popular wishes—want of reflection and impatience. Excited by the speeches of popular orators, the English people were seized with an absolute passion for the emancipation of the blacks, and this passion was sincere: but we must be permitted to say, that, though sincere, this passion was not wholly disinterested. If the abolition of slavery involved a political convulsion in India, the English might have been less anxious for its success. But as it only endangered America, they were free to indulge their feelings without risk to their interest. The English were, consequently, passionately anxious for the abolition of the slave trade, and as Louis XVIII. was aware of the intensity of their feelings on this subject, he very craftily advised M. de Talleyrand to have no scruple in drawing what advantage he could from their sentiments.

As the continental powers had neither interest nor opinion on a question that only concerned the maritime states, which were France, Spain, and Portugal, and as of these, France had most authority, M. de Talleyrand would necessarily have great influence, which he promised to use in Lord Castlereagh's interest, provided that, in return, the latter would assist him in the affair of Naples. These two questions, which were left for last, were on the part of the Congress, mere acts of politeness towards the Cabinets interested in them.

Lord Castlereagh first demanded the absolute and immediate abolition of the slave trade on the shores of Africa, and even required that the maritime states should have the right of watching each other, that is, the right of search, to be certain that none took part in the slave traffic; and he further demanded that the colonial goods of nations that refused to join this humane league should be refused admission to the other markets. This was asking a great deal, for the right of search could only be exercised by England, who alone took an active part in the pursuit of slave dealers. This negotiation was at first confined to the maritime powers, but as Lord Castlereagh felt himself isolated amongst them, he had induced the continental states to take part in the debate, a measure which gained him some support. He endeavoured to prove to France, Spain, and Portugal, that the slave trade was injurious to them, that it was dangerous to have a great number of blacks in their colonies opposed to a small number of whites, and that it would be much better to

content themselves with the negroes they had, and the posterity they would have when better treated. He was told in reply, that in all probability he was right, but that in Spanish and Portuguese colonies the number of blacks and whites was nearly equal, whilst in the English dependencies there were about twenty negroes to one white, which made his advice very applicable to his own countrymen, who had taken their precautions, and filled their colonies with blacks during the maritime war, which neither the French, Spanish, or Portuguese had been able to do: that consequently they would not, for some years, have a sufficient number of hands, and would not until then be in a position to abolish the slave trade. After a good deal of discussion, France for herself was satisfied with a term of five years. and had induced Spain and Portugal to be content with eight, at the termination of which period the slave trade was to be abolished.

This was not exactly what Lord Castlereagh desired; but his arguments produced no result. The reciprocal right of search, which was now brought forward for the first time, surprised and displeased everyone. It had been maintained, as a principle, that each nation should have the jurisdiction of her own flag in time of peace. As to a repressive commercial measure against the maritime nations who would not join in the English system, the difficulty was avoided by referring its decision to the time when the slave trade, being abolished, a penalty might be attached to its infringement. In order to satisfy Lord Castlereagh, who wished to have something definite to present to the British Parliament, a declaration, addressed to all nations, was drawn up in the names of the powers assembled at Vienna, condemning the slave trade as a moral enormity, declaring it a crime against civilization and humanity, and expressing a wish for its speedy abolition. In this the allies of Chaumont, supported by the representative of the French Restoration, put forth a declaration, which, though essentially true, equalled in style the most declamatory emanations of the Constitutional Assembly. MM. de Nesselrode, Metternich, and Talleyrand supported Lord Castlereagh in terms, at which they smiled in secret, for the interest they felt in the emancipation of the blacks might be easily divined from the manner in which they disposed of European peoples.

Now that the Congress was approaching its close, and that questions of self-interest had been so largely cared for, it was thought proper to bestow some consideration on questions of a moral nature, and many excellent regulations for the free navigation of large rivers, were adopted. It was decided that all should be open, and that the States on their shores could refuse any merchandize they did not wish to accept, but could

not prevent their transit to other States, that only a duty on tonnage could be enforced, and that independent of the quality or value of the cargoes, that these dues should be always expended for the maintenance of the navigation of the rivers; and lastly that these dues should furnish sufficient means of towing. These noble principles, dictated by justice and good sense, and announced in perfect sincerity, have done lasting honour to the Congress of Vienna, and are with the neutrality of Switzerland, and the abolition of slavery, the sole amongst its decrees which have been enrolled amongst the laws of nations.

All was now finished at Vienna except the questions of Parma and Naples, which were still in suspense, and all that M. de Talleyrand could obtain from Lord Castlereagh whom he had so ably assisted on the slave question, was that on the very day of his arrival in London he would lay the Neapolitan question before the British Cabinet. The question as to whether Napoleon was to be left at Elba or transferred to the Azores, was considered involved in that which touched Murat, and all discussion on that subject was avoided, in consideration of the treaty of the 11th April, by which Alexander considered himself personally bound. Both, it was said, would be arranged the same day, but it would be difficult to come to an immediate decision. It was insisted that the two millions promised by the treaty of the 11th April, should be paid to Napoleon, and M. de Talleyrand was told that it was not only mean, but dangerous to refuse, as the non-payment would give Napoleon a legitimate excuse for considering himself freed from his engagements to Europe.

The Congress was about to close, and no decision had been come to on those questions that were most important to the Bourbons. Lord Castlereagh was to leave on the 15th of February, and Alexander, after many delays, on the 20th, when Murat, as was his wont came to the aid of those, who desired his ruin, but who could not accomplish it. His minister at the Congress, the Duke de Campo-Chiaro, had been excluded for the same reason as the representatives of Saxony, Denmark, and Genoa. From this gentleman he received constant information of the efforts of the two houses of Bourbon against him, and of the possibility of an explosion on the question of Saxony. Poor Murat thinking this a good opportunity, sent a note through the Duke de Campo-Chiaro, in which he detailed all that had been done contrary to his interests in the Congress of Vienna, and demanded whether he was to consider himself at peace or war with the two houses of Bourbon, and insinuated that in case he should be forced to defend himself, he would be obliged to pass through several Italian States. Murat flattered himself that this declaration arriving at the very moment of a rupture between the greater powers would furnish him both the

right and the opportunity of acting against the enemies of his crown. Thus was M. de Metternich's prophecy fulfilled, that the allies need only wait a little while, and they would have a specious pretext for considering themselves freed from their engagements to the hapless Murat. Besides, the papers that had been found on Lord Oxford, whose arrest we have already mentioned, together with other intercepted documents, proved that Murat had a part in all the troubles, that threatened Italy. There were, therefore, sufficient reasons now to urge against those who still considered themselves bound to Murat.

When the Duke de Campo-Chiaro, received the above-mentioned note, he at once saw how inopportunistly it arrived, for the question of Saxony and all others that had threatened the unity of the Cabinets had been definitely decided. He immediately waited on M. de Metternich, showed him the document he had received, but begged him to consider it as non-existent, for that he would take upon himself to suppress it. This did not prevent M. de Metternich from telling of its arrival to the Duke of Wellington and Lord Castlereagh, who told it to M. de Talleyrand, who told everybody. This document, a seasonable arrival to persons who sought a cause of complaint, produced as much effect as though it were officially announced, for persons are never more powerfully excited than when they wish to be so. M. de Metternich in concert with M. de Talleyrand and the Duke of Wellington decided, that as Austria was now free from all anxiety with regard to Saxony and Poland, she should assemble one hundred and fifty thousand men on the Po, and declare that these precautions were taken to protect her territory and that of the Austrian princes established in Italy. This was almost a decided declaration of war against Murat, and at same time, gave Lord Castlereagh an opportunity of revealing all the intricacies of this affair to Parliament. It was reserved for France to strike the last blow. M. de Talleyrand was satisfied with a measure which was almost the solution he had desired, and which he had almost despaired of obtaining.

The Parma question was decided at the same time. The question had undergone many vicissitudes. At the earnest entreaties of France and Spain, the committee appointed to examine into Italian affairs had admitted that amid the universal restoration of hereditary princes, it would be difficult to refuse the re-establishment of the house of Parma. But the treaty of the 11th of April, constantly defended by Alexander, was a restraint, as was also consideration for Maria Louisa's father. It was almost impossible to get out of this embarrassment. At one time, it was thought to decide the question at the Pope's expense, by giving Maria Louisa one of the legations, which at her death should revert to the Holy See. But the Pope's

representative asserted very justly, that his master had as much right to the legations as the other restored monarchs had to their dominions, and that these provinces, the richest belonging to the States of the Church, were absolutely needed for the support of the Pope's finances. As this could not be denied, M. de Metternich thought of another expedient, that of giving Parma to the Queen of Etruria, and Lucca to Maria Louisa, by which she would be nearer the sea and the island of Elba, together with a pension, of which France and Austria should pay half. At Maria Louisa's death, Lucca instead of descending to her son, should revert to Tuscany, and spare France the offence of seeing a descendant of Napoleon on an Italian throne. However, when Austria consented that Parma should pass out of her family, she stipulated that she should be allowed to keep Plaisance, on account of the bridge across the Po.

This arrangement was accepted by France and Spain, but had not been yet proposed to Maria Louisa. M. de Metternich was chosen to make the communication to her. He had an interview with the Princess, and speaking in the name of the European powers and of her father, endeavoured to make her understand the difficulties of this affair; but to his great surprise he was very badly received. Though this princess was not naturally endowed with much strength of character, she obstinately refused to resign Parma, which she defended as her son's patrimony and her own dowry.

Her skilful counsellor, the Count de Neiperg, had advised her to appeal to her father, and to the Emperor Alexander, and embarrass them by the steadiness of her opposition, assuring her that this was the only way to succeed. She followed this advice, and succeeded in arousing her father's affection, and piquing Alexander's pride, which gave her so much courage, that when M. de Metternich returned, she decidedly refused the offer that was made her, alleging to M. de Metternich's surprise, what it would have been much more to her own honour to conceal, that she was more repelled than attracted by the neighbourhood of Elba, as she was determined never to join her husband. She had evidently sought in other ties, that domestic happiness which she preferred to rank, grandeur, and even to her own dignity.

It was now necessary to inform the committee, appointed to consider Italian affairs, that the proposed arrangement was rendered impossible by Maria Louisa's resistance. The case was embarrassing when M. de Metternich asked M. de Talleyrand for a few days' delay, assuring him that this last difficulty should be decided before he left Vienna. As the more important affair of Naples was about being arranged, M. de Talleyrand thought

he could afford to wait the decision of the Parma question, and he did so. Here is the solution of the difficulty devised by M. de Metternich, and of which he made a mystery to the French representative.

Lord Castlereagh had left Vienna for London, and intended to pass through Paris on his way. He was to see Louis XVIII., and as he possessed great influence over this prince as head of the British cabinet, it was hoped that he could induce him to agree to certain arrangements, a concession that could not be expected from M. de Talleyrand, who considered the affair of Parma as exclusively dynastic, and felt an almost personal interest in having it decided exactly as the Bourbons desired. As the cabinets of London and Vienna were more united than ever, Lord Castlereagh undertook to perform this service for Austria, and ask Louis XVIII. in the name of the Emperor Francis, and in considerations of the domestic sacrifices he had already made, to leave Parma to Maria Louisa during her life. That meanwhile the Queen of Etruria should have Lucca with a pension, and that at Maria Louisa's death Parma should revert to the Queen of Etruria or her children, and Lucca to Tuscany.

This, which was not in itself an unacceptable arrangement, being directly proposed to Louis XVIII. by his Britannic Majesty's chief Secretary of State, and in the name of two courts on whose decision the Neapolitan question depended, had every prospect of success. This was the cause of its being concealed from M. de Talleyrand, and his being requested to wait a few days.

When Alexander was about leaving Vienna, he wished to know what was to be done concerning a family project that interested him very much, the marriage of his sister, the Grand Duchess Anne with the Duke de Berry. The acute Count Pozzo considered that this marriage would be serviceable to France by procuring her a powerful alliance, and to Russia, that would thus obtain a higher matrimonial connection than she had yet made. This latter consideration had very little weight with Alexander, who was only desirous of a political union of the two countries, and certainly, had this alliance been accepted, and had we joined the Russian and Prussian policy on the Saxon and Polish question, there were few advantages that Alexander would have refused to France. His mother, a most respectable princess, entertaining all the sympathies of a French emigrant, was most anxious for an alliance that would be so flattering to her pride. The French court, less eager for the connection, would have acted like those noble families, who consent to form advantageous marriages in an inferior rank, but the Bourbons were restrained by the question of religion, and demanded, as we



have already said, that the Princess should change her faith before coming to France. Alexander, dreading lest he should seem to purchase this alliance by an act of apostasy, required that the Princess should remain a member of the Greek Church, until she had quitted the Russian dominions, but that she may change her faith anywhere else that was decided on. These were very trifling objections on both sides, when the union was recommended by so many important political reasons. But this question had lost much of its interest at Vienna, since M. de Talleyrand had so openly quarrelled with Alexander. However, this marriage was not altogether impossible, and before the end of the Congress Louis XVIII. desired his minister to free him from the demands of the Russian court, if he should think it necessary to reject them definitely, in which case he wished to have reasonable cause for drawing back.

M. de Talleyrand, convinced that by the treaty of 3rd of January, he had procured France better and more solid allies, and anxious to lessen the importance of a marriage to which he had raised so many obstacles, wrote a long letter to Louis XVIII. which is perfectly characteristic of the policy of the time. If the court of France, he said, in the early days of the Restoration, when she was still weak, had attached importance to a closer union with Russia, she was no longer in the same position. She had contracted the highest and strongest alliances, and was again become the centre of European policy. It was others who should now seek her support, she stood in need of none. The Russian alliance was of very little importance at present. Alexander was a very thoughtless prince, imbued with the wildest ideas, and with whom it would be impossible to act in concert. Besides, the reigning family of Russia was far inferior in point of birth to the Bourbons, to whom it would be a sort of degradation to accept its alliance. Austria would be more worthy of such a union, but as the marriages contracted with that house had been unfortunate for both countries, he unhesitatingly advised taking a princess in the house of Bourbon itself.

When Louis read this letter, he considered that his minister's opinions on those subjects were very just, that he entertained very sound ideas on the different gradations of crowned heads, and that his advice ought to be adopted. He consequently gave up all idea of the Russian alliance, and left M. de Talleyrand to free him from it with the tact which this great diplomatist exhibited on all occasions.

As long as anything remained to be done at Vienna, M. de Talleyrand avoided entering into any explanation on the projected marriage. However, on the eve of the general departure, he was obliged to put aside his reserve. In a last conversation, Alexander said to him, with an indifference that was only

assumed, "I have been asked for my sister's hand, but I will not dispose of it without entering into definite explanations with the court of France. My mother would be very much pleased by this marriage, and I would consider it a very honourable connection, but I wish to have everything decided. I have refused some offers, and" he said smiling, and in a tone of humility the most natural, "I have also met with refusals. Ferdinand VII. asked for my sister in marriage, but finding she belonged to the Greek church, he withdrew his demand." M. de Talleyrand smiled in his turn, and replied with as much ease as his august interlocutor, "The conduct of His Catholic Majesty must explain to you the embarrassment of His Very Christian Majesty." Then turning this serious subject into a jest, he told the Czar that the most pious Louis XVIII. was inflexible on the question of religion. Alexander did not insist, and did not seem to attach much importance to an affair that offended him deeply, for the Russian court was most anxious for the marriage of the Grand Duchess with the Duke de Berry. It was the fate of this princess to be disappointed in two alliances that would have made her a participator in the vicissitudes of our revolutions, and to be finally seated on the throne of the Low Countries, where she felt their reverberation.

This was the last question of importance that M. de Talleyrand had to conclude, and the manner in which he conducted this and all others in which he was engaged, are characteristic of the man, his time, and his court.

The Congress had now brought its great work to a conclusion, and the sovereigns were about to take their departure, leaving to their ministers the less important part of drawing up their decisions in proper form, when, in the beginning of March, a piece of intelligence suddenly burst upon them, which, however, did not surprise any one, for all had a secret presentiment of its coming. A despatch from the Austrian Consul at Genoa announced that Napoleon had escaped from Elba, and disembarked at the Gulf of Juan. Whither was he going? What was his object? were the questions asked in terror. According to M. de Metternich he would go to Paris, and this was the most natural supposition. M. de Talleyrand, anxious to deceive himself, said that Napoleon was gone to Italy. All were in the greatest excitement, and for some days public opinion hovered between these two fears, of which, indeed, one was far more probable than the other. The first feeling of terror was succeeded by anger. All were indignant with Alexander, as the author of the treaty of 11th April, by which Elba had been assigned to Napoleon as a residence. Alexander sincerely admitted his fault, but promised to repair the injury into which his generosity had betrayed him, by gigantic efforts against the

common enemy. All departures were immediately countermanded, and it was arranged that the sovereigns should not separate until this new danger should be past.

All the resolutions that had been decided on were to be maintained, and although their sanction by the final act of Vienna was delayed for six months, they were no less definite, and their existence was to be dated from the six last months of the year 1814, whose events we have recorded. We may, therefore, consider the Congress of Vienna as terminated at this period, at least as far as concerned the limits and constitution of states, and this is the fittest moment to pronounce an opinion on the European arrangement that has resulted from it, and which has been one of the most permanent recorded in history, having endured for nearly half a century.

In considering the Congress of Vienna under the double aspect of justice and policy, this is in our opinion what may be said of it, and in delivering this opinion we lay aside all national prejudices, for the historian ought not to identify himself with any country or century, that so he may the more freely approach the eternal springs of truth.

In hearing the complaints of those who are suffering from the crimes of others, and in listening to the generous indignation they pour out against these vices and against those who abandon themselves to their influence, we are tempted to say that these men could never become guilty of the like crimes. But, alas! the generous maxims of the eve are not always the guide of the morrow's conduct. Every power in Europe had suffered from the boundless ambition of Napoleon, and had so execrated its excess, that the world might be justified in believing that should these oppressed sovereigns ever become the arbiters of Europe, justice and moderation would be the characteristics of their reign. We have just seen how their acts corresponded with their words. The only difference of conduct discernible between Napoleon and the Allies is, that they were four instead of one, and that the ambition of each was restrained by that of the three others. As to France, she was treated as a conquered nation, which was natural, if not just. France, or rather he who governed her, had tyrannized in the hour of victory, and our conquerors did the same in their turn! It is childish to complain in such circumstances, and ridiculous to assert one's dignity at a rival's tribunal. It is on ourselves, on our own courage and prudence, and not upon others, that our dignity depends; and if we wish to avoid the consequences of errors, we should neither commit them ourselves, nor allow others to do so in our name.

However, we may, without subjecting ourselves to the accusation of national prejudice, be permitted to say, that though the Allies justly blamed the ambition of Napoleon, they fell into th

same excesses themselves, that after the different partitions of Poland and the Germanic secularizations, which so much extended the dominions of the Continental powers, after having seized those colonies, which gave such unlimited extent to the naval rule of England—having done all this, we say, it was neither just nor conformable to the general balance of power, to reduce France to the position she held at the end of the eighteenth century. We may be permitted to say, that if France had not outstripped all calculations by the fertility of her genius, of her soil, and of her Revolution, and had not become as great in peace as she had been in war, Europe would have felt a want—Europe, that cannot without risk be deprived of one of the states of which she is composed, and of France less than of any other, for England sometimes needs her against Russia, Russia against England, Prussia against Austria, Austria against Prussia, Germany against the two latter—and, finally, there is one cause that can never progress without the aid of France—the cause of civilization.

But a truce, we repeat, a truce to useless complaints against treatment that we drew upon ourselves. Let us speak of others! All that did not belong to the FOUR or did not directly interest them, was shared like booty found in a sacked city. The lesser German princes, the free cities, the property of the Teutonic knights, the property of the knights of Malta, ecclesiastical principalities and old republics, were absorbed, without pity, into the territory of the conquerors or their dependents. Were it necessary to calm the jealousy of a neighbour, to subsidize a useful ally, to give a better contour to the frontier of one of the FOUR, or give another a more extended sea-board, or a more convenient boundary, a German prince was immediately sacrificed, a free city was incorporated, an old republic suppressed, or a German ecclesiastical state secularized. No objection was raised when Austria took Venice, or Piedmont Genoa. Woe to any state in which one of the FOUR did not take an interest. Denmark, that represented no other interest than that of the freedom of the seas, at that time regarded as an entirely French interest, was deprived of Norway, to increase Bernadotte's popularity in Sweden. In return, Denmark got Swedish Pomerania, but Prussia wished to have this province in order to continue her line of coast from Stralsund to Memel, and Denmark was deprived of this weak indemnity, which was replaced by one still more illusory—the Duchy of Lauenburg, and some million crowns. Unfortunate Saxony, that had abandoned us at the battle of Leipzig, for which she deserved some reward from the conquerors, was defended, because her preservation was of importance to Austria and Germany, but though she found advocates, still half her territory was sacrificed to Prussia, that during ten years had not ceased

to complain of the spoliation of German states. Poland found protectors, because of the jealousy that England and Austria felt towards Russia, but it was finally given to Alexander under a pretext which veiled the ambition of the one and the weakness of the others, namely, that this country was again to become a kingdom, and be placed under one master; a sad illusion, that could not last, for the semi-independence thus bestowed on Poland would awaken the desire, and supply her with the means of throwing off the Russian yoke. She would naturally revolt and entail upon herself the punishment of being reduced to a Russian province, and Europe would then learn that she had enlarged Russia by the addition of all Poland. As France, whose feelings were little regarded, could alone take an interest in Italy, the country was given to Austria, to Austrian princes and Austrian influence, a ponderous gift, whose weight the Cabinet of Vienna would one day feel and regret. No restraint was imposed on England. In addition to Gibraltar, she wished to have the Ionian Isles, the Cape, the Isle of France, and some of the Antillas, and she met with no opposition. She also wished to have the mouths of the Scheldt and Rhine, in order to form the kingdom of the Low Countries in opposition to us, and this wish was gratified, without the least consideration for the dislike of the Belgians to the Dutch. Sometimes, indeed, one or other of these four co-partitionists of the world, amazed, not at his own cupidity, but at that of his three associates, felt inclined to blame, but the words of reproof faltered on his lips, so ill qualified was any of the FOUR to pronounce a lesson on moderation.

It is no vulgar resentment that leads us to these reflections, but having exposed the faults of Napoleon, we possess the right to point out the faults of those who succeeded to his rule, and who, under pretence of avenging Europe, had only divided it amongst themselves. It is the duty of a historian to lay bare the faults of all without distinction, and we may be permitted to remind the reader that our errors were those of a man, and not of France, and that when the allies crossed the Rhine, they solemnly promised that this distinction should be remembered—a promise, alas! that was soon forgotten, as the treaty of Paris proved.

Having considered the Congress of Vienna with reference to equity, we shall now look upon it from a political point of view. The whole policy of that assembly had but one design—to accumulate precautions against France. Instead of being ruled by the Bourbons, France should have been still in the hand of the dreaded conqueror on whom they wished to be avenged, when so many precautions were taken against her. And in that case England should have been allowed to act, and she would

have neglected no precaution. Still mindful of the continental blockade, she was determined to prevent us from ever approaching the shores of the North Sea or the Mediterranean, and she could not bear the idea of our ever again visiting Antwerp or Genoa. It was on this account that she founded the kingdom of the Low Countries, and favoured the revival of Piedmont. She chose well when she selected the houses of Orange and Savoy to oppose us, for besides the recent injuries endured by both, the one had acquired its glory in fighting against France, the other by making use of, and then betraying her.

She, therefore, entrusted them with Antwerp and Genoa. She did not stop there, but acting on an idea of Mr. Pitt, she compelled Prussia to accept the Rhenish provinces, in order to establish an enduring animosity between that power and us. But even these precautions did not satisfy her. In order to place Bavaria in the same position as Prussia, she, together with Austria, restored her the Palatinate of the Rhine. It was not from hatred, but policy, that Austria adopted the views of England; but though she was willing to compromise others with France, she would not compromise herself, nor would she ever listen to the proposal of resuming the sovereignty of Belgium. Prussia, though very indignant with us, understood very clearly the part that was forced upon her, complained of it to England, and insisted that she should get Saxony instead of the Rhenish provinces, but in the end was compelled to accept what she was offered. Alexander saw through all these plans, at which he often smiled, and would willingly have helped us, but seeing us so obstinately and incomprehensibly allied to England and Austria, he drew back, expressing his contempt for our foolish policy.

In thus accumulating distrustful interests, and inimical states around us, the Congress of Vienna originated the policy of the Holy Alliance, which has ruled Europe for nearly half a century, a policy which its authors meant to be eternal, but which, like everything else, has yielded to the influence of time, for the kingdom of the Low Countries, founded on the union of two hostile peoples has been dissolved, and England, the obstinate enemy of revolutions, has learned to look upon them in another light, Savoy, after forty years of blind hostility to France, has suddenly returned to her old policy of making use of her, whilst Austria, oppressed by the burden of her Italian possessions, has resigned a part of them; a policy that has nearly passed away, as a natural consequence of its weakness, but which the jealousy of Europe, and the imprudence of France might revive at any time, and which it is the interest of both to terminate, for with regard to Europe, this policy has the bad effect of making her neglect all her interests for one—that of checking us, and has made her in some sense the adversary of human progress, the

patroness of antiquated abuses, and not unfrequently the protectress of bad governments, and above all, by this policy, she procures for demagoguery the powerful aid of France; a policy no less injurious to France, whom it isolates, whom it condemns to permanent opposition to Europe, by seeing her most legitimate plans rejected merely because they are hers, whom it leaves without allies either in peace or war, and makes the accomplice of demagoguery, and the terror instead of the admiration of the world; a policy which it would be sin and madness in her to retort, by alarming Europe, and compelling all nations to seek their safety in uniting against us!

Indeed, this policy was quite natural at the epoch of which we speak. It was the necessary result of a long and fearful struggle, and we must not be too severe in reproving the diplomatists, who believed they were only using a legitimate means of defence when they built up this antagonistic policy against France. Nor must we forget that those who directed the Congress, though enemies of France, and especially of the revolution, against which they had struggled for twenty-five years, were now carried away by a violent reaction, which, however, they endeavoured to restrain within certain limits. In many things they had acted very wisely, for, after all, they were the greatest men of their age, the most skilful and the most enlightened, and though at the head of the counter-revolution, they were much more rational than the counter-revolutionists of Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, or France. As it was in their power to restrain the counter-revolutionists of Switzerland, they did so, and not being able to do more than advise those of Spain and France, they gave them excellent counsels. In fine, though each of the FOUR listened only to the dictates of national ambition when boundaries were to be traced, still they have left in the treaties on the abolition of slavery, and the freedom of river navigation principles, worthy of the French revolution, of which they were by birth and duty the inflexible opponents.

Now that we have spoken of victorious Europe, and of the manner in which she acted at Vienna, let us speak of ourselves and of our government, and endeavour to pronounce a just judgment on both.

Three opportunities occurred, by which the fate of France might have been decided: the armistice of the 23rd of April, the treaty of peace on the 30th of May, and at the Congress of Vienna.

Unpopularity has long lain, and still lies heavily upon the armistice of the 23rd of April, when the French negotiator abandoned, as was said, with *a stroke of his pen*, all the great fortresses of Europe, and an immense war *matériel*. This unpopularity, whose weight fell on M. de Talleyrand and the Count



d'Artois, we consider quite undeserved. A wild and unanimous cry demanded the evacuation of the French territory; this cry, extracted by suffering, was uttered without reflection. Whatever might have been done, the allied troops could not retire in less than two months, and in that time peace might be signed, and in fact was signed. The armistice ought to have been deferred until the conclusion of peace, an arrangement that might have been easily effected, as warfare had ceased, and then some compensation might have been obtained for the surrender of the European fortresses. But the cry that demanded the evacuation of our territory was so natural and so strong that it was not in human nature to resist, and more than excusable to yield to it. Now, demanding the evacuation of our territory, necessarily originated the demand that we should evacuate the foreign territories, of which we were still in possession, the one naturally induced the other. It may be answered, that in giving up Magdeburg, Hamburg, Texel, Breda, and Berg-op-Zoom, we might have kept Antwerp, Luxembourg, and Mayence. Had we made the attempt, the negotiators on the other side would have considered it a proof of our secret intention of preserving the line of the Rhine, to which they never would consent. The passionate desire for the evacuation of the French territory naturally induced the evacuation of foreign possessions, and the armistice of the 23rd of April was the inevitable consequence. The popular cry which condemned this armistice, after having imperatively called for it, is utterly unjust, and in equity we are bound to absolve the prince and the negotiator who signed it.

The armistice once signed, there was no need of treating immediately of peace even at Paris, nor of adding the precipitation of a definite treaty to the precipitation of the armistice. At Paris, our adversaries were united for our spoliation; at Vienna they might quarrel over the spoils. We ought, therefore, to have awaited the opening of Congress before deciding our fate. There was no occasion to hurry, as the armistice had made every one's position bearable. Blood no longer flowed; the powers had got possession of the fortresses they had so much desired; the Prussians had Magdebourg, the English, Antwerp, and the Germans Luxembourg and Mayence. We were restricted to the frontier of 1790, and therefore this delay could not arouse any prejudice in our favour. Besides, as the powers could not decide separately on the fate of any of their colleagues, they could not adopt a different conduct with regard to us. This so-much-blamed armistice restored us 300,000 men, which gave us a power of action, and our refusal to sign would have stopped all further proceedings. What we now assert is proved by the fact, that once the fortresses were restored, the coalition negotiators were no longer so eager to conclude. Alas! it was we who were

eager, and that from want of foresight, General Dessoles being the only person in the council who saw the advantage of our coming to Vienna free of all engagements; and, in the second place, we erred through impatience—impatience to sign, announce, and celebrate a peace which constituted the essential title, glory, and merit of the Bourbons.

It was through these combined causes—want of foresight and impatience—after the first excusable error of too hastily signing the armistice of the 23rd of April, that we committed a second, which was wholly inexcusable. We concluded a treaty of peace at Paris, whilst our adversaries were still united, instead of signing it at Vienna, where they would have inevitably been divided.

The peace of Paris being signed, it would have been very difficult at Vienna to make any change in our fate. Still every chance was not lost, provided we did not side too hastily with either of the two parties who were about to portion out Europe, and not add to the weighty chain of the treaty of Paris the still heavier shackles of immature decisions. There was no need of haste in the choice to be made between those powers, whose dissensions were already evident. On one side we had Russia and Prussia eager to get Poland and Saxony at any price, and even willing to relinquish their hostility to us, provided we forwarded their views; and on the other, England and Austria, whose only object was to shackle us, and unite all Europe in opposition to us. Under these circumstances, it is evident that we ought not to have hesitated in our choice; for if Posen and Dresden involved European interests, the Scheldt, the Rhine, and the Alps presented an interest exclusively French. The conduct of Saxony at Leipsic, and of Europe at Paris, justified us in preferring our own interest to that of others. And supposing that we ought to have been equally distrustful of all these opposing ambitions, that very circumstance ought to have rendered us more cautious in coming to a decision. Had M. de Talleyrand been less impatient, when he arrived at Vienna, to make a choice, whose merit was very doubtful, or to announce the principle of legitimacy so dogmatically; had he not been so eager to assume a part in important affairs, which was eventually sure to fall to him; had he contented himself with saying, with all that disconcerting phlegm which he possessed in so high a degree, that as France had been treated without any consideration, or rather deceived, in the May of 1814, when she had been promised an increase of territory and population, that was afterwards refused,—she was now at liberty to seek only her own interest; that her ambition should no longer disturb the world, but that when the world should be disturbed by the ambition of others, she would choose the part consonant

with her own policy. And having declared these sentiments, France might have waited until her assistance should be sought (as it infallibly would have been) by the divided parties. France's position would have been thus considerably changed. Alexander and Frederick William were so earnest and so anxious, they would have offered anything; and as the Rhine, the Scheldt, and the Alps, involved only English and Austrian interests, they would have made any concession we desired in that direction, and the largeness of their offers would have been proportioned to our slowness in coming to a decision. Had the dispute led to war, there is no doubt but that we might have got a part, at least, of the left bank of the Rhine. On the other hand, if matters did not go so far as war, Austria and England, alarmed at seeing us united to Russia and Prussia, would have been obliged to yield to the pretensions of the latter, and we should have thus obtained, without war, a better result than we did; for Saxony, instead of Prussia, would have been our neighbour on the Rhine, where she would have succeeded the complaisant, accommodating, and much-regretted ecclesiastical electors of Mayence, of Treves, and of Cologne, who were formerly our neighbours, and whose place is now occupied by the most military powers of the Confederation—Bavaria and Prussia. Thus, whatever followed, war or peace, our fate would have been better. Had war been the result, we should have had a chance of a better frontier; had peace succeeded, more tranquil neighbours. But it was not so. The Cabinet of Paris, without unity or foresight, considered only what was immediately before its eyes; whilst Louis XVIII., intellectual but absent-minded, and quite indifferent to foreign policy, looked upon intervention in foreign affairs as a sad legacy bequeathed by Napoleon. He consequently left M. de Talleyrand full freedom of action, having perfect confidence in his skill, experience, and the influence he exercised in European diplomacy. When the latter arrived at Vienna, determined to support the principle of legitimacy, he found the FOUR determined to decide everything between themselves, which so irritated him, that he placed himself at the head of the small German Courts, who flattered him by the eagerness with which they sought his aid, and he was thus compelled to become the defender of Saxony. He joined England and Austria, who were firmly resolved to confine us to the terms of the treaty of Paris, against Russia and Prussia, who would willingly have made us some concessions; whilst he loudly declared that France wanted nothing for herself—nothing but the triumph of principle, that is of legitimacy.

Henceforth there was no chance of making any important alteration in our fate. We were, undoubtedly, in very good company when we joined England and Austria; but the society

of Russia and Prussia was not to be despised. But the greatest advantage we could hope from this alliance would be to commence a fresh war with Russia and Prussia; and this, that Austria should obtain the entire of Italy; that England should have Malta, Corfu, the Cape, and the Mauritius; that the kingdoms of the Low Countries and Piedmont should stand like great fortresses at our very gates; that Prussia and Austria, separated by Saxony, might have less cause of mutual jealousy; that Russia should be less contiguous to Germany; and if we conquered in the service of our masters, we should enjoy the advantage of still remaining bound by the treaties of 1815! Truly, considering the benefits to be obtained, it was not worth while to risk the advantages of the lately-concluded peace.

But this is not all: even taking the part we did, which assuredly was not the wisest, we ought not to have been so eager in offering our aid; we ought at least to have waited until we were asked. But, stung to the quick, M. de Talleyrand committed the error least consonant with his character—he was too precipitate. It is certain that had he waited, he would soon have been admitted to the discussion of the most important affairs, and, in short, enjoyed all the consideration due to the representative of France. But he became a solicitor, instead of being solicited, as he ought to have been; and whilst offering the aid of 150,000 French, he appeared in the light of one who was asking instead of conferring a favour. And he consented, unconditionally, that in case of war, France should remain bound by the treaty of Paris. In his impatience to acquire importance in the eyes of the great Powers, he forgot to stipulate for the expulsion of Murat, the only question in which Louis XVIII. took an interest; and had not Murat himself furnished an excuse for his dethronement, the sovereigns would have quitted Vienna without coming to a decision on the Neapolitan question. M. de Talleyrand was an able negotiator; dignified, haughty, and endowed with admirable readiness of reply, when called upon to reprove the sallies of pride-swollen conquerors; but he was less a far-seeing politician than a skilful negotiator; and M. de Talleyrand committed the error, after having too hastily signed the peace at Paris, of forming his resolves too quickly at Vienna, and having come to a determination, he decided in favour of the powers from whom we had nothing to hope, and against those who might have ameliorated our condition; and in making this choice, he asked no other recompense than the honour of gratuitously serving his new allies, to secure the triumph of what was at that time called the principle of legitimacy. Undoubtedly, if under ordinary circumstances, and in the normal state of things, with Europe in a state of profound tranquillity, when each Sovereign would have found himself

in a position consonant with the spirit of the times and of existing treaties; if, under such circumstances, it was proposed to suppress a kingdom like Saxony, even though that suppression ensured the greatest advantages to France, justice and sound policy would have induced us to oppose such an act; for every political convulsion which is not inevitable, every territorial dispossession which is not counselled by the strictest equity or by the irresistible course of events, is inhuman, imprudent, and dangerous; and M. de Talleyrand, in defending the cause of Saxony, would have served at the same time the cause of justice and sound policy.

But amid the wreck of the ancient order of things, at a moment when the fate of no kingdom of Europe was decided, when all were in suspense, and each sought aggrandizement in the spoils taken from France, at a moment when the Continental Powers, after having swallowed up Poland, felt no scruple in devouring Venice, Genoa, the free cities, the intermediary German princes, a moment when England seized upon every important maritime position on the globe, when the lesser States were not less eager for spoils than the great, a moment in short when self was the predominant thought, it was surely at such a time lawful for France to think of herself, and not limit her entire policy to the conservation of a German State, in which no other power took an interest, and which had forfeited all title to France's protection. Under other circumstances, the policy of defending Saxony would have been not only the most generous, but the most prudent. But at an epoch when all established rights and treaties succumbed during a fearful war of two and twenty years duration, and when all were about to be re-established on a new basis, M. de Talleyrand neglected the interests of France too much in advocating the cause of Saxony, and his conduct which would have been otherwise inexplicable, can only be attributed to his impatience to play an important part and loudly defend a principle. But the sovereigns assembled at Vienna, could not believe him serious, for the Austrian, English, and French diplomatists who so warmly defended this principle at Dresden, sacrificed it at Vienna, Genoa, Malta, Stockholm, and in a hundred German principalities.

Thus twice within two years, the fate of France was decided by the most frivolous motives. At Prague in 1813, Napoleon had it in his power to secure to France an extent of territory, greater than was even desirable for her solid greatness, but blinded by an insensate ambition, he neglected the opportunity! And the Bourbons in 1814, neglected an opportunity of recovering some fragments of our lost greatness, and this through impatience to proclaim a peace, on which they based their principal title to popularity, as well as through want of reflection,

want of experience, and a desire to uphold and see others uphold a principle that flattered their pride of birth. Sad fate of our country, after having been tossed by the storms of a fierce revolution, to find herself sometimes dependent on the whim of one man, sometimes on the blunder of a faction. Fortunately material greatness is not everything, and France has by her moral greatness recovered the position of which events had deprived her. But in casting a glance over the desolating scenes we have described, let us pour forth a prayer that there may be at length established in France, a political system of government, which, regardless of dynastic or party interests, unmoved by the passion of the hour, without a dominant taste for either peace or war, in short free from all predilections, guided solely by state reasons, and having no other object in the direction of public affairs than the safety and prosperity of the country. May the Almighty deign to accord us this blessing, and France will then enjoy what she has never possessed, at least enduringly, a position proportioned to her intelligence, to her valour, and the torrents of blood she has shed.

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